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Abstract 
 
The term ‘consumption experience’ has become ubiquitous in 
marketing and consumer research circles. In this thesis I question 
the appropriateness of this canonical term. In its stead I employ the 
non-dualistic term ‘experiaction’, coined by an ecological 
psychologist, which points to the functional inseparability of 
experiencing and actions. 
 
I adopt a field-theoretical, phenomenologically-informed, 
perspective, whilst participating in, analysing, and writing about ten 
video-recorded research conversations. Likewise I address the 
various spin-off texts deriving from the initial conversations, such as 
transcripts and viewing-logs. I show that ‘field’-embedded 
individuals notice and act on many aspects of their immediate 
micro-environments, including their own intra-personal goings-on 
and expressive outputs.  
 
Through data analysis I identify five categories of regulable 
variables that an individual can act on as s/he seeks to regulate 
his/her sensing, relative to his/her reference value(s). Seen through 
this cybernetic lens, momentary human being comprises of a 
cyclical, ongoing process of self-regulation, in which individuals 
 ii 
expediently employ and/or modify accessible resources and goings-
on, in the service of seeking to actualise their currently-preferred, 
or expected, states-of-being, and to minimise unwelcome deviations 
therefrom.  
 
This thesis challenges the prevalent notion that when people 
consume particular products/services these offerings sponsor 
offering-dedicated experiences - what some people describe as 
‘consumption experiences’.  The concept of experiaction, in 
contrast, comprises of an ongoing interaction between a person and 
his/her micro-environment, in which the individual attends to, and 
acts on, whichever aspect(s) of his/her 360°-‘inner’-‘outer’-‘field’ 
become(s) momentarily salient to him/her, within the parameters 
imposed by his/her currently-sustained reference value(s). 
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Preface 
 
Given the atypical manner in which I undertook and presented this 
research project, I have written this preface to explain to 
prospective readers the kind of reasoning that informed how I 
approached the research as a whole. 
 
Near the beginning of my project I read several books written by 
Fritz Perls - a co-founder of Gestalt therapy - with a view to finding 
out how best to explore human experiencing.  Perls stresses the 
here-and-now immediacy of the Gestalt approach - how human 
experiencing always unfolds in the unstoppable present moment. 
 
As I reviewed the consumption-related literature, it gradually 
dawned on me that what consumer researchers call ‘consumption 
experiences’ emerge as consumers encounter some combination of 
commercial and non-commercial phenomena.  Whilst eating in a 
restaurant, for example, any conversing that accompanies the meal, 
contributes to what the diners experience whilst eating. We can 
think of the speaking, itself, as a creative/productive act that 
involves a consumptive (listening) aspect.  Thus a person’s act of 
speaking-whilst-dining contributes to what s/he, and other 
participants, experience(s) at that juncture.  Surely, then, to call 
what people experience in a restaurant ‘consumption experiences’ 
constitutes, at best, a one-sided characterization?  
 
This way of thinking, in time, led me to abandon the term 
‘consumption experience’ and to instead adopt the non-dualistic 
term ‘experiaction’ - a neologism that points to the functional 
inseparability of what we experience and what we do.  By combining 
experiaction with the Gestalt-derived here-and-now perspective, I 
arrived at the even-more-inclusive term ‘experiaction-in-situ’.  In 
 xiv 
contexts involving interacting beings we can augment the term still 
further, hence ‘inter-experiaction-in-situ’.   
 
Watching a movie, as part of the research process, constituted 
experiaction that involved watching, listening, sensing, and note-
making. When I subsequently read the notes-I’d-made-whilst-
watching-the-movie, I again experiacted in this new note-reading 
scenario, making a second set of notes as I read.  By documenting 
during-research ‘goings-on’, at successive stages of the research, I 
regularly encountered fresh experiaction-triggering ‘data’. My thesis 
takes the form that it does, then, not least because I endeavoured 
to include, within it, representations of the multi-layered 
experiaction briefly described here.   
 
The thesis documents an exploratory, learning-by-doing, process, 
during which I attempted to arrive at an aesthetically pleasing and 
philosophically consistent presentational style.  Towards the end of 
the project I had come to view the thesis-writing itself as the 
preeminent experiactional process. The thesis-writing - like the 
restaurant scenario mentioned earlier - combined creative action 
with ongoing, evaluative, receptivity to the created ‘material’.  I 
could then, if I chose to, immediately alter what I had written, in 
the light of my ongoing appraisal of it.  Amatucci (2013, p. 242) 
wrote:  
 
 In traditional qualitative research, data is conceived as an 
 object on which the researcher acts.  Whether that object fits 
 into a traditional category - an interview transcript, field notes 
 - or a transgressive category - a dream or memory - data are 
 still nouns, things to be apprehended by the senses.  In my 
 postqualitative work, data are not entities, not nouns subject 
 to process.  Instead a process - writing - is the data. 
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Although I stopped short of eschewing conventional data wholesale, 
I did seek to broaden the scope of what might pass as research-
relevant, by including a diverse sample of what I noticed (and how I 
acted) whilst researching.     
 
To recap; what I wrote contributed to what I momentarily 
experienced whilst writing. The nature of that momentary 
experiencing, in turn, informed how I amended and/or developed 
the emerging text.    Rather than viewing data as a fixed ‘done-deal’ 
- a ‘thing’ encountered and analysed - an experiactional view 
highlighted the way in which whatever I noticed, whilst 
encountering traditional data, constituted an aspect of my whilst-
encountering-traditional-data experiaction; whatever I ‘did’ at that 
stage formed the other, complementary, experiactional aspect. In 
this way I reconceptualised ‘consumption experiences’ as 
‘experiaction’ and then applied this experiactional-way-of-thinking 
to what we ordinarily think of as ‘data collection’ and ‘data analysis’.  
 
In a nutshell, this meant that I moved away from thinking in terms 
of the ‘consumption OF something or other’ - such as an audio-
visual recording or a transcript - and towards focusing on the 
‘experiaction that occurred WHILST engaging with such 
phenomena’.  What one experiences and does WHILST engaging 
with, say, research notes, exceeds simply an experience OF those 
notes.  You will note that an ‘experience OF’ demands a specific 
focal ‘object’ (something ‘consumed’), whereas the ‘experiacting-
WHILST’ perspective posits a relation of concomitance between 
experiencing, acting, objects, and scenarios.  To experiact WHILST, 
say, watching a movie, entails all that one experiences and does at 
that particular time-place, in relation to a host of noticeable 
particulars.  This type of thinking, more than anything else, 
accounts for the somewhat unconventional document before you. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
This thesis focuses on human being, which, as we all know, entails 
(a) experiencing and feeling, and (b) acting/behaving.  Rolf von 
Eckartsberg (a psychologist) coined the term ‘experiaction’ to 
describe, in a unitary fashion, the inseparable twin roles of 
experiencing and acting (von Eckartsberg 1978, p. 200-201).  In 
the consumer research and marketing domains the term 
‘consumption experience’ has become ubiquitous.  Consumer 
researchers and marketers talk, for example, in terms of 
“experiential consumption” (Holbrook and Hirschman 1982, p. 135) 
and “customer experience” (Carbone and Haeckel   1994).  And, as 
an indicator of how the tendency has spread, I recently read an 
article on the “student experience” (Butterworth 2013, p. 10). 
 
Five years ago I set out with a view to studying people’s 
‘consumption experiences’.  I soon recognised the difficulty, though, 
of trying to isolate the parts of a person’s full-blown experiencing 
that we can attribute to the products/services consumed, from 
those aspects of the same full-blown experiencing which do not 
derive from the product-/service-use.  It seemed to me that 
whatever happens during the consumption of a product/service 
gets, nominally, co-opted into the overarching ‘consumption 
experience’.  In effect, the designated product or service, whether a 
ballpoint pen or a meal out, becomes the phenomenon from whence 
any concurrently-experienced goings-on take their name - the 
‘ballpoint-pen-using experience’ or the ‘eating-out experience’ for 
example.   One may think of this as a product-/service-centric 
orientation, since the product or service used comes to rule the, 
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proverbial, roost - at least in terms of how one describes a 
particular experiential episode. 
 
I adopted what has become known as a ‘field theoretical’ orientation 
(Parlett 1997).  This involved thinking of people as contextualised 
beings who may, moment-by-moment, alight on (or attend to) any 
aspect of the 360°-‘inner’-‘outer’-‘field’ that they co-constitute.  
Thus when, say, watching a movie, a person may momentarily 
focus on inner-self indigestion just as readily as on the movie 
screen. Seen from this perspective, what a person experiences, 
from moment-to-moment, will depend on what s/he attends to, as 
well as his/her manner of attending.  I found it increasingly 
untenable to talk and write in terms of ‘consumption experiences’. I 
could not see how a designated object-of-consumption, say a tin of 
soup, could single-handedly sponsor a so-called ‘consumption 
experience’.  As I wrote earlier, it seemed clear to me that non-
commercial phenomena would contribute to the full-blown 
experiencing that one sustains at any given point in time.   
 
Viewing experience and action as functionally inseparable, I began 
to ask why we don’t talk in terms of ‘production experiences’ as well 
as ‘consumption experiences’.  Indeed, some marketing scholars do 
talk in terms of ‘prosumption’ - the fusion of production and 
consumption (Xie et al 2008, p. 116).  I considered this option, but 
the term ‘prosumption’, for me, strongly connotes commercialism.   
By adopting the term ‘experiaction’ I avoided an overtly commercial 
characterisation of human being.  
 
By the time I embarked on my video-recorded research 
conversations, in July 2011, I had long since rejected the term 
‘consumption experiences’. As far back as 23rd October 2009 I 
drafted an article called, “Anyone would Think that Consumption 
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Experiences Actually Exist”.  To summarise, I rejected the notion of 
‘consumption experiences’ because: (a) the term nominally leaves 
out the non-commercial aspects of any human experiencing; (b) 
human experiencing inescapably entails a behavioural dimension, 
thus in some cases (perhaps many cases) the term ‘production’ (or 
still better ‘creation’) more accurately describes what human being 
entails; and (c) I felt uncomfortable characterising human 
experiencing as ‘consumption experiences’.    
 
Given my field-theoretical outlook, it would have seemed 
inappropriate to have focused my research efforts on people’s 
responses to a particular product or service, such as a movie.  As I 
said earlier, even whilst watching a movie a person will attend 
dynamically to different parts of his/her 360°-‘inner’-‘outer’-‘field’.  
And so I set the video camera rolling and initiated conversations 
without a predetermined topic.  I did this on the premise that, as 
with other types of conversations, the individual participants 
(including me) would follow their moment-to-moment interests.  I 
took the view that this dynamic selection process, itself, constitutes 
an interesting and indicative phenomenon.     
 
I amassed around 18½-hours-worth of audio-visual recordings, 
having conversed with ten different individuals.  Ironically, the 
resultant audio-visual recordings would have made good candidates 
for the category of ‘consumable texts’ - which sponsor ‘consumption 
experiences’ when viewed - had I chosen to go down that route.  
But, as I said, I had already ruled out this orientation.  However, 
during a, subsequently published, email exchange that I initiated 
with a distinguished marketing professor (Woodward and Holbrook 
2013), it became apparent that what the professor called 
‘consumption experiences’ exactly coincided with what I, at that 
time, called ‘full-blown human experiencing’.  To the professor the 
 4 
terminology used mattered only in relation to the perceived 
marketing-domain-relevance of one’s work.  Thus, a ‘consumption 
experience’ - as an ‘object’-of-study - sits more comfortably within 
the domain of ‘consumer research’ than does ‘full-blown human 
experiencing’ (or ‘experiacting’).  In the case of the latter, then, the 
relevance of one’s work may come into question - even though one 
may study the ‘same’ underlying phenomenon. 
 
However, in calling human experiaction ‘consumption experiences’, 
I consider the labelling issue more than simply a matter of 
professional expedience.  Indeed, a ‘consumption experience’ 
characterisation of human being can have consequences in terms of 
how individuals think of themselves and other people. Arguably, 
once we begin to think in terms of self-as-consumable-product and 
others as consumables, something profound has occurred in the 
way human beings relate to themselves and others 
 
And so, my personal avoidance of using the term ‘consumption 
experience’ [whenever I use it I put it in inverted commas to 
indicate that I do not accept it as a naturalized, unproblematic 
term] constitutes a political act on my part.  Although I do not 
participate in party politics, I happen to think that the politics of 
language-use does matter, and has implications both personal and 
social.  
 
I’ve spent the last few years, then, problematizing what I now see 
as the expedient rebranding of an important aspect of human being.  
I view human subjectivity as one of the few regions of the world 
that doesn’t have commercial sponsors and publically-seen logos 
emblazoned on it. In a small way I have made a stand against the 
colonization of the human realm by ‘commercial speak’.  Some 
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would consider that battle already lost, but one does what one 
must. 
 
1.2  Outline of Thesis 
 
You will find a detailed literature review, [Chapter 2] in which I 
explore the origins of the notion of ‘consumption experiences’.  In 
the marketing, and consumer research, literature I found warrant 
for treating human interaction, itself, as a form of one-to-one 
marketing (Bagozzi 1975, 1977).  By looking at my thesis through a 
consumer researcher’s eyes one will see how everything I have 
written, more-or-less, relates to marketing and consumer research. 
However, my philosophical/methodological approach (field-
theoretical, phenomenologically-informed) [Chapter 3] ushered me 
toward a here-and-now/moment-by-moment orientation, and, as 
I’ve said, a potentially ‘field’-wide level of focus. My data analysis 
thus began with a systematic documentation of what I noticed 
whilst watching the audio-visual recordings of the research 
conversations that I had participated in [Chapter 4].   
 
During my studies I unexpectedly encountered cybernetic theory - a 
term that used to connote, for me, such things as computers and 
Robocop (1987).  However, in cybernetic theory I found the central 
model for my thesis - a model that links perceiving and behaving in 
a manner that corresponds with the linking of experience and action 
in ‘experiaction’, mentioned earlier.  On the back of this discovery I 
realised that the phenomena that I had noticed during data analysis 
- what I, at that time, called ‘homeostasis’ -  fitted hand-in-glove 
with the cybernetic  model of negative feedback (Powers 1973, p. 
252). [Chapter 5]    
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I then identified five variables - ‘access’, ‘configuration’, ‘levels’, 
‘association’, and ‘expression’ - that people may act on whilst 
experiacting. [Chapters 6-10]  Thus the cybernetic model that I 
adopted (and subsequently customised) potentially relates to every 
moment of everyone’s daily living.  For example, I lock my door 
when going to bed, thus regulating ‘access’ to my apartment; this 
engenders, within me, a sense of safety-from-intruders. I arrange 
piles of academic papers on the unused half of my double bed 
(‘configuration’); this facilitating ergonomic accessibility to the 
articles.  I open all the bedroom curtains during the day to ensure a 
maximum amount of natural daylight (‘levels’); this facilitates eye-
strain-free reading and writing.  I buy a reputable brand of 
flavoured spring water (‘association’); I thus reduce the risk of a 
stomach upset in the final days before summiting my thesis.  And, 
finally, I select, moment-by-moment, what I express (‘expression’) 
and how to express it (‘configuration’); in this way I manage my 
authorial voice.  In short, momentary being comprises of acting in 
conjunction with the five types of variables that I have just 
exemplified.  I devote a chapter to each of the variables mentioned 
above, although in life they intermingle. 
 
In addition to conducting the research conversations, one of my 
supervisors said that she would like to see how my approach to 
research might apply to a more conventional ‘consumption’ context. 
To this end I visited a cinema in Leeds - three times during the 
same weekend - to watch, and re-watch, David Cronenberg’s film 
Cosmopolis (2012).  You will find a chapter focused on and around 
those cinema visits. [Chapter 11] 
 
After summing up in relation to my five data chapters, I finally 
reveal my customised version of the cybernetic negative feedback 
loop. [Chapter 12]  I use it as a means of theorising the notion of 
 7 
‘experiaction’.  You will find more rudimentary versions of the 
negative feedback loop diagram at strategic points earlier in the 
thesis.  In spite of the mechanistic terminology, the cybernetic 
model strikes me as eminently human in it implications.  By 
rebranding the customised cybernetic model as ‘experiaction’ I hope 
to assuage unwelcome reactions that the term ‘cybernetics’ might 
otherwise trigger within some people.  
 
In my concluding chapter, [Chapter 13] just when theoretical 
parsimony may have dictated an exclusive focus on the 
experiactional model, I reopen a can of worms opened briefly at the 
end of my methodology chapter.  I believe that this so-called 
adverbial theory has a bearing on, what Ariely and Norton (2009, p. 
477) call, “psychological consumption”.  This putative consumption 
of thoughts and feelings constitutes just the point at which I part 
company with the consumption metaphor.  I present this adverbial 
way of thinking as a taster, and as a possible avenue for future 
research.  
 
1.3  Concluding - Limitations and Contribution 
 
I have worked in a ‘soft’ area of research, in a theoretically-
warranted, touchy-feely manner. When I say that I noticed 
something or other, no one can decisively discredit my testimony.  
Much, then, hinges on my good faith as a researcher.  As a reader 
you will gauge the authenticity and value of my account, and 
evaluate my contribution accordingly.     
 
What do I hope to have contributed?  Well, I have sought to 
produce a readable, carefully-argued, substantiated, candid, and 
sustained account of a project that brought into question one of the 
staple concepts in marketing, and consumer research. The 
 8 
alternative-to-‘consumption-experiences’ model that I posit 
positions consuming as just one of the many activities that humans 
engage in. On the downside, some may feel I have not stayed close 
enough to the ‘data’.  But in experiacting from moment-to-moment, 
and addressing the most salient-to-me issues as they arose - 
relative to my ‘reference values’ - I have lived the model that I here 
espouse.  In doing so I feel that I have stayed as close to my 
(phenomenological) here-and-now ‘data’ as possible. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introducing the Review 
 
In this review I begin by discussing products and brands, along with 
the mental images and concomitant experiences that products and 
brands contribute to.  The widening definition as to what constitutes 
a product or a service has led some academics to question whether 
we can indeed maintain a tenable distinction between commercial 
and non-commercial aspects of life.  
 
I go on to demonstrate that the concepts underpinning marketing 
have, according to some specified people, a universal applicability.  
These people suggest that the processes and techniques of 
marketing equate with the more general processes of identification, 
persuasion, and, ultimately, interactions and exchanges in which 
individuals and groups seek to proffer and receive ‘offerings’ and 
‘services’ which other individuals and groups find valuable in some 
way or other.  This ‘value’ primarily manifests as the (hopefully) 
affirmative experiences that people host during exposure to (or use 
of) multifarious ‘value propositions’. In the light of the blurring 
between commercially- and non-commercially oriented goings-on, I 
begin to question the use of the term ‘consumption experience’, 
even in consumer research. 
   
2.2 Product/Brand Image 
 
2.2.1 Product/Brand Distinction 
 
 Products are made in the factory […] but brands are made in 
 the mind.  
 
 10 
 
 
    - Walter Landor, quoted in Klein   
    (2000, p. 195) 
 
 In the factory we make cosmetics, in the store we sell hope.  
    
    - Charles Revson quoted in Collins and  
    Skover (1996, p. 73) 
 
 
The opening quotations cast products as ‘material’ and brands as 
‘mental’.  Similarly, Bullmore (1984, p. 236) writes, “A product can 
usually be assessed objectively: by Which?, for example.  A brand 
can be assessed only subjectively: does this object or service please 
me?”  However, Gardner and Levy (1955, p. 34) include 
‘institutional figures’ and ‘ideas’ in their list of phenomena which 
they define as products.  Kotler and Levy (1969a, p. 12) augmented 
Gardner and Levy’s list to include people in general - including the 
‘self’.  Kotler (1972, p. 51) extended the list still further to include 
‘places’ as consumable products.  More recently, Addis and Holbrook 
(2001, p. 64) encouraged us to view phenomena such as: the 
Internet, household pets, and even planets, as consumable 
products.  Table 2.1 shows this broadening of what we classify as 
products, as   seen   by   some   prominent academics.  Clearly we 
have now moved beyond the notion of products as simply factory-
made phenomena.   
 
Gardner and Levy (1955, p. 34) include ‘brands’ in their list of 
products. In like manner, Keller (1998, p. 4) states: 
 
 A brand is a product, then, but one that adds other 
 dimensions to differentiate it in some way from other products 
 designed to satisfy the same need. 
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               Table 2.1 Types of Products 
 
And Prahalad and Ramaswamy (2004, p. 13) write, “The experience 
is the brand.  The brand is co-created and evolves with 
experiences.”  For them the experience that a person has whilst 
consuming an offering “is” the brand.  This definition flies in the 
face of the definition of the term ‘brand’ given by the American 
Marketing Association and quoted in Keller (1998, p. 2).  It defines 
the term ‘brand’ as a: 
 
 […] name, term, sign, symbol, or design, or a combination of 
 them  intended to identify the goods and services of one seller 
 or group of  sellers and to differentiate them from those of 
 competition. 
 
According to this definition, a brand comprises of the ‘elements’ 
[extended by Keller (1998, p. 131) to include: names, logos, 
symbols, characters, packaging, slogans, and jingles] which identify 
and differentiate particular goods and services from other similar 
offerings.  In the light of this definition, a brand, necessarily, 
comprises of the palpable aspects of an offering.  If a consumer can 
not perceive/register any identifying characteristics or 
differentiating features, when addressing a branded offering, then 
the brand has not fulfilled its primary functions, of identification and 
differentiation.  It soon becomes apparent that seeking to 
distinguish between the terms ‘product’ and ‘brand’ may prove 
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problematic.  However, as Luck (1974, p. 72) wrote, “Let us plunge 
further into marketing’s semantic jungle”.   
 
Some authors do not distinguish between the terms ‘brand’ and 
‘brand image’.  Indeed, when I contacted Professor Ramaswamy, in 
relation to his aforementioned co-quote, and asked him, “Do you 
use the terms ‘brand’ and ‘brand image’ synonymously?”, he 
replied, “So yes, in that sense the brand and brand image are 
synonymous although it begs the question ‘what is a brand’ and 
‘who defines it’?”1  So when Prahalad and Ramaswamy (2004, p. 
13) wrote “The experience is the brand.” They could [according to 
Ramaswamy’s email to me] equally have written, ‘The experience is 
the brand image’.  Similarly Moore (2002, p. 44) wrote, “Your brand 
must become your customer experience, and your customer 
experience must become your brand.”  Thus the brand, according to 
this quote, takes the form of a person’s experience whist s/he 
engages with an offering. In terms of Luck’s aforesaid (1974) 
marketing-as-a-semantic-jungle metaphor, it does not seem so 
useful to venture into the jungle and ‘simply’ describe the 
entanglements found therein.  One hopes, perhaps, to find or create 
a clearing. In this regard Dobni and Zinkhan (1990, pp. 110-111) 
note: 
 
 As a point of clarification, it should be noted that in many of 
 the works on this subject, [of brand image] authors have 
 tended to use the word ‘product’ interchangeably with 
 ‘brand’. While it is acknowledged that in marketing there is 
 normally an important difference between these two 
 concepts, the writings on imagery have blurred this 
 distinction  by using both terms in the context of 
 distinguishing one competitor’s product from another. These 
 terms are similarly used here (as synonyms), unless 
 otherwise stated. 
                                                 
1 Ramaswamy, V. (2008), Email to M. N. Woodward, “Re: Brand or Brand image?”, 
21/08/2008. 
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Although Dobni and Zinkhan allude to an “important difference 
between these two concepts” [‘product’ and ‘brand’] they do not 
spell out this difference.  And, as I have shown in my opening salvo 
of quotations, the distinction between the terms ‘product’ and 
‘brand’ seems less than straightforward.   
 
As seen in Table 2.1, certain authors have sought to popularise an 
increasingly expansive definition of what constitutes a product.  For 
example, Kotler (1972, p. 47) wrote, “A product is something that 
has value to someone. Whether a charge is made for its 
consumption is an incidental rather than essential feature defining 
value.” More recently Shepherd (2005) sought to encourage 
marketing academics to apply themselves to the notion of ‘personal 
branding’, which he defines as (p. 589), “[…] applying to people the 
same marketing and branding principles originally developed for 
products and corporations […]”.  He goes on (p. 590) to credit 
Peters (1997) with having “virtually invented” the notion of personal 
branding. 
 
By viewing each party in a social interaction as a product (in this 
broadened sense) one can treat the verbal and non-verbal 
behaviour of each party as contributing to  the overall  ‘value 
proposition’ (Vargo and Lusch 2004, p. 11), which inheres in a  
particular social context, and from which both parties derive positive 
and/or negative value.  Vargo and Lusch make the point that the 
vendor can only offer a proposition of value, not value per se.  Each 
consumer must generate his/her own value (positive and/or 
negative) by translating the ‘value proposition’ into a valued 
experience.  By viewing the ‘offering’ - comprising of what each 
vendor-consumer provides, along with any ‘incidentals’ or 
environmental ‘givens’ - we genuinely do enter into a realm of co-
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creation.  [See section 2.5.4 of this review] Thus, whilst authors 
may differ about the distinction between a product and a brand, this 
debate need not detain us further here, having registered an 
awareness of some of the features of this debate, and having found 
a precedent for viewing people, and their self-expression, as 
products amongst other products. 
 
2.2.2  ‘Image’ 
Just as confusion reigns in the literature regarding the distinction 
between the terms ‘product’ and ‘brand’, so the terms ‘product 
image’ and ‘brand image’ form part of a constellation of similar, but 
differently-named, concepts.  As Holbrook (1983, p. 1 of 11) wrote: 
 
 The terminology used to discuss product imagery might be 
 characterized as a sea of confusion, awash in such ill-defined 
 and overlapping concepts as ‘brand image,’ ‘product 
 positioning,’ ‘differentiation,’ ‘unique selling proposition,’ 
 ‘visual and imagery systems,’ ‘pictorial content,’ ‘creative 
 copy claims,’ ‘imagination,’ ‘customer benefits,’ and 
 ‘differential advantage.’  
 
Dobni and Zinkhan (1990, p. 111) delineate a set of concepts 
closely allied to the concept of ‘brand image’, but which have 
different labels/names: “symbolic unity”, “perceived product 
symbolism”, “brand personality”, “brand character”, “personality 
image”, “the social and psychological nature of products”, “brand 
meaning”, “psychological meaning”, and “the messages 
communicated by products”.  In an attempt to introduce a modicum 
of manageability into this review, let me return to Gardner and Levy 
(1955), the text that marketing lore positions as the one that 
introduced the concept of product/brand image. [See, for example: 
Dobni and Zinkhan (1990, p. 110), Barich and Kotler (1991, p. 95), 
and Levy (1999, p. 128).]  
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Gardner and Levy (1955, p. 35) write in terms of, “the attitudes and 
feelings which make up the image of a product and a brand.”  They 
go on to write (p. 39), “[…] a product image is the result of many 
varied experiences. They all make their contributions, for good or 
for bad […]” Thus, unlike Prahalad and Ramaswamy (2004), and 
Moore (2002), quoted in the last section 2.2.1, [who equate the 
brand image with the consumer’s experience whilst consuming an 
offering] Gardner and Levy (1955) define product/brand image as 
the accumulated effect of “many varied experiences”, culminating in 
a “body of associations”.  In this way Gardner and Levy characterise 
product/brand image as that which resides in consumers’ memories 
in relation to a particular product.  Akin to Gardner and Levy 
(1955), Reynolds and Gutman (1984, p. 29) adopt a definition of 
brand image which positions it as the, “stored meanings that an 
individual has in memory […]”.  This stands in marked contrast to 
viewing the product/brand image as a real-time experience.   
 
As stated by Dobni and Zinkhan (1990, p. 117), in their review 
article, the, “definition and operationalisation [of ‘brand image’] 
have been fairly irregular, although not without some patterns and 
commonalities.”  They go on to delineate the essential features of 
brand image (p. 118): 
 
 Brand image is the concept of a brand that is held by 
the consumer. 
 
 Brand image is largely a subjective and perceptual 
phenomenon that is formed through consumer 
interpretation, whether reasoned or emotional. 
 
 Brand image is not inherent in the technical, functional 
or physical concerns of the product. Rather, it is 
affected and moulded by marketing activities, by 
context variables, and by the characteristics of the 
perceiver. 
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 Where brand image is concerned, the perception of 
reality is more important than the reality itself. 
 
The reader will note that Dobni and Zinkhan’s summary accords 
with the sentiments (expressed and implied) in the quotations at 
the very beginning of this review - Klein (2000, p. 195), and Collins 
and Skover (1996, p. 73), “Products are made in the factory […]” 
etc., - except that Landor, the author of the first quote, uses the 
term ‘brand’ where Dobni and Zinkhan use the term ‘brand image’.  
  
Another important distinction comes into play when we consider 
whether the ‘images’, held-within (and experienced by) individual 
consumers, have enough in common to enable 
marketers/researchers to talk in terms of ‘the’ brand image, as 
against ‘an’ individual’s image of a brand.  Reynolds (1965, p. 75) 
makes the point that, because people differ in terms of their prior 
knowledge, their creativity, and what they choose to focus on whilst 
consuming an offering,: 
 
 […] images are statistical in nature.  Different people will have 
 different images of the same product; the number of people 
 with  a particular image is always a percentage and not the 
 total population. 
 
Bullmore (1984, pp. 236-237) makes the same point in a slightly 
different manner: 
 
 A brand’s image is what people think and feel about it: and 
 those thoughts and feelings will not - cannot - be universally 
 identical […] The image resides in the mind of the beholder - 
 and it is conditioned at least as much by the nature of that 
 beholder as by the nature of  the object itself. 
 
On the same topic Keller (1998, p. 49) writes: 
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 If someone asked you what came to mind when you thought 
 of Apple computers, what might you say?  […] The 
 associations that come to mind for you would make up your 
 brand image for Apple […] Different consumers might think of 
 different associations for Apple, although many associations 
 are likely to be shared by a majority of consumers.  In that 
 sense, we can refer to ‘the’ brand image of Apple, but, at the 
 same time, it must be recognized that this image may vary, 
 perhaps even quite considerably, depending on the particular 
 groups of consumers involved. 
 
The reader will note that, in this quote, Keller has implicitly adopted 
a definition of ‘brand image’ based on the mental associations that 
people have in their memories. Elsewhere (p. 93) Keller explicitly 
defines the term ‘brand image’ thus, “[…] perceptions about a brand 
as reflected by the brand associations held in consumer memory.”  
Here, again, we can see how one’s definition of a product/brand 
image informs one’s approach to researching/operationalising the 
phenomenon.  The reader will also note that Keller’s definition of 
the term ‘brand image’ focuses on mental/cognitive activities within 
consumers.  It thus tends to encourage an exploration of what 
comes to ‘mind’ rather than what occurs within the perceiver’s 
organism as a whole.  Furthermore, Keller assumes that, “many 
associations are likely to be shared by a majority of consumers.”  
This does not accord with Hirschman (1981), who found that, on 
average, only 50% of respondents coincided when stating their ‘top 
of the mind’ mental association for each of a number of product 
names. For movies the figure dropped to 23%, and rose to 88% in 
relation to dairy products. Thus Hirschman found that shared 
associations diminished for cultural products, such as movies and 
music, and increased for more-utilitarian goods, such as dairy 
products, and clothing.  She attributes this discrepancy to the 
relative complexity of cultural offerings, along with the more 
idiosyncratic concomitant construal thereof.  The quoted statistics 
relate to the percentage of respondents stating the same most-
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frequently-mentioned mental association in relation to each named 
product in the study.  
 
Given that Gardner and Levy’s (1955, p. 35) definition of the term 
‘product/brand image’ includes the, “ideas, feelings, and attitudes 
that consumers have about brands”, we can see that ‘feelings’ 
figured alongside ‘ideas and attitudes’ in their conception.  
Interestingly, Hirschman (1984, p. 115) writes:     
 
 Humans are endowed with two essential modes of 
 consumption - thinking and sensing. On a personal, subjective 
 level almost all acts which involve the consumption of 
 products have as their outcome the stimulation of our 
 thoughts and/or senses.  Viewed at this most abstract of 
 levels, consumption may be cast as the process which 
 provides the individual with cognitive and sensory 
 experiences. 
 
Thus Gardner and Levy’s (1955, p. 35) definition of product/brand 
image [“ideas, feelings, and attitudes”] accords with Hirschman’s 
(1984, p. 115) definition of experience [“thoughts and/or senses"].  
In other words, one may see Gardner and Levy’s original definition 
[viewed in the light of Hirschman (1984, p. 115)] as focusing on 
consumers’ ‘experiences’ of ‘a brand element(s)’ [name(s), logo(s), 
design(s) etc.].  Thus the original conception of product/brand 
image focused on the experiences [“ideas, feelings, and attitudes”] 
triggered within consumers through their exposure to brand 
elements during product use and research. Although the 
experience(s) hosted by consumers during actually consuming the 
branded offering itself (along with related adverts, and word-of-
mouth etc.,) may contribute to this ‘image’, Gardner and Levy 
(1955, p. 39) positioned these phenomena as distinct from the 
product/brand image itself, “[…] a product image is the result of 
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many varied experiences. They all make their contributions, for 
good or for bad […]”. 
 
The, so-called, ‘experiential view’ in marketing-thought, widely 
attributed to Holbrook and Hirschman (1982), [See, for example: 
Arnold and Thompson (2005, p. 869), Carù and Cova (2007, p. 3), 
and Friedmann (1986, p. 1)] differed from the product/brand image 
concept, in that it focused, at least initially, on the experiences 
consumers had whilst consuming offerings.  As Holbrook and 
Hirschman (1982, p. 137) noted: 
 
 By focusing on the configuration of activities involved in 
 consumption, this viewpoint calls attention to the experiences 
 with a product that one gains from actually consuming it.   
 
Subsequently this focus broadened to include experiences hosted by 
consumers during the acquisition, and disposal of offerings too 
(Holbrook 1995, p. 101).  Carù and Cova (2003, p. 271) quote 
Arnould et al (2002) who suggest that researchers might also focus 
on ‘pre-consumption experiences’, along with ‘remembered 
consumption experiences’.  However, it seems to me that whether a 
person consumes a brand-name/logo, a product per se, or a 
memory of product use, the resultant image/experience necessarily 
manifests in the present tense.  Thus, the original, Gardner and 
Levy (1955), definition of product/brand image DID focus on 
consumer experience but, importantly, focused primarily on 
people’s accumulated mental associations triggered by ‘brand 
elements’, rather than on those experiences manifesting concurrent 
with the consumption of the offering itself,  in real-time.  As quoted    
at the top of this page, Gardner and Levy (1955, p. 39) viewed the 
experiences that people had, whilst consuming a product/brand, as 
contributing to the ‘image’ of that product/brand, and not as 
constituting the ‘image’ in themselves.  
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I have already cited authors [Prahalad and Ramaswamy (2004), 
and Moore (2002) earlier in this review] who have sought to equate 
the notion of ‘consumer experience’ with the notion of the 
‘brand/brand image’.  If adopted, this way of thinking effectively 
closes the gap between the notion of ‘brand image’ and the, so-
called, ‘experiential view’ in marketing-thought.  However, the 
reader will note that, whether a researcher/practitioner thinks in 
terms of ‘brand image’ or ‘consumption experience’, s/he 
nevertheless seeks to ascertain, and perhaps ultimately to 
control/manage, the impact of a particular offering on consumers.  
In due course I will argue that this attempt to isolate the 
experiential impact of particular offerings constitutes a huge 
philosophical and methodological problem.   
 
2.2.3  Image/Impression Management  
Barich and Kotler (1991, p. 94) refer to, “the customer’s impression 
of an organization” and go on to describe how companies might, 
“attempt to determine just what that impression is.”  The reader will 
note that Barich and Kotler employ the term ‘impression’ in a 
manner synonymous with the way some authors use the term 
‘image’.  Indeed, their article goes on to present a framework for 
‘image management’.  I make this observation to show that this 
synonymous use of the terms ‘image management’ and ‘impression 
management’ [See Goffman (1959) for ‘impression management’] 
sets a precedent that enables me to compare, and perhaps 
combine, marketing and sociological perspectives.  Thus an 
individual, or organization, will perform the same types of 
behaviours whether one describes those behaviours as ‘image 
management’ or ‘impression management’.  In this way disciplinary 
boundaries begin to weaken.   
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Writing from a commercial perspective, Berry et al (2002, p. 1) 
suggest that: 
 
 [T]he clues that make up a customer experience are 
 everywhere, and  they’re easily discerned.  Anything that can 
 be perceived or sensed - or recognized by its absence - is an 
 experience clue. Thus the product or service for sale gives off 
 one set of clues, the physical setting offers more clues, and 
 the employees - through their gestures, comments, dress and 
 tone of voice - still more clues. 
 
Approaching the same phenomenon from a sociological perspective, 
Goffman (1959, p. 241) writes about how human beings employ 
informational proxies, in the absence of full social information, 
within a given scenario.  He refers to these substitutes as, “cues, 
tests, hints, expressive gestures, status symbols, [… and] predictive 
devices.”  If we adopt the commercial view, of human beings as 
products, then a human being, as with any other product, will 
trigger images/impressions, within perceiving others, and will 
engage (wittingly or unwittingly) in image/impression management. 
On this last point Kotler (1972, p. 49), and Rosenfeld et al (2002, p. 
72) affirm that the process of image/impression management can 
proceed outside of the awareness of those practicing it. They 
attribute this to the over-learnt, and thus habituated, nature of 
some behaviour(s). For example, the socialisation process involves 
the naturalisation of saying ‘please’ and ‘thank you’, such that these 
terms constitute parts of the expected norms of polite society.  
Image/impression management need not therefore take the form of 
overtly wilful activity. 
 
Phillips (1996, aphorism No. 7), a former Principle Child 
Psychotherapist, cogently describes image/impression management 
without even employing any specialist vocabulary: 
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 We work very hard to keep certain versions of ourselves in 
 other people’s minds, and, of course, the less appealing ones 
 out of their  minds.  And yet everyone we meet invents us, 
 whether we like it or not.  Indeed nothing convinces us more 
 of the existence of other people, of just how different they are 
 from us, than what they can make of what we say to them.  
 
If we view ourselves as products amongst other products, then the 
notion of product/brand image assumes an additional dimension.  
Whilst others will continue to develop ‘images’ of us [and us of 
them], significantly, we will also have an ‘image’ of self.  According 
to this view, our capacity for self-awareness means that we will 
have a more-or-less-stable ‘image’ of self. Sirgy (1982, p. 287) 
states that, “[m]ost scholars seem to agree that the term ‘self 
concept’ denotes the ‘totality of an individual’s thoughts and 
feelings having reference to himself as an object’ […]”. He goes on 
(p. 288) to define ‘self image’ as, “a concept equivalent to the 
actual self concept”, namely, “how a person perceives herself” (p. 
187).  Schenk and Holman (1980, p. 3 of 9) also state, “Actual self 
image refers to an individual’s perception of what he/she is like”.  
This ‘actual’ self image contrasts with the term ‘ideal self image’, 
which, “refers to the way the individual would like to be.” Schenk 
and Holman (1980, p. 3 of 9) go on to introduce the notion of 
‘situational self image’ and define it as, “the meaning of self that the 
individual wishes others to have of him/herself.” This latter term 
seems closely allied to what Sirgy (1982, p. 287) refers to as the 
“social self”, namely, “how a person presents herself to others.”  In 
other words, how a person presents him/herself to others seems 
inseparable from the notion of how the presenting-self wishes 
others to regard him/her.  Finally, here, the term ‘global self-
attitude’, according to Sirgy (1982, p. 287), “has been treated as a 
conscious judgment regarding the relationship of one’s actual self to 
the ideal or social self […]”.  The dichotomy that exists regarding 
the meaning of the term ‘brand image’ [either a set of associations 
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in memory, or a ‘live’ experience that a consumer has whist 
consuming a branded offering] applies equally to the term ‘self 
image’.   We can interpret the term ‘self image’ as relating to a 
stored-in-memory phenomenon, or, alternatively, as a ‘live’ 
moment-to-moment phenomenon.  In the latter case the self image 
becomes one’s momentary experience of oneself. However, this 
presents as an interesting problem when it comes to trying to 
separate one’s self image from any other ‘product/brand images’ 
that we generate from moment-to-moment.  I will return to this 
point shortly, when I will discuss the complexity of the intertwined 
content of commercially- and non-commercially-triggered 
experiences.   
 
This leads me to the issue of the interrelationship between self and 
products, what Holbrook (1987, p. 129) termed, “the use of 
products as dramaturgical props that define and display the 
consumer’s self-image.”  As far back as 1959 Levy (p. 119) wrote, 
implicitly, about the interaction between product image and self 
image: 
 
 A symbol is appropriate (and the product will be used and 
 enjoyed) when it joins with, meshes with, adds to, or 
 reinforces the way the consumer thinks about himself.  We 
 are dealing here with a very plain fact of human nature.  In 
 the broadest sense, each person aims to enhance his sense of 
 self, and behaves in ways that are consistent with his image 
 of the person he is or wants to be. 
 
More recently Carù and Cova (2003, p. 271) quote Firat and 
Dholakia (1998, p. 96): 
 
 […] consumption is not a mere act of destroying, or using 
 things. It is also not the end of the (central) economic cycle, 
 but an act of production of experiences and selves or self 
 images […]. 
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And Wattanasuwan (2005, p. 180) writes, “In our everyday life, we 
employ consumption symbolism to construct and express our self-
concepts as well as to identify our associations with others”.   
 
In the light of the foregoing discussion we can perhaps begin to 
view a person’s relationship with ‘other products’ [accepting the self 
as a product amongst products] as an expansive form of co-
branding. [See next section for a definition]  The individual 
associates him/herself with other products/brands [broadly 
construed] and in doing so helps to define him/herself, as well as 
the products/brands with which s/he associates.  Belk (1988) makes 
a strong case for viewing the products that we appropriate, and 
associate with, as integral aspects of our sense of self - what he 
thus calls ‘the extended self’ - extended through associating with 
products.  Significantly, Belk (pp. 156-157) includes other people as 
possible markers of self.  Perhaps not surprisingly, Belk also 
includes a person’s own body, and its various parts, as central 
components of a person’s sense of self.  As Peters (1997, p. 4 of 7) 
put it, “When you’re promoting brand You, everything you do - and 
everything you choose not to do - communicates the value and 
character of the brand.”  Thus, who we associate with, and how we 
look after, manage and present our own body, all function as 
indicative signs which others may use as clues when constructing an 
image/impression of us.   
 
2.2.4 Co-Branding 
Keller (1998, p. 283) writes: 
 
 Co-branding - also called brand bundling or brand alliances - 
 occurs when two or more existing brands are combined into a 
 joint product and/or marketed together in some fashion. 
 
 25 
 
 
Rao and Ruekert (1994, p. 87) make the point that: 
 
 […] current [1994] academic research and the popular 
 business press focus on the value of the individual brand, 
 which has a distinct identity independent of other brands. In 
 reality, however, brands often coexist with other brands in the 
 same product. 
 
Solomon and Assael (1987) pre-empted Rao and Ruekert’s (1994) 
focus on brand alliances, albeit from the perspective of the 
consumer. Solomon and Assael focused on, what they called, 
“product constellations”.  They define these as (p. 191): 
 
 […] clusters of complementary products, specific brands, 
 and/or consumption activities used by consumers to define, 
 communicate, and enact social roles. 
 
They go on to write: 
 
 Although it is clear that many products possess symbolic 
 meaning for consumers, it is also apparent that in many cases 
 no single product in isolation defines a social situation. 
 Instead, consumers look to the total collection of cues in 
 the environment to decode the meanings present there 
 and to structure their behavior accordingly […]. 
 
And later they write (p. 198), “The consumer must amass a 
collection of symbolic ‘props’ which permits him or her to credibly 
play these [social] roles.”  Thus we can see how Solomon and 
Assael invoke the notion of theatrical ‘props’ in their discussion of 
the staging of social selves.  Gibbs (2002, p. 5), writing about the 
theatrical concept of ‘mise-en-scène’ states: 
 
 Literally translated it means ‘to put on stage’, but figurative 
 uses of the term have a long history.  For the student of film, 
 a useful definition might be: ‘the contents of the frame and 
 the way they are organised’.  Both halves of this formulation 
 are significant - the contents and their organisation. 
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  What are the contents of the frame?  They include 
 lighting, costume, décor, properties, and the actors 
 themselves. The organisation of the contents of the frame 
 encompasses the relationship of the actors to one other [sic] 
 and to the décor, but also their relationship to the camera, 
 and thus the audience’s view. 
 
Later, having examined the various aspects of mise-en-scène, Gibbs 
writes (p. 26): 
 
 It is important to be able to describe the individual elements 
 of mise-en-scène, and it is important to consider each 
 element’s potential for expression.  But it is worth 
 remembering from the outset that these elements are most 
 productively thought of in terms of their interaction rather 
 than individually - in practice, it is the interplay of elements 
 that is significant. 
 
Thus we may observe, from reading Gibbs (2002), that 
cinema/theatre designers/directors employ the same tactics and 
considerations as ‘experience engineers’ (Carbone and Haeckel 
1994) in the world of marketing.  Both groups must decide on the 
contents, and organisation of two-dimensional and three-
dimensional ‘environments’.  They essentially must think in terms of 
how the various components of a scenario, including the actors and 
their presentation, work in concert to propose a certain experience 
for the ‘audience’.  Interestingly, Tynan and Mckechnie (2009, p. 
505), in their review of the ‘experience marketing’ literature, trace 
the development of experience marketing back through Carbone 
and Haeckel (1994), to Holbrook and Hirschman (1982).  Holbrook, 
in turn, traces a line back to the predecessors who helped to 
develop the experiential turn in marketing-thought. [See section 
2.5.1 of this review]  
 
The use of celebrities in relation to the marketing of an offering 
constitutes a form of co-branding which applies in the dramatic arts 
 27 
 
 
as well as in relation to product and ‘cause’ endorsement.  It 
involves a famous person lending (usually at a price) his/her 
accumulated (usually favourable) associations [held in ‘the public 
mind’] to a product or cause.  As McCracken (1989, p. 312) puts it: 
 
 The effectiveness of the endorser depends, in part, upon the 
 meanings he or she brings to the endorsement process.  The 
 number and variety of the meanings contained in celebrities 
 are very large. 
 
I should note that, strictly speaking, the meanings reside within the 
perceiving consumer, and not within celebrities.  The celebrity 
functions as the trigger that ‘awakens’ the associations already in a 
consumer’s memory. McCracken goes on to write (p. 313): 
 
 [A]n endorsement succeeds when an association is fashioned 
 between the cultural meanings of the celebrity world, on the 
 one hand, and the endorsed product, on the other. 
 
We have seen that the marketing concept of clue-management, 
when practiced in the cinema/theatre, goes by the name of ‘mise-
en-scène’.  When applied in social life, Goffman (1959) called the 
process ‘impression management’.  And when applied in commercial 
contexts Carbone and Haeckel (1994) called the process ‘experience 
engineering’. Likewise we might call the individual elements within a 
given context ‘properties’ in the cinema/theatre, ‘objects’ in a social 
context, and ‘products’ or ‘clues’ in a commercial context.  I 
highlight this interdisciplinary dimension because I wish to address 
human behaviour and experience in a manner that remains open to 
phenomena which transcend the less-than-watertight-boundaries 
which demarcate the contents and limits of a particular subject 
discipline. 
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When ‘elements’ are brought together - or come together unbidden 
- in the cinema, theatre, social life, or in overtly-commercial 
contexts such as supermarkets or airports, an associational 
mingling begins to occur within the perceiving individual.  This 
associational activity gets triggered by different combinations of the 
various ‘ingredients’ [both commercial and non-commercial] 
comprising the overall situational ‘offering’.  This complicates the 
notion of brand image immeasurably.  The associations triggered, 
within an individual, by one of the ingredients, comprising a 
scenario, may interact unpredictably with the associations triggered 
by any other ‘ingredient(s).  The painter Francis Bacon spoke of this 
complex process (Archimbaud 1999, p. 148): 
 
 I think that every image, everything we see, changes our 
 ways of seeing everything else.  My perception is completely 
 altered. Certain images, perhaps even everything that I see, 
 might imperceptibly modify all the rest.  There’s a sort of 
 influence of image upon image; it’s a great mystery, but I’m 
 sure that that’s what happens. 
 
In discussing how people seek to engender self-related meanings 
McCracken (1989, p. 317) wrote: 
 
 We know that they must select and combine these meanings 
 [derived through interaction with ‘objects’] in a process of 
 experimentation […] But this process is still very much terra 
 incognito from a scholarly point of view.  Of all the topics in 
 the culture and consumer behavior portfolio, this one is the 
 most  neglected. 
 
According to Berry et al (2002, p. 2), “The company’s goal is to get 
to the point where it is providing the right set of clues to its 
customers.”  If a company (or individual) wants to manage the 
image/impression that others form of it (him/her), then it (s/he) 
may start by seeking to evaluate how consumers currently regard 
its (his/her) offering. 
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2.2.5 Measuring ‘Image’ 
Reynolds and Gutman (1984, p. 27) make the following point:  
 
 […] the way image is defined determines the manner in which 
 research to understand image is designed, executed, and, 
 ultimately, translated to the creative process. 
 
If researchers employ a definition of product/brand image that 
characterises ‘image’ as the stored meanings in consumers’ 
memories, then their methods of seeking to measure ‘image’ will 
probably differ from those used by researchers who embrace a view 
of ‘image’ that characterises it as the consumers’ ‘live’, moment-to-
moment, experiences whilst consuming an offering.  The former 
researchers may ask consumers what comes to mind when they get 
presented with a ‘brand element’, such as a name or logo, as in the 
following articles: Boivin (1986, p. 14), Hirschman (1981, p. 3 of 
9), and McDonald (1973, p. 165).  Researchers adopting ‘the-
brand-image-is-the-experience-whilst-consuming’ definition may 
instead enquire about a people’s perceptions during and/or after 
particular episodes. For example, Breazeale (2000) discusses the 
use of ‘electronic group measurement’ (also called ‘audience 
response systems’).  These systems employ interfaces that include: 
pressing keyboard buttons, moving sliders, turning dials, or some 
combination of these (p. 3 of 6).  Researchers can use these 
systems to probe audience-response to continuous stimuli such as: 
radio broadcasts, TV programmes/advertisements, movies, lectures, 
presentations, or even a lawyer presenting a case to a jury.  Thus 
researchers get second-by-second information regarding individuals’ 
responses, aggregated (and even segmented if required) to provide 
whole-group/sub-group ‘interest curves’.  According to Breazeale, 
researchers have employed these ‘group measurement systems’ 
extensively during political campaigns in the USA, in order to 
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identify popular/unpopular issues, and voter preferences regarding 
candidates.  Ramanathan and McGill (2007) employ this technology, 
amongst other methods, when seeking to measure if and how the 
presence of another person can impact on someone’s TV/movie-
viewing experience.  Similarly, Andrade and Cohen (2007) used 
moment-to-moment-response-measuring-technology in their 
research designed to explore why people would wish to watch 
horror movies, given that this type of product seemingly contradicts 
the concept of hedonic (feel-good) consumption behaviour. 
 
Rothwell et al (2006) sought to obtain data of a more ‘objective’ 
kind than that available through ‘audience response systems’.  They 
employed an experimental set-up that allowed them to record 
people’s physiological responses [biometrics] to emotional stimuli 
during movie-viewing.  This involved connecting individuals to 
instruments which measured, for example: heart rate, galvanic skin 
response [a change in the electrical resistance of the skin caused by 
emotional stress], body temperature and movement (p. 103).  
However, the researchers conceded that, as yet, they cannot 
differentiate, in their data, between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ 
emotions.  As with the ‘audience response measurement’, 
mentioned earlier, these latter measures provide quantitative data 
that provide only very coarse indicators of affect.  
 
Research undertaken to ascertain a person’s response after, rather 
than during, exposure to an offering, usually entails the use of 
questionnaires, interviews, and/or introspective techniques.  
Petrova and Cialdini (2005), for example, employed questionnaires 
in order to ascertain subject’s responses to hypothetical products.   
Likewise, Richins (1997) used questionnaires to gauge people’s 
responses to hypothetical scenarios.  Joy and Sherry (2003) 
interviewed art-museum visitors during and after the visitors’ 
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exposure to exhibitions, whilst Bonsu and Belk’s (2003) research 
involved in-depth interviewing, with a focus on people’s past 
experiences relating to death rituals and funerals.  Examples of the 
use of introspective approaches include Holbrook (1986) who used 
researcher introspection to focus on his own prior consumption of 
music, and Gould (1991) employed introspection to shed light on 
how he used various products to alter both the quality and levels of 
his own self-perceived organismic energy.  
 
2.2.6 Concluding Section 2.2 
I referred earlier to, what strikes me as, a huge philosophical and 
methodological problem with regard to the notion of product/brand 
image.  We may think of the entirety of a particular existential 
context or situation as a ‘field’. Yontef (1993, p. 3 of 39) defines a 
‘field’ as: 
 
 […] a whole in which the parts are in immediate relationship 
 and responsive to each other and no part is uninfluenced by 
 what goes  on elsewhere in the field. The field replaces the 
 notion of discrete, isolated particles. The person in his or her 
 life space constitutes a field. 
 
We can view this field as the dynamic culmination of a complex 
coming-and-bringing-together of constituent elements.  Thus the 
field consists of a constantly-mobile, dynamic ‘composition’. Each 
human being co-constitutes and, simultaneously, ‘lives off/in’ this 
‘configuration-in-flux’.  I propose that the ongoing experience(s) of 
each individual derive from his/her particular mode of ‘give and 
take’ within a particular field.  Bauman (2007, p. 57) characterised 
human beings as “consumer commodities”; in other words, a person 
may simultaneously consume [others, places, things, organisations, 
ideas…] whilst, him/herself, existing as a consumable phenomenon 
for self and others. Thus, the ‘image’ or ‘experience’ that constitutes 
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an individual’s consciousness, at a given point in space-time, will 
depend upon what s/he notices, and does, within a given ‘field’.  
This noticing and doing may take the form of an internal 
(interoceptive) focus, and/or an outward-looking (exteroceptive) 
orientation. A person’s experience will derive from the particular 
subset of organismic and environmental stimuli to which s/he 
simultaneously attends to and contributes to.  The idea that we can 
identify a direct, exclusive, causal link between a particular stimulus 
and a particular state-of-being, within a perceiving individual, 
seems problematic to say the least.  Addis and Holbrook (2001, pp. 
56, and 62) exemplify the particulars of this problem in two 
successive quotations: 
 
 [1] Every consumption event involves an interaction between 
 a subject and an object […], where the subject of interest is a 
 consumer or customer and the object of interest is some 
 good, service, event, person, place, or other kind of thing. 
 
 [2] When applied more generally, this holistic perspective 
 suggests that product usage is not separate and isolated from 
 the rest of the consumer’s world; rather it is embedded in 
 that world - that is, the product is closely related to a person’s 
 feelings, other products, relationships of the person, the 
 surrounding society, the consumer’s whole lifeworld. 
 
Here we see two somewhat incompatible objectives.  On the one 
hand the consumer researchers, understandably, want to ascertain 
an individual’s response to a particular consumption object.  On the 
other hand they acknowledge that the experience that an individual 
has, whilst consuming the ‘target’ stimulus, may derive from other 
concurrently-perceived stimuli within the perceiving-and-acting 
individual and/or amongst/around the targeted offering.  
 
As stated earlier, how one defines the terms ‘product’ and 
‘product/brand image’ will inform how one goes about one’s 
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business as a researcher thereof.  As this review progresses I will  
show, increasingly, that the conceptual infrastructure already exists 
within marketing-thought which enables me to view the entirety of 
each existential scenario as a complex ‘offering’, co-constituted by 
those individuals who concurrently reside therein.   I suggest that 
the concept of the individual product/brand image does not help 
when it comes to seeking to understand complex human 
experiences and actions in everyday scenarios.  Even notions of  
‘co-branding’ and ‘product constellations’ can only take us so far in 
accounting for complex person-environment interactions.  It seems 
inescapable, to me, that I must treat human being as comprising of 
complex interactions between selves and constellations of 
contextual elements.  The notion of the individual product/brand 
image must give way to a broader conception that encompasses the 
totality of an individual’s moment-to-moment, contextualised 
behaviour and experience.   
 
2.3 Broadening 
 
2.3.1 Marketing Definitions 
 
 The importance of a definition, including for marketing, 
 cannot be overstated.  Standing alone, a definition defines the 
 scope and  content of that which is defined, fixing its 
 boundaries and describing its subject matter. 
 
    - Gundlach (2007, p. 24) 
 
 To restrict the subject matter of marketing to ‘economic’ or 
 ‘commercial’ exchanges rather than the universal 
 phenomenon of exchange would be like constraining physics 
 to explore the material  structure of metals rather than the 
 entire world of physical reality. 
 
    - Bagozzi (1977, p. 322) 
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Marketing emerged at the beginning of the 20th century as a 
specifically commercial/economic discipline concerned with ensuring 
that products and their end-users/consumers met, and that an 
appropriate exchange of goods-for-money occurred (Bartels 1974, 
p. 73; Levy 2002, p. 299). However, marketing has subsequently 
undergone significant definitional changes. The inaugural 1937 
American Marketing Association (AMA) definition, for example, had 
an unequivocal business orientation, “those business activities 
involved in the flow of goods and services from production to 
consumption” (Gundlach 2007, p. 243). We can contrast this with 
the 2008 AMA definition (AMA 2008, p. 1): 
 
 Marketing is the activity, set of institutions, and processes for 
 creating, communicating, delivering, and exchanging offerings 
 that have value for customers, clients, partners, and society 
 at large. 
 
This latest definition, as I read it, clearly shows signs of an 
inclusiveness which allows for the non-business instances and 
applications of marketing.  The term ‘offering’ seems potentially 
more inclusive of non-commercial phenomena, than the terms 
‘product’ or ‘service’.  
 
The term ‘exchange’ entered the AMA definition of marketing in 
1985 - the first substantive change since the inaugural definition of 
1935 - (Gundlach 2007, p. 243):  
 
 the process of planning and executing the conception, pricing, 
 promotion, and distribution of ideas, goods, and services to 
 create exchanges that satisfy individual and organizational 
 goals. 
   
The term ‘exchange’ got dropped from the 2004 definition 
(Gundlach 2007, p. 243): 
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 Marketing is an organizational function and a set of processes 
 for creating, communicating and delivering value to customers 
 and for managing customer relationships in ways that benefit 
 the organization and its stakeholders. 
 
The reader will note that this definition represents marketing as a 
strictly ‘organizational’ phenomenon.  It does not allow for the 
application of marketing by individuals.  Sheth and Uslay (2007, p. 
302) welcome the 2004 AMA definition, in particular the move away 
from, what they call, “[…] the sacred cow of exchange.”  Sheth and 
Uslay celebrate the focus on ‘value creation’ as the prime underlying 
purpose of marketing.  In a nutshell they write, “Value creation 
depends and thrives on the quality and variety of personal 
experiences it enables” (p. 304).  Interestingly, the AMA 2008 
definition of marketing re-introduced the notion of ‘exchange’ whilst 
also retaining a reference to ‘value creation’ (AMA 2008, p. 1 of 3): 
 
 Marketing is the activity, set of institutions, and processes for 
 creating, communicating, delivering, and exchanging offerings 
 that have value for customers, clients, partners, and society 
 at large. 
 
Bartels (1974, p. 75) provides a description of the background and 
logic underpinning a broadened view of marketing: 
 
 The need for distribution or dissemination of products has 
 characterized all societies, in all stages of development.  To 
 provide for the supply of their consumption needs, societies 
 have developed  processes, institutional patterns, agencies, 
 standards, priorities, and values requisite for achieving their 
 particular objectives.  Although the distributive systems have 
 been known by a variety of names, they have served the 
 same purpose: the distribution of products, whatever their 
 kind and however they might have been produced. They also 
 shared in common the fact that they dealt with the economic 
 goods of the society.  The performance of this function in this 
 century [20th] has been identified as marketing.  […]  [B]asic 
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 human intelligence attains goals in interaction through 
 communication, persuasion, adaptation, compromise, 
 accommodation, and the like, whether expressed in the home, 
 school, church, or government. In marketing, those 
 processes have  been termed market research, selling, 
 market segmentation, adaptivity, consumer-orientation, 
 promotional strategy, and the like; and these activities have 
 constituted ‘marketing.’ Had the research and 
 conceptualization occurred first elsewhere than in the 
 economy, the terms from the educational, religious, or 
 political areas might by now have been incorporated in 
 marketing terminology, rather than vice versa.  What in 
 marketing is ‘selling’ in the school is ‘teaching,’ in the 
 church ‘proselyting,’ in politics ‘propagandizing,’ in the military 
 ‘indoctrinating.’  The marketer who adapts his product to the 
 market is doing what the teacher does in organizing his class 
 presentation, the preacher in sermonizing for the needs of  his 
 congregation, or the housewife in catering to the food tastes 
 of her family. 
  The question, then, is whether marketing is identified by 
 the field of economics in which the marketing techniques have 
 been developed and generally applied, or by the so-called 
 marketing techniques, wherever they may be applied. 
 
I have quoted Bartels at some length because what he writes 
underpins the development of my own argument.  The fact that 
human beings often differently-label the same types of 
activities/phenomena, when those activities/phenomena occur in 
different contexts and domains, lies at the heart of Bartels’ 
comments.  This points me to the idea that particular ‘discourses’ 
develop in relation to different disciplines.    Hall (1997, p. 44), 
[quoting from his own prior work (Hall 1992, p. 291)] explains: 
 
 By ‘discourse’, [Michel] Foucault meant ‘a group of statements 
 which provide a language for talking about - a way of 
 representing the knowledge about - a particular topic at a 
 particular historical moment. … Discourse is about the 
 production of knowledge through language. … But … since all 
 social practices entail meaning, and meanings shape and 
 influence what we do - our conduct - all practices have a 
 discursive aspect’ […]. 
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Thus, the particular vocabularies that develop, in different subject 
areas, constitute one of the ways of ‘enclaving’ that subject area.  
The vocabulary used within a discipline identifies and differentiates 
that discipline relative to others.  In other words, [employing here 
the discourse of marketing] the vocabulary helps to ‘brand’ the 
discipline.  As Levy (1996, p. 170) put it: 
 
 Branding cannot basically be distinguished from identifying or 
 naming anything that we believe is available for sale or 
 exchange -  whether ideas, objects, or persons. 
 
Over 40 years ago Kotler and Levy (1969b, p. 57) addressed the 
issue of the scope of the marketing concept: 
 
 Marketing is a universal process carried on by individuals, 
 groups, and organizations.  Basically, it describes those 
 efforts to win the support of others through offering value.  
 This process is termed marketing for two reasons: First, a 
 better term for this generic and endemic process has not been 
 found. Second, we think that a single theory can ultimately be 
 forged to describe this process no matter where it occurs and 
 no matter what it is called. 
 
Indeed, later that year Levy and Kotler (1969) wrote an article in 
which they proposed an alternative (or complementary) term to 
describe marketing phenomena (p. 70): 
 
 Perhaps the overall concept encompassing the determination 
 of audience needs and the generating of audience interest and 
 supportive response to one’s aims might use the term 
 ‘furthering’ instead of marketing.  Marketing might then 
 remain reserved to those interactions and forms of furthering 
 that have a more specific money fulcrum. [Emphasis in 
 original] 
 
History has shown that others have not appropriated the term 
‘furthering’ en masse.  Suffice it to say, however, that Levy and 
Kotler recognised a problem, of public resistance, regarding the 
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application of commercially-derived terminology [‘marketing’] to 
non-commercial phenomena.  Surprisingly, even a leading 
marketing textbook (Jobber 2010, p. 3) - which one might expect to 
take a pro-marketing stance - opens with the following sentence: 
 
 In general marketing has a bad press. Phrases like 
 ‘marketing  gimmicks’, ‘marketing ploys’ and ‘marketing 
 tricks’ abound.  The result is that marketing is condemned by 
 association. 
 
Initially, Kotler and Levy (1969a, p. 11) used the term ‘marketing-
like’ when referring to non-commercial applications of marketing.  
However, ten years later they wrote (Levy and Kotler 1979, p. 
235): 
 
 […] it became necessary to give up that usage when it 
 became apparent that there was no realistic difference 
 between marketing activities and marketing-like activities.  
 None of the attempts to distinguish business marketing and 
 marketing in any other setting in a fundamental way hold 
 water. 
 
Thus Levy and Kotler abandoned their own notion of ‘furthering’ in 
favour of a broadened application of the term ‘marketing’.  
  
Some academics have adopted a defensive, proprietorial, stance in 
relation to the impulse of others to broaden the concept of 
marketing. Luck (1969, pp. 53-54), for example, wrote:  
 
 Attenuate marketing’s definition to make it almost universal, 
 and it will wholly lose its identity. […] Marketing is concerned 
 with markets, of course, and markets must be characterized 
 by buying and selling.   
 
In their retort to Luck, Kotler and Levy (1969b, p. 57) wrote: 
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 Professor Luck is afraid that this [broadened] definition claims 
 too much for marketing and is likely to be interpreted as an 
 encroachment upon other disciplines.  We take the view that 
 jurisdictional disputes are healthy for the progress of science, 
 and the validity of any new viewpoint will ultimately be tested 
 in the marketplace. 
 
Laczniak and Michie (1979, p. 226) suggest that: 
 
 […] if the field of marketing succeeds in convincing the public 
 that the domain of marketing rightly involves all transactions, 
 the discipline of marketing is asking to play the role of a 
 symbolic Atlas with the weight of the world upon its 
 theoretical shoulders. 
 
Levy and Kotler (1979, p. 236) reply to this by suggesting that, 
“The broadened concept was merely calling attention to the fact 
that academic domains are conveniences and blinkered 
specializations […]”   And, further to this, Levy (2002, p. 2 of 5) 
quotes Popper (1963, p. 67): 
 
 All this classification and distinction [the territorial issue] is a 
 comparatively unimportant and superficial affair.  We are not 
 students of some subject matter but students of problems.  
 And problems may cut right across the borders of any subject 
 matter or discipline. 
 
And Bagozzi (1975, p. 39) writes: 
 
 It is not so much the fact that the subject matter of marketing 
 overlaps with that of other disciplines as it is that the 
 problems of marketing are universal. 
 
Which marketing problems can we describe as universal?  If we 
accept a broadening of the concept of marketing, then Levy’s 
following definition (Consumption, Markets and Culture [C.M.C.] 
2003, p. 113) identifies the problems that we all face: 
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 I see marketing as a term for the universal process of 
 exchange, including all striving to provide and to receive, and 
 all the competition, frustration, and gratification that are the 
 accompaniment of that striving.  The conventional content of 
 the consumption of goods and services and commercial 
 marketing are then particular manifestations of this universal 
 process of marketing.  
 
Levy thus identifies the process of exchange as central to his broad 
conception of marketing.  He does not, however, specify the 
‘currency’ of exchange.  As I will discuss later in this section, this 
currency may take the form of, for example: attention, 
effort/energy, know-how, and time, as well as money, goods, and 
services.  The ‘striving’, to which Levy refers, relates to our efforts 
to bring something ‘to market’. On a personal level, perhaps we 
want others to value our personal qualities, our appearance, and/or 
our creative output.  As Levy notes, we can feel frustrated when our 
‘product’ (our self and those things that we do and/or produce) fails 
to find ‘a market’.  We may also, at times, feel gratified on account 
of believing that others value us, and what we offer.  Levy refers to 
the competition inherent in this process; other, perhaps more 
tempting, ‘products’ may exist, than the one that we have to offer.  
How do we make our self and our output [more generally, our 
‘offer’] more desirable to our target market in a competitive 
context?  Here we have the universal ‘problem’ of marketing. Thus 
people may employ facets of the marketing arsenal in pursuance of 
their objectives.  Seen from this perspective, human being, itself, 
constitutes an elemental form of marketing.  We see more-popular, 
more desirable, people than ourselves, as well as less-popular, less-
desirable, people than ourselves. They produce more-
popular/celebrated ‘produce’ [or less so] than us - whether in the 
form of attractiveness, music, writing, and so on.  To what degree 
do we modify our self and our output in order to appeal to the 
market?  Does our ‘packaging’ correspond with our ‘contents’?  
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Which product category do we fit into? These (and other) 
‘marketing’ issues apply, metaphorically, to all forms of human 
interaction.  We may thus view human being as a complex actional 
and perceptual system, with a ‘persuasive’ dimension.  For me, the 
paramount questions become: How does our subjective experience 
relate to the palpable ‘clues’ that we give out and give off?  What do 
others make of what we give out and give off?  We can not answer 
these questions without the feedback of other people.  We can not 
experience our self from the outside (in the way that other people 
can experience us), our embodied state precludes this.  Most of us 
do not operate from an out-of-our-own-body perspective.  
 
Shepherd (2005, p. 592) notes: 
 
 […] attempts to adopt both the marketing principle and 
 marketing techniques in non-conventional settings [such as, 
 in: religion, politics, education, health, and places] is still the 
 subject of considerable resistance and debate. 
 
So we have those who view marketing as a specifically commercial 
phenomenon, and others who espouse the universality of the 
marketing concept.  Yet even those who promote a broad view 
acknowledge resistance from those who, for one reason or another, 
do not feel comfortable applying commercially-derived discourse to 
non-commercial areas of life. 
  
2.3.2 Exchange 
Bagozzi (1975) argues that the straightforward ‘cash-for-
goods/services’ or ‘goods/services-for-other-goods/services’ forms 
of exchange constitute only one part of a tripartite typology of 
possible exchanges.  He enumerates these as: ‘restricted’, 
‘generalized’, and ‘complex’ exchanges, respectively.  The term 
‘restricted exchange’ pertains to the, aforesaid, two-party give-and-
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take (reciprocal) exchange.  A ‘generalized exchange’ takes the 
form of a system, comprising of at least three parties, in which the 
participants benefit each other only indirectly.  For example, I go to 
Speaker’s Corner in London and I ‘speak my mind’ in front of a, 
seemingly impassive, audience.  Something that I say ‘strikes a 
chord’ with one of the listeners and she embarks on a life-changing 
process.  I subsequently receive a letter from the girl’s parents 
(who have tracked me down somehow).  They thank me for the 
part that I played in the reformation of their, formerly, drug-
addicted daughter.  Thus my ‘payoff’ comes from people once-
removed from the original recipient of my catalytic communication 
act.  ‘Complex exchange’ again involves a minimum of three 
parties, but in this case each party engages in at least one direct 
exchange.  Over and above this, interrelationships also occur 
between the parties.  If I return to my ‘Speaker’s Corner’ example, 
it becomes a complex exchange when the drug-addicted girl 
approaches me after my presentation, says that what I said inspired 
her, and thanks me.  She then goes home, a changed woman, and 
family relationships improve exponentially.  I subsequently also get 
thanked by the girl’s parents.  
 
Bagozzi (1975, p. 35) defines the ‘media of exchange’ as: 
 
 […] the vehicles with which people communicate to, and 
 influence, others in the satisfaction of their needs.  These 
 vehicles include money, persuasion, punishment, power 
 (authority), inducement, and activation of normative or 
 ethical commitments.  Products and services are also media of 
 exchange. 
 
In the examples, cited above, my self-presentation, posture, and 
my use of language constitute the media of exchange as I stand on 
my plinth at Speaker’s Corner.  I ‘receive’ in the form of genuine 
thanks and appreciation via words and handshakes/hugs/smiles.  
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Bagozzi (1975, pp. 36-37) goes on to discuss the nature of what 
people get from the exchange process, in terms of experiences, 
feelings, and meanings.  He again employs a tripartite model: 
‘utilitarian exchange’, ‘symbolic exchange’, and ‘mixed exchange’.  
‘Utilitarian exchanges’ (also called economic exchanges) involve the 
straight exchange of money for goods/services or goods/services for 
other goods/services.  Here the focus lies on the direct, tangible 
benefits that the recipients gain from the items exchanged.  The 
hypothetical ‘Speaker’s Corner’ exchange does not fall into this 
category, since it involves no direct economic, or material, quid pro 
quo.  If the girl had thrown some coins into my up-turned cap, on 
the floor in front of me, we could describe this as a ‘service-for-
cash’, utilitarian exchange. The term ‘symbolic exchange’, “refers to 
the mutual transfer of psychological, social, or other intangible 
entities between two or more parties.” (Bagozzi 1975, p.36) The 
‘Speaker’s Corner’ example very much fits into this category of 
exchange.  I provided ‘inspiration’ through the vehicles of speech 
and gesture; in return I received ‘appreciation’ via the vehicles of 
words and gestures.  ‘Mixed exchanges’, as the name implies, 
“involve both utilitarian and symbolic aspects, and it is often difficult 
to separate the two.” (Bagozzi 1975, p. 36) Thus, as I said, if the 
girl had given me money for my efforts, along with thanks and a 
hug, then she and I would have had a ‘mixed exchange’.  
 
Bagozzi (1975, p. 37) concludes his discussion of modes of 
exchange by stating the following: 
 
 The processes involved in the creation and resolution of 
 exchange relationships constitute the subject matter of 
 marketing, and these processes depend on, and cannot be 
 separated from, the fundamental character of human and 
 organizational needs.   
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In other words, Bagozzi casts exchange relationships, and thus 
marketing, as an essential, inescapable component of human being.   
 
2.3.3 Further Extensions of the Marketing Concept 
Peter and Olson (1983, p. 120) quote Kuhn (1970, p. 198): 
 
 The superiority of one theory to another is something that 
 cannot be proved in debate. Instead, I have insisted, each 
 party must try, by persuasion, to convert the other […] 
 [Emphasis added by Peter and Olson]. 
 
Thus Peter and Olson suggest that scholars must market their 
‘theory products’.  In suggesting this notion, Peter and Olson, 
themselves, engage in ‘marketing’. Specifically, their article 
promotes a novel application of the marketing concept. They apply 
the, so-called, 4P’s of marketing [product, promotion, place, and 
price (Jobber 2010, pp. 17-23)] to the marketing of theories.  
Interestingly, when it comes to the ‘price’ of a new idea, Peter and 
Olson (p. 115) include: ‘time expenditure’ [time spent 
reading/learning the new idea], psychological costs [resulting from 
the disruption to one’s ‘mental’ status quo], and the physical 
energy/effort expended during the research process.  These latter 
‘costs’ augment any literal costs involved in buying books and 
attending conferences etc. 
 
Gilbert (1977), writing from outside of the marketing discipline, 
suggests that academic referencing constitutes a form of persuasion 
(p. 116): 
 
 In order to justify an argument to an audience of potentially
 interested readers, it is most effective to cite a selection of 
 those papers which the intended audience believe present well 
 founded, valid results.  The participants in a mature field will 
 share a belief that some published work is important and 
 correct, some other work is trivial, perhaps some is 
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 erroneous, and much is irrelevant to their current interests.  
 Hence, authors preparing papers will tend to cite the 
 ‘important and correct’ papers, may cite ‘erroneous’ papers in 
 order to challenge them and will avoid citing the ‘trivial’, and 
 ‘irrelevant’ ones.  Indeed, respected papers may be cited in 
 order to shine in their reflected glory even if they do not seem 
 closely related to the substantive content of the report. 
 
One can thus see academic referencing as allied to the notion of 
‘the marketing of ideas’ written about by Peter and Olson (1983). 
 
Hirschman (1983, p. 49) suggested that artists of certain types 
become the first audience/consumers of their own work.  Hirschman 
positions this idea as a broadening of the notion of ‘exchange’ (p. 
49): 
 
 The term ‘audience’ or ‘consumer’ is extended beyond the 
 public at large and even beyond the notion of external parties 
 (e.g., peers, critics) to the realization that some marketing 
 exchanges are initiated within one’s self.  In self-orientated 
 marketing the creator may serve as the initial consumer of 
 that which he/she creates. 
 
This notion supports the idea that when two people interact, ‘actor1’ 
will consume his/her own moment-to-moment self-awareness as 
part of ‘the mix’ when, ostensibly, simply consuming ‘actor2’s’ 
output.  In other words, communicating-individuals consume their 
own overt verbal contributions [as well as their covert goings-on 
i.e., the things they experience but do not express] whilst attending 
to each other’s output.  Julian Schnabel (artist/filmmaker) alluded 
to this phenomenon when interviewed in Rappolt (2008, p. 74): 
 
 I’ve always thought about simultaneity of time, I’m talking 
 about one thing, but you’re not just hearing what I’m saying 
 to you, you’re thinking about whatever happened to you - I 
 don’t know what problem you have - but I know you’re not 
 just thinking about what I’m saying[.] 
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Indeed the ‘listener’ may listen more carefully, and with more 
enjoyment, to his/her own ‘inner dialogue’, than to the speaker’s 
overt utterances during a social exchange.  This chimes with 
something Bagozzi (1978, p. 554) wrote: 
 
 […] the theory [of exchange] needs to be expanded to 
 incorporate ongoing exchanges as they ebb and flow.   
 Exchange behaviors exhibit a dynamism that risks being 
 obscured by static analyses. 
 
By focusing on dynamic human being as it occurs, in real-time, 
rather than focusing solely on one’s own, or others’, prior 
experiences, I have an opportunity to get as near as humanly 
possible to the mechanics of  moment-to-moment  acting/behaving 
and experiencing.   
 
I will end this section with two anomalous marketing concepts which 
may have a bearing on my project.  Firstly, Kotler and Levy’s 
(1971) notion of ‘demarketing’, essentially the idea that in certain 
circumstances, it may benefit an individual, or organisation, to 
reduce the demand for his/her/its/an offering.  It will suffice to say 
here that we can employ marketing techniques to discourage 
consumption as well as encourage it.  Healthy-living campaigns, for 
example, may seek to encourage people to reduce their alcohol 
intake, whilst encouraging the same people to eat more fruit and 
vegetables.  In terms of interpersonal relations, we do not want 
everyone to become our close friends, thus we can keep certain 
people ‘at a distance’ whilst encouraging others to ‘come a little 
closer’. Secondly, Kotler and Levy (1973) suggested that buyers 
sometimes market themselves to sellers.  If, for example, a person 
wants to secure a bank loan, s/he will do well to ‘make an effort’ in 
terms of preparation and personal presentation.  Why should the 
bank manager give money to one person rather than another?  
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Given parity in all other departments, a well presented individual, 
with manners and charm, will likely prevail over a ‘competitor’ 
lacking in these social graces.  Similarly, we will probably engender 
a better rapport in a food outlet if we treat the staff with courtesy.  
In short, the buyer can seek to improve his/her standing in relation 
to a ‘seller’ through marketing him/herself as a desirable person to 
sell to or serve.  This phenomenon may relate especially in cases of 
the buying and selling of pets or houses - the adage about not 
giving ‘pearls to swine’ comes to mind here. 
 
2.3.4 Concluding Section 2.3 
The exchange paradigm encourages a focus on the dynamics 
occurring between specific participating agents.  The value creation 
paradigm focuses on the co-creation of value, [See section 2.5.4 of 
this review] where the term ‘value’ functions synonymously with the 
notion of ‘valued experiences’.  In both paradigms we see an 
implicit focus on controlling the offering [its physicality, context, 
accessibility, associational dimensions, and ‘price’] in order to 
facilitate ‘value creation’.  I will argue that, viewed from a field-
theoretical-perspective, anything and everything that comprises a 
particular ‘field’ potentially enters the value creation [experience 
creation] process.  The ‘organism/environment field’ (Perls et al 
1951, p. 228), thus constitutes the essential, indissoluble context of 
exchange processes: 
 
 There is no single function of any animal that completes itself 
 without objects and environment, whether one thinks of 
 vegetative  functions like nourishment and sexuality, or 
 perceptual functions, or motor functions, or feelings, or 
 reasoning. 
 
Any value/experience inescapably arises from the 
exchange/interaction between an individual and his/her micro-
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environment.  The notion of the “consumer commodity” [we 
consume, and also get ‘consumed’ by self and others (Bauman 
2007, p. 57)] implies a ‘taking in’ and a ‘giving to’, but the field-
theoretical-perspective implies that such an exchange does not 
simply occur between ‘actor1’ and ‘actor2’.  The exchange goes on 
between ‘actor1’ in relation to his/her total environment, and ‘actor2’ 
in relation to his/her total environment.  ‘Actor2’ forms a part of 
‘actor1’s’ environment; and ‘actor1’ forms a part of ‘actor2’s’ 
environment.  The exchange thus always occurs between 
contextualised individuals embedded in their respective 
organism/environment fields.   The individuals may, or may not, 
share the same geographical setting; during an email exchange, for 
example, the individuals may exist in discrete, distant locals.  
 
An artist, marketer, or homemaker - anyone for that matter - may 
attempt to control, for example, every aspect of a work, an offering, 
or a domestic environment. Yet the consuming and producing 
individual who enters such a ‘managed field’ fundamentally changes 
the structure of the field as s/he becomes a constituent part of it.  
Thus the consumer-producer always experiences and acts as a field-
co-constituting agent.   The field-co-constituting individual thus 
always experiences and acts in relation to other aspects of the wider 
‘field’. In this way, an individual does not solely consume a 
particular product/service to the exclusion of all else; rather, s/he 
attends to whichever aspect(s) of his/her organism/environment 
field become(s) fore-grounded on a second-by-second basis. 
 
The ‘figure/ground’ concept (Thompson et al 1989, p. 136) points to 
the fact that: 
 
 A particular setting can afford different experiences as certain 
 aspects of the context stand out while others recede and 
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 become background […]. Consider a mother and child 
 shopping in a store. Initially, the mother is focally aware of 
 the store’s offerings and the child is in the background of her 
 experiential field.  Let the child begin crying and, 
 suddenly, the store recedes into the background as the child 
 becomes the focal aspect of the mother’s life-world. 
 
And, on the same theme, Gestalt therapist Fritz Perls (1973, p. 2) 
writes: 
 
 A man coming into a room full of people, for example, does 
 not perceive merely blobs of color and movement, faces and 
 bodies.  He perceives the room and the people in it as a unit, 
 in which one element, selected from the many present, 
 stands out, while the others recede into the background.  The 
 choice of which element will stand out is made as a result of 
 many factors, all of which can be lumped together under 
 the general term interest.  As long as there is interest, the 
 whole scene will appear to be organized in a meaningful way.  
 It is only when interest is completely lacking that perception is 
 atomized, and the room is seen as a jumble of  unrelated 
 objects. 
 
And finally, psychologist/philosopher William James (1890, p. 402) 
writes: 
 
 Millions of items in the outward order are present to my 
 senses which never properly enter into my experience.  Why? 
 Because they have no interest for me.  My experience is what 
 I agree to attend to.  Only those items which I notice shape 
 my mind - without selective interest, experience is an utter 
 chaos.   
 
Thus, a person within a given setting (such as a cinema or 
restaurant) may not, simply, consume the ostensible object of 
consumption i.e., the movie or the meal.  Whilst ostensibly ‘taking 
in’ one thing, s/he may alternatingly or concurrently ‘take in’ 
something else. Thus, whatever a person ‘takes in’, registers, or 
notices, via his/her senses, within and/or outside of him/herself, 
become(s) his/her of-the-moment object(s) of consumption. 
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2.4 Defining ‘Consumption’ and ‘Consuming’ 
 
2.4.1 So what do we Mean by ‘Consumption’? 
As with the terms ‘product’, ‘image’, and ‘marketing’, discussed 
earlier in this review, much hinges on how people understand the 
term ‘consumption’.  Mackay (1997, p. 2) asks a key question, “So 
what exactly do we mean by consumption?”   Wilk (2004, p. 11) 
answers, saying that most social scientists employ a, “vague, 
undefined and intangible” notion of consumption.  O’Connor (2002, 
p. 151) goes some way towards explaining this ‘fuzziness’. He 
describes words such as: ‘fear’, ‘relationship’, and ‘consumption’ as 
nominalizations: 
 
 A nominalization is the result of a verb being turned into an 
 abstract noun. […] When a noun cannot be directly seen, 
 heard, touched, smelled or tasted, it is a nominalization.   
 
In order to begin to concretise a nominalization, O’Connor (p. 151) 
suggests that we “turn the noun back into the verb and express the 
thought as a process.” Cheal (2008) calls this process 
“denominalising” - ‘fear’ becomes ‘feeling afraid’, ‘relationship’ 
becomes the process of ‘relating’, and the term ‘consumption’ 
becomes a specific act of ‘consuming’.  Nominalizations, including 
‘consumption’, leave-out relevant information [Who does what to 
whom?], hence their vagueness.  O’Connor (2002, p. 177) says, 
“They [nominalizations] lack any specific information, so [a person] 
makes sense of them in any way that suits them best.”  In Figure 
2.1 we can see some of the information necessary for a person to 
construct a more specific understanding of what the term 
‘consumption’ implies.  In this case I have used the hypothetical 
example of consuming a movie.  In short, when people (or other 
organisms) engage in consumption, they ‘consume’ something or 
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other. This begs a further important question, posed by Holt (1995, 
p. 1), “What do people do when they consume?” 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Nominalization - Adapted from O’Connor (2002, p. 
152)  
 
Aldridge (2003, p. 2) traces the word ‘consume’ back to the 
fourteenth century; it originally meant, “to use up, destroy, devour, 
waste, squander, exhaust.”  Wilk (2004, p. 16) writes: 
 
 Burning is historically the first English usage of the verb 
 consume, attributed to the Wyclif Bible in 1382, in a biblical 
 passage where a  sacrifice ‘with fier shal be consumyd?’ (Lev. 
 6: 23). 
 
Wilk suggests (p. 16) that “[e]ating and consuming are also 
connected to each other through their common metaphorical 
relationship to fire, and the act of burning.”  [The burning-up of 
calories]    Bauman (2007, p. 25) refers to the, “archetypical form 
of [consumption,] the metabolic cycle of ingesting, digesting and 
excreting”. And Levy (1996, p. 164) refers to, “the primitive roots 
of consuming” and, like Bauman (2007), he links the broad concept 
of consuming to the processes of eating: 
 
 The first definition of the word “consume” is usually to eat, to 
 ingest, followed by other meanings also derived from the Latin 
 origins of the word - to take completely, to use up, to destroy, 
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 and to waste.  As consuming organisms, we take food, use it, 
 and make waste. 
 
Cskszentmihalyi (2000, p. 271) cites economist/philosopher Adam 
Smith [1723-1790] as a person who promoted the notion, “that 
production is justified by consumption; that the needs of the 
consumer dictate what the economy should provide.”  This accords 
with Williams’ (1988, p. 78) assertion that the ‘consumer’, as 
distinct from the ‘producer’, of goods and services, began to emerge 
as a linguistic term from the middle of the eighteenth century.   
However, Williams (1988, p. 79) cites the late nineteenth century 
(primarily in America, but spreading quickly) as the period when the 
notion of the ‘consumer’ of products and services came to the fore.  
This period coincided with the development of, what Williams (1988, 
p. 79) describes as:  
 
 Modern commercial advertising […] the creation of needs and 
 wants and of particular ways of satisfying them, as distinct 
 from  and in addition to the notification of available supply 
 which had been the main earlier function of advertising […].   
 
Williams (1988), goes on to suggest that manufactures and their 
agents thus created the figure of ‘the consumer’.  Drescher (1992, 
pp. 322-323) cites the latter half of the nineteenth century as the 
historical period when producers first employed registered-
trademarks [Thellefsen et al (2007, p. 63) describe a trademark as 
the legal term for a brand name] to differentiate and identify 
otherwise indistinguishable goods. Drescher mentions Quaker oats, 
which in 1877 became the world’s first registered trademark for 
breakfast cereal.  Williams (1988, p. 79) suggests that the term 
‘consume’ became a more-generally-used term, as distinct from its 
specifically political/economic sense, by the mid-twentieth century.  
Aldridge (2003, pp. 14-15) writes: 
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 The consumer as a chooser is the property of neoclassical 
 economics.  Against this, rival disciplines, notably sociology 
 and social anthropology, have emphasized other images [of 
 the consumer], above all the consumer as communicator.  
 Cultural studies has intervened in support of the consumer as 
 hedonist/artist. 
 
In cultural studies, Mackay (1997, p. 2) tells us that: 
 
 Consumption is seen as an active process and often 
 celebrated as pleasure […]. In postmodern accounts cultural 
 consumption is seen as being the very material out of which 
 we construct our identities: we become what we consume. 
 
And, as Graeber (2011, p. 489) puts it, “a whole intellectual 
industry has developed over the past few decades around the study 
of consumption.”  As a recipient of a studentship, with my focus on 
problematizing ‘consumption experiences’, I share in the spoils of 
this economy.  
 
As we saw in section 2.2 of this review, the range of phenomena 
now deemed ‘consumable’ has become extensive, if not exhaustive.    
Each of these ‘product’ types has the potential to develop a public 
image, which consumers may use as identity markers. Choosing 
one product, rather than another, may thus hinge on the ‘image’ as 
well as the functionality of the product.  The product thus becomes 
a means of communication (to self and others), in addition to any 
other functions it performs.  
 
2.4.2 Consuming as a Metaphor 
According to exponents  of  ‘cognitive linguistics’, [Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980), Sweetser (1990), Ibarretxe-Antuñano (2002)]  
since human beings can not exist without food and drink,  we may 
view the consumptive activities of eating and drinking as 
fundamental, and thus ‘prototypical’, examples of consumption.  
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Newman (1997, p. 214) writes, “The unique place of the human 
body in our daily lives makes the human body, and its associated 
parts and processes, conceptually basic.”  Wilk (2004, p. 16) 
suggests that, “Some things seem more like consumption than 
others because of their proximity and resemblance to the prototype 
[of eating/drinking and, by extension, burning].”  According to Wilk, 
then, the term ‘consumption’ does not provide water-tight 
categorization, but, rather, provides relational benchmarks 
[eating/drinking/burning] which enable us to apply the term 
‘consumption’, more or less loosely, in relation to non-food 
phenomena. 
 
Having considered Newman (1997, p. 214), whose work on 
metaphor theory derives from cognitive linguistics, I deduce that we 
can extend the prototypical ‘source domains’ of eating and drinking 
to the ‘target domains’ of each or the product categories mentioned 
in Table 2.1 [self, others, places, ‘things’, organisations, and ideas]. 
These product categories, when broadly construed, potentially serve 
to classify any phenomena which occur in life. So, although I refer 
to them as ‘product categories’, I view them as extensively 
applicable to the full gamut of phenomena comprising our lives and 
environments. Following Newman (1997, pp. 214-216), we can 
start by identifying the various component parts of the overall 
processes of eating and drinking: hunger/thirst, intake, 
mastication/swallowing, digestion, nourishment, gustation, and 
excretion.  Wilk (2004, p. 19) augments this prototypical sequence 
of eating/drinking-related events by inserting ‘shopping’ after 
‘hunger’.  I have added cooking/preparation/presentation after 
‘shopping’, to render the enumerated sequence of events more fine-
tuned and inclusive.  In Tables 2.2-2.7 we can see how, by 
metaphorical extension, I have mapped the componential actions, 
comprising eating and drinking, onto each of the six product 
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domains [self, others, places, ‘things’, organizations, and ideas] 
gleaned from Table 2.1. In simple terms, the processes involved 
when consuming the various types of products, equate, more-or-
less, with the basic sequence of events involved in eating and 
drinking.  Thus whilst we do not, for example, literally, feel hungry 
for a concert ticket, we may feel a desire (a hunger-like state) for 
the ticket. In the case of the ‘self’, as a product category, [Table 
2.2]   we can relate each of the componential processes of ‘literal’ 
eating and drinking, such as hunger/thirst, shopping, and cooking, 
to the ‘figurative’ consumption the self. The manifest self thus 
becomes a surrogate, metaphorical food - a consumable 
phenomenon - for the delectation of oneself and others. Cognitive 
linguists thus suggest that we can understand a concept, such as 
‘consumption’, through the relation of various phenomena, which 
we class as instances of consumption, to the prototypical forms of 
consumption: eating, drinking, and burning. 
 
 
 Table 2.2 Self-As-Food 
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 Table 2.3 Other(s)-As-Food 
 
 Table 2.4 Place(s)-As-Food 
 
 
 Table 2.5 ‘Thing(s)’-As-Food 
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 Table 2.6 Organisation(s)-As-Food 
 
 
 Table 2.7 Ideas-As-Food 
 
Up to this point I have mentioned only physical consumption i.e., 
the use of the senses in eating-related, or eating-like, activities. 
Matters become more interesting when we employ Sweeter’s (1990, 
p. 28) THE-MIND-AS-BODY metaphor.  According to this metaphor, 
we may view the mind as if it had the properties and propensities 
that we would ordinarily expect to find in a free-standing, living 
organism. As with an actual living organism, we may view the mind 
as having its own physiological and psychological consumptive 
requirements.    Viewed in this way, the mind lives off, and in, its 
immediate, intra-organismal, micro-environment - effectively 
nourished by its host-body’s inner goings-on.  In this manner, the 
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mind consumes the thoughts and sensations which populate its 
domain, within the individual consumer.  Hirschman (1984, p. 115) 
writes: 
 
 In a phenomenological sense consumption consists of the 
 generation of internal thoughts and/or sensations, which 
 constitute the content of experience. 
 
Hirschman goes on to make the point that even when consumption 
comprises of the intake of ‘external-to-the-self’ stimuli, the 
processes of consuming entail the generation of intra-personal 
psychological-and-sensory-goings-on.  So, in viewing the mind, 
itself, as a consuming organism, Sweetser’s (1990) work invokes 
the notions of: the mind’s-eye, the mind’s ears, the mind’s nose, 
the mind’s mouth, and the mind’s fingers.   Ibarretxe-Antoñano 
(2002, p. 113) builds on Sweetser’s work, again explaining that, 
“the mind is understood as a separate person, with its own bodily 
functions and necessities.”  This metaphorical mapping of the 
physical sense organs onto the functioning of the mind helps to 
explain how we can view thoughts and sensations, themselves, as 
consumable via the mind’s sensorium.  Just as the physical body 
consumes products from without; the mind consumes inner-body 
(phenomenological) ‘products’.  Interestingly, Sarukkai (2002, p. 
473) compares consuming to perceiving, “Perception is consumption 
- a self-consumption.”  Sarukkai thus explicitly links the notion of 
‘self-perception’ with that of ‘consumption’. He describes this as a 
form of (metaphorical) cannibalism.  But Noë (2009, p. 475) writes:   
 
 To perceive something is not to consume it, just as it is not a 
 matter of constructing, within our brains or minds, a model or 
 picture or representation of the world without.  
 
Noë continues (p. 482): 
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 What enables objects and their properties to show up for us in 
 experience is the fact that they exist and that we have access 
 to them.  A theory of direct perception requires a theory of 
 access. 
 
I   have only recently [June 2013] encountered this notion of us 
having direct access to the world - as apposed to us forming 
internal representations thereof. I feel it appropriate to 
acknowledge the existence of this point of view, without currently 
having the breadth of understanding required to either embrace or 
discount it. I make this point to highlight the truism that, when 
conducting research, one really can’t look under every stone.   
 
Schelling (1984, pp. 343-344), posits a concept of consuming that 
combines the physical consumption, of stimuli external to the 
consumer, with the psychological consumption of stimuli 
manifesting themselves within the consumer: 
 
 We consume with our mouths and noses and ears and eyes 
 and proprioceptors and skin and fingertips, and with the 
 nerves that react to external stimuli, and internal hormones; 
 we consume relief from pain and fatigue, itching and thirst.  
 But we also consume by thinking. We consume past events 
 that we can bring up from memory; future events that we can 
 believe will happen; contemporary circumstances not 
 physically present, like the respect of colleagues and the 
 affection of our neighbours and the health of our children; and 
 we can even tease ourselves into believing and consuming 
 thoughts that are intended only to please.  We consume good 
 news and bad news. 
 
As mentioned earlier, Perls et al (1951, p. 259) describe the totality 
of an individual’s mind/body combo, along with its surrounding 
context, as an “organism/environment field”.  
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2.4.3 The Field-Theoretical Perspective 
Kurt Lewin (1952) developed the notion of Field Theory. Lewin 
asserted that any constituent aspect of a particular context (and/or 
any combination of aspects therein) may contribute to the 
behaviour (including the ‘experience’) of a person embedded within, 
and thus co-constituting, that field.  Every new field has a unique 
configuration, never quite the same as before. Lewin (1946, p. 
239), for example, writes: 
 
 In general terms, behavior (B) is a function (F) of the person 
 (P) and of his environment (E), B = F (P, E). This 
 statement is correct for emotional outbreaks as well as for 
 “purposive” directed activities; for dreaming, wishing, and 
 thinking, as well as for talking and acting. 
 
Figure 2.2 comprises of a diagrammatic representation of an 
organism/environment field, viewed from the perspective of 
consuming. By replacing an attempt to isolate the 
experiential/behavioural impact of consuming particular products, 
with a field-theoretical perspective (Lewin 1946, pp. 238-241), we 
may view the entirety of any particular existential context or 
situation - such as a research conversation - as a ‘field’.  A person’s   
experience and action, at any point in space-time will thus depend 
on the particular subset of organismic and environmental stimuli to 
which s/he simultaneously contributes to and attends to.   
 
2.4.4 Concluding Section 2.4  
I started this review by discussing the expansion of what constitutes 
a product - everything potentially qualifies as a ‘product’ when 
viewed from a liberal perspective.  Bagozzi’s theory of exchange 
sets a precedent for viewing the interactions occurring within an 
organism/environment field as, at the very least, ‘marketing-like’ 
phenomena - with their value-generating potential. The 
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metaphorical use of the term ‘consumption’ constitutes a 
perception-like phenomenon.  And thus we arrive at a field-
theoretical perspective in which the dualistic notions of ‘production’ 
and ‘consumption’ give way to an immersive, fluid interaction 
between organisms and their environments, in which discrete roles 
of ‘producer’ and ‘consumer’ get replaced by a fusion of these two 
roles.  Indeed, I will subsequently bring into question the use of 
these economically-derived terms as a means of characterizing 
human being - even within ‘consumer research’. 
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Figure 2.2 An Organism/Environment Field Viewed from the Perspective of Consumption
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2.5 ‘Consumption Experiences’ 
 
2.5.1 Beginnings  
 
 […] Kotler and Levy opened possibilities for studying hitherto 
 neglected kinds of products such as those found in 
 commercial communication in general and in entertainment, 
 the arts, advertising, and the media in particular.  Indeed, 
 Kotler and Levy’s expansive view tended to legitimate a 
 sphere of interests that [...] [I], by temperament, […] found 
 virtually irresistible - including music, visual art, movies, 
 and television. 
 
    - Holbrook (1995, p. 11) 
 
Marketing/consumer-research academics regularly cite Holbrook 
and Hirschman (1982) as the article that introduced the notion of 
experiential consumption. For example, Arnould and Thompson 
(2005, p. 869) tell us that Consumer Culture Theory (CCT) has its 
origins in calls by researchers for a broadening of the field to 
include the experiential, social, and cultural dimensions of 
consumption.  They cite Holbrook and Hirschman (1982) as 
trailblazers in this regard.  Carù and Cova (2007, p. 3) cite Holbrook 
and Hirschman (1982) as the “seminal article” that introduced the 
notion of experience into the study of consumption and marketing.  
And Friedmann (1986, p. 1) cites Holbrook and Hirschman (1982) 
as the article that represents the ‘experiential perspective’ in his 
survey of the different eras in consumer research.  Holbrook 
belatedly acknowledged other trailblazers of the ‘experiential view’.  
In Holbrook (1995, p. 80) he wrote: 
 
 As with any conceptual development, this shift in perspective 
 had its roots in the earlier work of others.  Had we known 
 the literature better, we could have found clear anticipations 
 of our viewpoint, traced obvious parallels with earlier writings, 
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 and done more to acknowledge the contributions of […] others 
 […]. 
 
Holbrook goes on to mention certain theoretical forebears: Wroe 
Alderson, Harper Boyd, Sid Levy, Jack Jacoby, and Walter Woods.  
Holbrook continues (p. 81), “Our early failure to credit these 
intellectual predecessors in enough detail resulted from simple 
ignorance.”  
  
Holbrook and Hirschman (1982, p. 135) posited the ‘experiential 
view’ as a counterpoint to the, then, prevailing ‘information 
processing view’:  
 
 The information processing view conjures up an image of the 
 consumer as a problem solver engaged in goal-directed 
 activities of searching for information, retrieving memory 
 cues, weighing evidence, and arriving at carefully considered 
 judgemental evaluations. 
 
In the conclusion to their paper, Holbrook and Hirschman (1982, p. 
139) note that: 
 
 […] neither problem-directed nor experiential components can 
 safely be ignored.  By focusing single mindedly on the 
 consumer as information processor, recent consumer research 
 has tended to neglect the equally important experiential 
 aspects of consumption, thereby limiting our understanding of 
 consumer behaviour. 
 
On the same topic Schelling (1984, p. 344) writes: 
  
 
 So we have at least two distinct roles for our minds to play: 
 that of the information processing and reasoning machine by 
 which we choose what to consume out of the array of things 
 that our resources can be exchanged for, and that of the 
 pleasure machine or consuming organ, the generator of direct 
 consumer satisfaction. 
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The authors of the last two quotes argue for the inclusion of both 
approaches, [information processing, and the experiential aspects of 
consumption] rather than encouraging a blanket focus on one or the 
other.  
 
2.5.2 Definitions    
Holbrook (1995, p. 101) defines consumption experiences as: 
 
 […] the experiences that occur when some living organism 
 acquires, uses, or disposes of any product that might achieve 
 a goal, fulfill a need, or satisfy a want.  In short, consumer 
 research encompasses virtually all human activities regarded 
 from the viewpoint of consummation. 
 
Carù and Cova (2003, p. 270) write: 
 
 For researchers of consumer behaviour, an experience is 
 above all a personal occurrence, often with important 
 emotional significance, founded on the interaction with stimuli 
 which are the products and services consumed […]. 
 
According to Carù and Cova (2007, p. 38), “An experience is a 
subjective episode that customers live through when they interact 
with a firms product or service offer.”  And Holbrook and Hirschman 
(1982, p. 137) write, “[…] this [experiential] viewpoint calls 
attention to the experiences with a product that one gains by 
actually consuming it.”  The last batch of definitions, of the term 
‘consumption experience’, position it as the experience triggered by 
the consumption of a specific product or service.  However, as we 
have seen in our discussion of co-branding earlier, [Section 2.2.4] 
we do not consume individual products in a vacuum; they always 
form part of a field which includes other elements as well as the 
consumer him/herself - and perhaps others. 
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In their article in which they adopt a field-theoretical perspective, 
Hirschman and Holbrook (1986, p. 216) write: 
 
 Consumption, we believe, is not something that people do to 
 products (i.e., goods or services); rather consumption 
 involves the experiences accumulating in consumers as they 
 interact with products. 
 
They go on (p. 217): 
 
 Thus, on this view, consumption consists fundamentally of 
 experiences generated during interaction with products.  The 
 product may be a good, or service, sign or significate, a 
 tangible or  intangible, a thing or concept; in short, it may be 
 any aspect of a person’s environment. The consuming 
 situation involves an interaction between that person and 
 environment. The consumption experience responds to the 
 nature of the person environment interaction.  
 
I feel in total agreement with the last quotation.  Hirschman and 
Holbrook go on to write (p. 220), “In addition, we follow several 
authors in regarding the consumption situation as a person-
environment interaction.”  It seems that Hirschman and Holbrook 
go along with the idea that a person may consume any aspect of 
his/her environment, not just the ostensible/designated object of 
consumption.  
  
Holt (1995, p. 15) broadens the notion of consumption beyond the 
experiences one hosts whilst consuming, “One important implication 
[of his research] is that consuming is never just an experience, a 
disinterested end in itself.”  Holt develops a four-part typology of 
‘consumption practices’. Through observing people consuming 
baseball games, Holt suggests that people consume for: (1) the 
experiences that the process of consuming engenders, (2) for the 
sense-of-self that the consumption of the host product helps to 
establish and/or consolidate - what Holt calls the ‘integration’ of the 
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product into one’s self-concept, (3) to classify or position oneself in 
relation to others - creating a sense of group-belonging/identity, 
and (4) for the fun of it - which Holt defines as the ways in which 
consumers use their acts of  consumption as a basis for communing 
and socialising with others, so that the consumers develop a ‘shared 
experience’ and/or a playful dialogue based on their respective 
experiences. 
 
Holt’s perspective interests me in the sense that he observes that 
consumers employ the object of consumption in a variety of ways.  
Yes the consumption of baseball (to use Holt’s example) does give 
rise to experiences; but consumers also use the baseball offering for 
self-definitional/classificatory purposes, and as the basis for 
interpersonal sharing.  Thus, for Holt, ‘to consume’ means 
something more than simply ‘taking in’ or registering a product 
stimulus; for him the act of consumption encompasses the 
employment of products/services as aids in productive social 
performances.  I think this raises an interesting ambiguity.  I note 
that we do employ [and thus consume] products in self-definitional 
practices, however, this strikes me as a combination of production 
and consumption. Wilk (2004, p. 23) cites the terms “productive 
consumption” and “consumptive production”.  For him, these terms 
refer to the work involved in shopping, self-assembly of products, 
and the work of familiarising oneself with a product's features and 
its mode of operation, and the like. He continues, “In the real world, 
there are no simple boundaries between consumption and 
production or work and leisure.”  Kotler (1986a, 1986b) highlights 
the notion of ‘prosumers’, “people who produce many of their own 
goods and services.”  Kotler (1986b) writes, “salad bars are 
increasingly popular in restaurants because many people prefer to 
‘compose’ their own salads.”  Kotler (1986a) frequently uses the 
example of ‘people cooking their own food’ as an archetypal 
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‘prosumer’ activity - one in which production and consumption go 
hand-in-hand.  Kotler (1986b) ends on this note, “People want to 
see themselves as cause, not effect; as players, not spectators, in 
producing their life results.”  Humphreys and Grayson (2008, p. 3) 
write: 
  
 By conventional practice, the organization (or set of 
 organizations) that grows, harvests, roasts, and sometimes 
 grinds the beans is labelled the ‘producer’, whereas the 
 person who brews the coffee in order to drink it is labelled the 
 ‘consumer’. But, importantly, both producer and consumer 
 work to create the value in the cup of coffee.  The creation of 
 value does not necessarily distinguish these two roles. 
 
Ritzer (2009, pp. 10, 12) writes: 
 
 The consumers of pornography are increasingly themselves 
 also its producers.  They may either photograph or video 
 themselves, or use ‘friends’ to do the ‘work’. […] It may well 
 be that instead of shifting between production and 
 consumption, we should have always been focusing on 
 prosumption. 
 
And Xie et al (2008, p. 116) make the point that: 
 
 Once a product has been purchased it can be used in many 
 ways: consumed “as is”, changed in form or composition, or 
 added to other ingredients to produce concoctions in which 
 any given input may no longer be recognizable. 
 
The last batch of quotes underscores the fact that academics have 
acknowledged the problematic of trying to create a watertight 
distinction between so-called ‘production’ and ‘consumption’. 
Similarly, in a quote I used earlier, Firat and Dholakia (1998, p. 96) 
wrote: 
 
 […] consumption is not a mere act of destroying, or using 
 things. It is also not the end of the (central) economic cycle, 
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 but an act of production of experiences and selves or self 
 images […]. 
 
I view the complex processes of assemblage, which constitute self-
expression, as productive activities which incorporate the 
consumption of products and services.  When a painter paints, s/he 
consumes tubes of paint, paint brushes, canvas, and turpentine 
etc.; but I suggest that we do not ordinarily view this activity as 
primarily an act of consumption.  Indeed, according to Kotler 
(1986a), “In Japan, some of the ‘famous’ scroll painters made their 
own brushes, mixed their own paints, and even made their own 
paper.”  This, according to Kotler, made them model ‘prosumers’.  
We tend to view painting as a productive practice that involves the 
consumption of resources.  Having said that, Hirschman (1983, p. 
49) has suggested that we can view the painter as someone who 
consumes his/her own creative process as it unfolds, “In self-
orientated marketing the creator may serve as the initial consumer 
of that which he/she creates.”  Thus the painter consumes his/her 
own emergent painted image.  In this way, the creative/productive 
act of painting goes hand-in-hand with the consumption of material 
resources and the artistic process itself, by the painter.  And, of 
course, when completed the painting becomes an object of 
consumption for others - assuming it gets displayed.  And yet, 
nominally, ‘consumption’ takes precedence if we call painting a 
‘consumption experience’. 
 
Carù and Cova (2003, p. 276) make an interesting distinction 
between ‘consumption experiences’ and ‘consumer experiences’.  
For them a ‘consumer experience’ involves a market relation, 
involving financial exchange.  A ‘consumption experience’, however, 
need not involve a direct commercial component.  The authors list 
three types of ‘consumption experience’ which do not centre on 
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market phenomena: (1) family experiences, (2) friendship 
experiences, and (3) citizenship experiences.  They write (p. 276):  
 
 If marketing is exchange, then when there is no [monetary] 
 exchange the individual no longer lives experiences as a 
 consumer,  but experiences of consumption which are outside 
 the market. 
 
Here we see an attempt to keep commercial and non-commercial 
worlds apart. However, if I go out with my mum [‘family 
experience’], socially, to a café for a meal, we travel there in a car, 
both dressed in purchased clothes, breathing the ambient, un-
commoditised, air. We cannot, it seems to me, separate commercial 
and non-commercial spheres - they interpenetrate. 
 
Carù and Cova (2003, p. 271) quote Arnould  et al (2002) who posit 
the idea of dividing-up the consumption process into four, 
interrelated  stages: (1) ‘pre-consumption experience’, (2) 
‘purchase experience’, (3) ‘core consumption experience’, and (4) 
‘remembered/nostalgia consumption experience’.  According to this 
view, we cannot pin down consumption to one specific point in time. 
Similarly, Holbrook (1995, p. 88) refers to: “the acquisition, usage, 
and disposition of products.”  Rather like the baby that starts its life 
as twinkles in its parents’ eyes, consumption begins with the first 
intimations of an idea, desire, need, gravitational-attraction, and so 
forth.  To study a complete consumption cycle may prove 
impossible, since the ‘remembered consumption episode’ remains 
open to the vagaries of re-telling, subject to mood-changes, and the 
retro-active impact of current experiences (Cowley 2007). And, as 
already stated, the very notion of a ‘consumption cycle’, nominally 
at least, leaves out constructive and productive activities - unless 
we co-opt all creative expression under the auspices of the term 
‘consumption’ 
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2.5.3 Aesthetic, Hedonic, and Symbolic Consumption 
Holbrook (1995, pp. 55-56) makes an interesting confession: 
 
 In the late 1970s, I began referring to this general stream of 
 research [pertaining to advertising, the arts, entertainments 
 and the media] as ‘consumer aesthetics’ (Holbrook, 1980).  
 I thought then (and still do) that one can best position one’s 
 work by designating a trademark, logo, or slogan to set it 
 apart and to capture people’s attention.  In this spirit, the 
 term consumer aesthetics has proven useful.  Nonetheless, 
 this ‘trademark’ is just a fancy name for studies of commercial 
 communication.  
 
Here Holbrook exemplifies the way in which researchers may create 
research-stream ‘brands’ that compete to attract increased adoption 
by the marketing and consumer research sectors. 
 
Holbrook (1980) uses the term ‘esthetic’ to designate a category of 
products [the arts, entertainments and media] and also a particular 
type of experiential response - one involving cognitive and sensory 
pleasure.  Holbrook uses the term ‘hedonic’ to describe one of the 
aspects of aesthetic response.  Likewise, in defining the term 
‘hedonic consumption’ Hirschman and Holbrook (1982, p. 92) 
mention the “esthetic, intangible and subjective aspects of 
consumption”.  And the term ‘symbolic consumption’, whilst 
ostensibly referring to both the denotative and connotative 
meanings associated with particular offerings, has an inescapable 
experiential dimension.  As Levy (1959, p. 119) puts it: 
 
 It will suffice to say that in casual usage symbol is a general 
 term  for all instances where experience is mediated rather 
 than direct; where an object, action, word, picture, or 
 complex behavior is understood to mean not only itself but 
 also some other ideas or feelings. 
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Thus Levy makes the salient point that symbols may give rise to 
feelings as well as cognitive ‘meanings’.  For example, a particular 
type of motor car may symbolise wealth and prestige whilst also 
giving rise to sensory responses within consumers of the vehicle.   
     
Friedmann and Lessig (1986, p. 1 of 9) state: 
 
 The central notion of aesthetic consumption is that consumers 
 may attend to, perceive and appreciate a product for itself, 
 without regard to the utilitarian functions [or] benefits it may 
 provide the consumer. 
 
Hirschman and Holbrook (1982, p. 96) give examples of, what they 
call, ‘esthetic products’, “audio records and tapes, novels, plays, 
movies, opera, sporting events and so forth.”  They go on to make 
the point that, “[…] all products can be hedonically experienced by 
consumers […]”.  Venkatraman and MacInnis (1985, p. 8 of 10) 
underscore this latter point when they report on research which 
demonstrates that: 
 
 Hedonic consumers perceive the hedonic aspects of a product, 
 whether it is a bathroom tissue, movies, or opera. Cognitive 
 consumers, on the other hand, see the practical/functional 
 value of a product, be it football or peanut butter.  
 
And for Holbrook (1995, pp. 11-12) the term “consumer aesthetics” 
pertains to:  
 
 […] consumer’s appreciative responses to artworks, to 
 entertainment, to advertising, to the media, or to other 
 products that provide aesthetic experiences ranging in 
 intensity from the simplest hedonic pleasure to the most 
 profound ecstatic rapture […].  
 
Hirschman and Holbrook (1982, p. 92) define hedonic consumption 
as: 
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 […] those facets of consumer behavior that relate to the 
 multisensory, fantasy and emotive aspects of one’s 
 experience with products. 
 
If we relate these latest quotes to the previous discussion, in this 
chapter, we can perhaps deduce that, if a person’s experience 
derives from his/her total interaction with his/her micro-
environment, then, any aspect of his/her moment-to-moment 
experience and action can have a multisensory dimension.  
Hirschman (1984, p. 117), for example, cites the smelling of flowers 
and making love as examples of sensory consumption.  Holbrook 
(1995, p. 135) refers to the consuming, “of services provided for 
free (by family members [and pets])”.  And Gould (2008, p. 413) 
writes about, “the consumption of light, energy, sound, sensation 
and thought, whether or not product related.” As one reads a 
newspaper one may host a  multisensory experience if, for example, 
one looks at an advert [symbolic], as one drinks a cup of tea 
[hedonic] whilst reading well-written prose [aesthetic]. 
Furthermore, even [perhaps ‘especially’] the use of utilitarian 
products - such as a sponge, detergent, and water, used whilst 
washing a car - may coincide with daydreaming/fantasy as a means 
of spicing up the mundanity of  the car-washing process.  
 
To avoid going round in circles here, it will perhaps suffice to say 
that the terms ‘aesthetic’, ‘hedonic’ and ‘symbolic’ do not readily 
allow for watertight separability, they overlap somewhat. These 
three research tributaries flow into the unified river of human being. 
 
2.5.4 Value - Incorporating ‘Co-Creation’  
As touched on briefly earlier, some consumer researchers describe 
the positive and/or negative responses that consumers have whilst 
interacting with other people and products as the ‘value’ that 
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consumers derive from those encounters.  Vargo and Lush (2008, p. 
7) write, “Value is always uniquely and phenomenologically 
determined by the beneficiary.”  And later they make an important 
qualifying statement (p. 9): 
 
 However, to the extent that the word experience is intended 
 in a phenomenological sense, we are comfortable with the 
 terms [‘experiential’ and ‘phenomenological’] being used 
 interchangeably,  as we have done on a number of occasions. 
 
In other words, the consumer ultimately determines ‘value’ through 
the nature and quality of the experience that s/he has whilst 
consuming a particular product/offering.  The term ‘co-creation of 
value’ designates, what Prahalad and Ramaswamy (2004, p. 8) 
define as the, “joint creation of value by the company and the 
consumer.” This contrasts with the view that those making the offer 
‘provide’ the value.  Vargo and Lusch (2004, p. 11) put paid to this 
latter notion with their assertion that, “the enterprise can only make 
value propositions”.  They go on to write, “the consumer must 
determine value and participate in creating it through the process of 
coproduction.”  Thus any offering constitutes, at best, a value 
proposition.  When we watch a movie, the movie does not ‘contain’ 
value, which we simply swallow whole, like a pill.  We must, rather, 
generate positive and/or negative value through our organismal 
goings-on whilst watching the movie.  However, the product-
centricity of this way of thinking seems at odds with the field-
theoretical orientation that I have mooted in this chapter.  In other 
words, the ‘value’ experienced as one consumes a particular product 
may derive from other elements that co-constitute the 
person/environment ‘field’ that the particular product contributes to. 
 
Holbrook (1999, pp. 5-9) defines value in a compact, yet complex, 
manner, “I define customer value as an interactive relativistic 
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preference experience.”  This means interactive in the sense of an 
interaction between a perceiving individual and some physical or 
mental object(s). The term relativistic has three senses.  First I can 
say I prefer water to beer, but I can’t say that I like water more 
than you like water.  In other words, I must make ‘utility 
comparisons’ between objects but not comparisons relating to 
perceiving individuals. In the second sense, relativistic means that 
individuals value the same phenomena differently.  And, thirdly, 
relativistic means that value depends on the context in which an 
individual makes a value judgement. The term preference functions 
as a synonym for the idea of ‘a positive evaluation judgement’. And 
the term experience relates to the idea that, “customer value 
resides not in the product purchased, not in the brand but rather in 
the consumption experience(s) derived therefrom […]”. 
 
Ballentyne and Varey (2006, p. 335) bring the various threads, 
which I have discussed, together: 
 
 […] a customer’s value-in-use begins with the enactment of 
 value propositions, and the development of reciprocal value 
 propositions […]. 
 
2.5.5 Concluding Section 2.5 
The phenomenon of ‘consumption experience(s)’ has become a 
widely accepted object of study.  Nominally starting from the early 
1980s, but traceable back to the 1950s, marketing academics, and 
consumer researchers, have focused on the experiential aspects of 
product- and service-use.  However, now, because of the inclusivity 
of what we might classify as ‘products’ and ‘services’, we have 
reached the stage where, at least one prominent marketing 
academic, namely Morris B. Holbrook, takes the view that we can 
think of all human experiences as ‘consumption experiences’ 
(Woodward and Holbrook 2013, p. 327).   When broadly construed, 
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the terms ‘consumption’ and ‘consuming’ may apply to the whole of 
daily life.  Through extension, via the MIND-AS-BODY metaphor, the 
notions of the mind’s eye, the mind’s nose, the mind’s ears, the 
mind’s tongue, and the mind’s fingertips come into play.  When we 
perceive through our five senses we ‘consume’ the perceived 
phenomena.  We thus consume thoughts, sensations, and other 
‘inner-body’ goings-on, as well as consuming external-to-self 
phenomena.  This expansive conception of consumption and 
consuming provides warrant for treating the research process, 
including - but not limited to - video-recorded research 
conversations, as ‘legitimate’ embodiments of the various 
marketing-related concepts mentioned earlier in the review.  
Specifically, I have in mind the LIFE-AS-PRODUCT-BUFFET 
metaphor, which entails ‘prosumers’ going about their ‘business’ of 
reciprocal value-creation. 
 
Viewed from this perspective, the idea of studying people’s 
responses to a focal product, such as a movie, a book, or a musical 
concert, gives way to an approach which views each moment as 
comprising of a dynamic constellation of elements, which 
collectively constitute the entire ‘field’ of ‘play’.  This field-
theoretical perspective undergirds my research initiative.  By taking 
seriously the conceptual-broadening-work of some of my academic 
colleagues, I dispense with the pursuit of ‘consumption experiences’ 
associated with particular products and instead treat people’s 
moment-to-moment experiences and actions, within research 
processes, themselves, as the foci and loci (respectively) of my 
study.  In this way I have not so much discovered a gap in the 
literature; rather I have, by taking ‘broadening’ to its furthest 
reaches, arrived at a place where products, marketing, and 
‘consumption experiences’ have become so exhaustively  pervasive, 
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that we no longer need focus on particular ‘commercial’ offerings to 
justify our research.   
 
An obvious classificatory problem accompanies the adoption of this 
point of view.  If the whole of life, and not just ‘commercial life’, 
becomes the subject of marketing thought, then ‘life processes’ and 
‘marketing and consumption’ become synonymous.  Some have 
already crossed this conceptual threshold.  Once we call all of our 
experiences ‘consumption experiences’ we have acceded to a world-
view colonised by a commercially-co-opted metaphor.  Attempts to 
ameliorate this state of affairs by showing that the term 
‘consumption’ has its roots in the human processes of eating, 
drinking, and burning, do little to change the vast connotational 
freight that the term ‘consumption’ triggers in people at this time in 
world history.  Rebranding the term ‘consumption’ seems, to me, an 
unlikely solution.  
 
In a nutshell, what a person notices links, inseparably, to what that 
person does.  Consumption, it seems, forms one half of a binary 
opposition, namely, ‘production’ versus ‘consumption’.  The coining 
of the term ‘prosumption’ constituted an attempt, by some 
academics, to reconcile these inseparable processes.  What do I 
notice and what do I do?  What do I experience and which actions 
do I perform?  My research becomes the study of human being, as 
people, nominally, engage in ‘research’.  Surely ‘consumption’ must 
become subsumed within life at large, rather than life becoming 
subsumed within marketing-speak?  We thus reach a deeply 
political moment.  We must choose how we characterise our life and 
times.  “Beyond ‘Consumption Experiences’” we find ‘experiaction’, 
but more of that later.   
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If I apply the foregoing discussion to my own research initiative, 
then each field-embedded individual, in a social interaction, co-
constitutes a value proposition for the other.  I say that each 
individual “co-constitutes a value proposition for the other” because 
the individuals inescapably reside within their encompassing 
context, and this all-encompassing context/field provides the 
individuals embedded therein with the multifarious means of value 
creation.  This amalgam of latent value-triggers clearly extends 
beyond the interacting humans. Each person forms only a part of 
the interacting-other’s micro-environment. As I promised earlier, I 
have sought to demonstrate that the conceptual infrastructure 
already exists within marketing-thought to support this way of 
thinking.  Specifically, if we think of a person as a ‘product-
amongst-products’, and if the whole existential field constitutes a 
product-buffet, then product-centricity makes no sense since, even 
when distracted from the ostensibly-focal product, say a movie, a 
person can not readily avoid alighting on some other ‘product’, 
whether within or outside of him/herself.  In other words, rather 
than pursuing a person’s response to a particular product, it makes 
sense, from a field-theoretical perspective, to open oneself to 
whatever a person attends to - from moment-to-moment - whilst 
s/he apparently, or nominally, engages with a designated ‘main 
event’, such as a movie.   
 
2.6 My Research Agenda  
 
Aldridge (2003, pp. 7-8) draws our attention to, broadly, two 
possibilities in relation to the study of consuming: (1) one may 
focus on the “economic models of consumption”  which relate to, for 
example,  the supply of, and demand for, products and services, or 
(2) one may explore the more subjective, irrational aspects of 
consuming.  We may think of these as macro- and micro- 
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perspectives, respectively. The first, with its focus on the 
generalised/segmented consumer, contrasts with the second, a 
focus on the particular goings-on of the specific, individuated 
consumer. And, perhaps more importantly for my research 
initiative, we can make a further distinction between (a) a view of 
consuming which specifically focuses on the consumption of 
commercial goods and services, and (b) a view of consuming which 
conceptualises it as a pervasive social/psychological phenomenon, 
that transcends a focus on goods and services, and thus extends to 
the whole panoply of phenomena comprising everyday life. This 
includes: self and self-awareness, others (including animals, plants, 
and the like), places, ‘objects’, organisations, ideas, and so on.  In 
the discipline of consumer research, the terms ‘product’ and 
‘service’ usually serve to delimit which phenomena researchers, 
working in the domain, can ‘legitimately’ study.  Holbrook (1995, p. 
11), for example, writes:  
 
 […] Kotler and Levy [(1969a), Kotler (1972)] opened 
 possibilities for studying hitherto neglected kinds of products 
 such as those found in commercial communication in 
 general and in entertainment, the arts, advertising, and the 
 media in particular.  Kotler and Levy’s expansive view tended 
 to legitimate a sphere of interests that […] [I] found virtually 
 irresistible - including music, visual art, movies, and 
 television. 
 
Aldridge (2003, p. 5) describes the concept of ‘consumption’ as 
“contested”, moreover, “It is in the nature of such concepts that no 
agreement about their definition will ever be achieved; the contest 
is interminable.”  Stephen Gould, a consumer researcher, addresses 
the ambiguity and lack of clarity with regard to what constitutes 
‘real’ consumption. He refers to Schelling (1984) [cited earlier] 
(Gould 1993, pp. 204-205): 
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 […] Schelling […] in defining the mind as a consuming organ 
 went  further than most consumer researchers would in his 
 concept of consumption as including the consumption of 
 events, memories, and so on which do not necessarily involve 
 products or services. […]  While we can deproblematize his 
 concept of consumption by limiting our investigation to mental 
 activity which is consumption-related in terms of actual 
 products and services, we nevertheless still run into the 
 problem that the boundaries between consumption and non-
 consumption are not clear.  […]  [I] leave open the question 
 of how permeable the boundaries should be for future 
 exploration and discussion. 
 
And Ariely and Norton (2009, p. 477, 478) point out that: 
 
 […] although one view of consumption divides consumption 
 into  consuming the physical (food, water) compared with 
 consuming the psychological (ideas, information), the 
 sociological/anthropological  view suggests that this division 
 may be artificial: Conceptual consumption is implicated in 
 even the most basic consumption acts, such as eating or 
 drinking, and is therefore paramount. […] We suggest that 
 consumer behaviour is fundamentally and increasingly the 
 study of conceptual consumption, broadly defined across 
 many domains of consumption. 
  
How can we cleanly separate the thoughts and sensations 
attributable to a particular product stimulus, from thoughts and 
concomitant sensory activity which may have derived from, say, a 
prior act of consumption? Christopher Bollas (1992, p. 3) writes: 
 
 As we inhabit this world of ours, we amble about in a field of 
 pregnant objects that contribute to the dense psychic textures 
 that  constitute self experience. […] In this respect, then, the 
 objects of our world are potential forms of 
 transformation. [Value propositions]  When we select any 
 series of objects - such as listening to a particular record, 
 then telephoning a particular person, then reading from a 
 particular book - we transform our inner experience by 
 eliciting new psychic textures that bring us into differing areas 
 of potential being.  
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We may view Bollas, here, as writing about a series of different 
products consumed in succession, and the cumulative, and 
dynamic, experiential impact of this on the individual consumer. 
Solomon and Assael (1987), in contrast to Bollas, focus on, what 
they call, “product constellations”.  They define these as (p. 191): 
 
 […] clusters of complementary products, specific brands, 
 and/or consumption activities used by consumers to define, 
 communicate, and enact social roles. 
 
They go on to write: 
 
 Although it is clear that many products possess symbolic 
 meaning for consumers, it is also apparent that in many cases 
 no single product in isolation defines a social situation.  
 Instead, consumers look to the total collection of cues in 
 the environment to decode the meanings present there 
 and to structure their behavior accordingly […]. 
 
And later Solomon and Assael (1987, p. 198) write, “The consumer 
must amass a collection of symbolic ‘props’ which permits him or 
her to credibly play these [social] roles.”  Thus we can see how 
Solomon and Assael invoke the notion of theatrical ‘props’ in their 
discussion of the staging of social selves.  This accords with Gibbs 
(2002, p. 26), who states: 
 
 It is important to be able to describe the individual elements 
 of mise-en-scène, and it is important to consider each 
 element’s potential for expression.  But it is worth 
 remembering from the outset that these elements are most 
 productively thought of in terms of their interaction rather 
 than individually - in practice, it is the interplay of elements 
 that is significant. 
 
Whether in the dramatic arts, marketing, or social settings, the 
ones making the ‘offer’ must consider how the contents and 
 82 
 
 
organisation of their managed micro-environments, in toto, impact 
on their respective audiences.     
 
To recap then, we have seen that the theatrical/cinematic concept 
of ‘mise-en-scène’, when it manifests in relation to retail 
environments, becomes ‘experience engineering’ (Carbone and 
Haeckel 1994).  Sociologist Erving Goffman (1959) called the way 
that people seek to control what others perceive (by regulating 
aspects of self and environment) ‘impression management’.  
Concomitantly, we can call the individual components that comprise 
a given scenario: ‘properties’ in the theatre/cinema, ‘clues’ or 
‘products’ in a commercial space, and ‘objects’ in a social context.    
I have emphasised the interrelatedness of these domain-boundary-
crossing concepts and practices en route to problematizing the 
domain-specific notion of ‘consumption experiences’.     
  
Gould (1991, pp. 195, 197) straddles the fine line between the 
commercial and the non-commercial when he writes about how he 
manipulates his moment-to-moment experience [what he calls his 
“perceived vital energy”] through, both, what he partakes of and 
what he partakes in: 
 
 [A]s I discuss how I experience and manage my vital energy 
 in consumption, it should be kept in mind that I am speaking 
 of the everyday phenomena of immediately bodily felt 
 (noticeable) experience […] i.e., sensations and their 
 mediating desires, moods, emotions, and thought […]. The 
 gestalt of the perceived effects of these sensations, affect, 
 and cognitive phenomena constitutes what I call “perceived 
 vital energy.” […] [W]hen envisioning potential energy states, 
 selecting desired  ones, and so forth, the individual may also 
 consider engaging in nonconsumption-orientated activities, 
 such as sleeping, lovemaking, meditating, and so on, rather 
 than product use  operations. [Note however that Hirschman 
 (1984, p. 117) includes “smelling flowers” and “making love” 
 as examples of “sensory consumption” and Holbrook (1995, p. 
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 119)  characterizes “loving a cuddly pet” as an “emotionally 
 complex” “consumption phenomena”] Thus, while the process 
 of energy regulation through these activities is similar to  
 that for product use, it is important to note that 
 sometimes a consumer may actually make a choice between 
 engaging in a consumption activity or a nonconsumption 
 activity […] (e.g., I might choose to meditate to calm down,   
 play calming music to do so, or do both). In a related 
 manner, we might note that the individual will take the 
 resultant energy state as a base for further desires and 
 actions no matter whether they come to be expressed in 
 terms of consumption or other activities. 
 
Carù and Cova (2003, p. 282) write: 
 
 [P]ractitioners [researchers, managers, professionals - 
 involved in  marketing] must be able to take the full breadth 
 of a phenomenon such as experience, from the ordinary to 
 the extraordinary, from the commercial to the non-
 commercial. 
 
The last two quotations point to the idea that if we grant an 
individual behavioural and perceptual liberty, allowing him/her to 
engage with the world freely via his mind/body, then we can not 
expect to cleanly separate the commercial aspects of the ‘field’ from 
the non-commercial aspects.  An individual’s focal awareness will 
determine the particular mix of phenomena that s/he notices and 
acts on.  However, Hirschman and Holbrook (1986, p. 224) deal 
with the issue - of the non-commercial components in ‘consumption 
experiences’ - in another way.  They bundle any ‘extra-curricular’ 
experiential content - such as distractions and incidentals - in with 
the experience resulting from the consumption of the ‘main’ 
consumption object.  They write: 
 
 […] consumption consists fundamentally of experiences 
 generated during interaction with products.  The product may 
 be a good or service, sign or significate, a tangible or 
 intangible, a thing or concept; in short it may be any aspect 
 of a person’s environment. 
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Thus, for Hirschman and Holbrook (1986), whatever experience a 
person hosts, whilst consuming a particular product, becomes 
his/her ‘consumption experience’.  The ‘consumption experience’ 
consists of the experience that coincides with the consumption of a 
particular product, such as a movie.  In contrast to this, I propose, 
at the outset, that we bring into question this specific-product-
centric orientation and, in its stead, posit a field-wide person-
centred orientation - an approach that follows the vagaries of an 
individual’s focal attention, rather than encouraging (implicitly or 
explicitly) the expression of focal-product noticings.     
 
I suggest that when viewed from a field-theoretical standpoint, the 
object of study for ‘consumer researchers’, interested in ‘consumer 
experience’, becomes the individual’s moment-to-moment ‘give’ and 
‘take’ in relation to his/her organism/environment field.  Hirschman 
and Holbrook (1986, p. 213) quote Laudan (1977, p. 80), “[…] 
one’s views about the appropriate methods of inquiry are generally 
compatible with one’s views about the objects of inquiry.”  I have 
described the manner in which, at the outset, I intend to re-think 
consuming in the light of a field-theoretical orientation. I will now 
briefly address the methodological implications of adopting the 
proposed perspective. 
 
In the rough and tumble of everyday life, people do not operate like 
scientifically-calibrated consuming units. Consumer researchers can 
not simply pop a product sample into the belly of  a microwave-
oven-like consuming machine, which will burn-up the product 
sample and furnish the researcher with a black box recording of the 
exact nature of the sample’s experiential impact on the consuming 
unit.  On the contrary, people living their daily lives consume a host 
of phenomena, often in an oscillating and overlapping manner, 
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perhaps focusing, variously, on a product’s attributes, their own 
aberrant thoughts, uncontrollable visceral sensations, as well as an 
array of other commercial and non-commercial phenomena. 
 
The flux of people’s focal attention renders the notion of a clean-
burning consumption-machine problematical. I can’t, in good faith, 
treat people as if they lived in a smokeless-fuel zone, where they 
can only burn the ‘legally sanctioned’ fuel i.e. products/services.  
One can understand that consumer researchers may wish to 
analyse particular types of  ‘fuel’, the resultant ‘smoke’, the ‘heat 
generated’, and ‘the speed at which it burns’, and the like;  
however, a person’s experiences and actions do not  (apart from in 
sterile experimental conditions) lend themselves  to an isolationist 
treatment, in terms of stimulus-response.    
 
Instead of predetermining the consumption-object of interest, in a 
particular setting, and focusing on responses to the consumption of 
that specific object, I envisage observing how individuals [including 
myself] experience and act from moment to moment.  In other 
words, my agenda comprises of focusing on person/environment 
dynamics themselves. This will allow me to address goings-on ‘live’ 
as they occur within the research process.  Indeed some 
researchers have, implicitly and explicitly, called for such an 
approach.  As Shotter (2006, p. 198) puts it: 
 
 It is not a matter of what an outcome can be attributed to 
 after the event, but a matter of getting inside the event as it 
 is happening to describe the unfolding invitations, barriers, 
 and resistances at work in each unfolding moment, that are in 
 fact shaping people’s actions within the event. 
 
To mix my metaphors still further: seen through a field-theoretical 
lens, ‘products’ and ‘services’ take their places alongside manifold 
 86 
 
 
other ‘props’ and ‘actors’ in the staging of, what Aztec Camera 
(1990) memorably describe as, the “one-take movie” that we call 
life.  I consider myself a student of this ‘big picture’, operating from 
the perspective of a participant observer. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
         
3.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I address the methodological implications resulting 
from my review of the literature relating to consumption and 
‘consumption experiences’.  In short, some consumer researchers 
have suggested that any aspect the 360°-‘inner’-‘outer’ existential 
‘field’ may momentarily become the ‘object’ for some form of 
consuming.   In taking this broad view seriously, it became evident 
to me that  I did not need to posit a  focal object or ‘product’,  as 
has become routine in consumer research, rather, any aspect of 
human being would suffice as an exemplar of ‘consuming’ and 
‘producing’ conduct - broadly construed.  Thus the contextualised 
research conversation, itself, seemed as relevant a place to start as 
any other when beginning to reconsider the universal applicability of 
the notions of consuming and producing.   
 
I gravitated to existential-phenomenology because, prima facie, 
when introduced to the orientation at graduate school, it struck me 
as the most touchy-feely, experience-centred, research tradition on 
offer. In particular, Gestalt therapists draw heavily on existential-
phenomenological thought, and so my early reading focused on the 
works of Fritz Perls, a co-founder of Gestalt therapy. The references 
for this chapter include some of those books.   
 
After introducing some foundational tenets of existential-
phenomenology, I go on to discuss how those existential-
phenomenological basics informed my approach within the research 
conversations.  I then discuss how I went about recruiting my 
volunteers. I finally address the most salient ethical issues 
pertaining to my ‘data collection’ process. 
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I have chosen to present my approach to data analysis in the next 
chapter.  I did not want to overload the reader in the form of one 
long, dense chapter here.  Furthermore, I wanted to emphasise the 
distinctiveness of my own approach to data analysis in a stand-
alone setting.    
 
3.2 Defining Existential-Phenomenology 
 
Valle et al (1989, p. 6) write: 
 
 From its very name, existential-phenomenological psychology 
 is quite obviously the result of a blending of two interrelated 
 perspectives, existentialism and phenomenology. Although 
 existentialism and phenomenology constitute complementary 
 approaches, certain distinctions can be made between them. 
 
Valle et al (1989, p. 6) go on to mention two twentieth-century 
existentialists, Jean-Paul Sartre and Martin Heidegger, and 
characterise the existential orientation as seeking to address: 
 
 […] the concrete existence of the individual person and
 attempt[ing] to elucidate the fundamental themes with which 
 human beings invariably struggle […]: joy, despair, love, 
 freedom, and choice […]. 
 
Greetham (2006, p. 255) suggests that, “If any single principle 
constitutes the doctrine of existentialism it is that freedom and 
choice are central facts of human nature.”   In terms of my own 
research initiative, this issue relates, for example, to my focus on 
the degrees of perceptual and actional liberty that a 
researcher/research-volunteer can exercise within the framework of 
the overall research process. The term ‘existentialism’, then, 
represents a few core concepts with a bearing on my project: a 
focus on concrete physical and experiential facts, a focus on the 
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momentary choices people make, along with the degree of freedom 
that human beings can exercise, in the microcosm of the research 
process.   
 
The term ‘phenomenology’, according to Churchill and Richer (2000, 
p, 168) pertains to: 
 
 […] the turning of one’s regard towards the multiplicity of 
 experiences wherein everything to which we relate shows 
 itself.  In simpler terms, phenomenology is the disclosure of 
 things or events as they occur for someone, with the ultimate 
 aim of uncovering and articulating the modes of presence that 
 co-constitute, and thus make possible, the perception of all 
 things and events. 
 
The phrase, “everything to which we relate” in the last quotation, 
pertains both to ‘external’ [to a perceiving human being] ‘objects’ 
and to ‘internal’ [to a perceiving human being] goings-on.  I will 
return to the topic of phenomenology towards the end of this 
section. Suffice it to say here that, taken together, the compound 
term ‘existential-phenomenology’ (according to von Eckartsberg 
1998, pp, 8, 16) means, “the application of the phenomenological 
method to the perennial problems of human existence.”  He 
continues:  
 
 With some justification, we can say that the mystery of 
 existential-phenomenology is concealed in the hyphen itself.  
 It indicates the difficult expressive problem of languaging the 
 simultaneity and interpretation of both living and thinking, of 
 spontaneous enactment and reflective explication. 
 
I will proceed, then, by spelling out the main tenets which comprise 
existential-phenomenological-thought and which pertain to my own 
project.   
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3.3 Some Tenets of Existential-Phenomenology 
 
3.3.1 Co-constitutionality/Field Theory 
 Valle et al (1989, p. 7) write: 
 
 The major (and perhaps the most critical) issue is that people 
 are not viewed as just objects in nature. Rather, the 
 existential-phenomenological psychologist speaks of the total, 
 indissoluble unity or interrelationship of the individual and his 
 or her world. The existential man or woman is more than 
 simply natural man or natural woman.  In the truest sense, 
 the person is viewed as having no existence apart from 
 the world and the world as having no existence apart from 
 persons. Each individual and his or her world are said to 
 coconstitute one another. In traditional psychology, people 
 and  their  environments are seen, in effect, as two separate 
 and distinct things or poles.  This traditional conception is 
 rejected by the existential-phenomenologist, in favour of the 
 previous mentioned unity. 
 
Thompson et al (1989, p. 135) refer to this as a “contextualist world 
view.”  According to Valle and King (1978b, p. 8) the notion of 
“dialogical relationship” underpins the notion of ‘co-
constitutionality’. They explain that a person and his/her micro-
environment always engage in a moment-to-moment dialogue with 
each other.  This involves the person taking-in/registering aspects 
of what the world has to offer, and also involves the person acting 
purposefully towards the world i.e., engaging with, and/or putting 
something out into, the world.  Moss (1978, p. 86) writes: 
 
 Perception and action are usually studied in isolation from one 
 another. Yet, both neurologically and at the level of human 
 action in lived-space, we discover that they are intertwined.  
 To be underway in some action is to organize our perception 
 towards some object, and inversely, to perceive a situation in 
 the world is to be invited into active involvement in that 
 situation.  With every step forward, our view of the situation 
 is adjusted; with every adjustment in our view, we are invited 
 to step forward anew.  Merleau-Ponty has called this 
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 continuous interplay between man and his world a dialectic. 
 In this dialectic between man and his world it is difficult to 
 distinguish strictly between perception and action […]. 
 
I now see this issue, of ‘dialogical relationship’, as the source of an 
ambiguity that I discerned during my review of the literature. This 
pertained to whether we view, say, an artist-at-work, as primarily 
engaged in an act of consuming, an act of producing, or both. If we 
view perception and action as mutually implicated in the dialogue 
between an artist, his/her painting accoutrements, and his/her 
studio, then we accept perception and action as functionally 
inseparable. Schelling (1984, pp. 343-344) posits an expanded 
definition of consuming:  
 
 We consume with our mouths and noses and ears and eyes 
 and  proprioceptors and skin and fingertips, and with the 
 nerves that react to external stimuli and internal hormones; 
 we consume relief from pain and fatigue, itching and thirst. 
 But we also consume by thinking.   
 
Accordingly, the verb ‘to consume’ becomes somewhat 
interchangeable with the dictionary definition of the verb ‘to 
perceive’ i.e., to “become aware or conscious of” [Concise Oxford 
English Dictionary, 11th Edition].  When two individuals interact, 
within, for example, a research conversation, they coexist, for the 
duration of the conversation, within their shared micro-
environment, and create an interdependent system.  
 
Readers familiar with Kurt Lewin’s ‘field theory’ will perhaps identify 
a parity between the notions of ‘co-constitutionality’ and ‘field’.  
Lewin (1952, p. 240) wrote, “A totality of coexisting facts which are 
conceived of as mutually interdependent is called a field.”  Neither 
Valle et al (1989) or Thompson et al (1989) employ the term ‘field’ 
in their introductory discussions regarding existential-
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phenomenology.  However, some Gestalt therapists use the term 
‘field’ whilst also describing Gestalt therapy as having an existential-
phenomenological orientation.  For example, Yontef (1993, p. 3 of 
39) writes, “The scientific world view that underlies the Gestalt 
phenomenological perspective is field theory.”  Indeed, Valle and 
King (1978a) include a section [pp. 295-299, written by Sol S. 
Rosenberg] about Frederick [Fritz] Perls (a co-founder of Gestalt 
therapy) in their book about existential-phenomenology.  Rosenberg 
(p. 295) quotes Laura Perls (1976) (a co-founder of Gestalt therapy 
and one-time wife of Fritz Perls) as saying: 
 
 Gestalt therapy takes its bearing from what is here and now, 
 not from what has been or should be.  It is an existential-
 phenomenological approach and as such it has to be 
 experiential and experimental. 
 
3.3.2 The Life-world 
Moving on to another tenet of the existential-phenomenological 
orientation, Valle et al (1989, p. 9) write: 
 
 The Lebenswelt, being given directly and immediately in 
 human experience, is the starting point or ground for the 
 existential-phenomenological psychologist.  The life-world is 
 the foundation upon which existential-phenomenological  
 thought is built (no assumptions are made as to what might 
 be behind or cause the life-world); in the truest sense, the 
 Lebenswelt is the beginning. 
 
According to Burley and Bloom (2008, p. 152), phenomenology 
derives from Immanuel Kant’s distinction between phenomena and 
noumena.  Kant posited noumena as ‘things-in-themselves’, the 
things which populate the ‘objective’ world.  He used the term 
phenomena to designate the world as perceived by the individual.  
Kant asserted that human beings cannot experience noumena 
directly; they can only have knowledge of the ‘objective’ world via 
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phenomena - the content of perceived ‘reality’ - what Valle and King 
refer to (above) as a person’s Lebenwelt or life-world. 
 
3.3.3 Intentionality 
Burley and Bloom (2008, p. 151) cite Franz Brentano [1838-1917] 
as the first person to conduct serious investigations into 
phenomenology. However, Edmund Husserl [1859-1938], one of 
Brentano’s students, usually gets described as the founder of 
phenomenology. [See, for example: Greetham (2006, p. 195), 
Robson (2002, p. 195) and Valle and King (1978b, p. 7)]  According 
to Hacker (2001, p. 119) Brentano, “brought afresh into the 
limelight” what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages had called 
‘intentionality’. Brentano’s re-introduction of notion of ‘intentionality’ 
began the process by which it has become one of the staple tenets 
of present-day existential-phenomenology.  Valle et al (1989, p. 11) 
write: 
 
 […] the existential-phenomenological psychologist also points 
 out  that we are never merely conscious but are always 
 conscious of something. Saying that consciousness is always 
 a "consciousness of” means that it always has an object (an 
 object, that is, that is not consciousness itself). This object 
 may be of a concrete nature such as a chair, a tree, or 
 another person; it could be anyone of a number of dream 
 images, or it could be an abstract idea or concept. 
 Consciousness is, therefore, said to be intentional in nature or 
 to be characterized by intentionality. That is, when speaking 
 of consciousness, one is either implicitly or explicitly referring 
 to its intended object as well. 
 
Similarly, both Anscombe (1965) and Ryle (1932) link the notion of 
intentionality with the grammatical relation between transitive verbs 
and their objects - as in ‘thinking (verb) a thought (object)’.   
Anscombe (1965, p. 56) writes of, “intentional verbs, taking 
intentional objects”, and Ryle (1932, p. 171) writes, “To every piece 
of mental functioning there is intrinsically correlative something 
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which is the accusative of that functioning […] all consciousness is 
‘intentional or ‘transitive’”. 
 
I have recently [2013] encountered the adverbial theory, which 
brings into question the taken-for-granted use of transitive verbs of 
mental conduct and their direct objects.  As Pendlebury (1998, p. 
101) puts it: 
 
 The core of the [adverbial] theory, consists […] in the denial 
 of objects of experience (as apposed to objects of perception) 
 coupled with the view that the role of the grammatical object 
 in a statement of experience is to characterise more fully the 
 sort of experience that is attributed to the subject by saying 
 something about the contents of that experience.  The claim, 
 then, is that the grammatical object functions as a modifier, 
 and, in particular, a modifier of a verb.   
 
According to Bestor (1979, p. 233) Gilbert Ryle suggests that, in 
place of mental phenomena, such as ‘abstract ideas’, 
‘consciousness’, and ‘images’, we can speak in terms of different 
modes/types of mental conduct . Bestor (1979, 236) quotes Ryle as 
saying: 
 
 Don’t look for things named by the bits and pieces of our 
 mental talk (covert things).  Think of that talk as qualifying 
 the doings and undergoings of people (doings and 
 undergoings both overt and covert).  
 
So, instead of, for example, ‘having a daydream’, adverbially one 
‘imagines daydreamingly’.  The noun ‘daydream’ gets adverbialised,   
such that the adverb ‘daydreamingly’ qualifies the verb ‘imagines’. 
Thus we have modes-of-mental-conduct rather than mental verbs 
acting on mental objects. This philosophical move fundamentally 
challenges an aspect of the ontology of ‘intentionality’ and 
‘transitivity’, by postulating an objectless mental/phenomenological 
landscape. In terms of my own research, adverbial theory gives me 
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pause when discussing the commonplace view that we may 
‘consume’ our own ‘thoughts’ and ‘feelings’.  Adverbialised, 
‘consuming one’s own thoughts’ becomes ‘thinking self-watchingly’. 
One doesn’t have a ‘thought’ separate from the 
thinking/consumption thereof - one has an adverbially-modified 
mode of thinking/consuming. But a mode of psychological 
consuming without an ‘object’ becomes ‘foodless’ consuming.  
Without figurative/mental ‘food’ the psychological-consumption 
metaphor breaks down.  I revisit this topic in chapter 13. 
 
3.3.4 Figure/Ground 
Thompson et al (1989, p. 136) position ‘intentionality’ as an 
“attendant concept” in relation to the notion of figure/ground; they 
explain the figure/ground metaphor thus, “A particular setting can 
afford different experiences as certain aspects of the context stand 
out while others recede and become background […]” For example, 
an individual faced with a vista, actively ‘takes-in’ the scene 
according to the selectivity and mobility of his/her sensory-
attending.  The aspects of the scene which become ‘figural’ [stand 
out], for the individual, co-exist with the aspects of the vista that 
simultaneously become ‘ground’ [contextual background] to the 
‘figure’. Thus the ‘figure’ and the ‘ground’ mutually, and 
inseparably, co-constitute each other. Perls (1973, pp. 2 and 8) 
writes: 
 
 The choice of which element will stand out is made as a result 
 of many factors, all of which can be lumped together under 
 the general term interest. […]  Formulating this principle in 
 terms of Gestalt psychology, we can say that the dominant 
 need of the organism, at any time, becomes the foreground 
 figure […]. The foreground is that need which presses most 
 sharply for satisfaction, whether the need is […] physiological 
 or psychological.  
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Thus, that which seems most pressing, salient, or ‘appropriate’, 
from moment to moment, serves to highlight whatever, in our 
experiencing, needs attending to. 
 
Since human perception always takes place within particular 
contexts, and since consciousness, according to an intentionalist 
account, always explicitly or implicitly focuses on some ‘thing’ 
beyond the act of consciousness itself, then we cannot insist that 
emergent experiencing derives solely from human subjectivity. The 
intentionality of perception implicitly posits a world beyond 
consciousness - whilst awake, we remain ‘conscious-of-some-thing’. 
We can not, so far as I know, simply have an awareness of 
conscious itself.  However, as mentioned in the previous section, 
adverbialism suggests that we undertake ‘mental’ acts - of, say, 
imagining, remembering, and thinking - ‘consciously’, rather than 
having an awareness of a ‘thing’ called ‘consciousness’.  Thus, the 
notion of a ‘separate’ consciousness gives way to multifarious 
mental acts undertaken consciously - self-awarely, self-
monitoringly, self-watchingly.   According to adverbial theory, then, 
doing things consciously replaces the notion of ‘consciousness’ per 
se. 
 
3.3.5 Intentionality in Brief  
Philosophically speaking, we can perhaps only hypothesise with 
regard to the existence of an ‘objective’ world, separate from 
human perception, since without intentional consciousness the 
world would have no witnesses. As Brownell et al (2008, p. 19) 
note: 
 
 The world as it is lived gets its meaning through the existence 
 of individual consciousness that makes it present in the act of 
 intentionality. Without the person, without consciousness 
 through which the objects are revealing themselves, the world 
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 would not exist in any meaningful way.  The world exists only 
 as “world-for-consciousness” […]. Objects in the world, 
 including other persons, exist only through the meanings we 
 create for them, i.e.  they exist as intentional objects.  
 Neuroscientific research […] proves that the immediate 
 perception, the first translation of a stimulus into an object, 
 lasts perhaps a split second.  Our brains immediately engage 
 further, more complex schemas created in and derived from 
 our whole experience, and they start to construct meaning.  
 Meaning is implicit in our experience of reality.  As a matter of 
 fact, reality for a person is the process of experiencing.  The 
 subjective “I” and its intentional objects thus create an 
 indissoluble unity characterized by mutual intentionality.  In 
 this sense the existence of one is dependent on the other.  
 Through the world in consciousness the meaning of the 
 person’s existence emerges, and the world gets meaning, its 
 existence, through consciousness which makes it present. 
 
3.3.6  Reflection and Prereflection  
There remain a clutch of related terms which need explaining before 
we can complete this round-up of key existential-phenomenological 
concepts.  Valle and King (1978b p. 11) describe the distinction 
between reflective thought and a prereflective stage.  We can think 
of reflective thought as the elaboration of more-basic sensory 
perceptions. These, more-primary, prereflective perceptions pre-
date the elaborative, reflective stage of experiencing. Some 
existential-phenomenologists seek to get ‘back’ to the prereflective, 
unelaborated realm of perceiving the world, to the extent that they 
can. This process requires that the existential-phenomenologist 
‘brackets’ (or ‘puts-out-of-play’) their so-called ‘natural attitude’ in 
favour of a so-called ‘transcendental attitude’.  The former ‘natural 
attitude’ views the self and the world as discrete entities and views 
the world as governed by cause-effect scientism (Valle and King 
1978b, p. 12).  By seeking to usurp the ‘natural attitude’ with an 
attitude informed by the foregoing (existential-phenomenological) 
theoretical perspective, some existential-phenomenologists seek to 
move towards perceiving the world, in a manner less infused with 
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preconceptions and habitual, patterned ways of perceiving.  
However, Valle and King (1978b, p. 12) acknowledge that, “This 
process of bracketing is one that never ends so a complete 
reduction is an impossibility.”  The term ‘reduction’, here, pertains 
to the process of subduing the ‘natural attitude’ and amplifying a, 
so-called, ‘transcendental attitude’. In other words, reduction 
entails a movement ‘back’ towards experiencing prereflective, raw 
phenomena, as against elaborated, reflective experiencing. 
 
Willis (2001, p. 8) distinguishes between “classical approaches to 
phenomenological research” and, what he calls “‘new’ 
phenomenology”.  He goes on to spell out the distinction: 
 
 It is then possible to inquire about the nature of the 
 experience and how it presented itself as a phenomenon as 
 in classical phenomenology or to follow the alternative 
 empathetic phenomenology by inquiring what the subject 
 made of that experience: what was its significance. 
 
In this regard I take my lead from Finley (2009, p. 9) who suggests 
employing terms such as, “phenomenologically inspired” or 
“phenomenologically orientated” in order to differentiate less-strictly 
Husserl-informed approaches from more strictly Husserlian 
approaches. In this regard Colaizzi (1978, p. 69) makes the 
powerful point that, “[…] dialogal research uncovers presuppositions 
most fruitfully.” In other words, research participants acting more 
reflectively, may wittingly and/or unwittingly disclose their world-
views, preferences, prejudices, beliefs and so on, via the details of 
their spontaneous verbal and non-verbal expression, as they 
engage in nominally ‘unstructured’ dialogue.  Thus, everyday 
speaking may provide us with useful information, without our 
having to try to, systematically, ‘get back’ to a more ‘essential’ 
state of being. 
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3.3.7  A Non-Prescriptive Approach  
Finally, King et al (1978, p. 273) write: 
 
 Since existential-phenomenology is not a mechanical-type 
 theory, each practitioner’s incorporation of the theory into 
 their own work will be somewhat different […]. 
 
Here King et al suggest that an existential-phenomenological 
approach constitutes a non-prescriptive orientation; we can expect 
individuals to appropriate aspects of the overall approach 
idiosyncratically.  This gave me licence to research without feeling 
overly wedded to a well-worn path. 
 
3.3.8 Concluding Section 3.3 
In this section I have introduced the main tenets of the existential-
phenomenological approach. In the course of discussing 
‘intentionality’ I briefly introduced adverbial theory which postulates 
a radical departure from received views regarding intentionality and 
transitivity.  I will return to the topic of adverbial theory in chapter 
13 of this thesis, but, for now, I wish to make the point that I have 
not simply adopted the existential-phenomenological orientation 
wholesale.  The existential-phenomenological approach enabled me 
to get my bearings in a sea of alternative approaches.  I needed to 
start somewhere, to obtain a theoretical foothold. In the course of 
my data analysis I also appropriated aspects from a different, 
though complimentary, theoretical approach, namely cybernetics; I 
will come to this in due course. 
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3.4 Noticing 
 
Hollway and Jefferson posit four core questions associated with 
analysing qualitative data:   
 
 what do we notice? 
 why do we notice what we notice? 
 how can we interpret what we notice? 
 how can we know that our interpretation is the ‘right’ one? 
   
   - Hollway and Jefferson (2000, p. 55) 
 
 
 notice  v. 1 become aware of. 
 
   - Concise Oxford English Dictionary (11th Edition) 
 
 
It seems clear to me that a live research conversation presents 
participants with manifold forms of ‘data’, all just as susceptible to 
Hollway and Jefferson’s questions as a written text or a piece of 
audio  data.   What, for example, do we notice as we converse with 
another person during a research conversation? According to my 
Concise Oxford English Dictionary (11th Edition) the verb ‘to notice’ 
means: to “become aware of”. By substituting the latter for the 
former in Hollway and Jefferson’s opening quote we get: 
 
 what do we become aware of? 
 why do we become aware of what we become aware of? 
 how can we interpret what we become aware of? 
 how can we know that our interpretation of what we 
become aware of is the right one? 
 
Indeed, as I will go on to argue, we could equally substitute the 
terms: ‘consume’, ‘experience’, ‘perceive’, or ‘sense’ for the term 
‘notice’ in Hollway and Jefferson’s quoted questions.  Furthermore, 
 101 
what we ‘become aware of’, ‘consume’, ‘experience’, ‘notice’, 
‘perceive’, or ‘sense’, will most likely, at times,  comprise of  focal 
phenomena beyond the nominal ‘data’.  The preliminary quoted 
questions beg a couple of supplementary questions. How do we 
delimit (and who delimits) what we can notice?  If someone asks us 
to concentrate on something specific, do they not ask us to alter the 
limits of our awareness?  This, in turn, links with the existential 
freedom of choice, mentioned earlier in this chapter, and clearly 
relates to the issue of power relations.  Who directs one’s attention 
to what? 
 
 As long as you are awake, [and sometimes even as you sleep] 
 you are at every moment aware of something. 
 
   - Perls et al (1951, pp. 82-83) 
 
 
 […] we have to start with what is the primary given and for 
 the person this is his own flow of experiencing. 
 
   - von Eckartsberg (1972, p. 161) 
 
 
 Awareness is experience - 
 Experience is awareness. 
 
   - Perls (1969, p. 28) 
 
As already suggested, from an intentionalist perspective, we always 
notice, become aware of, or experience ‘something’.  This 
something may include phenomena outside of our body, our own 
overt actions, along with our ‘inner’ goings-on - such as thinking, 
imagining, and feeling.   As von Eckartsberg (1972, p. 161) puts it: 
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 We live and act and try to make sense of it.  This is the 
 simplest understanding of existential phenomenology that I 
 can arrive at.    
 
According to von Eckartsberg (1978, pp. 200-201) the combination 
of our experiences [what we notice - what we become aware of] 
and what we do [our actions] constitute our ‘experiactions’.  Von 
Eckartsberg (1972, p. 166) suggests that, ideally, a fully-field-
theoretically-orientated person, “would have to use an even more 
complex term like: ‘experiaction-in-situation’”. This latter term 
explicitly acknowledges the necessary, and impactful, involvement 
of an existential setting in the generation of any experiences and 
actions.  This interdependence between constituent aspects of a 
field accords with Lewin’s (1952, p. 239) equation B = F (P, E), 
where a person’s “behavior (B) is a function (F) of the person (P) 
and his environment (E).” A dyadic research conversation would 
thus comprise of ‘inter-experiaction-in-situ’ - two people 
experiencing and acting in relation to each other, and in relation to 
their shared micro-environmental context. Sensory noticing 
constitutes one aspect of human being; our overt actions 
concurrently contribute to what and how we notice.  As Powers 
(2005, p. 41) notes, “What an organism senses affects what it does, 
and what it does affects what it senses.” [Italics in original]  So, the 
terms: ‘to notice’, ‘to become aware of’, ‘to experience’, and ‘to 
sense’, all seem closely related, if not synonymous. 
 
  Rolf von Eckartsberg (2010, pp. 258-259) notes:  
 
 I can take a walk through the park, while at the same time I 
 think about a lecture I have to give or daydream about some 
 adventure. 
 
For me, much hinges on our moment-to-moment experiaction - our 
combined, and functionally inseparable, experiencing and acting.  
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To even ask, ‘What do we notice?’ apparently invites us to uncouple 
our experience from our actions; but does it?  We can, and do, 
notice both what we do and what we think and feel - our actions as 
well as our affect.  Laing (1967, p. 20) refers to people as, “centres 
of experience and origins of actions”. But does this not contradict a 
major tenet of existential-phenomenology?  Seen from a field-
theoretical/contextualist perspective, micro-environment and 
organism constitute an interdependent whole.  Doesn’t the very act 
of instituting an ‘I’ divide the field into organism and environment, 
instead of thinking in terms of a unitary organism/environment 
field?  Perls et al (1951), some of the early developers of Gestalt 
therapy, resolve this dichotomy by defining the ‘self’ as the 
‘boundary function’ - the contact-boundary where organism meets 
environment. The, so-called, ‘self’ thus gains identity courtesy of 
the manner in which it manages (or regulates) its contact boundary. 
One can thus see the ‘self’ as the gate-keeper who tends to the 
boundary wall, and who oversees the issues of proximity to other 
phenomena, ingress, and egress [the ‘traffic’] across the contact 
boundary.  Perls et al (1951, p. 229) write: 
 
 […] experience is ultimately contact, the functioning of the 
 boundary of the organism and its environment […]. [T]he 
 contact-boundary, where experience occurs, does not 
 separate the organism and its environment; rather it limits 
 the organism, contains and protects it, and at the same time 
 it touches the environment. 
 
Perls et al, then, define the contact-boundary as the zone at which 
the business between organism and environment gets transacted, 
with attendant/concomitant ‘experiencing’ hosted by the implicated 
(conscious) organism.    
 
The questions: ‘What do I notice?’ or, ‘What do I become aware of?’ 
or, ‘What do I experience?’ [Or - non-dualistically - ‘What does my 
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momentary ‘experiaction-in-situ’ comprise of?’] all seem key 
questions which one might, implicitly or explicitly, ask oneself at 
any juncture. These questions would, minimally, aid the questioning 
individual in becoming more consciously aware of his/her own 
moment-to-moment goings-on.  Although some situations, such as 
automated routines, like getting cash from an ATM, may not require 
one to become deeply invested in one’s concomitant inner goings-
on, in other contexts, such as conversations, one may benefit from 
a developed level of awareness, such that one can remain abreast 
of potentially significant momentary developments and changes in 
conversational tone and direction.  Our (implicit or explicit) answers 
to these questions [namely, What do I notice? Why do I notice what 
I notice? etc.,] inform our ongoing behaviour.  The term ‘data 
analysis’ constitutes just one of many such named activities, like: 
‘data collection’, ‘movie-viewing’, and ‘reading’.  Barker and Wright 
(1954, p. 235) call such terms “episodes”, “a name for a commonly 
recognized or recognizable unit of action with its context.” They 
suggest that asking an observed person the question, “What are 
you doing?” (p. 258), would generally furnish an observer with an 
appropriate title for a particular episode.  They nonetheless 
recognise the issue of, “concurrence of episodes” what they call 
“overlapping” (p. 226). However, to ask, ‘What do you notice about 
the data?’ or, ‘What did you notice about the movie?’ presupposes 
the direction of the focal attention of the questioned individual.  In 
contrast, to ask a person, ‘What do you notice AS you read the 
data?’ or, ‘What do you notice WHILST watching the film?’ frames 
the enquiry in a somewhat more open-textured manner, leaving the 
respondent ‘wriggle room’.  To ask the question, ‘What do you think 
OF the movie?’ asks for movie-specific noticings.  And, whilst we 
can, and do, provide some sort of an answer to such questions, to 
answer requires us to come up with question-relevant noticings. 
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3.4.1 Concluding Section 3.4 
How would I encapsulate what I’ve written in this section? 
 
 Noticing, or becoming aware of something-or-other, 
may occur during sleeping as well as waking states. 
 
 During a ‘live’ research conversation, the question, 
‘What do I notice now?’ constitutes the, usually implicit, 
question that informs all that occurs therein.  Even if 
one chooses to withhold (rather than express) what one 
notices, the fact of our having noticed (something or 
other) remains true as an aspect of our subjective 
experience. 
 
 I can’t escape the conviction that, as a field-theoretical, 
phenomenologically-informed researcher, my full-blown-
experiaction-in-situ, whilst involved in ‘research’, 
constitutes my ‘process’ of study - my data.   
 
 Each research-related moment furnishes me with the 
opportunity to ask, implicitly or overtly, ‘What do I 
notice now?’  I may notice any aspect of the-‘field’-I-co-
constitute, and what I notice, along with whatever I 
‘do’, comprises ‘reality’ from my perspective. You will 
note that the distinction between ‘observer’ and 
‘observed’ dissolves when we ‘self-observe’. 
 
 My research initiative had to do with exploring the 
implications of applying a field-theoretical, 
phenomenologically-informed, orientation to the overall 
research process. I wanted to explore ways of 
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reconceptualising what some consumer researchers 
think of as ‘consumption experiences’.   
 
In words that echo my own sentiments Perls (1969, p. 69) wrote: 
 
 I have made awareness the hub of my approach, recognizing 
 that phenomenology is the primary and indispensible step 
 towards knowing all there is to know. 
 
3.5 Walking-Through the Research Method 
 
3.5.1 The Research Conversations 
I undertook the ‘data collection’ aspect of my research using an in-
depth conversational approach.  This involved each volunteer and 
me, initially, watching a short [18-minute] movie, screened at the 
beginning of each conversation.  I conceptualised the screening of 
the movie as a way of segueing, more softly, into the research 
conversation proper. I did not screen the movie with a view to 
soliciting people’s responses to it as a focal product.  The film thus 
provided a shared point of reference which both participants in a 
conversation could, if they wished, refer to during the subsequent 
conversation.  The conversation, per se, had no pre-planned focal 
topic; each conversation thus developed somewhat ideosycratically.  
I video-recorded each conversation, since the field-theoretical 
perspective, which I adopted, potentially took account of any 
aspect(s) of the research context and the interaction therein.  
  
3.5.2  A Two-Stage Approach 
 
3.5.2.1 Stage One 
The research comprised of a two-stage process.  Individual 
conversations, in both stages of the research, lasted for between 
around 1½ hours and 2 hours. This timescale excluded the 
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screening the 18-minute-long movie prior to the start of the 
conversation proper. [My New New York Diary [sic] (2010), by 
Michel Gondry and Julie Doucet.  The film takes the form of a fusion 
of cartoon-style ‘graphic-novel’ and ‘live action’,  documenting the 
very processes by which the film, itself, got made i.e., the 
collaboration/meeting of two artists - graphic-novelist and 
filmmaker.]  The first (method-development) stage, of the research, 
entailed me conducting three research conversations, each followed 
by a (much shorter) interview with each volunteer, conducted by 
one of my supervisors.  This enabled my supervisors to closely 
monitor volunteers’ reactions to taking part in the video-recorded 
research conversations, by providing volunteers with an opportunity 
to reflect on their research-conversation experiences outside of the 
research context. The volunteers may have had concerns which 
they felt unable to express whilst taking part in the research 
conversations themselves. Research volunteers thus had a chance, 
for example, to withdraw consent regarding the video-recorded 
material, without having to confront me as the researcher.  My 
supervisors and I could also benefit from volunteers’ feedback, thus 
indentifying any strengths and weaknesses which the volunteers 
detected in relation to the approach. 
 
3.5.2.2 Stage Two 
The second (theory-development) stage, of the research, entailed 
me conversing with a further seven adult male and female 
volunteers, of different ages.  As with the stage one conversations, 
these remained relatively unstructured, in the sense that I did not 
employ prefabricated questions.  And as with stage one 
conversations, I conducted stage two conversations in a manner 
informed by field-theoretical, Gestalt principles.  In practical terms 
this entailed the following. 
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3.6 The Informing Gestalt Principles 
 
3.6.1 Here and Now 
I sought to hold and encourage a firm focus on the here-and-now, 
moment-to-moment experience and behaviour of both participants 
in a research conversation.  Holbrook (1995, p. 11) writes: “Kotler 
and Levy [1969a] opened possibilities for studying hitherto 
neglected kinds of products […] including music, visual art, movies, 
and television.”  Informed by field-theory, I looked upon the movie, 
screened prior to the research conversation, as simply one product 
amongst a potpourri of other ‘products’ - broadly construed. The 
research setting thus constituted a kind of buffet - including: 
people, sounds, multifarious artefacts, vistas-out-of-windows, and 
the like. I did not approach the screening of the movie from the 
perspective of a market researcher. I did not routinely ask 
volunteers to share their movie-specific noticiings, although some 
volunteers spontaneously shared some of their movie-related 
observations.  The interactive mode of conversing meant that, I too, 
selectively shared my own present-tense experiencing throughout 
each conversation. Perls (1947, p. 208) encouraged this 
orientation:  
 
 Throughout the theoretical part of this book I have been 
 laying the utmost stress on this sense of actuality - on the 
 importance of realizing that there is no other reality than the 
 present.  
 
3.6.2 Figure/Ground 
Remaining mindful of the figure/ground dynamic involved honouring 
salient aspects of one’s own, and the other’s, experiencing and 
behaviour i.e., whatever became ‘figural’ or ‘stood-out’ moment-to-
moment during the conversations. As Perls (1973, p. 2) put it: 
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 The choice of which element will stand out is made as a 
 result of many factors, all of which can be lumped together 
 under the general term interest. 
 
3.6.3 Potentially ‘Field’-Wide Level of Focus  
I encouraged participants to focus on both ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ 
phenomena within the conversation ‘field’, this in accord with Perls’ 
(1969, p. 69) statement: 
 
 I have made awareness the hub of my approach, recognizing 
 that phenomenology is the primary and indispensible step 
 towards knowing all there is to know.  
 
3.6.4 Gestalt Interrelatedness 
I remained mindful that a person’s combined 
physical/behavioural/experiential goings-on form a gestalt - an 
indivisible whole.  Thus, everything a person expresses (verbally 
and non-verbally) forms an integral constituent part of that person’s 
ongoing process of being.  As Perls (1973, p. 187) put it: 
 
 A gestalt is an irreducible phenomenon.  It is an essence 
 that is there that disappears if the whole  is broken up into its 
 components. 
 
 And (Perls 1973, p. 187), “Keep your eyes and ears open. Every 
clue is to be accepted.”   
 
3.6.5 Volunteers Free to Withhold 
The approach to research, that I adopted, required from volunteers 
(and indeed from me) a willingness to share, by degree, what they 
observed and experienced from moment-to-moment.  This did not, 
however, preclude the exercise of choice and discretion on the part 
of participating individuals.  I worked on the foundational premise 
that human beings selectively represent their experiencing, and that 
this constitutes an interesting, and indicative, phenomenon in itself. 
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3.6.6 Concluding Section 3.6 
The approach that I took to the research conversations focused, 
primarily, on both participants’ inter-experiacting-in-situ; any 
aspect of a conversation-context [including ‘self’ and ‘other’] could 
get ‘taken-in’ or registered, from moment-to-moment.  The choice 
of what, exactly, got ‘taken in’ depended on the selective attention 
and selective expression of each participant.   What each person, 
ostensibly, attended to, became evident through what s/he chose to 
share, verbally, with the other participant. Ellis et al (1997, p. 121) 
wrote about this form of interacting: 
 
 [W]e view interviewing as a collaborative communication 
 process occurring between researchers and respondents, 
 although we do not focus on validity and bias. […] In this 
 process, the distinction between “researcher” and “subject” 
 gets blurred. 
 
3.7 Video Recording 
 
My deciding to video-record the research conversations seemed 
unequivocally warranted by my adoption of a field-theoretical 
orientation which rendered any aspect of the research-conversation-
context a potential ‘object of consumption’ for participants.  This, 
potentially, included any visual, verbal/aural, and behavioural 
phenomena occurring during a research conversation.  The video-
recording of research conversations served the following three 
purposes:                 
 
1) It facilitated post-conversation data-analysis. A 
 participant researcher has finite (and selective) powers 
 of attention and may miss details, during a research 
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 conversation, which s/he may register on subsequent 
 viewing(s) of the recording. 
2) It provided some ‘insurance’, in that each of the 
 conversations occurred ‘on the record’, and thus, 
 evidence exists of what went on during the 
 conversations.  The video-recording of conversations 
 also supported the development of the research 
 method, itself, by facilitating ‘research-conversation-
 post-mortems’.  
3) Importantly, video-recording captured non-verbal [and 
 micro-environmental details], as well as the verbal 
 expression of both the researcher and the volunteer as 
 they interacted. The nature of the ‘data analysis’
 depended, initially, on my own ‘noticings’ as I watched 
 the audio-visual recordings - as described in the next 
 chapter. 
 
The Ethics Approval Committee agreed with my reasoning and 
accepted my application for ethics approval without amendments. 
 
3.8 Sample 
 
Robson (2002, pp. 265-266) refers to my mode of recruiting 
research volunteers as ‘purposive sampling’ and writes, “A sample is 
built up which enables the researcher to satisfy her specific needs in 
a project.” I asked two volunteers to each direct an associate of 
theirs to me as a potential research volunteer. This constituted the 
first stage of a process that Robson (Ibid.,) calls ‘snowball sampling’ 
- one contact leading to others - although the term ‘snowballing’ 
overstates the case in relation to small-scale research such as mine. 
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I needed to recruit volunteers able to demonstrate an ongoing 
awareness of self and their immediate environment. They also 
needed to display a readiness, and the vocabulary, to articulate 
their moment-to-moment experiencing. However, this latter 
requirement needed qualifying by the fact that a field-theoretical, 
perspective also takes account of what people express non-verbally.  
Thus individuals may involuntarily ‘express’ themselves via non-
verbal means - such as facial expressions and body posture.    
   
I discovered, through informal conversations, prior to embarking on 
the research conversations per se, that some people had an 
appetite for the mode of interaction that I had proposed, whilst 
others did not. I therefore, necessarily, enlisted the help of those 
individuals who found the prospect of my research-agenda enticing.  
Gould (1995, p. 720) makes the point that some people have, “a 
talent and a passion” for introspective methods.  It seemed clear 
that some individuals would feel more comfortable with (and adept 
at) my proposed mode of enquiry, than other individuals. 
Hirschman and Holbrook (1986, p. 242) also support this view: 
 
 Although it violates the democratic norms of logical 
 empiricism to state that the conduct of introspective inquiry 
 requires a certain intrinsic nature on the part of the 
 investigator, this does appear to be the case. 
 
The conversational approach that I employed entailed a certain 
blurring of the roles usually assigned to an ‘interviewer’ and an 
‘interviewee’.  I left  potential volunteers in no doubt that I viewed 
them as collaborators in an inquiry that focused on both 
participants’ observations, behaviours, and experiences within a 
‘conversation’ and not an ‘interview’. [See Fig. 3.1 and Fig. 3.2 at 
the end of this chapter]  I ‘pitched’ my research agenda, and then 
allowed forces of attraction and aversion (within prospective 
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volunteers) to find a level.  I vetted potential volunteers according 
to my own overt and covert criteria, e.g., Do I want to work with 
this person? This criterion did not apply in the case of ‘Ruby’ 
[conversation No. 3];   a prior volunteer had recommended her, and 
thus I had not met her prior to the day of our research 
conversation.  Platt (1981, pp. 77-78) writes, “I also left out of my 
sample altogether a few potential respondents of whom I was 
frightened on grounds of personality and/or status […]”. 
 
 I   invited  ten  people, in all, to participate in my project, enabling 
me to pick my sample from people I had already met, or who, as in 
the cases of Ruby and Sufia [not their real names], got introduced 
to me by other  participating associates of theirs.    I approached 
people who had already shown themselves as willing to share their 
experiences, in informal settings, and with whom I felt a working 
level of rapport.   
 
Although the mode of communication that I encouraged, within the 
research conversations, would not have appealed to everyone, it 
seemed inappropriate, to me, to modify my approach to research on 
the strength of resistance from some individuals.  Far better, I 
thought, to find a receptive ‘audience’ for my research initiative.  In 
this, somewhat-exploratory, small-scale, approach I did not seek 
statistical validity.  I needed the help of individuals prepared to take 
part in an emergent process, enabling us to see what happened 
when I began to apply field-theoretical, phenomenologically-
informed, ideas in moment-to-moment human interaction.   
 
 For the first (research-method-development) stage of the research I 
recruited fellow researchers/academics - people able to help me to 
fine-tune the conversational approach to research, by giving my 
supervisors and me a more ‘technical’ level of feedback concerning 
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the mechanics of the approach.  A lay person may not have had the 
experience, or vocabulary, to discuss the finer points of research 
technique.  Furthermore, I figured that colleagues of mine would 
find it more convenient to attend the proposed follow-up interviews 
with my supervisors. In the event Neil [conversation No. 2] came 
from outside of the University.  In relation to the [stage two] 
‘theory-development-stage’ of the research, I invited people, such 
as, for example, three former clients from my days as a professional 
hairdresser. I had already established a high degree of mutual trust 
with such people.  They already had a measure of what they might 
expect from me, and what motivated me.  Thus I felt happy to allow 
one such person to recommend a ‘suitable’ person, to me, as a 
participant. I found the number of volunteers manageable in 
relation to my mode of data analysis.    
 
3.9 Ethical Issues 
 
Two aspects of my research agenda required particular ethical 
consideration:  (a) my modus operandi before, within, and after the 
research conversations, and (b) my plan to video-record the 
research conversations.  
 
Since I had no covert agenda, I could share, with potential 
volunteers, my intentions and the envisaged style of the 
conversations.    If contra-indications emerged within a prospective 
volunteer, and/or myself, [before, during, or after a planned 
research conversation] then we had agreed not to pursue the 
conversation. The Information-Sheet/Consent-Form, given to each 
prospective volunteer, [See Figs. 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 at the end of this 
chapter] communicated this point and provided him/her with my 
contact details. Clearly, the research agenda required the 
willingness of both parties to take part.  The fact that I worked with 
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people with whom I had already had some degree of contact [or 
people recommended to me by such people] meant that I had less 
confidence-gaining work to do at the outset.  
 
By viewing participants as ‘conversationalists’, rather than as 
‘interviewees’, I encouraged interactive exchanges, in which the 
experience and expressive output of both interactants [theirs and 
mine] potentially got taken into account. 
  
If, as a researcher, I felt clear about my overarching purposes and 
theoretical orientation, and if I proceeded with due care, adequate 
supervision, and sensitivity, and if, in addition, I video-recorded the 
research events, enabling future scrutiny, then I had gone a long 
way towards minimising [whilst not completely eradicating] the 
potential for harming or upsetting volunteers and/or myself as a 
researcher.  As already stated, after each of the three ‘stage one’ 
research conversations, each volunteers met with one of my 
supervisors. Volunteers thus had the chance to raise any 
issues/concerns before, during, and/or subsequent to the research 
encounters.  
  
The Consent Form [See Fig. 3.3 at the end of this chapter]   helped 
me to manage the issue of ‘permissions’ regarding the use of the 
video-recorded material.  In the first instance I recorded, and 
stored, each conversation on the hard-drive of my (purpose-
bought) camcorder.  Following each conversation, I made a DVD 
back-up copy of the recording for the purpose of data-analysis.  I 
also made a copy for each volunteer who wanted one.   Three of the 
ten volunteers chose not to receive a DVD copy of the conversation 
that they had participated in.  As stated, the Consent Form allowed 
each volunteer to stipulate how I may use my DVD recording of a 
conversation.  The form also required each volunteer to undertake 
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not to copy and/or broadcast their personal DVD copy via any 
means. The DVDs in my possession will remain available for 
research-auditing purposes. Upon completing my PhD, [circa 
January 2014] I have undertaken to permanently delete any 
research-conversation-footage remaining on my camcorder’s hard-
drive. 
 
I keep my camcorder and my back-up DVDs at home - a double-
locked second-floor apartment, inaccessible from the outside of the 
building.  I needed ongoing access to the discs, since I work 
primarily at home, and needed the flexibility to consult the discs as 
required.  The DVDs have no markings which identify the volunteers 
depicted therein.  Furthermore, the transcripts made from the 
recordings do not contain any information which would identify the 
featured volunteers.   
 
3.10 Concluding 
 
Existential-phenomenology provided me with a foundational footing 
as I began my project.  In particular, I embraced a field-theoretical 
orientation. Thus instead of conceptualising the research context as 
populated by predetermined focal objects, I heeded the dynamic 
attentiveness of participants (including myself) as the determinant 
of salient-to-participant(s)-phenomena during research 
conversations.  In my data chapters I address the idea that 
prevailing ‘frames of reference’ may inform what research 
participants feel it ‘appropriate’ to attend to and to express in a 
research context.  Thus I do not wish to imply, at this early stage, 
that people exercise unbridled freedom in their actions and inner 
goings-on. 
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 Figure 3.1 Stage One Information Sheet 
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 Figure 3.2 Stage Two Information Sheet 
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Figure 3.3 Consent Form 
              
The following form is based on a form developed by Susan M. Ervin-Tripp, 
Psychology Department, University of California at Berkeley.  
 
 
Researcher’s name:  Michael N. Woodward 
 
LETTER OF CONSENT 
 
PHOTOGRAPHIC, AUDIO, AND/OR VIDEO RECORDS RELEASE CONSENT 
FORM 
 
As part of this project I have made a photographic, audio, and/or video recording of 
you while you participated in the research. 
 
I would like you to indicate below what uses of these records you are willing to 
consent to. This is completely up to you. I will only use the records in ways that you 
agree to. In any use of these records, names will not be identified. 
 
1. The records can be studied by the research team for use in the research project. 
 
Photo __________ Audio __________ Video __________ 
 
[Please use initials] 
 
2. The records can be used for Journal publications. 
 
Photo __________ Audio __________ Video __________ 
 
[Please use initials] 
 
3. The written transcript can be kept in an archive for other researchers. 
 
Photo __________ Audio __________ Video __________ 
 
[Please use initials] 
 
4. The records can be used by other researchers. 
 
Photo __________ Audio __________ Video __________ 
 
[Please use initials] 
 
5. The records can be shown at meetings of researchers interested in the study of 
marketing and consuming. 
 
Photo __________ Audio __________ Video __________ 
 
[Please use initials] 
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6. The records can be shown in classrooms to students. 
 
Photo __________ Audio __________ Video __________ 
 
[Please use initials] 
 
7. The records can be shown in public presentations to non-academic groups. 
 
Photo __________ Audio __________ Video __________ 
 
[Please use initials] 
 
8. The records can be used on television and radio. 
 
Photo __________ Audio __________ Video __________ 
           
[Please use initials] 
 
 
I have read the above description and give my consent for the use of the 
records as indicated above.  I understand that I can withdraw my consent at 
any time (e.g., after viewing the DVD recording of the interview I took part in) 
by simply contacting the researcher. [See below for contact details] 
 
Date: _________________ 
 
Signature: _________________________ 
 
Occupation: _______________________ 
 
Name: _______________________________ Age: _______    Sex: _______ 
 
 
 
• The DVD copy of the conversation, given to me, is for my personal/domestic use. I 
will not broadcast or copy it via any means. I accept __________ [Please use initials] 
 
• Please send me a summary of the research findings.  Yes/No [circle as required] 
 
When not assessing the data, I will store the DVD and camcorder safely under lock 
and key.  Like you, I will retain a DVD copy of the interview-recording and will use it 
only in accordance with the terms and conditions agreed to via this form.  Any data 
remaining on my camcorder’s hard-drive will be deleted upon completion of my PhD. 
 
Michael Woodward (Doctoral Researcher)  
Bradford University School of Management 
Emm Lane 
Bradford  
BD9 4JL 
Telephone: 01274 596298 Email: m.woodward1@bradford.ac.uk 
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Chapter 4: Data Analysis Walk-Through  
 
 I write down whatever occurs to me about what I see on the 
 screen.  And that text appears in the left-hand column of my 
 database.  These are the emotional responses: How does the 
 shot make me feel when I see it for the first time?  Are there 
 any associations?  If, say, the image of a banana occurs to me 
 for some reason, I write “banana,” even if I have no idea why.  
 Maybe later I’ll find out the reason - but at the moment I 
 don’t question any of these things.  I try to remain completely 
 open to whatever is going through my mind. […]  
 
 Later, when I’m getting ready to put the scene together, I 
 take a second series of notes; these are less emotional and 
 more surgical, and appear in the centre column of the 
 database.  I’m no longer the lover beholding the beloved, I’m 
 the surgeon looking at the patient, analysing her joints and 
 ligaments, writing down the exact footage number at each 
 comment. 
 
    - Walter Murch (Ondaatje 2002, pp. 44, 45) 
 
 
 Sometimes, though, you’ll have to write during a screening.  
 Here you shouldn’t aim for perfect penmanship, since you’re 
 the only person who’ll have to decipher your scratches.  Try 
 writing without dropping your eyes from the screen; you’ll be 
 surprised how legible the results can be. 
 
    - David Bordwell (2004, p. 12) 
 
Together these two quotes served to inspire me as I developed the 
method of data reduction outlined in this chapter.2   You will note 
that Murch focuses, initially, on his own ‘inner’ goings-on as he 
watches the film footage.  This accords with the sentiments of 
Wenders (1991, p. vii) who wrote: 
 
 I was watching movies, but as much as I was looking at the 
 screen, I was also aware of myself as the observer.  Writing 
 was as much self-observation as film-observation […]. 
                                                 
2  I view data-reducing processes as any - including those operating during perception and 
communication - which reduce ‘too-much-information’ to manageable proportions.    
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A field-theoretical orientation, though, leads me to cast my net even 
more broadly than Murch and Wenders.  I think of the scope of a 
field-theoretical orientation as potentially including any aspect(s) of 
the momentary 360°-‘inner’-‘outer’-‘field’.  Burgin (2004, pp. 7-8) 
cites Roland Barthes who: 
 
 […] at the cinema found himself most fascinated by ‘the 
 theatre itself, the darkness, the obscure mass of other bodies, 
 the rays of light, the entrance, the exit’. 
  
Thus, like Murch and Wenders, I may notice ‘inner-self-wise’, but, 
unlike Murch and Wenders, I may also, like Barthes, notice and 
document contextual phenomena ‘outside’ (or beyond) the movie-
screen - what we might, ordinarily, think of as ‘distractions’ or 
‘incidentals’.   
 
When I put it to Morris Holbrook (Woodward and Holbrook 2013, p. 
325) that, “Given the dynamic nature of our attentiveness, we may 
oscillate between different ‘objects-of-consumption’ from moment 
to moment”, he replied, “That’s right.  We are multi-tasking all the 
time.”  My research project already had a field-theoretical 
orientation, which, in line with Emmison (2004, pp. 256-261), 
encompassed ‘two-dimensional data’ (like newspapers and 
photographs), ‘three-dimensional data’ (such as motor cars and 
monuments), and ‘lived visual data’ (including places and settings).  
Emmison specifies what he means by ‘lived visual data’: 
 
 […] such matters as the observable movements of people in 
 time  and space, […] [an] interest in behaviour in public 
 places, […] [and] how conduct is inextricably embedded in the 
 immediate  ecology and the material realities at hand.  
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When  taken seriously, the notion that a person’s momentary 360°-
‘inner’-‘outer’-‘field’ constitutes his/her dynamic data pool, leads to 
the notion that a person’s mobile attentiveness determines what, 
exactly, becomes fore-grounded in his/her consciousness at a point 
in space-time.  In Table 4.1, I have enumerated some of the more 
obvious forms of ‘data’ that I encountered whilst researching.  To 
this list I need to add, as noted earlier, my inner goings-on and the 
contextual ‘data’ that co-constituted the fields in which the types of 
data enumerated resided - any of which may have momentarily 
competed for my interest.   
 
       Table 4.1  
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Figure 4.1 First Pass, Conversation No. 8 - Redacted Extract  
Produced: 14th February 2012 (01:50 - 03:39) - Notes 
                 16th February 2012 (00:48 - 01:40) - Meta-notes 
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Figure 4.1, depicts an extract from a viewing-log.  Down the left-
hand side you see the DVD playback-counter numerals 
(hours/minutes/seconds).  In the central column [black ink] you can 
see the notes made, in real-time, whilst I watched the DVD 
recording of conversation No. 8.  In the right-hand column [blue 
ink] you can see the meta-notes that I made whilst reading the 
original viewing-notes.  I made the meta-notes two days after the 
original viewing session.  Together the notes and the meta-notes 
constitute one complete pass of the audio-visual recording.  
 
Table 4.2, [PTO] depicts the first three (stage one) research 
conversations. These involved each volunteer subsequently meeting 
with one of my supervisors, to discuss each volunteer’s participation 
in a research conversation.  Had we thus received any complaints,     
concerns, and/or suggestions from volunteers, at this early stage of 
the research, we could have modified the approach to take heed of 
these comments. In the event, however, we received predominantly 
encouraging feedback. Ruby (conversation No. 3) did, however, 
suggest that the in-depth approach may not have suited teenagers; 
she thought that they would perhaps not have had the requisite 
degree of self-knowledge. 
 
As you can see [Tables 4.2 & 4.3] I conversed with six women and 
four men in all, ranging from 21 years old to 65 years old: two 
people in their 20’s; two people in their 30’s; three people in their 
50’s; and three people in their 60’s. 
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  Table 4.2  
 
 
 
 
  Table 4.3  
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Figure 4.2 Second Pass, Conversation No. 8 - Redacted 
Extract 
Produced: 18th February 2012 (00:23 - 02:00) - Notes   
  18th February 2012 (12:38 - 13:56) - Meta-notes 
 
I made two passes of each of the ten recordings.  This enabled me 
to notice details, in each recording, which I may have overlooked 
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during the first pass, or to notice extra-to-recording goings-on 
specific to the context in which I viewed the material a second time. 
 
              Table 4.4  
 
 
In Table 4.4, you can see a full record of the production of my 
viewing-logs.  You will note that I produced two sets of meta-notes 
in relation to conversation No. 1.  I subsequently settled into 
producing one set of meta-notes in relation to the following nine 
research conversations. The time taken to create the original set of 
viewing-notes corresponds with the full-length of each recording, 
since I watched each DVD in real-time.  The meta-notes tended to 
take less time to produce, but see conversation No. 4 for a notable 
exception. 
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Figure 4.3 Composite Viewing-Log, Conversation No. 8 -
Redacted Extract 
Incorporated 1st Pass:   25th Feb. 2012 (17:08-18:25) - Notes  
     25th Feb. 2012 (21:45-22:56) - Meta-notes  
 
Incorporated 2nd Pass:  25th Feb. 2012 (18:27-19:40) - Notes 
    25th Feb. 2012 (22:57-23:45) - Meta-notes 
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In Figure 4.3, [previous page] you can see that, when producing 
composite viewing-logs, I first included the most salient first-pass 
noticings from individual viewing-logs, followed by the related 
meta-noticings. I then interspersed the most salient second-pass 
noticings, then second-pass meta-noticings. By alternating between 
black and blue ink it became possible to visually differentiate 
between which noticings pertained to which pass of the recording.  
This method also enabled me to avoid duplicating documented 
noticings. 
 
                 Table 4.5  
 
 
In Table 4.5, you can see that my first composite viewing-log gives 
only an overall timing.  This had to do with me arriving at an 
appropriate documenting practice, through trial and error.  Creating 
composite viewing-logs enabled me to jettison material that seemed 
superfluous - either in terms of the perceived triviality of a detail, or 
its failure to catch my interest.  I knew that I had a complete paper 
trail, so omitting certain details, in successive layers of the data-
reduction, did not equate with ‘deleting’ those details. I can, at any 
point, go back to the original viewing-logs.  
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Figure 4.4 Uni-Log, Conversation No. 8 - Redacted Extract 
Produced:  29th Feb. 2012 (15:31-N. A.) 
 
I thus created three composite viewing-logs: the first comprising of 
noticings/meta-noticings pertaining to the twice-viewed recordings 
of conversations 1-3; the second comprising of noticings/meta-
noticings pertaining to the twice-viewed recordings of conversations 
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4-6; and the third comprising of noticings/meta-noticings pertaining 
to the twice-viewed recordings of conversations 7-10.  I 
subsequently amalgamated, and further compressed, the noticings 
into one document - what I called a uni-log [Figure 4.4, (previous 
page) and Table 4.6]. I wanted a single (manageable) document 
that brought together all of my most salient noticings, pertaining to 
all ten research conversations, under one roof, so to speak. 
 
                       Table 4.6 
 
       
I read the (34 page) uni-log on the 02nd March 2012 (10:27-13:50), 
before setting out for a supervision meeting.  This enabled me to 
get an overall impression of how the noticings related to each other 
as a whole. I underlined, circled, and otherwise emphasised salient 
aspects of the uni-log.  Just before the (15:00) supervision meeting 
I typed the following keywords, [Figure 4.5, PTO] which I took with 
me to the meeting.  I liken this process to producing a set of 
keywords for an academic paper, where the time spent researching 
and writing the paper qualifies (and enables) one to trust one’s top-
of-the-mind associations.  
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 Figure 4.5 Keywords 
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Moss (1978, p. 86), in a quote cited earlier, writes: 
 
 Perception and action are usually studied in isolation from one 
 another. Yet, both neurologically and at the level of human 
 action in lived-space, we discover that they are intertwined.  
 To be underway in some action is to organize our perception 
 towards some object, and inversely, to perceive a situation in 
 the world is to be invited into active involvement in that 
 situation.  With every step forward, our view of the situation 
 is adjusted; with every adjustment in our view, we are invited 
 to step forward anew. Merleau-Ponty has called this 
 continuous interplay between man and his world a dialectic. 
 In this dialectic between man and his world it is difficult to 
 distinguish strictly between perception and action […]. 
 
Powers (2005, p. 41) similarly writes:  
 
 What an organism senses affects what it does, and what it 
 does affects what it senses. […] The effects of behavior in 
 altering subsequent stimuli, and even in directly causing 
 stimulation, have certainly been noticed, but there has as yet 
 been no correct analysis of this in any fully developed 
 psychological theory. 
 
You will perhaps, here, see the basis for the inseparability of 
experiencing and action.  Every time we do something (speak, walk, 
eat, listen, write etc.,) we modify our own, ongoing, experiencing; 
and that, now-modified, ongoing experiencing, provides a particular 
incentive for subsequent actions.  Ducasse (1964, p. 111) puts it 
this way: 
 
 This process - of inspiration-creation-contemplation-
 judgment-and correction or approval - is repeated again and 
 again until the musical composition, or as the case may be 
 the painting, or statue, or work of one of the other arts, is 
 finished […]. 
  
As mentioned previously, this inseparability of experiencing and 
action led Rolf von Eckartsberg to coin the term ‘experiaction’. This, 
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in turn, helped me to question the, nominal, division of acts of 
‘consumption’ from acts of ‘production’.   
 
I built my research, then, on the understanding that the research-
conversation-scenario, including the participants, itself constituted a 
dynamic 360°-‘inner’-‘outer’-‘field’ of latent data. As Kvale (1996, p. 
132) writes, “Ideally, the testing of hypotheses and interpretations 
is finished by the end of the interview […]”.  Kvale (2003, p. 290) 
refers to this process as, “[…] communicative validity, in the sense 
of testing observations and interpretations in a dialogue […]”.  My 
subsequent, contextualized, interaction with spin-off texts, such as 
viewing-logs, has received encouragement from Atkinson and 
Coffey (2004, p. 59), who write: 
 
 It is tempting, when undertaking ethnographic fieldwork or 
 some similar piece of qualitative research, to treat 
 observational and oral data (such as may be derived from 
 interviews or recorded interaction) as the primary data, and 
 any documentary material as secondary.  […]  We would urge 
 that the documentary materials should be regarded as data in 
 their own right. 
      
By augmenting this text-based view of data with  the embodied 
(phenomenological) experiencing of context-embedded research 
volunteers and researcher, we arrive at the, for me, seductive 
notion that a researcher’s ‘data’ always already comprises of a 
360°-‘inner’-‘outer’-‘field’ of concurrent goings-on, from which 
his/her momentary attentiveness selects focal phenomena.   
 
Rather than viewing research volunteers as repositories of 
knowledge that I set out to mine, I, instead, viewed each research 
conversation as a co-creative initiative.  However, once the 
volunteers and I had created the DVD recordings of the ‘live’ 
events, the recordings became pieces of data within subsequent 
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data-viewing fields.  Thus the research-conversation-recordings 
became, for me, as a researcher, movie-like phenomena.  And, like 
Walter Murch and Wim Wenders, quoted at the beginning of this 
chapter, I felt free to attend to my own inner-goings-on whilst 
viewing the ‘movies’.  And, importantly, like Roland Barthes, also 
quoted at the beginning of this chapter, I felt at liberty to attend to 
any other aspects of the ‘field’ that vied for my attention as I 
watched a research-conversation recording. In short, I take it as 
axiomatic that a field-theoretical, phenomenologically-informed 
approach to research must embrace a potentially field-wide level of 
focus.  I wanted to address full-blown human experiaction within 
the research process. To seek to focus on the during-research-
conversation-‘inter-experiaction’, to the exclusion of the post-
conversation-data-analysis/write-up-‘experiaction’, would surely 
miss the whole point.  I therefore accept, as a limiting condition of 
my research, a state of affairs well expressed by Stacey (1988, p. 
23): 
 
 With very rare exceptions it is the researcher who narrates, 
 who “authors” the ethnography. In the last instance an 
 ethnography is a written document structured primarily by a 
 researcher’s purposes, offering a researcher’s interpretations, 
 registered in a researcher’s voice. 
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Chapter 5: Introducing the Themes  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Towards the end of the last chapter I presented the list of keywords 
that arose through the distilling process that I called ‘data 
reduction’.  You will note that the term ‘homeostasis’ features at the 
top of the list - the first word that ‘came to mind’ when I compiled 
the list.  The term also appears twice-more, in the nine-item list, in 
the forms of ‘physiological homeostasis’ and ‘image-homeostasis’.  I 
had not, at the time I produced the keywords, specifically 
researched the notion of homeostasis, but clearly I felt I had a 
sufficient grasp of the concept to enable me to employ it.  Given the 
term’s prominence in my keywords I felt inclined to read more 
deeply around the topic. This led me to some unexpected 
discoveries. 
 
I learned that, what I called ‘physiological homeostasis’, constitutes 
the original use of the term.  Cooper (2008, p. 420) tells us that, 
“The stabilisation of bodily states is now termed homeostasis, a 
word introduced 70 years ago by the physiologist, Walter Cannon.”  
[From Cannon himself (Cannon 1939, p. 24) we read: 
 
 The coördinated physiological processes which maintain most 
 of the steady states in the organism are so complex and so 
 peculiar to living beings - involving, as they may, the brain 
 and nerves, the heart, lungs, kidneys and spleen, all working 
 coöperatively - that I have suggested a special designation for 
 these states, homeostasis.] 
 
Cooper (2008, p. 420) continues: 
 
 Shortly afterwards, [1948] the engineering mathematician, 
 Norbert Weiner, introduced the concept of negative feedback 
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 which became central to physiologists’ ideas of how 
 homeostasis worked. 
 
 
   Figure 5.1 The Negative Feedback Loop - the 
   Basic Unit of Cybernetic Control, Carver and 
   Scheier (1982, p. 112) 
 
According to Carver and Scheier (1982, p. 112), the concept 
became know as the negative feedback loop because, “its function 
is to negate, or reduce, sensed deviations from a comparison 
[reference] value.”  In different words, a person’s perceiving and 
behaving work together, such that the person behaves in a manner 
that ‘impacts on the environment’ in a manner which makes his/her 
immediate (post-behaviour) perception more closely matched to 
his/her ‘inner’ expectations, or preferences, represented by his/her 
‘reference value(s)’.  The outcome of the comparison, between 
his/her immediate perception and his/her reference value(s), drives 
subsequent behaviour.  If the perception closely matches the 
reference value(s), then s/he will not have to act/behave in order to 
negate a deviation from the reference value(s).  If, on the other 
hand, his/her perception mismatches (when compared with) his/her 
internal reference value(s) then s/he will, more likely, act to try to 
reduce the discrepancy.  His/her immediate (post-behaviour) 
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sensing will - when compared, anew, with the reference value(s) - 
tell him/her whether his action/behaviour has brought his/her 
perceiving into line with his/her reference value(s), or whether s/he 
needs to persist in that direction.  
 
Cooper (2008, p. 426) continues: 
 
 Wiener recognised that negative feedback underpins 
 homeostasis and that this is an essential condition for the 
 continuation of life […].  Nowadays, negative feedback loops 
 to achieve homeostatic control of essential physiological 
 variables are familiar from textbook diagrams. […] 
 
 Cannon’s last major co-worker, [Arturo] Rosenblueth, working 
 with Wiener at the same time, saw how homeostasis could be 
 operationalised by introducing the engineering principle of 
 negative feedback.  Homeostasis was lifted from an updating 
 of [Claude] Bernard’s concept [by Cannon (1939)] to a 
 working proposition. 
 
In 1878 Claude Bernard had written (Fulton 1966) that: 
 
 […] the milieu intérieur [internal environment] surrounding 
 the organs, the tissues and their elements never varies; 
 atmospheric changes cannot penetrate beyond it and it is 
 therefore true to say that the physical conditions of 
 environment are unchanging in a higher animal: each one is 
 surrounded by this invariable milieu which is, as it were, an 
 atmosphere proper to itself in an ever-changing cosmic 
 environment.  Here we have an organism which has enclosed 
 itself in a kind of hot-house.  The perpetual changes of 
 external conditions cannot reach it; it is not subject to them, 
 but is free and independent. 
 
Bernard’s notion of an independent milieu intérieur, then, predated 
Cannon’s development of the concept of homeostasis. Cannon’s 
concept subsequently became widely adopted.  
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Wiener (1948, p. 19) writing about the origin of the term 
‘cybernetics’ wrote: 
 
 Thus as far back as four years ago, [circa 1944] the group of 
 scientists about Dr. Rosenblueth and myself had already 
 become aware of the essential unity of the set of problems 
 centring about communication, control, and statistical 
 mechanics, whether in the machine or in living tissue.  On 
 the other hand, we were seriously hampered by the lack of 
 unity of the literature concerning these problems, and by the 
 absence of any common terminology, or even a single name 
 for the field.  After much consideration, we have come to the 
 conclusion that all the existing terminology has too heavy a 
 bias to one side [the machine] or another [living tissue] to 
 serve the future development of the field as well as it should; 
 and as happens so often with scientists, we have been forced 
 to coin at least one artificial neo-Greek expression to fill the 
 gap.  We have decided to call the entire field of control and 
 communication theory, whether in the machine or in the 
 animal, by the same ‘Cybernetics’, which we form from the 
 Greek Kuberneties or ‘steersman’  
 
Stagner (1977, p. 109), provides an example of how the cybernetic 
feedback loop helps to explain homeostasis: 
 
 More precisely, we can say that there is a center in the 
 hypothalamus [a sensing function] which registers a certain 
 optimum or expected level of glucose. [a reference level]  If 
 the input (level in the blood stream) falls below this level by a 
 threshold amount, [via comparison with the reference 
 level/value] energy is mobilized and action initiated to restore 
 the proper equilibrium. [See Figure 5.1 above] 
 
Thus, the cybernetic negative feedback loop models the process 
that explains how steady states prevail in human  beings and also 
how, say, a thermostat works.  In the case of the latter, an 
individual sets the dial (reference value) at the desired temperature 
setting.  A sensor in the thermostat measures the actual ambient 
temperature, relative to the reference setting, and adjusts the 
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output of the heating system, turning it either on or off, in order to 
maintain the room temperature at the desired-by-operator level.    
  
5.2 Psychological Homeostasis 
 
John Fletcher became one of the first people to apply Cannon’s 
notion of homeostasis to the psychological realm.  In his article 
“The Wisdom of the Mind” (1938, p. 7) he wrote: 
 
 The intention of this paper is, in pursuance of the notion 
 suggested in the title, [echoing Walter Cannon’s The Wisdom 
 of the Body (1939) cited earlier] to point out that the 
 mind, no less than the body has its devices, mechanisms, or 
 modes of response by which it seeks to maintain its 
 equilibrium and to defend itself against pain and injury. 
 
Fletcher then goes on to posit five, “illustrative instances of mental 
defences” which I will briefly outline here. (1) Repression, defined 
by Sigmund Freud as, “the process by which a mental act capable of 
becoming conscious … is made unconscious and forced back into the 
unconscious system”. [Allen and Unwin (1922), “Introductory 
Lectures on Psycho-analysis”, London, pp. 248-249, 287.]    
Fletcher continues: 
 
 […] even perceptual processes, as well as those of thinking, 
 have been shown to be affected by determining tendencies 
 and organic sets of the mind itself.  There are none so blind 
 as those who refuse to see. 
 
Thus - whether through (a) an unwitting refusal to allow a particular 
train of thought, or (b) say, a prejudicial mindset that blinds one to 
‘the obvious’ - people may regulate their psychological goings-on. 
Fletcher continues with his next example of psychological 
homeostasis (2) Dissociation, which he defines as, “a restriction of 
the field of consciousness […] an act of screening off, of pruning, of 
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losing some to save the rest.”  I understand this as a conscious 
distancing of oneself from certain sights, sounds, smells, tastes, and 
ideas etc., perhaps through strategic disregard.  Fletcher continues 
with (3) Compensation:   
 
 If homeostasis may be interpreted broadly to apply to social 
 status as well at bodily temperature we may extend its 
 meaning so as to explain the positiveness and the energy of 
 our reactions against personal insults, which are calculated to 
 disturb that status. 
 
Fletcher also extends the notion of ‘homeostatic compensation’ to 
the perceptual realm, “Snow that seems white in the sunlight also 
seems white in the moonlight, although sunlight is 800,000 times as 
bright as full-moonlight.”  Thus we can see how people may act in 
ways which seek to guard against threats to their sense of self-
esteem.  And, in the example of vision, our eyes can compensate 
for differing light conditions rendering the perceived colour as 
constant. Regarding the next example, (4) Regression, Fletcher 
writes: 
 
 The drug addict cannot face the responsibilities and 
 discomforts of his life in a normal way, nor is he willing to pay 
 the price the gods have placed upon happiness. So he must 
 render his higher brain centres insensitive to the actualities of 
 his existence and induce in himself the illusion of well-being 
 by induced regression. 
 
Here we see an example of someone refusing to ‘face the music’ 
and, instead seeking chemical solace.  The addict does compulsively 
what a non-addict might do more selectively. Fletcher’s final 
example of psychological homeostasis takes the form of (5) Escape, 
which may manifest as: bodily flight, amnesia, utopianism, day-
dreaming, fantasising, and introversion.  Thus a person may literally 
or figuratively run away from perceived psychological danger or 
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discomfiture.  It seems that these five examples overlap somewhat.  
One may view drug addiction as a form of escape, as well as a form 
of regression.  And dissociation seems akin to escape, since both 
dissociation and escape involve avoidance.  However, Fletcher 
(1938) makes no claim of water-tightness (or exhaustiveness), with 
regard to his illustrative examples of psychological homeostasis.   
 
5.3 Psychology and the Negative Feedback Loop 
 
Whist Fletcher made an early effort to apply the concept of 
homeostasis to the psychological realm, we can now go on to see 
how cybernetically-informed theorists have, more recently, applied 
the notion of the negative feedback loop to personal psychological 
functioning.  As suggested earlier, cyberneticists draw comparisons 
between certain principles of control applicable in (a) the realm of 
engineering and mathematics, and (b) in physiological regulatory 
processes.  Cooper (2008, p. 425) identifies, and encapsulates, the 
common denominator as “negative feedback - information that 
brings the output [of a system] into closer proximity to the 
designated goal.”    Powers (2005) calls his brand of cybernetic 
theory, Perceptual Control Theory (PCT).  Powers views the 
cybernetic feedback loop, when applied to humans, as premised, 
ultimately, on an individual controlling what s/he perceives.  He 
characterises PCT as (p. 284): 
 
  […] the concept of behavior as a feedback process organized 
 around the control of perception, and reorganized as a way of 
 maintaining ourselves in a peculiarly human condition defined 
 by intrinsic reference levels.   
 
Powers thus suggests that human beings act in order to control 
what they perceive;   they want to perceive what their subjectively-
held ‘reference levels/values’ incline them to desire, expect, prefer, 
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and so on. Thus, seen from a Perceptual Control Theory [PCT] 
perspective, we may view all human conduct as self-regulatory.  
The operative ‘reference levels’, against which people benchmark 
their immediate perceptions, may take many forms. Depending on a 
person’s preferences, expectations, conditioning, and the like, [in 
general his/her ‘reference values’] s/he will behave in ways 
calculated to bring what s/he senses/perceives, from moment to 
moment, into closer accord with his/her reference value(s).  This 
does not mean that a person can not change his/her reference 
value(s).  It does mean, however, that at any point in time, his/her 
immediate perceivings/sensings will get benchmarked against the 
reference values that manifest concurrently with those 
perceivings/sensings.  This effectively amounts to a comparison 
between ‘actual’ and ‘preferred’ states of being.  Power’s (2005), 
then, presents a dynamic picture of momentary human being; a 
picture that casts human beings as volitional, relative to certain 
internally-operative reference values.  So, unlike physiological 
homeostasis, which entails the maintenance of steady, inner-body, 
states within fairly narrow margins for error, PCT applies the same 
underlying principle, of negative feedback, to psycho-behavioural 
goings-on.  
 
Carver and Scheier (1982, p. 113) encapsulate, what they call just, 
control theory: 
 
 [The central function of a feedback system] is not to create 
 “behaviour.” Its purpose is to create and maintain the 
 perception of a specific desired condition: that is, whatever 
 condition constitutes its reference value or standard of 
 comparison. 
 
You will note that, when applied to humans, the cybernetic negative 
feedback model emphasises the self-regulation of what a person 
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senses, relative to his/her preferred states of being.  Any 
environment-changing behaviour that a person enacts, then, serves 
to bring the behaving-person’s immediately-subsequent-perceptions 
more into line with his/her expected or preferred state.    
 
5.4 ‘Behavior Settings’ 
 
We can now turn, finally, to the application of the cybernetic 
feedback model to a domain called ecological psychology.  Roger 
Barker, one of the founders of this domain, calls his unit of analysis 
“behavior settings”.   Barker (1963, p. 29) writes: 
 
 Altogether, then, there is abundant evidence that behavior 
 settings, like many bio-physical entities, are strongly self-
 regulated systems which regulate the behavior episodes 
 within them as molecules regulate atoms, as organs regulate 
 cells, and as structures regulate the beams of which they are 
 constructed. 
 
He continues (p. 34): 
 
 The inhabitants of behavior settings always have the 
 potentiality, and usually the active tendency, to exhibit a 
 greater variety of behavior than the setting requires or can 
 tolerate.  The behavior setting control mechanism reduces 
 this variety to the amount appropriate to the setting, and 
 maintains it within an acceptable range of values. 
 
Barker, then, views social settings as self-regulating systems, which 
operate in ways akin to the functioning of self-regulating 
individuals.  In the case of ‘behavior settings’  internalised norms 
held within participants, along with externally-policed ‘laws’ and 
‘regulations’,  work in concert to ensure that setting-dwellers abide 
by the ‘rules’, relative to a particular setting.  For example, speed 
cameras usually serve as the ‘sensing mechanisms’ that monitor 
vehicle speeds relative to pre-set speed limits (reference values).   
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When a vehicle exceeds the speed limit a camera gets activated by 
an ‘executive mechanism’ setting in motion a process of financial 
punishment, intended, presumably, to inhibit future speeding via 
this ‘deviation-countering mechanism’.  In extreme cases the driver 
my get ‘vetoed’ - barred from the road. Thus the road constitutes a 
regulated ‘behavior setting’ of sorts (Wicker 1979, pp. 13-15).  
 
Wicker (1979, p. 17) writes: 
 
 The careful observer of the environment comes to recognize 
 a series of nested - that is, hierarchically ordered - self-
 regulating systems that fit together somewhat like the layers 
 of an onion.  Each system is a component of a larger system, 
 and each contains, within its boundaries, a number of 
 component systems.  
 
This way of thinking draws together the notions of homeostasis 
(inner-body regulation), PCT and control theory (where an 
individual seeks to regulate his/her own perceptions), and social 
regulation (where ‘behavior settings’, such as cinemas, classrooms, 
and libraries, conspire, systematically, to keep human conduct in 
check, within those settings).   
 
More recently Wicker (2012, p. 485) has extended the ecological 
psychology of ‘behavior settings’ to include the experiences of 
setting-participants in relation to the settings themselves:  
 
 Applied to people’s encounters with behavior settings, 
 experience includes what occupants sense or feel from direct 
 contact with physical stimuli and happenings in settings, and 
 their adjustments to them.  It also includes the residuals of 
 such contact. […] [D]ifferent occupants may achieve different  
 patterns of satisfactions, and […] settings of different 
 genotypes provide different satisfaction possibilities […]. 
 [Experience in settings] also includes symbolic meanings that 
 occupants attach to activities, objects, and spaces that they 
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 encounter [such as power, authority, exclusivity, awe, 
 inspiration, and community]. 
 
It seems to me that, through this approach, Wicker wants to 
attribute a person’s experience, in toto, to environmental stimuli, 
residuals thereof, and connotations triggered thereby.  I would 
prefer to think that a person’s experiencing, whilst within a 
particular setting, may extend to phenomena ‘outside’ of the 
setting, via, say, associational thinking and feelings not immediately  
linked to the setting.  For example, a person may have argued with 
someone en route to the setting and this fracas may colour his/her 
experiencing and actions within the setting.  
 
5.5 Keywords 
 
Given that the term ‘homeostasis' turned up three times in my list 
of keywords, [Fig. 5.2, PT0] it seemed that it may constitute one of 
the key concepts that would inform my ‘data analysis’.  Further 
scrutiny of the keywords reveals ‘Regulation’, ‘Inside/Outside’, 
‘Keep-in/Keep-Out, and ‘Let-In/Let-Out’ - which all relate strongly 
to the notion  of control, whether construed at: (a) an inner-body 
level, (b) at the level of  personal behaviour, or, indeed, at (c) the 
level of a ‘behavior setting’.   
 
Thus, when it came to creating the five ‘themes’, that structured my 
writing in relation to ‘data’, I selected the following terms.  (1) 
‘Access’ - linked to the keywords: ‘Regulation’, ‘Inside/Outside’, and 
‘Keep-In/Keep-Out’ - pertaining to the control of access to bounded 
spaces. (2) ‘Configuration’ - linked to the keywords: ‘Regulation’, 
‘Attraction/Aversion’, and ‘Me/Not-Me’ - pertaining to the perceived 
suitability [or not] of particular arrangements of constituent 
‘elements’ within bounded spaces). (3) ‘Levels’ - linked to the 
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keywords: ‘Homeostasis’, ‘Regulation’, ‘Physiological Homeostasis’, 
‘Keep-In/Keep-Out’, ‘Let-In/Let-Out’, and ‘Attraction/Aversion’ - 
pertaining to, for example, hydration-levels, hunger-levels, light-
levels, temperature-levels, thirst-levels, and levels of 
attraction/aversion). (4) ‘Association’ - linked to the keywords:   
‘Image Homeostasis’, ‘Let-In/Let-out’, and ‘Me/Not-Me’ - pertaining 
to what  a person/organisation feels comfortable associating with; 
what s/he/it lets into his/her/its life/home/organisation, and what 
s/he/it considers suitable for him/her/it to associate with, in terms 
of people, places, objects, other organisations, and ideas, etc. And, 
finally, (5) ‘Expression’ - linked particularly to the keywords: 
‘Inside/Outside’, ‘Keep-In/Keep-Out’, and ‘Let-In/Let-Out’ - 
pertaining to the regulation of communicative outputs, actions, or 
gestures, in terms of expressing and/or withholding.  [See Fig. 5.3] 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Keywords 
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Figure 5.3 Data Themes 
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5.6 Concluding 
 
In this chapter I have shown how I arrived at my five ‘themes’.    
They closely relate to the keywords that I had produced in advance 
of ‘discovering’ the cybernetic negative feedback model - which 
functions as a general, more-contemporary, and specified 
explanation of the processes underpinning forms of physiological,   
psychological, and situational homeostasis.   
 
A field-theoretical orientation informed my thinking throughout my 
research project.  Consequently I considered the goings-on in,  and 
around, data-viewing ‘behavior settings’, and, likewise, the thesis-
writing ‘behavior settings’, as, potentially, just as relevant to my 
research as the particular texts that I looked at, or worked on, in 
those settings. Furthermore, the thinking and feeling that went on 
within me, whilst viewing particular texts, in particular settings, 
could also, at any point, become momentarily salient in my 
experiencing.  Hence the notion of the 360°-‘inner’-‘outer’-‘field’ 
covered the entire gamut of particulars that one may have attended 
to from moment to moment.  I could have ignored such attentional 
vacillation, but for me to have ignored it would have meant failing 
to address the very phenomenon that I professed to study, namely, 
full-blown momentary ‘experiaction’.  It would have seemed remiss 
of me, if I had sought to focus on the experiaction represented in 
the audio-visual recordings of research conversations, to the 
exclusion of my whilst-doing-data-analysis experiaction and my 
whilst-writing-up-data-analysis experiaction. I trust that this 
explains my inclusion of certain reflexive passages in and amongst 
the ‘data analysis’ that follows.  
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Chapter 6: Access 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Through the process of systematic data-reduction, described in 
chapter 4, I arrived at five data themes: ‘access’, ‘configuration’, 
‘levels’, ‘association’, and ‘expression’.  Each of these themes 
constitutes, what I call, a ‘regulable variable’.  And each of the 
regulable variables only begins to make sense when viewed in the 
light of the cybernetic negative feedback model, introduced in 
chapter 5. [Fig. 6.1, below] As a quick reminder, the negative 
feedback model posits that a person - or a sub-system within a 
person; or, indeed, the micro-environmental system (‘behavior 
setting’) in which a person resides - will kick into action when 
s/he/it senses a threat to his/her/its preferred state - the state 
represented by his/her/its most salient, currently-operative, 
‘reference value(s)’, goal-state(s), or preferred/expected state(s). 
His/her/its immediate [PTO] 
 
 
    Figure 6.1 The Negative Feedback Loop - the 
    Basic Unit of Cybernetic Control, Carver and 
    Scheier (1982, p. 112) 
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perceiving/sensing gets benchmarked against his/her/its preferred 
‘reference value(s)’ (‘comparator’). In the wake of a discrepancy 
between ‘actual’ and ‘preferred’ states, the actional-upshot takes 
the form of ‘output’ calculated to bring his/her/its immediately-
subsequent perceiving/sensing more into line with his/her/its 
reference value(s).  The five regulable variables that I have 
identified [‘access’, ‘configuration’, ‘levels’, ‘association’, and 
‘expression’] constitute those abstract  ‘things’ that s/he/it can act 
upon in the process of seeking to bring his/her/its 
sensing/perceiving more into line with his/her/its reference 
value(s). We start then with ‘access’, and in particular the metaphor 
that underpins the very notion of spatial access. 
 
6.2 The Container Metaphor 
 
 We are physical beings, bounded and set off from the rest of 
 the world by the surface of our skins, and we experience the 
 rest of the world as outside us.  Each of us is a container, with 
 a bounding surface and an in-out orientation.  We project our 
 own in-out orientation onto other physical objects that are 
 bounded by surfaces.  Thus we also view them as containers 
 with an inside and an outside.  Rooms and houses are obvious 
 containers.  Moving from room to room is moving from 
 one container to another, that is, moving out of one room and 
 into another.  We even give solid objects this orientation, as 
 when we break a rock open to see what’s inside it.  We 
 impose this orientation on our natural environment as well.  A 
 clearing in the woods is seen as having a bounding surface, 
 and we can view ourselves as being in the clearing or out of 
 the clearing, in the woods or out of the woods.  A clearing in 
 the woods has something we can perceive as a natural 
 boundary - the fuzzy area where the trees more or less stop 
 and the clearing more or less begins.  But even where there is 
 no natural physical boundary that can be viewed as defining a 
 container, we impose boundaries - marking off territory so 
 that it has an inside and a bounding surface - whether a wall, 
 a fence, or an abstract line or plane.  There are few human 
 instincts more basic than territoriality.  And such defining of 
 territory, putting a boundary around it, is an act of 
 quantification. Bounded objects, whether human beings, 
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 rocks, or land areas, have sizes.  This allows them to be 
 quantified in terms of the amount of substance they contain.  
 Kansas, for example, is a bounded area - a CONTAINER - 
 which is why we can say, “There’s a lot of land in Kansas. 
  Substances can themselves be viewed as containers.  
 Take a tub of water, for example.  When you get into the tub, 
 you get into the water.  Both the tub and the water are 
 viewed as containers, but of different sorts.  The tub is a 
 CONTAINER OBJECT, while the water is a CONTAINER 
 SUBSTANCE.   
 
    - Lakoff and Johnson (1980, pp. 29-32) 
 
I follow Lakoff and Johnson (1980) in using capital letters when 
identifying particular metaphors. Lakoff and Johnson go on to 
suggest that, “VISUAL FIELDS ARE CONTAINERS”, meaning that 
things come in and out of view - with regard to the limits of what 
we can see at any point in time.    According to Lakoff and Johnson, 
events and actions, may function as metaphorical CONTAINER 
OBJECTS, e.g., he takes part in a research conversation and he 
enjoys taking part in a marathon run. Activities may constitute 
metaphorical CONTAINER SUBSTANCES, e.g., he immerses himself 
in the process of writing.  And states of being may function 
metaphorically as CONTAINERS, as when we say,   he’s in love with 
his wife, or she’s in a joyful state. 
 
If we view our body as a CONTAINER OBJECT, then the acts of 
eating and drinking comprise of putting things into that container.  
Refusing, or restricting, the ingestion of certain types of food and 
drink constitutes a form of regulatory behaviour - regulating what, 
and how much, gains access to the body-as-container.  The plot 
thickens when we begin to think of people’s involvement with non-
food phenomena, such as texts, as akin to the consumption of food 
and drink.  Thus, when ‘consuming’ movies, books, or music we 
take these metaphorical foods in via our particular ‘product-
 154 
relevant’ senses.  As Schelling (1984, pp. 343-344), quoted earlier, 
put it: 
 
 We consume with our mouths and noses and ears and eyes 
 and proprioceptors and skin and fingertips, and with the 
 nerves that react to external stimuli and internal hormones; 
 we consume relief from pain and fatigue, itching and thirst.  
 But we also consume by thinking.  We consume past events 
 we can bring up from memory; future events that we can 
 believe will happen; contemporary circumstances not 
 physically present […] and we can even tease ourselves into 
 believing and consuming thoughts that are intended only to 
 please. 
 
In an important sense, our so-called ‘mind’ constitutes a receptacle 
into which incoming perceivings/sensings flow.  Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980, p. 148) again: 
 
 […] the IDEAS ARE FOOD metaphor is based on still more 
 basic metaphors.  For example, it is based partly on the 
 CONDUIT metaphor, according to which IDEAS ARE OBJECTS 
 and we can get them from outside ourselves.  It also assumes 
 the MIND IS A CONTAINER metaphor, which establishes a 
 similarity between the mind and the body - both being 
 CONTAINERS.  Together with the CONDUIT metaphor, we get 
 the complex metaphor in which IDEAS ARE OBJECTS THAT 
 COME INTO THE MIND, just as pieces of food are objects that 
 come into the body. 
 
Why do I mention all this in relation to the notion of regulating 
access?  Because if we view a research room as a container, and if 
we view each research-participant’s body as a container, and if we 
view each research-participant’s mind as a container, then we can 
conceptualise the goings-on, within that research setting, in terms 
of the regulation of access to (and traffic between) these various 
nested containers, and, indeed, others that I will mention later.  
Respectively this involves (1) someone (or something) regulating 
access to the physical space of the research room - what gets in 
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and out. (2) It involves regulating access to the participants’ bodies, 
via breathing, eating and drinking - what gets in and out - materials 
inside a body gain access to the ‘outside world’ when they get 
expressed from within that body. (3) The perceiving/sensing 
function of an individual, according to the negative feedback model, 
determines what finds its way, via the sensor signal, to the 
benchmarking ‘department’ (within an individual), where his/her 
immediate perceivings/sensings get pattern-matched against 
his/her currently-held ‘reference value(s)’, resulting in either a 
match or a mismatch thereof.  A mismatch, between immediate 
sensings and reference value(s), sponsors action (via an ‘error 
signal’) which seeks to bring subsequent perceivings/sensings more 
into line with the individual’s currently held reference value(s).  A 
close match between a current perception and a preferred reference 
value obviates any need for ‘remedial action’. Without thus 
distinguishing between outer-body states and inner-body/mind 
states, the notions of seeking to harmonise one’s perception of 
outer-goings-on with inner-held preferences would make no sense.  
The negative feedback model, then, posits a world that we can act 
on, in addition to our perception thereof.  However, our exploration 
doesn’t stop here.   
 
The camcorder used to record the research conversations, itself, 
has a restricted and regulable field of vision, as do the human 
participants.  Furthermore, written texts constitute containers, of 
sorts, with insides, outsides, and contents.  A student and his 
supervisors, for example, co-determine what finds its way into his 
PhD thesis.  So, when I talk in terms of regulating access within a 
research setting I have ‘in mind’ regulating access to:  the room 
itself; to the bodies within the room; to the, nominal, ‘minds’ within 
the bodies;  to the ‘props’ within the rooms;  to the contents of the 
camcorder’s frame; and to the 18-minute-long movie [screened 
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prior to each of the ten research conversations] i.e., what got put 
into the film and what can a viewer ‘take out’ and ‘ingest’ from the 
movie? Sufia (conversation No. 7), for example, could understand 
the French-language content without reading the subtitles; Matt 
(conversation No. 6), a sight-impaired person, could not see, but he 
could hear the movie.  Our acquired skills and sensory capacities 
inform what we can readily ‘take’ from, in this case, a movie.  
 
Much of what follows, in this chapter, does not appear in my 
viewing-logs relating to research conversations; I have 
subsequently added some of the noticings, included here, in line 
with a field-theoretical orientation, which encourages us to view  
the three-dimensional research setting as an integral component of  
the 360°-‘inner’-‘outer’-‘field’ of each participant, including myself.   
The research setting can so easily become part of the taken-for-
granted infrastructure that supports the ‘main event’.  A field-
theoretical perspective ensures that the researcher takes account of 
the interconnectedness and functional inseparability of research 
participants and research settings. 
 
6.3 Data 
 
It seems very important, to me, not to characterise ‘data’ as 
something separate from the ‘data analyst’.  When I enter a 
research setting with a field-theoretical, phenomenologically-
informed orientation, I will notice whatever I notice in any nook or 
cranny of my immediate 360°-‘inner’-‘outer’-‘field’ and I will do 
whatever I do.  One may question the relevance of some of my 
noticings and actions, but what I notice and do constitutes the 
reality of my existence from moment to moment, for better or for 
worse. 
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In an important sense, the very naming of a particular episode, 
such as a ‘research conversation’, serves to prime participants, 
constraining and delimiting what might count as ‘legitimate’ or 
‘relevant’  conduct therein.  Thus the event label functions like a 
Procrustean bed which implicitly requires us to lop off extraneous 
material or to stretch parts of our testimony to fit it to the contours 
of the (research conversation) bed.  It seems to me that in any 
given research setting, a participant’s ‘data’ may take the form of 
any aspect of the whole  ‘field’ - the 360°-‘inner’-‘outer’ sphere - 
that s/he may attend  to momentarily. In the case of a research 
conversation, two somewhat idiosyncratically perceived ‘fields’    
interact. Von Eckartsberg (1971, p. 373) calls the interface between 
two experiencing and active individuals, ‘inter-experiaction’. 
Elsewhere von Eckartsberg (1978, p. 200) defines ‘experiaction’ as, 
“[…] a way of conceiving of the unity of experience and action in 
any given instance of life lived through […]”.  
 
When viewed from a field-theoretical perspective, a DVD recording 
of a research conversation constitutes just one aspect of the 360°-
‘inner’-‘outer’-‘field’ of the analyst as s/he ‘analyses data’.  Whilst 
watching or reading ‘data’ a person may attend to, or engage with, 
any aspect of his/her dynamic  ‘field’, and whatever s/he notices 
and does whilst nominally ‘analysing data’ forms a part of his/her 
‘field’ that, itself, contains the nominal ‘data’, such as a DVD 
recording.  A written or verbal, representation of the analyst’s 
combined experiences and actions as s/he nominally ‘analyses 
data’, itself becomes ‘data’ that the analyst may subsequently 
attend to as a part of a subsequent ‘field’. A focal text, such as a 
transcript, constitutes only one of the constituent parts of the 
analyst’s dynamic ‘field’ as s/he reads it.  A person can attend to, 
and engage with, any aspect(s) of his/her momentary, dynamic 
‘field’, and his/her response to the phenomena s/he notices may 
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form the foundation for further associative digressions and actions 
on his/her part. Importantly, as Laing (1967, p. 15) puts it, “The 
other person’s behaviour is an experience of mine.  My behaviour is 
an experience of the other.”  To paraphrase Laing, I only have 
access to the other via my experience of his/her physical being, 
his/her expressive outputs, or representations thereof.  Thus in 
studying experiaction within the research process, even quoting 
research volunteers verbatim requires the researcher to select the 
said quotes for inclusion and to evaluate the  significance of those 
quotes in the light of the researcher’s frame of reference and 
his/her overarching agenda.  
 
6.4 Regulating Access to Research Rooms 
 
As suggested earlier, we may think of research rooms as bounded 
containers.  In order to gain access to these rooms, that I used 
when conducting the ten research conversations, I had to discuss 
the availability of the rooms with one or other of the receptionists at 
the School of Management.  The receptionists could activate my 
bar-coded student card, such that I could then use my card to 
access the specific rooms that I booked.  This process related to 
both gaining access to the rooms and to the duration of that access.  
I booked rooms for four-hour sessions: one hour for setting-up and 
for testing equipment; half an hour, or so, for watching the 18-
minute-long movie; up to around two hours for the post-movie-
viewing research conversation; and about half-an-hour for packing 
up.  The rooms that I used needed to have a resident DVD player, 
to enable me to play the movie screened before each conversation; 
this meant that the receptionists necessarily assigned me to 
teaching rooms, designed to accommodate groups of students.  
Consequently, each room that I used had far more tables and chairs 
than I needed.  Furthermore, the receptionists gave priority to 
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lecturers who needed rooms for conducting classes; indeed some 
lecturers had pre-booked particular rooms, which meant that I 
couldn’t use the same room for each of the ten research 
conversations.  Thus, if I wanted to use a particular room in which 
to conduct a research conversation I needed to follow the protocol 
for securing a booking.  One can not simply drift into any room 
which takes one’s fancy.  Similarly, we can’t, with impunity, walk 
into the homes of strangers; we ordinarily knock on a closed door 
and wait for an occupant to greet us, or to say “enter”, or some 
such phrase. However, this practice does not usually apply to 
seemingly unoccupied classrooms.  I didn’t want a group of 
students to turn up, half-an-hour into a volunteer and me engaging 
in a research conversation, claiming that their class will begin, in 
the same room, in five minutes. A room booking system, when 
successfully administered, averts the kind of unwelcome eventuality 
mooted here, thus ensuring my own, interruption-related, peace-of-
mind.   
 
In addition to the regulation of room access overseen by reception 
staff, I prepared an A4 sheet which I slid into the Perspex holder on 
the wall outside of each room that I used; it read, “QUIET PLEASE! 
RESEARCH IN PROGRESS”.  This sign functioned both as an attempt 
to control the noise-level emanating from passersby and to deter 
people from entering the room during the research conversation; 
either eventuality might have disrupted the audio-visual recording.  
In the event we had no problems resulting from these potentialities.   
 
I provided each research volunteer with a bottle of spring water and 
positioned it, prior to the session, on the floor at the side of his/her 
chair.  Exceptionally, Sufia (conversation No. 7) held her bottle of 
water in her hand for the entire duration of the conversation.  Other 
volunteers intermittently reached for their bottles of water, with the 
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exception of Ruby (conversation No. 3) who picked up her bottle of 
self-bought orange drink at 00:48:56 and then kept it in her hand 
(or on her lap) for the remainder of the conversation.   I think this 
proximity-of-drink issue relates to the question of access in the 
sense of my positioning of ‘props’ in order to give people ready 
access to them. However, this proximity-of-drink issue also relates 
to the theme of ‘configuration’, [See chapter 7] as well as to 
‘access’, namely, how one configures elements within a room also 
determines an individual’s ease of access to certain phenomena 
within that room - ergonomically speaking.  Similarly, my purpose-
bought camcorder has a remote-control device for operating it 
without leaving one’s seat, but given the nearness of the camcorder 
to the conversing research participants [both the volunteer and I 
appeared, sat side-by-side, during each recording] I chose to 
manually turn the camcorder on and off, at source.  This way I 
could satisfy myself that the operation had indeed occurred.  At the 
end of my first conversation, with Alia, I went through the motions 
of turning off the camcorder, using the remote control, only to find 
subsequently that the recording had continued beyond the point 
when I thought I had stopped it. This latter kind of positional access 
differs, however, from access to containers or spaces and deals 
more with access through expedient proximity.   
 
6.5 Regulating Access to Our Bodies 
 
By intermittently enquiring about their comfort levels, I ensured   
that research volunteers felt at liberty to leave the room, for toilet 
breaks, or for any other reasons.  Three out of the ten volunteers 
availed themselves of this freedom: Neil at 01:18:00, for two 
minutes and twenty seconds; Bridie at 01:25:04, for three minutes 
and 40 seconds; and Bob at around 01:35:30, for two minutes and 
44 seconds.   And of these three, Neil and Bob pro-actively initiated 
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their own toilet breaks:  Neil (01:17:56), “Excuse me Michael, 
would it be alright to go to the toilet?”, and Bob (01:36:02), “Is 
there a toilet nearby Michael?”  In the case of Bridie, I asked her if 
she felt aware of any intruding/distracting thoughts/feelings.  She 
responded to my question my saying she needed a “comfort break”.   
 
We may think of the human body as a room-like structure.  As with 
a literal room, individuals may, by degree, control access to this 
‘room’ via its various points (and means) of ingress.  Headphones, 
for example, control the flow of aural signals into the ears.  As Alia 
(conversation No. 1, at 00:43:28) notes: 
 
 […] the building is full of students; they’ve got their MP3 
 players in or they’re on their phone, and they’ll just stop in 
 front of you. They’re not aware of people around them.  
 They’re in their own little cocoon. 
 
Similarly, when creating notes whilst viewing recordings of research 
conversations, and transcribing audio-visual recordings of research 
conversations, I strategically wore headphones in order to minimise 
ambient audio distractions and to enable me to maximise my ability 
to accurately represent the content of the audio track.  In both of 
these examples we see individuals strategically regulating sensory 
input in pursuance of particular ends - immersion in music and 
concentration on the task of data-analysis respectively.  We may 
also view clothes as a means of regulating which parts of our bodies 
we allow others to see and touch.  In this regard I noted that Jane 
(conversation No. 9) had a shawl draped around her torso, during 
our video-recorded conversation, which she took off after I turned 
off the camcorder.  Rightly or wrongly I interpreted this as a sign of, 
some combination of, taste, modesty, and propriety - based on the 
overall tenor of Jane’s during-research communication.  For 
example:   
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 00:16:18 Michael: […] when you talked about the movie, 
 and evaluating the movie, I heard things that I would 
 associate more with a puritanical perhaps, or a more spiritual 
 [Jane: Spiritual, right] kind of bias. […] Have I understood 
 that correctly? 
 
 Jane: Yes, yes, yes.  When you were talking I was thinking 
 about the word spirituality, then you used it, so you 
 understood. […] Now by spirituality we would mean that 
 people of high spirituality would not use dirty jokes and would 
 not drink that much beer, and would not draw a lady with that 
 type of breasts […]. Yes if we understand the word spirituality 
 this way […] then I would say, you were right; I place myself 
 on that continuum, closer to the Eastern part of the world.  
 
If wearing the shawl had simply related to Jane keeping herself 
warm, I would have expected that Jane would have needed the 
shawl still more urgently when leaving the research setting, rather 
than removing it at the end of the conversation. 
 
6.6 Regulating Access to Props 
 
Upon gaining access to a research setting, for a particular duration, 
I went on to use my activated student card to access the audio-
visual-equipment cabinet in each room.  Similarly I have a purpose-
bought protective bag in which I store my camcorder and tripod, 
and to which I have exclusive access.  As stated earlier, the 
receptionists at the School of Management administered the control 
of access to the research rooms and their contents, whereas I had 
custodianship over my personal belongings.  However, for the 
duration of my tenure in the room, I became the acting-regulator of 
access to the room.  I locked the room when we had toilet breaks. 
Similarly, I locked each research room after I had finished preparing 
it for use and then set out to meet each volunteer in the foyer of 
the School of Management.  I did not (and do not) allow anyone but 
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myself to get anywhere close to my camcorder bag and its contents.  
I also ensured that I carried a large golfing umbrella with me when 
travelling to, and from, each research conversation, so that, in the 
event of rain, I could prevent any raindrops from coming into 
contact with my equipment bag.  Furthermore, within the outer 
shell of the equipment bag there reside other separate bags which 
contain specific pieces of kit.   For example, the camcorder has its 
own padded zipper bag, and the tripod has a dedicated, protective 
zipper bag.  This, for me, evokes the notion of Russian dolls nested 
one within another.  I feel attracted to the notion of conceiving of 
buildings as containers which contain a multitude of constituent 
containers, such as my equipment bag, which themselves may 
contain other nested containers.  Similarly, Hoffmeyer (1998, p. 36)    
writes: 
 
 The membranes of living systems - at whatever level, i.e. 
 whether they encircle sub-cellular organelles, cells, tissues, 
 organs, or organisms - are in fact best described as interfaces 
 facilitating a highly regulated exchange of signs between 
 interiors and exteriors.  Life should fundamentally be seen as 
 organised around the nested set of membranes or interfaces 
 which we call organisms […].  
 
Whilst inanimate and animate phenomena of course differ, at the 
level of containers-within-containers a clear analogy exists.  Indeed 
this container metaphor sponsors this entire ‘access’ chapter,  in 
which buildings, rooms, bodies, and props all have insides and 
outsides and, thus, boundaries, membranes, and surfaces, 
across/through which we may, or may not (by degree) allow  
‘traffic’ to pass. 
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6.7 Some Other Forms of Access Regulation 
 
We may view the regulation of daylight entering the research room 
as an access issue of sorts.  Closing the blinds, in conjunction with 
turning off electric lighting, enabled me to create cinema-like 
conditions for the screening of the preliminary movie.  During 
conversation No. 5 (00:24:31) I strategically opened the blinds of 
the room, not to let more light in but rather to allow Bella and I to 
see outside,  Michael: “I’m just thinking how nice it is actually to 
have this […] vista.”  Indeed, for conversation No. 2, with Neil, I 
purposely chose the room with the most dramatic and impressive 
outlook because Neil works in a world-class, state-of-the-art 
institution and I wanted to provide him with a home-from-home 
setting.  As well as keeping Neil in the style to which he had 
become accustomed, this choice potentially indicated to Neil, if he 
chose to see it this way, that I, like him, had gained entrée into a 
prestigious organisation.  Here we can see the use of buildings, 
rooms, and vistas as potential identity/status-bolstering aids. 
 
The notion of ‘access’, described in this chapter, has primarily 
focused on the notion of adventitious phenomena entering bounded 
spaces, as prototypically exemplified by the acts of eating and 
drinking.  However, we might now, for a moment, imagine a pre-
industrial world, [somewhere between the 14th and 18th centuries - 
Williams (1988, pp. 78-79)] when people ate, drank and made fires. 
At this pre-modern juncture, the verb ‘consume’ related to such 
allied, elemental processes of devouring and destroying.  Any 
conversation that took place as people ate and drank around a fire, 
obviously didn’t form part of the eating itself.  However, as I’ve 
said, extra-to-food perceiving and sensing would have contributed 
to the overall experience that even a person of such primitive  
means sustained whilst eating. In other words, whether a person 
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literally eats or figuratively eats, the person still hosts an 
accompanying full-blown mode of experiencing.  In the case of 
literal eating, the food contributes to full-blown experiencing which 
exceeds the contribution of the food itself. In the case of figurative 
consumption, since everything constitutes potential ‘food’, and 
nothing remains off-piste, [or off the menu] consumption becomes 
all-pervasive.  And, as such, any experience one has, necessarily, 
derives from the ‘intake’, or sensory registration, of something or 
other, even if one nominally ‘takes in’ what already resides within 
oneself, such as one’s thinking and feeling.  However, human 
beings do not simply perceive, take in, and consume, they ‘do’, 
express, and produce.  I will deal with this topic in chapter 10, in 
which I focus on the issue of regulating ‘expression’. 
 
6.8 Concluding 
 
I have mentioned some of the ways in which access to rooms, 
bodies/minds, and ‘props’ gets controlled by someone or other.  In 
the case of securing access to the rooms in the first instance, the 
receptionists at the School of Management functioned as 
gatekeepers.  For the duration of my four-hour tenure I became the 
acting-gatekeeper, if you will.  If, after setting-up the room, I 
wanted to leave the room for any reason, I could use my activated 
student card to lock and unlock the door, thereby ensuring that no 
one could steal my camcorder in my absence.  Similarly, individuals 
within the research environment (voluntarily or involuntarily) 
regulated what physically entered their bodies and what physically 
left their bodies via excretion and exhalation for example. Only 
Bridie [conversation No. 4] ate during a session; she ate some 
apple pieces between 01:28:00 and 01:37:00 on the DVD playback 
counter. I also suggested that, for the individuals within the 
research environment, clothing functions as a ‘skin’ which restricts 
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visual access, by the other (and the self), to particular parts of their 
respective bodies.  One can see this as analogous to curtains and 
wallpapers which stop passersby from peering into a room or which 
cover the raw surface of a wall, respectively.   
 
The term  ‘access’, when used as a transitive verb, implies  the 
regulation of access to something or other, in this case to: rooms, 
bodies, texts, ‘props’ and the like.  This, in turn, connotes the 
notion of archetypal consumption, since both eating and drinking 
entail putting substances from outside the body-container, into the 
body-container.  The container metaphor thus underpins archetypal 
consumption. However, by bringing into question a specifically 
input/intake orientation and by moving towards an interest in the 
regulation of two-way, interactive, traffic between nested 
‘containers’, as in human communication, we can begin to free 
ourselves from a ‘consumption’ orientation; we can begin to think in 
terms of dynamic interactivity rather than nominally focusing on 
‘incoming’ phenomena and perceptions. 
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Chapter 7: Configuration 
 
7.1 The Main Body of the Chapter 
 
 While many of the ideas in this paper are pilfered from other 
 sources (see long list of references), the author is proud to 
 assert that precisely these words have never been written in 
 precisely this order. 
 
    - Anthony Patterson (2010, p. 57) 
 
Patterson, here, gently subverts the academic convention of making 
an originality/value-claim regarding one’s own work.  In particular 
he focuses on, what Hanks (1989, p. 95) refers to as, a particular 
“configuration of signs”.  Von Eckartsberg (2010, p. 256)   makes a 
similar point to Patterson, but with reference to the rough and 
tumble of three-dimensional human actions and interactions: 
 
 The individual moves through his world bodily, and thus 
 traces a certain unique path through the existing geographical 
 landscapes of his universe. […]  His bodily path can be traced 
 on various geographical maps.  In mapping the path of the 
 body-in-motion, we obtain a basic record of an individual’s 
 body-movement through space, which anchors all other 
 possible experimental happenings. Such a mapping 
 constitutes a basic existential fact about a person. 
 
Echoing Patterson’s opening quote, a person may thus proudly 
assert that precisely these movements and actions have never 
occurred in precisely this order, in these precise locations.  Von 
Eckartsberg (2010, p. 256) continues: 
 
 Using language, I engage in a crucial translation of the 
 original event, which becomes accessible only indirectly as 
 pointed to by means of language.  At present, there seems to 
 be no other possible way of access to experience except 
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 through some form of communication that constitutes, 
 already, a translation of the original events. 
 
Following this line of thought, there exist experiential phenomena 
which predate their translation into palpable-to-others (written, 
spoken, etc.,) forms.  Just as we can refer to the particular word-
order of an academic article as unique, and as a body’s movement 
through space-time may prove unrepeatable in all of its details, so 
too, an individual’s ‘inner’ goings-on (his/her thinking and feeling) 
proceeds idiosyncratically, privately, and  ongoingly - broken only 
by periods of dreamless sleep. 
 
Using Laszlo’s (1973, p. 379) musically-related distinction - 
between, “composer, performer, and listener” - I want to invite us 
to view the ‘live’ research conversation as, itself, a unique 
configuration of elements, comprising of contingently-articulated 
utterances and associated bodily positioning, within a strategically-
organized physical environment. Given the absence of scripted 
questions during the research conversations, the communication 
emerged, improvised-jazz-like, from the participants of each distinct 
situation. 
 
It seems crucial, for me, to characterise each ‘live’ research 
conversation as co-composed, co-performed, and co-perceived by 
the two participants occupying particular space-time coordinates.  
In an important sense, each individual could act ‘on’ the emergent 
‘music’ and the performance thereof.  We can thus think of the ‘live’ 
research conversation as a work-in-progress. 
 
When I subsequently viewed the audio-visual recording, of each 
research conversation, I became a listener/viewer and a concurrent 
note-maker.  Unless and until I objectified my noticings, they 
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remained tacit and thus private.  Unlike a computer hard-drive that 
potentially saves all of a computer’s goings-on in a recoverable 
format, for posterity, a person’s thinking and feeling exists only 
fleetingly, unless preserved in some sort of death-defying medium.   
[“The faintest ink is better than the most retentive memory.” 
(Origin unknown)]  The crucial question becomes, How does one 
arrive at a configuration of words (or other symbols) that accords 
with the ‘configuration’ of one’s inner goings-on, or one’s sought-
after state?  T. S. Eliot (1921, p. 92) referred to this as the search 
for an “objective correlative”: 
 
 […] in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of 
 events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; 
 such  that when the external facts, which must terminate in 
 sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately 
 evoked. 
 
This leads us to the heart of the writing process.  One articulates 
some words; one registers the impact of those very words on one’s 
own ‘system’.  One’s momentary evaluation of one’s emerging work   
then informs immediately-subsequent expression - for better or for 
worse.   
 
We have, then, an interrelating of geographical (often artefact-
imbued) contexts, and people (each with their ‘inner’ experiencing, 
along with their witting and/or unwitting expressive conduct).  How 
does one encompass such complexity when communicating?  
 
Laszlo (1970, p. 294) distinguishes between, “self-stabilizing 
through manipulation [of environmental variables] and self-
organizing through adaptation [of one’s inner reference levels]”. 
Thus a person can act on environmental variables in order to bring 
his/her sensing of those variables into line with his/her reference 
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value(s).  Alternatively s/he may, sooner or later, develop modified 
norms, preferences, and/or tastes, such that his/her expectations 
get met without his/her having to change environmental variables.  
In short, a person may change aspects of the world beyond his/her 
skin as a means of regulating his/her current experiencing; [Fig. 
7.1]  alternatively, s/he may work on his/her own ‘infrastructure’ - 
his/her own ‘inner’ points of reference - as a means of regulating 
what s/he experiences [Fig. 7.2]. 
 
      Figure 7.1 Experiaction Loop (Developed from Laszlo           
 [1970] and [1973]) 
 
 
 Figure 7.2 Experiaction Loop with Shift in Reference 
 Value(s) (Developed from Laszlo [1973]) 
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Laszlo (1973, p. 381) calls the process of reference-level-
adjustment “learning”.  He writes: 
 
 […] we shall not enter into the problem of how [R2] is derived 
 from [R1].  It is sufficient for our purpose to note that all 
 learning is held to be a form of creative response to 
 challenges in the experience of the subject […] an 
 exploratory process which leads to the re-examination of 
 one’s existing […] constructs and evolves, if necessary, new 
 constructs […]. 
 
Inter-experiaction, then, potentially involves two (or more) people, 
each harbouring an idiosyncratic assemblage of reference values.  
Thus, what each person senses, interprets, and acts on, will depend 
on his/her prevailing points of reference.  This basic model, coupled 
with each individual’s potential for ‘learning’ [Fig. 7.2] provides a 
way of representing the complexities that may arise in human inter-
experiaction. 
 
 
Figure 7.3 Inter-Experiaction (Developed from Laszlo 
[1973]) 
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Stern (1998, p. 5) reminds us that, “[…] all narratives are ‘made’ or 
created in the sense that they impose structure on a multiplicity of 
details.”  The subjective report may thus belie the complexity of the 
lived event.  The film critic Andrew Sarris (1971) points to this 
difficulty when he writes: 
 
 It is our misfortune as film critics that we must discuss a film 
 one-thing-at-a-time when on the screen so many things are 
 happening and reverberating at the same time. 
 
What applies to movies also applies to moment-to-moment 
experiencing, where simultaneous goings-on don’t readily lend 
themselves to concurrent description.   As Biró (1982, p. 24) puts 
it, “thought contains simultaneously what in speech occurs 
consecutively”. A transcript of an audio-visual recording, for 
example, contains written representations of verbal expressions, 
and actions, but clearly does not ‘contain’ experiencing itself. At 
best a transcript or audio-visual recording comprises of 
representations of experiencing and actions, which may ‘resonate’ 
within a sympathetic reader/viewer. Parts of the ‘live’ research 
conversation evade capture via the audio-visual recording, just as 
parts of the non-verbal experiencing of research participants do not 
find their way into verbal reports.  I must use words, and/or other 
symbolic means, in spite of the fact that these means, at best, 
represent experiencing - stand for experiencing - which the 
hearer/reader must, in the end, bring to life in his/her own being, in 
the form of his/her own responsive experiencing.   
 
Research convention ushers me towards ‘the data’ to find support 
for my five themes.  However, the five themes derived from a set of 
keywords.  The keywords ‘came out of’ my head, top-of-the-mind-
style, shortly after I had read my uni-log - a distilled selection of (a) 
what I had noticed whilst watching recordings of the research 
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conversations, (b) what I noticed as I re-read the notes and meta-
notes, made whilst viewing the audio-visual recordings and note-
reading respectively. The uni-log, in question, followed several 
generations down the line from the original live research 
conversations.  I began with two viewing-logs for each research 
conversation. I then went on to create the three composite viewing-
logs, before finally, creating the uni-log.  My keywords thus arose 
from an engagement with several successive types of data, 
addressed in different three-dimensional contexts. My thinking 
regarding the, subsequent, development of the keywords into five 
themes also developed through, for example, reading about 
homeostasis [Cannon (1939), Fletcher (1938), Stagner (1977),] 
and the cybernetic negative feedback model [Ashby (1957), Carver 
and Scheier (1982), Powers (2005)] and through conversing with 
peers.  Rather than viewing ‘data’ as residing solely in material 
‘texts’, a field-theoretical, phenomenologically-informed perspective 
led me to consider my own ‘inner’ goings-on, during the various 
stages of the research process, as relevant phenomena.  Miller and 
Glassner (2004, p. 127) allude to this kind of complexity: 
 
 Numerous levels of representation occur from the moment of 
 “primary experience” to the reading of researchers’ textual 
 presentation of findings, including the level of attending to the 
 experience, telling it to the researcher, transcribing and 
 analysing what is told, and the reading. 
    
I cannot escape the conviction that my ‘data’ potentially comprises 
of all that I notice as a researcher.  Even when I quote the exact 
words used by a research volunteer, I thus include something that I 
noticed whilst watching the recording of a research conversation.  
Similarly, when I bring together quotes from different volunteers 
(and from myself) I do so according to what strikes me as 
interesting and/or relevant, according to my line of argument.   In 
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full-blown experiaction the ‘data’ may comprise of any aspect(s) of 
my current 360°-‘inner’-‘outer’-‘field’.   
 
I set out to study ‘consumption experiences’, only to find myself re-
conceptualising the notion of ‘consumption experiences’ in the light 
of my review of the literature, seen through a field-theoretical, 
phenomenologically-informed lens.  As a consequence of this inquiry 
I found myself exploring the implications of this re-conceptualisation 
of ‘consumption experiences’ for the process of data analysis per se.  
When the concept of consuming stretches to include sensory 
‘noticing’, ‘becoming aware of’, and ‘experiencing’, then what 
applies, for example,  to the consumption of movies, begins to 
apply to the consumption of conversations, and indeed manifold 
other phenomena.  Just as, when viewing movies, we can, and do, 
attend to phenomena outside of the movie, so too our experiencing 
whilst engaged with research ‘data’ may exceed data-specific 
noticings.  This comparison seems especially apt given that the DVD 
recordings of research conversations resemble movies, both in 
terms of their audio-visual format and the fact that research-
conversation-recordings last for around the same amount of time as 
an average movie. If I really want to address full-blown 
experiaction-in-situ, then I can’t ignore the structural complexities 
sketched in this chapter. 
 
* * * 
 
 I will use asterisks to denote a shift to a different 
 temporal/spatial/attitudinal realm. 
 
    - Ronai (1995, p. 397) 
 
* * * 
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Having gained access to a research room I proceeded to arrange 
the room’s contents to suit my purposes and expectations. In 
particular I stacked all the superfluous tables and chairs around the 
outer edges of each room. I left two chairs which I positioned in 
front of the screen where I projected the pre-research-conversation 
movie. I left another two chairs which I positioned against an 
uncluttered section of wall, with a tripod-mounted-camcorder 
trained upon them, where the post-movie-viewing research 
conversation took place.  I thus set up a movie-viewing area and a 
separate post-movie-viewing-research-conversation zone. I 
removed any residual litter from the room.  Alia, my first volunteer, 
an experienced senior lecturer, said (05:04), “I thought, when I 
came in, that it was all looking very professional and well set up, 
very organised.”  Ruby, my third volunteer, a mature student, when 
asked during her post-research-conversation-monitoring-discussion, 
with my supervisor Nancy, “What recommendations would you give 
about how to improve the process?” said:  
 
  […] the room itself was quite, sort of, cold and… not as in 
 temperature-cold, but possibly a, sort of, more… possibly a… 
 I’d say probably a smaller room, a bit more, sort of, 
 comfortable. 
 
Here we see two different volunteers, confronted with essentially 
the same research setting, and yet noticing different aspects of it 
and making different value judgements concerning the setting. Alia 
spoke from the perspective of a professional lecturer. I suggest that 
Ruby may have had in mind the suitability of the room in relation to 
the nature of the conversation that we had had. For example, at 
one point during our conversation (No. 3, 42:35) Ruby said: 
 
 I think I’m probably using it as a bit of a counselling session 
 as well.  [Laughing]  I try… I’m one of those people who tends 
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 to, sort of, bottle everything up.  I try not to talk about 
 myself.  
 
Perhaps Ruby found it incongruous having a heart-to-heart 
conversation in an impersonal, institutional, and somewhat 
cavernous space; whereas Alia made her, “all looking very 
professional”, comment at the start of our conversation, before she 
knew what would follow.  However, Ruby, when seeking to account 
for the fact that she had shared certain personal information with 
me said: 
 
 […] I think a lot of it, as well, is because it’s, sort of, more in 
 the name of research.  And if people aren’t gonna give you 
 the honest truth, there’s no point you conducting any 
 research.  This is where it’s very different from a normal, 
 everyday situation.  I feel that I need to be totally… I need to 
 be honest.  And I’ve been as honest as I can possibly be […]. 
 
Here Ruby invokes a ‘research’ frame of reference to explain her, 
out-of-character, level of self-revelation within the research setting. 
Ruby cited ‘counselling’ and ‘research’, both ‘frames of reference’ 
which sanction, or even require, a more candid mode of being.  For 
Ruby, “normal, everyday situation[s]” do not raise expectations of a 
heightened level of honesty.  Furthermore, Ruby cited the fact that 
‘she will probably never meet me again’ as giving her licence to 
speak freely.  When speaking with Nancy, my supervisor, during the 
post-research-conversation session, Ruby said: 
 
 […] because I didn’t know him [Michael], I’ve never even 
 seen him around campus, so I felt pretty comfortable 
 knowing that I probably wouldn’t see him again much.  So 
 yeh, I think the majority of people will open up more to 
 strangers than people they know. 
 
In sum, Ruby identified three factors contributing to her own 
uncharacteristic candour during our research conversation: (1) she 
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found herself consciously, yet spontaneously, using the situation as 
means of expressing some of her ‘issues’.  This linked, in Ruby’s 
mind, with (2) the freedom of talking with a stranger [me] with 
whom she didn’t have an ongoing relationship and would probably 
not meet again. And (3) Ruby sees research conversations as 
necessarily entailing honest communication, since anything less 
than honestly, from her, would undermine the value of any 
subsequent findings.  Matt (conversation No. 6) makes a similar 
point, in the context of explaining why he had gone to some trouble 
to challenge a point I’d made earlier in our conversation (42:56):  
 
 […] I suppose if after this I then […] thought back on this and 
 thought, ‘Well hang on a minute, I think we were completely 
 misunderstanding what we were meaning’, then I would… I 
 would, sort of, feel that this hadn’t got as much value as it 
 could have had, in that you would have thought that this had 
 led… you would have gained particular things from this 
 discussion, which then, if I thought that’s what you were 
 gaining I would have said, ‘Well hang on, that’s not what I 
 meant… what we were taking about’.  So, you know, you 
 would have then based some sort of academic findings - in a 
 tiny, tiny way, ‘cause you’re doing masses of other stuff,  but 
 in a tiny way - on something that actually I didn’t feel, would, 
 you know, would, looking backwards, have been the 
 discussion that we would have had.  
 
It seems clear from these two examples that Ruby and Matt both 
saw honesty and accuracy, respectively, as necessary aspects of the 
research process and that they used these criteria to warrant and to 
account for their non-workaday behaviour within the research 
setting.  In other words,  the ‘research’ frame of reference, for the 
individuals cited, legitimized and warranted behaviour which they 
would not practice in everyday life; the expectations and 
parameters, relating to conversation, shifted in a ‘research’ context, 
when compared to, say, a ‘social’ context. Here we can see the 
cybernetic notion of ‘reference value(s)’ in action. Rather than 
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perceptions ‘entering’ a human-being-with-a-clean-slate [tabula 
rasa] the perceiving gets benchmarked against an existing-before-
latest-perceiving infrastructure.  This comparing of ‘incoming’ with 
‘already-in’ constitutes what cybernetic theorists call the 
comparison/benchmarking stage of the negative feedback loop.  
The degree of mismatch between these ‘patterns’, putatively drives 
the perceiving individual’s perceived-mismatch-reducing behaviour. 
  
Erving Goffman (1974, p. 10) employs the term “frames of 
reference”. Berger, in his (1985) Foreword to Goffman’s Frame 
Analysis (1974, p. xiii) writes, “[…] what goes on in interaction is 
governed by usually unstated rules or principles […]”.  Goffman 
(1974, p. 25) goes on to write, “during any one moment of activity, 
an individual is likely to apply several [such] frameworks.” A 
person’s currently-employed reference values (or ‘frames of 
reference’) provide him/her with a standard of comparison against 
which to benchmark his/her perceptions of current states of affairs 
which s/he find him/herself engaged in.   
 
The fact that, as a ‘researcher’, I observed an ethical code and 
promised confidentiality and anonymity to volunteers, added to the 
formalised, and extra-ordinary, rules-of-engagement which 
pertained when I engaged in qualitative research.  Indeed, without 
peer-reviewed, ethics-approval clearance I could not have 
embarked on the series of video-recorded research conversations.  
The fact that the first three volunteers met with one of my 
supervisors, subsequent to their respective research conversations 
with me, helped in my gaining ethics approval for my project. This 
process ensured that my supervisors, and the volunteers 
themselves, found the research-conversation process fit for purpose 
and gave rise to no contraindications. This safeguard helped to 
foster confidence in the project, in those people charged with 
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authorising it, along with, we assume, the volunteers involved in 
the stage-one research conversations.  Indeed, on the 27th May 
2011, one of the two anonymous ethics-approval reviewers wrote:  
 
 The two stage approach to constructing the research 
 conversation process allows oversight from the researcher’s 
 supervisors and adds a  further check on any ethical issues 
 arising. 
 
Here then, the particular organization, or configuration, of the 
research design, itself, helped us to convince the ethics-approval-
gatekeepers of the merits of our plan of action.  Thus the regulable 
variable of ‘configuration’ may pertain to manifold instances of the 
strategic structuring of ‘elements’.  The configuring may apply to 
three-dimensional environments, people, or two dimensional texts.  
In addition to configuring rooms, we might, for example, reduce our 
food intake, and begin exercising, in order to reconfigure our own 
body -   thus bringing ‘it’ into a closer accord with our ‘preferred’ 
vision of self.    I acted on the research design in order to actualise 
my wish to gain ethics approval for my project.  In this instance 
certain configurations of elements - marks on paper - will satisfy 
gatekeepers as the gatekeepers employ a set of criteria (reference 
values) designed to weed-out shoddy research practice. 
 
To recap: I had arranged two sets of two chairs - one set in front of 
the movie-viewing screen, in one part of the room; the other set 
placed against a wall, with a camcorder trained thereon, elsewhere 
in the same room, where the post-movie-viewing research 
conversation took place.  The distance between chairs, the distance 
from the chairs to the movie-viewing screen and the camcorder, 
respectively, and how this configuration related to the stacked, 
redundant chairs and tables, around the edges of each room, 
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together constituted the floor-plan of the elements in each room.   
Stimson (1986, pp. 652-653) cites Edward Hall, saying that Hall: 
 
 […] argues that in North American culture there are four 
 major distances between people, the intimate, personal, 
 social and public. […] Intimate distance goes from actual 
 contact to about 18 inches.  Personal space (from 18 
 inches to up to about four feet), is the usual protective 
 sphere that is maintained between self and others […].  
 Social distance, from four to twelve feet, is the common 
 distance for people attending a casual social gathering, for 
 people who work together, and at the further end is the          
 distance at which impersonal business is conducted. […  At 
 public distance (from twelve feet and above) …] 
 everything must be exaggerated […] (think of the importance 
 of pronounced gestures to orators and other public figures - 
 Hitler’s gesticulations, the Queen’s wave, the Pope’s 
 blessing).    
 
Although these distances may differ somewhat amongst different 
individuals and cultures, and whilst no explicit rules get laid down, 
when configuring the research room, prior to the arrival of the 
volunteers, such implicit societal norms [reference values] would 
have informed my sense of how I should space the chairs.  I 
consciously made this decision on the basis of what felt right, to 
me, in terms of a comfortable proximity. I trust that I have a, 
somewhat, shared sense of social-proximity-norms, at least in 
terms of the British norms which I grew up with.  I had to balance 
this with the pragmatic limitation of what I could fit into the (literal) 
frame of the camcorder’s viewing screen. So, although ‘I’, 
ostensibly, regulated the room, my actions conformed to pre-
existing, society-wide expectations which insidiously regulated my 
behaviour, by virtue of which distances felt ‘comfortable’.    
 
As already mentioned in my literature review, in movie-making, and 
in the theatre, some people employ the term ‘mise-en-scène’.  
Gibbs (2002, p. 5) defines the term mise-en-scène, used in relation 
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to film, as, “the contents of the frame and the way they are 
organised”. According to the Encarta World English Dictionary the 
word ‘ordonnance’ pertains to, “the general arrangement of 
elements in architecture and in works of art and literature”.     
These definitions of the terms ‘mise-en-scène’ and ‘ordonnance’ 
overlap; the term ‘mise-en-scène’ pertains to both the contents and 
their organisation, whereas the term ‘ordonnance’ pertains 
specifically to the arrangement of elements and not to the elements 
per se. You will note that, what I have called the ‘configuration’ of 
elements within the research setting constitutes a more widely-
applicable variant of the more specialist terms ‘mise-en-scène’ and 
‘ordonnance’.  Thus, the movie that I screened prior to each 
research conversation had its own compositional characteristics.  
And yet, like the Russian-doll notion of nested containers, the 
screened movie existed within the broader architectural setting of 
the School of Management. Thus we had the mise-en-scène of the 
movie, nested within the encompassing ordonnance of the research 
setting. Likewise, the research room, itself, sat within a building, 
and the building, itself, within its grounds etc.  This leads me to the 
heart of my thesis. Research-context-embedded individuals, each 
dynamically attentive, may momentarily alight on any aspect of a 
multidimensional mobile ‘composition’.  I have previously referred 
to this ‘composition’ as the 360°-‘inner’-‘outer’-‘field’ that a person 
resides within and co-constitutes.  Perls et al (1951, p. 228) called 
this ‘composition’ the “organism/environment field”. Lewin (1952, 
pp. 238-240) refers to the subset of the organism/environment field 
- as perceived by the individual - as the individual’s “life space”, 
namely, what s/he perceives, both within and outside of 
him/herself. 
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One need not look very far to find examples of people with, what we 
might call, ‘divided attention’.  Bella (conversation No. 5, 04:15) 
said: 
 
 […] when I was watching the film I was thinking, ‘Oh help’, 
 I’m not very observant, I know that.  I haven’t got a very 
 good memory. Em, ‘I hope I’m not going to have to, em, give 
 too much detail about what was in the film’.   
 
Similarly Matt (conversation No. 6, 57:29), when talking about 
watching the movie, said:   
 
 I was aware of you, wondering whether you were watching 
 me [Matt can hardly see and has a guide dog] to see how I 
 was reacting to it. And at one point I discovered that I was 
 sitting back… I was actually a bit cold so I was, sort of, doing 
 that [Matt demonstrates hugging himself]. 
 
The last two quotations point to the notion of ‘wayward’ ‘noticings’ - 
how, whist ostensibly watching a movie, we may attend to, and get-
up-to, other things.  We may think of the whole of our moment-to-
moment 360°-‘inner’-‘outer’-‘field’ as a container, of sorts, which 
houses all that we consciously know and notice in the emergent, 
leading-edge of awareness and action. A cybernetic perspective 
points to a person’s ‘internal’ reference values as the context-
specific standards which inform his/her moment-by-moment 
choices. For example, earlier I suggested that a ‘research 
conversation context’ encouraged a greater-than-usual expectation 
(and actualization) of honesty and accuracy, for the two volunteers 
cited. 
 
I asked Paul (conversation No. 8), at the start of our conversation 
(01:11), “[…] knowing that you were going to be filmed today, did 
that influence what you wore?”   After a pause Paul answered, “I 
would say a bit, but not necessarily, actually, because I do [pause] 
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dress well even without that presentation.” Paul thus concedes that 
the impending research event had influenced what he chose to wear 
that day.  But he qualifies this by saying that he has high-standards 
of personal presentation irrespective of the particular event in 
question.  And Matt (conversation No. 6, ♎ 01:08:30) said: 
 
 I did choose, this morning, to wear, [pause] you know, 
 something that I felt comfortable in, but was smart - smart’s 
 not the word because I never associate jeans with being 
 smart - but that felt presentable, in an academic environment 
 or whatever.  […]  I knew that I was going to be filmed, so 
 I suppose that had some slight bearing on asking [his wife] 
 for something that was presentable.  [Matt can not see very 
 well and had a guide-dog with him during the research 
 conversation.] […]  [♎ 01:12:00] I’ll tell you what I’m 
 communicating: purely  the fact that [pause] it’s strange, 
 because when you boil it down, all I was doing this morning, 
 when I made those decisions, was making decisions that I 
 thought would be appropriate for the various settings that I 
 would be in today […]. I wanted to avoid, “My goodness, 
 what’s he wearing that for?”  […] I just didn’t want to stick 
 out as […] wearing something that was inappropriate.  So, to 
 me it was about that, rather than positively wanting to 
 portray a particular thing. 
 
Matt thus stressed that although he didn’t want to portray a specific 
image through his choice of clothes, he did endeavour to dress 
appropriately and fittingly.  He didn’t want to stand out.  Paul and 
Matt both showed signs of having ‘made an effort’, more-or-less 
adhering to the dress-code that they judged as fitting for an 
academic-research-setting.  In doing so, they enacted and upheld 
certain personally-conceived reference standards in relation to self 
and academia. 
 
7.2 Concluding 
 
In this chapter I have sought to show that an individual within a 
research setting can personalise the configuration of the elements 
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within that setting, relative to his/her reference value(s). S/he can 
introduce new phenomena into that context, and can change his/her 
appearance and position within the overall dynamic composition.  
Importantly, from the perspective of the individual, his/her 
perceptual platform [his/her awareness] co-constitutes whatever 
s/he construes.  His/her innate registering/sensing ‘equipment’ 
conditions and informs the nature of his/her responses. For 
example, s/he cannot see out of the back of his/her head whilst 
simultaneously looking straight ahead - s/he has an inherently 
restricted field of vision. Thus, in order to see out of a window, for 
example, s/he may need to walk in the direction of the window first. 
 
The notion and practice of configuring pervades the research 
process, all the way to completing a chapter such as this one.  
Here, whilst writing, my operative reference values take the form of 
the internalized academic and aesthetic standards against which I 
benchmark my own written output.  The fact of successive drafts 
points to the idea that I frequently fail to manifest those standards 
in the early stages of writing. My incremental ‘polishing’ gradually 
brings the document more into line with what I feel comfortable 
associating with.  
 
Having first accessed a room, I then configured the furniture/props 
and myself, and together we [the research volunteer and me] fine-
tuned ‘levels’ such as: amounts, durations, heights, intensities, and 
volumes, within the room, its contents, and ourselves - the subject 
of the next chapter.   
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Chapter 8: Levels 
 
8.1 Meta-Analysis 
 
When charged with ‘analysing the data’ I found myself unable to 
simply get on with the job.  I needed to work through some 
theoretical issues en route to finding a way of doing the analysis - a 
way that made sense in the light of a field-theoretical, 
phenomenologically-informed orientation.  I call the opening   
section of this chapter ‘Meta-Analysis’ - a necessary-for-me process 
of working towards an answer to the question: What does it mean, 
for me, to analyse data, and how might I go about doing so?  
Although one may view this as a methodology question; I found 
myself facing it during the process of trying to write my ‘findings’. 
Seen from a phenomenological perspective, whatever dominates 
one’s current field of consciousness constitutes one’s most pressing 
‘data’; exploring that ‘data’, arguably, constitutes a relevant form of 
‘data analysis’. 
 
* * * 
 
 Only experience is evident. Experience is the only 
 evidence. […] Social phenomenology is the science of my 
 own and others’ experience. It is concerned with the relation 
 between my experience of you and your experience of me.  
 That is, with inter-experience. It is concerned with your 
 behaviour and my behaviour as I experience it, and your and 
 my behaviour as you experience it. […] Since your and their 
 experience is invisible to me as mine is to you and them, I 
 seek to make evident to the others, through their 
 experience  of my behaviour, what I infer of your experience, 
 through my experience of your behaviour. 
  This is the crux of social phenomenology. 
 
    - Laing (1967, pp. 16-17) 
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Von Eckartsberg’s (1971, p.  373) term ‘inter-experiaction’ seems 
an improvement on Laing’s ‘inter-experience’, since the term ‘inter-
experiaction’ makes the inseparability of ‘experience’ and ‘action’ 
explicit, while in Laing’s term, ‘inter-experience’,  the inseparability 
of experience and action  remains, at best,  implicit. That said, if we 
accept the substance of Laing’s opening quotation then, our 
moment-to-moment experiencing as researchers - and, indeed, as 
human beings generally - constitutes our primary, indeed our only, 
source of ‘data’.  Denzin (2013, p. 354) writes: 
 
 […] the politics and political economy of evidence, also known 
 as data, is not a question of evidence or no evidence.  It is 
 rather a question of who has the power to control the 
 definition of evidence, who defines the kinds of materials 
 that count as evidence, who determines what methods best 
 produce the best forms of evidence, whose criteria and 
 standards are used to evaluate quality evidence?  The politics 
 of data, the politics of evidence cannot be separated from the 
 ethics of evidence. 
 
And Lincoln (2002, pp. 5, 6) fine-tunes the distinction between 
‘evidence’ and ‘data’: 
 
 Qualitative evidence and qualitative data are not necessarily 
 the same thing.  Although data and evidence are often used 
 interchangeably to mean the same thing, they do not 
 necessarily mean the same thing.  Data may be merely 
 information.  Evidence, however, is data brought to bear on 
 specific questions, theories or experiences.  Evidence is data 
 with a purpose. […]  Evidence represents data to which have 
 been added a layer - or multiple layers - of interpretation and 
 rhetorical strategy. […]  Data […] is not evidence until two 
 things happen: first, someone recognizes it as data, and 
 second, an inquirer subjects it to some form of systematic 
 analysis, which turns it into evidence directed towards some 
 question or argument. 
 
Unless and until a human being witnesses and engages with     
some form of  ‘data’,  then, that data remains ‘potential evidence’. 
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According to Lincoln, the term ‘evidence’ implies the mobilization of 
data in the service of some human purpose or goal.  Any empirical 
phenomena that I employ as I construct my thesis thus serve as 
evidence to further my cause, namely, presenting a coherent, 
persuasive alternative to the binary consumption/production 
concept.  If experience and action go hand-in-hand, as experiaction, 
and human being, itself, constitutes our only source of 
data/evidence, then data filtered through (and serving) human 
beings takes the form of complex processes rather than stable 
texts. Parts of the process of experiacting take the form of 
observable actions. We may attempt to objectify/reify our 
experiential goings-on through manifold acts of representation. As 
von Eckartsberg (2010, pp. 255, 257) writes: 
 
 All aspects of our life are given to us in our immediate 
 experience of them. […] However, personal experience can be 
 expressed through language or other forms of representation.  
 This expressed record - commonly referred to as subjective 
 report - can serve as legitimate data for analysis. 
 
The audio-visual recordings of the research conversations that I 
conducted, or the notes and transcripts I made whilst watching 
them, do not, in themselves, constitute my data; my experiaction 
whilst viewing or reading them, respectively, also constitutes 
experiential data.  I must, wittingly or unwittingly, symbolise my 
experiencing in order to make it somewhat palpable to others via 
their experience of my expressive output. I do not experience 
audio-visual recordings, and the notes made whilst watching them, 
in and of themselves, directly, but always in the form of my 
embodied and contextualised experiaction as I engage with them.  
My experiencing necessarily exceeds simply an experience OF the 
audio-visual recordings, or viewing-logs, and inevitably constitutes 
an embodied experiencing that I host WHILST engaging with the 
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audio-visual recording or viewing-log, within a particular physical 
setting.  An experience OF something implies experiencing solely 
derived from, and dedicated to, a particular stimulus; experiencing 
sustained WHILST engaging with something or other leaves the, 
proverbial, window open to other, extra-to-target-stimulus, goings-
on. 
 
I suggest, therefore - supported by Laing, and von Eckartsberg - 
that we can only know ‘data’ (in the conventional sense of 
recordings, viewing-logs, and the like) via our experiencing WHILST 
attending to such ‘data’.   And because the experiencing that we 
host, concurrent with our exposure to conventional data, exceeds 
simply an experience OF that data, then our whilst-addressing-data 
experience will comprise of experiential ‘evidence’ which doesn’t 
necessarily directly relate to the extra-personal ‘data’ except, 
perhaps, in terms of its concurrence in time and its proximity in 
space as we address ‘data-in-the-conventional-sense’. This less-
than-immaculate-consumption of focal texts3 - where we don’t have 
a dedicated-to-a-specific-text experience, but rather experiact 
whilst associating with the focal text - occurs similarly in (a) the 
pre-conversation-movie-viewing context, (b) during the research 
conversation itself, and  (c) during the viewing of the audio-visual 
recordings thereof. Thus we never have an exclusive experience OF 
someone or something; we always sustain experiencing WHILST 
encountering that particular someone or something, in a particular 
existential context.  
 
This discussion points me towards the idea that we only ever ‘know’ 
our own experiencing. This experiencing incorporates our own 
concomitant behaviour which, itself, contributes to the experiencing 
                                                 
3 The term ‘consumption’, here, functions as a synonym for the terms, ‘becoming-
aware-of’, ‘experiencing’, ‘noticing’, ‘perceiving’, and ‘sensing’. 
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that we sustain. This combined experiaction, because of its 
necessarily embodied and situated character, must exceed a 
notionally direct and dedicated perception of a target phenomenon. 
By a ‘target’ phenomenon I mean the phenomenon from which an 
event takes its name e.g., ‘eating’, ‘movie-viewing’, or ‘data-
analysing’. We necessarily apprehend target phenomena via our 
sensory/perceptual processes. By definition, we can not 
perceptually-grasp target phenomena in an unmediated fashion. 
Furthermore, a target phenomenon competes for our attention with 
other phenomena that co-constitute our 360°-‘inner’-‘outer’-‘field’.   
 
8.2 Experience as Our Only Evidence 
 
 It is tempting, when undertaking ethnographic fieldwork or 
 some similar piece of qualitative research, to treat 
 observational and oral data (such as may be derived from 
 interviews or recorded interactions) as the primary data, and 
 any documentary materials as secondary. […] We would urge 
 that documentary materials should be regarded as data in 
 their own right. 
 
    - Atkinson and Coffey (2004, p. 59) 
 
Seen in the light of a phenomenological orientation, it becomes 
questionable to conceive of the research process as comprising of a 
hierarchy of ‘texts’, as suggested in the last  quote.  The data 
available to us in the form of our immediate experiencing, 
necessarily constitutes our most ‘primary’ data - indeed, as Laing 
said (in the opening quote of this chapter), our “only evidence”.   
 
8.3 Some Implications 
 
I now need to identify the practical implications, of this 
phenomenological way of thinking, for ‘data analysis’.  Each 
research-conversation setting provided a context in which two 
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individuals (a volunteer and me) could watch an 18-minute-long 
movie, and then subsequently converse [inter-experiact] for upward 
of 1½ hours.  I have an audio-visual recording of each of the ten 
research conversations I conducted.  I think of the audio-visual 
recordings as movie-like texts.  And, as I’ve said, the experiencing 
that I sustained WHILST viewing these audio-visual recordings 
exceeded simply an experience OF those texts in themselves.  
Similarly, when reading back the notes I’d made whilst watching the 
audio-visual recordings, my experiencing exceeded simply having 
experiences OF reading notes. Again, I sustained full-blown 
experiaction WHILST note-reading, not simply experiences OF note-
reading.  You will note that by nominalising the process of 
‘experiencing’ and thus turning experiencing into ‘experiences’ 
[nouns/objects/things] we objectify our inner goings-on.  This 
nominalising move enables marketers, for example, to sell us a 
‘once-in-a-life-time experience’.  We do not find marketers offering 
us moment-to-moment ‘experiencing’, since this, more fuzzily-
bounded process, entails ‘stuff’ not provided via the marketed 
product/service. Our idiosyncratic, momentary experiencing, whilst 
consuming something or other, exceeds a packaged ‘experience’ 
that marketers may, nominally, seek to sell us. 
 
Most importantly, as one tries to represent the experiaction 
occurring during each successive engagement with different 
varieties of ‘data’,4 one produces still more conventional data, in the 
form of experience-representing texts.  I need to distinguish here 
between, on the one hand, a multiplicity of texts - as posited in the 
last quote (Atkinson and Coffey) - and, on the other hand, a series 
of self/environment contexts (or ‘fields’), the selective-perception of 
                                                 
4 I put the term ‘data’ in inverted commas here to indicate data in the 
conventional sense of discrete ‘texts’, as distinct from the field-theoretical sense 
of data which extends to the 360 intra- and extra-personal experiactional goings-
on.   
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which sponsors moment-to-moment experiential/phenomenological 
data.  On the basis of my own experiencing, I note that much 
experiential data gets jettisoned, and/or slips through the 
representational net, in the course of data analysis.  The very 
concepts of ‘data’ and ‘data analysis’ frame the modus operandi of 
the researcher, encouraging him/her to discount, as irrelevant, non-
data-related evidence or noticings. I can see the potential for 
including, in reports, the kind of material that ordinarily gets 
omitted; this in the interests of presenting more-faithful-to-lived-
experiencing representations of the research process.  Here I mean 
that, if one focuses on the goings-on ‘in’ an audio-visual recording 
of a research conversation, one can easily overlook, say, the mild 
headache that co-constitutes the whilst-watching-the-recording 
experiencing.  And yet, that headache forms an integral aspect of 
the researcher’s whilst-doing-data-analysis ‘experiaction’.  But if 
one conceptualises one’s data as the audio-visual recording, then 
the headache one sustains whilst viewing it seems irrelevant.  In a 
sense, watching the research recording head-achingly constitutes a 
mode of experiaction - a combined doing-feeling process.  To focus 
on the audio-visual data seems, to me, akin to watching a movie 
and disregarding the rest of the 360°-‘inner’-‘outer’-‘field’.  For me 
data analysis can not mean text-dedicated analysis, since this would 
de-contextualise the text, and thus separate it from the 
phenomenological matrix in which it exists for me.    
 
Law (2004, p. 2) opens himself to the prospect of a more inclusive 
approach to researching complex phenomena, such as human 
experiencing:  
 
 If much of the world is vague, diffuse or unspecific, slippery, 
 emotional, ephemeral, elusive or indistinct, changes like a 
 kaleidoscope, or doesn’t really have much pattern at all, then 
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 where does this leave social science?  How might we catch 
 some of the realities we are currently missing?  
 
I feel a normative pressure of expectation - to focus on the 
‘primary’ research event - the research conversation - and yet, with 
my phenomenologist’s hat on, and in the light of the foregoing 
discussion, to do so, exclusively, would constitute a philosophical 
and a methodological inconsistency.   
 
 There are no prescribed post-positivist ways to analyse 
 qualitative data. […] However, you do need to be systematic 
 and thorough. 
 
    - Ryan (2006, pp. 97, 98) 
 
 As an analyst then, you are trying to expose the rules that 
 shape any particular document or account. 
 
    - Ryan (2006, p. 104) 
 
I need to lay claim to some of these ideas as I try to make a path 
for myself through the ‘data analysis’ thicket. 
 
8.4 Some Further Implications  
 
 If we conceive of our experiactional stream as, itself, data, 
then the term ‘data’; comes to represent a dynamic process 
rather than  concrete, static ‘objects’ or ‘texts’.  Thus one can 
either focus on the notionally objective ‘object/text’, or on the 
subjectively-witnessed  stream of experiaction that 
accompanies our association  with, and juxtaposition in space-
time with, a ‘target’ phenomenon, amongst others. 
 (Question) Why would a student of human experiaction focus 
on a particular external-to-self focal text as his/her object of 
study? (Answer) Because that text constitutes the 
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conventional ‘data’ which s/he must analyse. (Q.) But what if 
his/her current stream of situated experiaction, itself, 
constitutes his/her data - his/her only source of data?   
 
It goes something like this:  A research volunteer and I watch a 
movie - we experiact whilst watching the movie.  We can see the ‘-
action’ part of the other’s whilst-watching-a-movie experiaction, but 
not his/her ‘experi-'(encing) per se.  Words, gestures, and other 
expressive forms of representation, function as proxies for what 
others don’t have direct access to, namely, to each expressing 
person’s subjective experiencing.  But, according to Krishnamurti 
(1970, p. 295) we may view our subjective experiencing, itself, as a 
form of representation: 
 
 When expression becomes all-important because it is 
 pleasurable, satisfying, or profitable, then there is a cleavage 
 between expression and feeling.  When the feeling is the 
 expression then the conflict doesn’t arise, and in this there is 
 no contradiction and hence no conflict. 
 
Thus, if I understand Krishnamurti correctly, we may view our 
feelings, themselves, as expressive, in that they indicate the state 
of our self/environment relationship, moment-by-moment. We may 
thus view ‘inner’ experiencing, itself, as an organismal 
accomplishment which provides the host perceiving organism with a 
dynamic ‘status report’ of sorts.  As Perls et al (1951, p. 332) put it: 
 
 […] feelings are not isolated impulses but structured evidence 
 of reality, namely of the interaction of the 
 organism/environment field, for which there is no other direct 
 evidence except feeling […]. 
 
I thus start from the position that I don’t have unmediated access 
to other people’s experiencing. I rely on representational proxies, 
which co-sponsor experiencing within me - the observer of the 
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other.  In a ‘live’ research conversation the process of inter-
experiaction prevails.  I video-record the conversation, and when I 
subsequently ‘watch’ the audio-visual recording and experiact for 
the duration thereof - I sustain a stream of consciousness, and 
concomitant behaviour.  I can try to represent THAT form of whilst-
data-viewing-experiencing - although, as I’ve said repeatedly, that 
experiencing will exceed ‘an experience’ OF (simply) watching an 
audio-visual recording.   
 
We only ever undergo and undertake a stream of experiaction, 
which we can plot, as occurring, somewhere in space-time. The 
experiaction that one hosts in a particular setting arises as a unique 
contingency of that organism/environment field. Yet we may easily 
fall into the trap of treating, say, transcripts as ‘primary data’ when 
the transcripts, themselves, derive from the audio-visual 
recordings, which, themselves, derive from the ‘live’ conversations.  
We can not find a more ‘primary’ form of data than our own 
immediate experiencing per se. ‘Becoming-aware-of’, ‘experiencing’, 
‘noticing’, ‘perceiving’, and ‘sensing’, occurs in different contexts 
and in relation to different constellations of phenomena.  Yet a text-
centric conception of data analysis may easily lead the researcher to 
disregard the full-blown experiencing that occurs WHILST the 
researcher associates with specific texts.  This brings me to the 
central issue that I touched on earlier in this chapter.  
 
We talk in terms of experiencing phenomena of different types, such 
as beverages and landscapes.  But do we not simply witness our 
experiencing whilst ‘consuming’ these beverages and landscapes, 
rather than the unmediated beverages and landscapes themselves?  
Yet we distinguish between, say, a living person, a photograph of a 
living person, and a painting based on the photograph of the living 
person, and so on.  The discussion about these different levels of 
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representation serves to objectify the various texts - leading to the 
classifying of texts in terms of a hierarchy of their different ‘reality-
statuses’ (Goffman 1974, p. 82).  We start with the ‘actual’ 
conversation.  We next make notes whilst watching an ‘audio-visual 
representation’ of the conversation. Each successive layer, or level, 
constitutes a representation of a different order.  And yet the 
‘actual’ conversation, itself, comprises, at least in part, of 
participants’ verbal representations of their ‘actual’ experiencing.  
Does this kind of ordering, or stratification of representations have 
any use-value?  By focusing on the reality-status of different texts, 
our attention gets diverted away from the compelling idea that we 
can only ever have here-and-now-experiencing-and-actions. The 
experiaction-co-sponsoring phenomena - such as audio-visual 
recordings and transcripts - contribute to our here-and-now goings-
on.  They do, as in the above example, have different reality-
statuses, namely, recordings of ‘live’ conversations, or ‘descriptions’ 
of what I noticed whilst watching the recordings of ‘live’ 
conversations;   however, the experiaction sustained by the person 
encountering contextualised phenomena, such as audio-visual 
recordings and transcripts, necessarily occurs ‘live’, here-and-now.  
For some purposes - such as in a legal context - a description of an 
incident may carry less weight than an audio-visual recording 
thereof.  But conceived from a phenomenological perspective, 
experiaction always manifests from moment-to-moment, in the 
context in which one finds oneself. In short, to focus on the reality-
status5 of a particular text diverts attention away from the 
purported focus of phenomenology, namely a person’s moment-to-
moment sensing in relation to goings-on in a particular micro-
environment. A text-focused analysis thus seems at odds with a 
field-theoretical, phenomenological orientation.   
                                                 
5  For example an event may have the status of:  ‘an actuality’, ‘a representation 
of an actuality’, or ‘a representation of a representation of an actuality’ etc. 
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A transcript derives from a prior audio-visual recording, and an 
audio-visual recording, itself, derives from an earlier ‘live’ 
conversation.   The ‘live’ conversation, in turn, derives from two 
people inter-experiacting in a particular context.  In this way we can 
trace the whole representational manifold [the full range of 
research-related ‘texts’] back to research-involved-individuals’ 
moment-to-moment streams of experiencing and acting - their 
idiosyncratic experiacting.     
 
The term ‘data’ implies some kind of foundational, reliable bedrock 
on which we can base our ‘findings’.  Yet what does this data 
actually comprise of?  The term ‘data’, for me, now stands for (or 
represents) my/our full-blown moment-to-moment experiaction, as 
given through my/our individual awareness - a dynamic process 
rather than a static object or text.  We can variously represent our 
experiencing, but an act of representation does not just 
chronologically follow a prior instance of experiencing in a linear 
fashion. The very act of representing something - for example 
‘speaking one’s mind’ - may, itself, contribute to the very state of 
mind that one momentarily seeks to represent.  In other words, 
verbalising one’s thinking immediately augments the very stream of 
consciousness that we seek to verbalise - we can’t express our self 
without modifying the-very-self-we-wish-to-express in the act of 
expression.  The cyclical nature of the negative feedback loop 
captures this inseparability of perception and expression [Fig. 8.1].  
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   Figure 8.1 Negative Feedback Loop,  
   Carver and Scheier (1982, p. 112)  
 
As one speaks, or writes, or expresses oneself in some other 
medium, [Output Function] one modifies the ‘environment’ that one 
immediately re-senses.  In this way, expressing something or other 
changes the very ‘field’ that one resides and experiacts within.   
 
Viewed from my most liberal perspective, data analysis constitutes 
a research-context-transcending, expansive receptivity to my 
current experiencing, coupled with a will to incorporate as much of 
that experiencing as practicable within the parameters of academic 
acceptability. I premise this way of thinking and acting on the 
understanding that the whole of my experiacting constitutes the 
very fabric of my life.  As R. D. Laing puts it in the quote at the 
beginning of this chapter, “Only experience is evident.  Experience 
is the only evidence.”  To paraphrase and individuate Laing’s 
sentiments: I can only ever notice my own experiencing - nothing 
else.  Only my own experiencing exists for me.  I can only notice 
the expressivity of others through my own awareness of their 
expressing. Rogers (1961, pp. 23-24) makes the primacy of 
personal experience an article of faith: 
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 Experience is, for me, the highest authority.  The touchstone 
 of validity is my own experience.  No other person’s ideas, 
 and none of my own ideas, are as authoritative as my 
 experience.  It is to experience that I must return again and 
 again, to discover a closer approximation to truth as it is in 
 the process of becoming in me. 
Neither the Bible nor the prophets - neither Freud nor 
research - neither the revelations of God nor man - can take 
precedence over my own direct experience.  
My experience is the more authoritative as it becomes 
more primary, to use the semanticist’s term.  Thus the 
hierarchy of experience would be most authoritative at its 
lowest level.  If I read  a theory of psychotherapy, and if I 
formulate a theory of psychotherapy based on my work with 
clients, and if I also have a direct experience of 
psychotherapy with a client, then the degree of authority 
increases in the order in which I have listed these 
experiences. 
  My experience is not authoritative because it is 
 infallible.  It is the basis of authority because it can always be 
 checked in new primary ways.  In this way its frequent 
 error and fallibility is always open to correction.  
 
In the final paragraph of this quote Rogers alludes to the cybernetic 
self-correcting process. A person’s immediate sensings get 
benchmarked against his/her ‘inner’ reference levels.  The degree of 
match/mismatch between his/her immediate sensing and his/her 
reference level(s) sponsors either acceptance of the status quo or 
environment-modifying corrective action, respectively. [Fig. 8.1, 
previous page] 
 
In this section I have explored a way of thinking that positions our 
immediate experiencing as our only basis for knowing.  Jerome 
Bruner, in conversation with Bradd Shore (Shore 1997, pp. 45-46), 
says: 
 
  Jerome Bruner:  […] Now I want to go back to your 
 question about what do I say about the phenomenological 
 character of self. Some say that there is some kind of 
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 ultimate truth that lies in that immediacy of experience.  
 How can one doubt it? 
  Bradd Shore:  That is really true.  It is the anxiety with 
 the tension between the attack on “essentialism” and the call 
 for “experience-near” and deeply embodied ethnography.  It 
 provides for an acceptable replacement for essentialism in 
 the form of experiential authenticity. 
  JB: That’s right.  There is something about immediacy 
 that is an implicit essentialism […]. 
 
Shore’s discussion alludes to the distinction between, on the one 
hand, ‘objective’ truth, and, on the other hand, ‘subjective truth’ - 
what Wenders (1991, p. vi) calls, “the truth of experience”.   
Rogers’ (1961) earlier quote (previous page) articulates something 
akin to Laing’s (quoted at the start of this chapter); both make a 
case for the central importance of experience in human existence. 
My own thesis leans heavily on this tenet of phenomenological 
philosophy.   
 
‘But you haven’t yet analysed the data!’ I hear an imaginary critic 
say.  Well, if by this the critic means that I haven’t yet cited a 
selection of utterances and described behaviours attributable to 
research participants, as evidence that my five themes arose from 
those representations, then sure, I haven’t yet analysed the data.  
However, in writing these words I have sought to give form to - and 
to thus resolve - a perceived disequilibrium, within myself, 
triggered, in part, by the very requirement to ‘analyse the data’.  
This section of this chapter then, itself, constitutes a form of data 
analysis - at least in accordance with the philosophical orientation 
that I have here espoused.  I have recently found support for this 
orientation in a paper by Amatucci (2013, pp. 342, 345): 
 
 In traditional qualitative research, data is conceived as an 
 object on which the researcher acts. […]  In this article, I 
 theorise data as a verb. […]  I have no ambition to tell truths 
 about anyone other than myself.  What I see is not what 
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 others will see. And I won’t process those moments - until 
 they reveal themselves - come alive - to me in the writing.  
 Writing is the unfolding present, the only present […].   
 
Fritz Perls (1969, p. 208), a co-founder of Gestalt therapy, 
expressed a similar sentiment, “I want to write whatever and 
however pictures and ideas emerge.”  My reflecting on the process 
of data-analysis constitutes a form of what Amatucci calls “doing 
data” - the production and analysis of data occurring concurrently in 
a ‘writing/perceiving/writing-again…’ feedback loop. 
 
8.5 Data Analysis in a More Conventional Key 
 
The ‘levels’ referred to in the title of this chapter denote one of the 
five categories of ‘regulable variables’ that I have identified in 
relation to the experiaction process.  I use the term ‘levels’ when 
referring to both ‘environmental’ (exteroceptive) and organismal 
(interoceptive) states which an individual may sense and, if 
necessary, act on (consciously or unconsciously) to bring his/her 
experiencing more into line with his/her goal/preferred state(s).  
When thinking about ‘levels’ within research settings, then,  I 
immediately think of lighting, heating, and audio-visual equipment.  
[Reading this section now (16th March 2013) I recall Claude 
Bernard’s notion of the intra-personal environment - ‘le milieu 
intérieur’ (Cooper 2008, pp. 421-422).  According to Bernard:  
 
 […] all the vital mechanisms, varied as they are, have only 
 one object, that of preserving constant the conditions of life in 
 the internal environment […].     
 
These “vital mechanisms” include such processes as breathing, 
drinking, eating, and excreting.] Interestingly, and in accord with 
cybernetic theory, the lights, within the research rooms that I used, 
operated via sensing devices. If, whilst conversing, we stayed 
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relatively motionless for a length of time, the lights automatically 
turned off, to save energy.  On a number of occasions I had to 
leave my seat during research conversations in order to trigger the 
sensor and thus switch the lights back on.  Relatedly, Watzlawick et 
al (1968, p. 147) employ, what they call, “the classic analogy of the 
household furnace thermostat” to explain the homeostatic principle.  
An electronic sensor monitors the ambient temperature and when 
the temperature falls below (or exceeds) a pre-set level, the heating 
system either starts up or shuts down respectively.  The negative 
feedback-loop model [Fig. 8.1, this chapter] underpins the theory of 
homeostasis. One can think of the term ‘negative feedback’ as 
relating to the way in which the feedback process seeks to ‘negate’, 
or neutralise, any sensing/perception that deviates from a reference 
value.  Although this, to some readers, may sound overly 
mechanistic and ‘scientific’, I would ask you to bear with me as I 
spell out the implications of applying this model to human being.   
 
Think of the ‘input function’ as sensory perception.  Think of the 
‘reference value’ as a preferred state (or a goal state) that one 
holds in one’s mind as a desirable benchmark state.  According to 
this cybernetic model, one’s current perception gets benchmarked 
against the ‘reference value’, hence the notion of the ‘Comparator’ 
in Figure 8.1. Any discrepancy between the current perception and 
the reference value results in an ‘error signal’ - essentially the 
degree of difference between the perception one currently has and 
the perception one would ideally prefer to have.  If the current 
perception more-or-less matches the reference value then any 
negligible error signal does not result in any corrective behaviour.  
However, a large discrepancy between one’s current experience and 
what one would prefer to experience generates an error signal 
which drives discrepancy-reducing behaviour.  The larger the 
discrepancy (or error signal) the greater the behavioural 
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intervention required to close the gap between ‘actual’ and 
‘preferred’ perception.  The ‘disturbance’, according to this simple 
diagram, [Fig. 8.1] comes from a place outside of the perceiving 
organism, and the behavioural output seeks to neutralise the 
perceptual impact of this ‘environmental’ fly-in-the-ointment.  In 
the penultimate chapter of this thesis I include a customised version 
of this model [Fig. 12.2] which takes heed of intra-personal (as well 
as extra-personal) ‘disturbances’. 
 
At the beginning of my conversation with Paul (conversation No. 8), 
I noted that Paul had wiped his shoes during the screening of the 
pre-conversation movie. In the light of the negative feedback 
model, we may view this as Paul monitoring his micro-environment, 
beyond the edges of the movie-viewing screen, and registering his 
own dirty shoes.  This environmental disturbance sponsored 
dissonance [or an ‘error signal’] when perceived by Paul, and when 
benchmarked against his preferred (‘clean-shoes’) reference value. 
Paul then directly acted on the shoes, cleaning them in the moment, 
thus bringing his immediate perception of the shoes into line with 
his ‘clean shoes’ reference value.  Similarly, at 39:23, during our 
conversation, Paul said he felt cold and proceeded to put on his 
winter jacket, thereby countering his perception of feeling cold.  
This latter example, which I will return to in the next chapter, 
relates to classic homeostasis (Cannon 1939), where the human 
body has mechanisms which monitor, for example, body-
temperature, blood-sugar levels, oxygen levels, and hydration 
levels, such that the body generates symptoms, such as feeling 
cold, hungry, breathless, and thirsty when the respective levels 
drop below those required for sustaining essential life functions.   
Examples of this kind of physiological self-regulation include 
research participants: (a) eating an drinking, and (b) taking toilet-
breaks during conversations [See chapters 6 and 10 respectively]; 
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adding and shedding layers of clothing [See chapter 9]; and 
referring to drug taking  (medicinal and recreational) which 
operates on levels of anxiety/depression or inhibition. Examples of 
the latter include Bob (conversation No. 10), who at ♎ 49:21 (uni-
log), shared with me that he had felt tortured for most of the time 
until he began taking lithium, a  prescribed  mood-altering drug.  
On a lighter note, Bella (conversation No. 5), at 01:14:44, said: 
 
 Well, I like, I like having alcohol because  that… [Pause] it 
 does release my inhibitions [Michael: Sure] I’m… I know I’m 
 very inhibited.  And when I’ve had a few drinks I do… you 
 know, I can be quite silly and do silly things and I love 
 that. I mean, a lot of people don’t like to be out of control, 
 but I love to be out of control.   
 
 01:15:12 Michael: Sure. 
 
 01:15:13 Bella: … because I’m in control the rest of the 
 time. [Laughing] 
 
Some of the research volunteers had a smoking habit, but they 
could not smoke during our conversation due to university 
regulations.  However, when I met Sufia (conversation No. 7) on 
the driveway of the School of Management, prior to the 
conversation, she stubbed out a cigarette that she had just finished 
smoking.  Alia, my first volunteer, said [Noted at around 38:37 
during my first pass of the DVD] that she preferred to watch movies 
at home, rather than in cinemas, so that she could enjoy a cigarette 
whilst viewing. I know, from having previously met Bob 
(conversation No. 10) outside of the research context, that he 
smokes. I also spoke with Ruby (conversation No. 3) about using 
movies and television programmes as mood-altering ‘substances’: 
    
 06:00 Michael:  How do you understand the term ‘value’? 
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 Ruby:  In that context, [watching a movie] if I’m getting 
 something from it that, sort of, helps me in some way. 
 
 Michael: And where do you find value in movies? […] 
 
 Ruby: Things that make me laugh, things that make me cry - 
 something that taps into my emotions more than anything. 
 
Thus we can see people variously working on their current states of 
being through the ingestion of, or association with, phenomena 
intended to shift their experiencing in the direction of a preferred, 
or altered, state.  After all, if one felt blissful, replete, and satisfied 
[or in a state of pain or dissatisfaction, if one prefers/expects those 
states] one would not need to search-out ways of modifying one’s 
experience, since one’s prevailing state would suffice.  Gould (1991, 
p. 196) wrote: 
 
 Product use may be defined as a process in which consumers 
 engage to manipulate their vital energy. Consuming  products 
 moves one from one energy state to another. 
 
Gould, then, sets a precedent, in consumer research, for viewing 
consumption from the perspective of using products to regulate 
one’s, “immediately bodily felt (noticeable) experience […] 
sensations, and their mediating desires, moods, emotions, and 
thought” (p. 195).  My approach differs from Gould only to the 
degree to which he seeks to maintain a distinction between 
“product-use operations” and “nonconsumption activity” (p. 197), 
whereas I view this distinction as untenable.  For example, even 
whilst ostensibly engaged on a 'nonconsumption' activity, such as 
conversing, one’s own, and the other person’s, clothes, spectacles, 
haircut, and cosmetic products, (along with situational ‘props’) co-
constitute that activity and hence inform the concomitant 
experiential goings-on.   
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According to cybernetic theory, discrepancy-reducing-behaviour 
only occurs when a person’s immediate perception fails to accord 
with his/her reference value (or preferred state).  As Powers (2005, 
p. 45) puts it: 
 
 The main proposition of this book is that all behavior is 
 orientated all of the time around the control of certain 
 quantities with respect to specific reference conditions.  The 
 only reason for which any higher organism acts is to 
 counteract the effects of disturbances (constant or varying) 
 on controlled quantities it senses. 
 
Here the term “controlled quantities” corresponds with what I have 
called ‘regulable variables’, namely, those parts of a ‘field’ which 
one senses, relative to one’s reference value(s), and which one may 
act on in order to bring one’s sensing(s) more into line with one’s 
reference value(s).  At 35:23 Bella (conversation No. 5) says: 
 
 I had quite a wobbly morning, and some of that was around 
 technology. […] When I was trying to watch television last 
 night […] I couldn’t get it to work.  And anything like that 
 really upsets me.  I know it’s unimportant, I know in the 
 scheme of things I shouldn’t let it get me down, but it does.  
 
Here Bella invokes the notion of a ‘wobble’, in contrast to a 
preferred ‘steady’ state of being.  Bella says how her disturbed state 
resulted, in part, from a technology failure.  On the morning of our 
conversation Bella had rung the supplier of her TV and had received 
assistance, over the telephone, which enabled her to remedy the 
problem with her TV.  In terms of self-regulation Bella (like all of 
us) continually monitors her perceptions in relation to (or in the 
light of) a range of preferred reference states, levels, or values.   
When Bella’s momentary perception failed to match one of her 
valued reference levels, Bella acted in such a way as to try to bring 
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her current perception into closer accord with her relevant reference 
level.    Bella continues (36:36): 
 
 So I got through, I knew it wasn’t costing me anything and he 
 was lovely.  He didn’t make me feel like an idiot.  And he just, 
 em, gave me, you know, several possibilities to try and 
 eventually… he even went on his computer and had a look at 
 my hand remote-control to see which one I had, told me what 
 to do, and the picture just came back.  And I just said to him 
 ‘You are wonderful, I can’t praise Richer Sounds enough’. 
 
Rather like the sensors in the research rooms which turned off the 
lights when the sensors failed to detect movement, Bella failed to 
detect a television picture, and therefore, as soon as practicable, 
she acted, in conjunction with a technician, to remedy the situation 
- namely, to restore the television’s picture.  Similarly, when the 
lights went off during a research conversation, as they did during 
my conversation with Sufia (conversation No. 7), I immediately took 
action to bring the lights back on - by standing up and waving my 
arms about.  For example (conversation No. 7): 
 
 01:23:58 [Lights go out in room]  
 
 Sufia: Oh! 
 
 Michael: No don’t worry, it’s purely because we’re not 
 moving. The time… they turn themselves off, to save energy. 
 
 S: Yeh, that’s sensible. 
 
 M: If there’s no movement in a class, they assume 
 there’s no one here.  So they just switch themselves  off. 
 
 S: Very technical. 
 
Not only did I take action to bring the lights back on, I also said 
things to assuage the minor shock that Sufia apparently 
experienced.  Her immediate response to the lights going out 
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sponsored a perception, in me, of Sufia feeling disturbed.  According 
to my reference value, I didn’t want Sufia to feel upset, so I 
immediately dealt, simultaneously, with the practical [lights] and 
psychological [shock] disturbances.   Sufia’s immediate affirmative 
feedback meant that I got the impression/perception that I had 
adequately assuaged her ‘shock’ response. 
 
For me things become particularly interesting in relation to a 
person’s sense-of-self getting disturbed during a research 
conversation.  This occurred most markedly during my conversation 
with Matt (conversation No. 6).    
 
 34:34 Matt: […] I was just wanting to challenge on that, what 
 to me felt like a bit of a, sloppy thing to say […]  [36:25] I’m 
 just abreacting to, sort of , sloppiness in terms of time and 
 the past and that […]. 
 
After expressing my disquiet at Matt characterising what I’d said as 
‘sloppy’ Matt went on to explain: 
 
 37:18 Matt: The word sloppy goes back to a challenge that I 
 would make of myself in an academic environment, as a 
 mathematician, and it’s about always being able to justify 
 what you’re doing - and the language you use in maths.  
 Maths can’t be sloppy because it doesn’t… it’s not maths then 
 […] it doesn’t lead you to the right place.  So, […] it was 
 coming from within me.  It’s not meant to be an insult. 
 
Matt hereby used academic and mathematical frames of reference 
to justify the nature and the language of his challenge of what I’d 
said. However, although Matt tried to smooth down my ruffled 
feathers and I continued with the conversation in good faith, I never 
fully recovered from the way I had reacted to the way that Matt had 
characterised what I had said to him.  Indeed I found myself 
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recounting the incident (albeit anonymously) to my next volunteer, 
Sufia (conversation No. 7):  
 
 01:14:18 Michael: I’ve got a reference point in my last 
 conversation that I had, in this context, where somebody 
 described my… something I’d said as ‘sloppy’.  [Michael raises 
 his eyebrows; Sufia reciprocates. Michael exhales 
 conspicuously.]  And I’m just remembering that and looking 
 at how you’ve reacted.  It reminds me of that night, I went 
 out with my wife for an Indian meal at the Aagrah in Shipley.  
 And we shared a bottle of wine, which we wouldn’t do apart 
 from celebratory-type meals.  And er, I was still reeling from 
 the conversation that I’d had earlier in the day.  And it 
 centred on being accused of… being accused of being sloppy. 
 [Laughing] 
 
 01:15:08 Sufia: I can’t believe anyone could say that of you 
 at all.                                                 
 
I cite this example to show that in spite of Matt’s reparatory efforts 
I still left our conversation feeling sufficiently perturbed to require a 
soothing dose of alcohol in the evening.  And at 01:16:08 
(conversation No. 7) after I’d told Sufia, “I don’t think I recovered 
from it until the next day”, Sufia replied, “I don’t think you have, 
have you, ‘cause you’re still… it’s still got resonance with you hasn’t 
it?”, to which I replied, “That’s true, that’s true.  It’s entered into 
this conversation, for sure.”  So, rather like Ruby (conversation No. 
3), who said she had used the conversation with me as an 
impromptu counselling session, I found myself (anonymously) 
sharing this anecdote as a means of processing material which I had 
still not fully reconciled myself to.  Clearly the term ‘sloppy’, when 
applied to my use of language, created a strong ‘error signal’ in me. 
This resulted from a significant mismatch between, on the one 
hand, how I view my own language skills, and, on the other hand, 
Matt’s characterisation of what I’d said to him (relating to the 
concept of time) as ‘sloppy’.  At points during the remainder of my 
conversation with Matt, I explored the rights and wrongs of Matt’s 
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use of the term sloppy.  Yet, as I’ve said, in spite of Matt saying he 
hadn’t meant to offend me, I nevertheless felt offended.  I cite this 
as an example of the limits of control on my part.  Although I 
immediately registered the impact of the word ‘sloppy’, on my 
viscera, and although I immediately verbalised my experience and 
identified the offending term, I remained perturbed.  And, ironically, 
I recognized, even in the midst of the disturbance, that this would 
probably constitute an interesting example that I could use in my 
research write-up. 
 
I experienced a similar, though less-impactful-on-me, episode 
during my conversation with Bob (conversation No. 10): 
 
 01:11:00 Bob: I’m actually a bit surprised, what you’re 
 doing. I’m surprised ‘cause I thought you were involved in 
 film and I thought, ‘Oh I can see Michael doing a film and 
 that   sort of thing.’ But I can’t see you doing market 
 research. 
 
 Michael: Well, I’m doing it now. 
 
 B: Yeh exactly, so I’m surprised yeh. […] I just had you in 
 my head as a punk rocker and similar to me.  And you’re an 
 artistic man, a holistic man. […] I don’t see you as a 
 salesman. [Laughing] 
 
 M: But I don’t see myself… I’m not a salesman.  I don’t 
 think  you’ve grasped the weight of what I’m saying to you 
 […].  
 
And so it continued.  I registered, and felt perturbed by, the fact 
that Bob had begun to think of me as a salesman - an identity that 
really doesn’t appeal to me.  I then sought to persuade Bob of the 
merits of my research-undertaking from the perspective of human 
interaction. More recently, whilst corresponding with Morris B. 
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Holbrook over the summer of 20126 I realised, acutely, that - in 
spite of Morris’ and my category-broadening aspirations - Morris still 
operates under the moniker of Emeritus Professor of Marketing and 
I operate as a PhD student within the marketing and consumer 
research domain.  I used to feel much more comfortable attending a 
college of art, whilst working towards my MA - but enough of me.   
Here I catch myself self-regulating the level of reflexivity finding its 
way into this piece of writing. 
 
I have examples of where research volunteers sought to clarify 
things I had said which didn’t sit comfortably with their prevailing 
sense-of-self.  In one particularly interesting example, involving 
Paul (conversation No. 8), I said: 
 
 46:41 Michael: Of course. I tell you what I hear in what 
 you’ve just said to me. I hear you clarifying a point, redefining 
 yourself, lest I defined you in a way that didn’t feel quite 
 comfortable. And I think you perceived my… you appear to 
 perceive my expression as… that you were a superficial 
 person, perhaps, that you were just name-dropping… [Paul 
 smiling] that you were just top-show…  [Paul nodding] that 
 you were just interested in a superficial impression. So you 
 corrected me [Paul: Yes] by suggesting that my observation 
 was extrinsic [Paul: Em, em] whereas, in actual fact, to 
 defend myself (or to clarify myself), [Paul smiling] if you like, 
 earlier on I would have been talking about how I perceived an 
 intelligence at work and I talked about presence, and we 
 talked about behaviour in terms of honourable behaviour and 
 things like that.  But, I think I understand…  It seemed like, 
 perhaps, defending your honour [Paul laughing] by saying 
 what you said. And I perfectly understand that. 
 
 Paul: No, no it’s just more, more, more… clarifying things 
 yeh, than defending. 
 [Overlapping]   
 Michael: Of course, of course.  But I take your point 
 absolutely. 
 
                                                 
6  An email exchange which we subsequently edited and had accepted for 
publication as Woodward and Holbrook (2013)     
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 Paul: OK. 
 
This quote refers to Paul clarifying something I’d said about him, 
then me clarifying something Paul had implicitly perceived me as 
doing, and then Paul re-defining what I had described as ‘defending 
his honour’ as ‘clarifying’ - the latter term preferable from Paul’s 
perspective.    You will note that at the end of the quoted section I 
gave Paul ‘absolute’ assurance that I took his point, and he 
accepted this and we moved on.  Paul, in this way, through 
clarifying-verbal-expressions, ensured that his preferred definition 
of himself [His ‘reference value’] prevailed, and I acquiesced.  This 
kind of clarifying and counter-clarifying behaviour occurred at other 
times during the research conversations.  For example, during 
conversation No. 9, at ♎ 01:17:35, I said that some of Jane’s 
comments, relating to the movie [screened prior to our 
conversation] seemed quite puritanical - and then I immediately 
corrected myself and said ‘spiritual’.  Jane seized on my latter 
characterization of what she had said, in preference to the first 
[‘puritanical’] one.  Here again a person, this time Jane, behaved in 
a way that ensured that she felt comfortable with what went onto 
the record.  This seems, to me, a clear case of Jane controlling her 
own perceptions relative to her preferred sense of self.  She 
identified more readily with the notion of having ‘spiritual’ rather 
than ‘puritanical’ values. Each word connotes different things to 
different people - as with the term ‘sloppy’ in relation to my 
conversation with Matt (conversation No. 6).  The types of 
behaviour, discussed here, show the implicated individuals seeking 
to keep faith with particular senses-of-self - particular ‘reference 
values’ if you will. 
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8.6 Concluding 
 
In the latter part of this chapter I have shown examples, culled 
from research conversations, of how individuals control ‘levels’ as a 
means of regulating their overall perceiving and experiencing.  I 
have shown how the levels that people regulate can pertain to 
extra-personal phenomena, such as lighting and heating, as well as 
to intra-personal phenomena such as dehydration, disequilibrium, 
and self-perception.  Splitting the different sorts of regulable 
variables into five discrete chapters constitutes an abstraction from 
everyday complexity. In everyday life, all five regulable variables 
interact and overlap.  After completing the final two ‘themes’ I will 
attempt to show how living, moment by moment, can entail the 
regulation of all five regulable variables at once.    
 
* * * 
 
Whilst polishing this chapter [24th December 2013] I regulate the 
light level within the office, which in turn helps me to guard against 
eye-strain, which, if not managed, leads to undesirable  bloodshot 
eyes.  I also manage the heat-level courtesy of a portable heater 
positioned just behind me.  I ate a sizable breakfast in order to 
ensure sufficient ‘fuel’ for working.  I have a warm sheepskin 
waistcoat on and use ‘vary-focal’ spectacles. These examples 
constitute specified regulable ‘levels’:  illumination, eye-health, 
room-/body-temperature, sustenance, and the legibility of text on 
the screen.  I make the point that referring to past events, such as 
research conversations, can lead one to neglect the immediate 
manifestations of the phenomena in question - namely ‘levels’. A 
Christmas card just came through the letter box, thus gaining 
‘access’ to my home.  The person who sent the card had arranged 
an insert, “Our News in Brief”, in paragraphs starting with the 
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husband at the top, followed by the wife, then the two daughters 
(eldest first), and finally news pertaining to family pets. This ‘text’ 
clearly exemplifies what I call ‘configuring’ - the arrangement of 
elements within a bounded space.  Additionally the sender of the 
card had chosen a card that she felt represented her personal-
/family-aesthetic [‘Association’ - see next chapter] and selected 
what information to reveal [‘Expression’ - chapter 10]. Thus all five 
of my themes exist concurrently, in the microcosm of my current 
situation. This state of affairs also illustrates an, aforementioned, 
ongoing tension that I encounter.  On the one hand I have a set of 
research conversations, which took place over two years ago; on 
the other hand I have immediate phenomenological data, which 
trumps the past, filling me with a lively here-an-now.  How does 
one incorporate the present - which as a phenomenologist seems 
essential - whilst discussing past events?  As you can see, I have 
chosen, simply, to incorporate ‘the present’ - which has already 
past.  
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Chapter 9: Association  
 
 Where shall we start?  I propose that actions and body-
 movements in general […] can serve as the primary reference 
 points, because my being and having a body always anchors 
 me firmly in our common cultural world: I always occupy a 
 place.  My life, as that of every individual, is uniquely 
 characterized by its movement through situations in places.  
 This is the most general statement that can be made about 
 human living […].  [I]f I - as every individual - always inhabit 
 a unique place at a specific historical time, I also occupy an 
 identifiable space-time coordinate point. […] [T]he reach of 
 human attention may extend beyond the physical givens of 
 the here and now situation. […] [A] person can live 
 simultaneously or successively in quite different situations.  I 
 can take a walk through the park, while at the same time I 
 think about a lecture I have to give or daydream about 
 some adventure. […] The observer can never fully fathom 
 what this moving through town meant to me personally.  All 
 of my perceptions, for instance, are given solely to me and 
 unless I tell about them to the observer, they remain private 
 […]. 
 
    - von Eckartsberg (2010, pp. 257-259) 
 
 
I wrote the following piece of data analysis - enclosed between two- 
sets of three-asterisks - about a year ago, in April 2012.  In her 
feedback, relating to this extract, Nancy (one of my supervisors) 
picked-up-on what von Eckartsberg, in the opening quote here, calls 
“liv[ing] simultaneously or successively in quite different situations”, 
Nancy wrote: 
 
 What intrigues me about this first discussion is how, with 
 Paul, you ‘fractured the time-space continuum’ (whatever that 
 means). In that present, there was a past and a future, 
 many pasts and imaginary futures.  […] EXCITING WORK!!!! 
 
The challenge of data analysis, for me, relates to reconciling, in one 
text: the multiplicity of space-time coordinates implicated in the 
research process; the complex field-configurations present at each 
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space-time juncture; and the experiactional complexities 
manifesting in various field-embedded individuals in their respective 
loci.   For me this complexity necessarily includes the writer, during 
the writing and assemblage of the text before you, as well as you, 
the reader during your reading of it. 
 
* * * 
 
During my first pass of conversation No. 8, I noted at 26:24 
[henceforth 8,P126:24] that Paul asks Michael [intentional third-
person reference to me, in order to indicate a differently-orientated 
self to the one writing here] for Michael’s understanding of the term 
‘brand’.  At (8,P2 ♎ 07:09) Michael had encouraged Paul to view 
their exchange as a reciprocal conversation, rather than a one-way 
extraction of information, from Paul, by Michael the ‘interviewer’.  
One can thus view Paul’s question as an enactment of the 
‘permission’ Michael had given him, but also an ‘on-message’ 
question i.e., a question pertaining to the ostensible focus of the 
research, according to Paul’s conception of the research at that 
time.  Paul’s question prompts a response from Michael in which 
Michael talks about the inescapable interaction between commercial 
and non-commercial phenomena in life.  After a five-minute 
monologue, during which Michael posits a very broad definition of 
the notion of a brand [including: individuals, universities, clothes, 
the city of Bradford, Great Britain… (8,P2 ♎ 26:24)], Paul asks a 
markedly narrowing question.  Specifically, at around 32:27, [Figure 
4.1, chapter 4] Paul asks Michael if he has a relationship with a 
particular brand.  Michael counters this by asking Paul about what 
drives Paul’s question.  Paul has a particular interest in Michael’s 
appearance and his style of clothing.  At 8,P136:38 [Fig. 4.1, 
chapter 4] Michael cites Yohji Yamamoto (a Japanese clothes 
designer) as a personal influence.  In 8,CV-L ♎ 36:38 [Fig. 4.3, 
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Composite Viewing-Log, chapter 4] I noted that Paul, “smiles with 
recognition” at Michael’s revelation.   
 
I first became aware of Yohji Yamamoto around 24th June 1990 
[diary entry] after seeing a short piece in the July edition [sic] of 
Options magazine, trailing the film Notebook on Cities and Clothes 
(1989) - a documentary focusing on Yohji Yamamoto.  I travelled to 
Manchester’s Corner House cinema to see the film on Sunday 22nd 
July 1990.  After watching the movie I wrote, “I related to & 
empathised with all that I saw and heard & I felt that I had 
discovered a ‘source’” [postcard written on 22nd July 1990, 
16:38/Sunday]. I subsequently saw the movie when it came to the 
Bradford Playhouse and Film Theatre on 01st November 1990. And 
on the 27th February 2003 I received the DVD [my first] of 
Notebook on Cities and Clothes from CD Universe in America.  
Furthermore, on the 20 August 1990 I bought August Sander’s 
Citizens of the 20th Century (Sander 1989), a book that both Yohji 
Yamamoto and Wim Wenders (the director of Notebook […]) “knew 
and treasured”, (Notebook […] ♎11:49) independently, prior to 
meeting each other.  The Sander’s book also appears in the film.  In 
the following quote, which I transcribed from the DVD of Notebook 
[…], Yohji Yamamoto refers to Sander’s book.  The quote links 
directly to something that occurred during my eighth research 
conversation: 
  
 In there [Sander (1989)] there is a kind of my ideal clothes, 
 because, I mean, people don’t consume the clothing.  People 
 can live life with this clothing.  So that means, for me, I want 
 to make something like that. For example, at the beginning of 
 the 19th Century, and if you’re born in not very rich country, 
 the winter is really winter for you.  So it’s very cold, so you 
 need a thick coat on you.  Then this is life; this is real clothes 
 for you.  This is not for the fashion.  So the coat is so 
 beautiful because you feel so cold and you can’t make your 
 life without this coat.  For example, it looks like your friend, or 
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 it looks like your family.  And I feel strong duress on me, if 
 people can wear my things like in that way, then I could be so 
 happy, because [smiling broadly] for example, when the 
 clothes, or dress or jacket, coat, themselves, are left on the 
 floor, or hang on the wall, then in that case you can 
 recognise, ‘oh this is John’, ‘this is Tommy’, like that, this is 
 yourself.  [01:06:36  01:08:56]    
 
Although I do not wear Yohji Yamamoto clothing, I do connect with 
his taste for monotone, minimalist, lived-in-looking garments.  [See 
Figs. 9.2 & 9.3, this chapter] Paul enumerates the various cities 
where he has seen Yamamoto clothes on sale (8,P1+2 ♎ 37:00) 
[Figs. 4.1 & 4.2, chapter 4]: Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Vienna, 
Moscow, and London.  Michael asks Paul to describe his image of 
the Yohji Yamamoto brand; Paul uses the terms “classy” and 
“expensive” - he says he respects the brand.  And at  39:16 [Fig. 
9.1, this chapter], during our conversation, Paul says that he feels 
cold, and as Michael gets up to close a window, Paul walks over to 
put on his “winter jacket”, ‘so that he doesn’t freeze’.  [See Figs. 
9.1-9.3, this chapter for a more complete representation of what 
occurred.]  In my uni-log, [Fig. 4.4, chapter 4] at 39:23, I made a 
note to myself to “Grab [Yohji-Yamamoto-related] quote” - the one 
you’ve just read. The Yamamoto quote foregrounds the thermal 
function of clothes - the fact that clothes keep their wearers warm 
in winter. Yamamoto plays down the notion of ‘fashion’ and instead 
posits a close union between the clothes a person wears and his/her 
social identity, such that a person’s disembodied clothes might 
signal the absent wearer.  Rick Poynor (1990, p. 52), in his review 
of Notebook on Cities and Clothes, highlights, what he sees as, a 
contradiction, between Yamamoto’s stated aspirations and his role 
as a leading ‘fashion’ designer: 
  
 The main revelation from Yamamoto - and it goes 
 unremarked by Wenders, who seems to have experienced an 
 epiphany in a Yamamoto jacket - is the essentially 
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 contradictory nature of the designer’s aims.  Yamamoto wants 
 his clothes to have the elemental quality he finds in the 
 photographic portraits of August Sander, where clothes are 
 not images, or tokens of identity to be consumed and 
 discarded, but real things inseparably and unselfconsciously 
 a part of the wearer’s identity as individual and worker.  Yet 
 the relentless turnaround of fashion, its frivolous insistence on 
 a continual present in which last season’s clothing is 
 (notionally at least) consigned to the jumble, make this an 
 unattainable and curiously naïve hope for such a sophisticated 
 designer to nurture. 
 
And so, I cite this short episode, from conversation No. 8, as an 
example of the embedded use of a commercial product (a coat) in 
response to a primal organismal need, i.e., the will to remain warm 
and comfortable in winter.  Cannon (1939, p. 185), in a quote that 
suits my purpose here, discusses the use of clothes in the process 
of regulating body temperature: 
 
 In place of the efficient protection which fur would afford, 
 mankind has to resort to extra clothing - often the fur of lower 
 animals! - to prevent too great loss of heat. 
 
So, even if we grant that clothes have aesthetic and symbolic 
functions, it seems safe to say that in the cited instance, in 
conversation No. 8, Paul’s jacket predominantly served a thermal 
function.  I cite this as a behavioural manifestation of the regulation 
of body temperature via the use of a commercial product.  In Figure 
9.2 (PTO) we can see Michael drinking water - also a regulatory 
process relating to the levels of body-hydration and vocal-cord 
lubrication.  
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00:39:16 Paul:  It’s quite cold here. [Michael gets up and walks to the window] 
 
00:39:18 Michael:  I noticed the window opened during… 
    
 
                    Figure 9.1   Paul Stands Up                     00:39:28 
 
00:39:23 Paul:  If I take my jacket… I can… take my coat, [Paul stands up and walks 
out-of-frame] my winter jacket.  I can wear it. Is that OK? 
 
 
                    Figure 9.2   Michael Drinks                       00:39:42 
 
00:39:30 Michael:  Oh you have it there, of course. 
 
00:39:33 Paul:  Because of the cold… 
 
 
                    Figure 9.3   Paul Returns                          00:39:54 
 
00:39:34 Michael:  I forgot that you’d put your jacket there. […] I understand that.  
 
00:39:39 Paul:  … so, I don’t freeze. [Paul returns to his seat wearing his winter 
coat] 
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We could view the actual research conversation as the ‘primary’ 
event.  In that case, the video-recording constitutes the first 
representational transformation. And subsequent noticings 
(documented in the form of viewing-logs, composite viewing-logs, 
and in the form of a uni-log, themselves constitute further 
representational layers deriving from the ‘original’ research event. 
[See Figure 9.4, below]  For me ‘data’ becomes difficult to isolate.  
Encountering data invariably contributes to the production of still 
more data, whether in the form of documents or in the form of 
phenomenological responses - experiential-data if you like. 
 
         
Figure 9.4 Some of the Layers of Representation Comprising 
My Research Process              
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* * * 
 
By degree, we regulate who and what we associate with; we also 
regulate when and how we associate with those particular 
phenomena. Goffman (1963, p. 64) calls the interpersonal variant 
of selective association the “‘with’ relationship”.  He continues: 
 
 To be ‘with’ someone is to arrive at a social occasion in his 
 company, walk with him down a street, be a member of his 
 party in a restaurant, and so forth.  The issue is that in 
 certain circumstances the social identity of those an individual 
 is with can be used as a source of information concerning his 
 own social identity, the assumption being that he is what the 
 others are. 
 
This process of selective association, whether in relation to people 
or other phenomena, concomitantly entails dissociation from other 
alternatives.  To eat a vegetarian diet, for example, entails 
associating with certain foods and dissociating from other foods.  In 
order to evaluate a person, or to just get a measure of him/her, we 
tend to take note of the manifest phenomena associated with that 
person, not least his/her body.  During a conversation, where two 
people sit face-to-face, the individuals have a host of manifest 
indicators at their disposal which they can use to form an 
impression of the other.  However, a field-theoretical perspective 
encourages us to think in terms of a field-wide potential for 
awareness.  As Parlett, (1997, p.18) puts it, “[…] ‘inner and ‘outer’ 
reality are both contained within the field, as are other distinctions - 
such as ‘person’ and ‘situation,’ and ‘figure’ and ‘ground.’”  Other 
phenomena interact with our perceptions of the person sat opposite 
us. Rather like having unrelated-to-film thoughts whilst watching a 
movie, when talking with another individual we can simultaneously 
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think and feel in ways unrelated to the topic of conversation.  The 
artist and filmmaker Julian Schnabel (Rappolt 2008, p. 74) writes: 
 
 I’ve always thought about simultaneity of time, I’m talking 
 about one thing, but you’re not just hearing what I’m saying 
 to you, you’re thinking about whatever happened to you - I 
 don’t know what problem you have - but I know you’re not 
 just thinking about what I’m saying [No full stop in original] 
 
What we experience, from moment-to-moment, does not simply 
derive from a particular isolatable stimulus.  
 
So, when we choose to wear certain clothes, or to have our hair cut 
in a particular way, we materially alter our manifest self - the 
palpable self that others can readily perceive.  And, as with the 
notion of nested Russian dolls, we may encounter an individual 
human being, coated (literally or figuratively) with a superficial 
layer of clothing, positioned, perhaps, within a particular car, shop, 
research setting etc., in a particular city….  Thus the ‘core-doll’ - the 
irreducible embodied self - exists amid a dynamic nested set of 
container-like structures - each successive ‘shell’ containing 
artefacts, other objects, and phenomena, which contextualise the 
core-doll and give observers clues as to the ‘doll’s’ interests, tastes, 
and proclivities.   
 
By ‘verbally’ dissociating oneself from aspects of what one 
‘materially’ associates with, it becomes possible to ‘figuratively’ 
distance oneself from that which one has  ‘literally’  associated with.  
When Alia (conversation No. 1, ♎ 07:39) said, “I found this 
woman’s drawing-style pushed me away from the concept” [of the 
part-animated, 18-minute-long movie, screened prior to our 
conversation], she distanced herself from an aspect of the movie 
she had just watched.  Thus, although, to an onlooker, Alia 
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associated with the move-text in the same manner as the other 
research volunteers, Alia selectively dissociated herself, verbally, 
from an aspect of the film that didn’t accord with her taste.  Without 
Alia’s dissociating statement I might have wrongly assumed that 
Alia did, indeed, endorse the drawing-style featured in the movie. 
When Alia went on to say (07:00), “I don’t think she’s a particularly 
well-grounded artist, in the old-fashioned way”, I challenged her 
statement.   I felt that Alia had sought to find ‘objective’ grounds for 
not liking a particular style of drawing.  Alia argued that the work 
compared unfavourably, technically, with other artists that she 
admired. Interestingly, Bob (conversation No. 10, ten minutes 
before the end) said he found the aesthetic of the film “abrasive - 
quite punk”; he    liked   its ‘jaggedness’.  Thus Bob associated with 
the phenomenon that Alia had dissociated herself from.  Both had 
used the movie as a means of communicating their respective 
sensibilities. 
 
Bella (conversation No. 5) told me that she had had to select 
between eight and ten musical tracks in connection with an 
invitation to appear on a local-radio equivalent of Desert Island 
Discs.  Bella said (40:00, transcript): 
 
 […]I realised [pause] that they were all pop, rock tracks; 
 there was nothing classical, nothing… no opera or anything 
 like that.  And that, sort of, took me back a bit. [Michael: 
 Really?]  Yeh it made me feel a bit shallow I suppose, yeh. 
 
Here we see a very clear example of the associational phenomenon 
that I observed.  Bella fears that others will think of her as a ‘light-
weight’ on the strength of her choice of musical tracks.  In the light 
of the cybernetic feedback model [Fig. 9.5, below] I suggest that  
 224 
 
 
   Figure 9.5 The Negative Feedback Loop - the 
   Basic Unit of Cybernetic Control, Carver and 
   Scheier (1982, p. 112) 
 
this points to a discrepancy between (a) a reference value that Bella 
harbours, concerning a well-rounded, culturally-literate individual, 
well-versed in the arts, and catholic in her tastes, and (b) her 
perception of her chosen list of tracks which seemed incongruent 
with her preferred reference value.  A perceived discrepancy (or 
‘error signal’) developed, manifesting as a reduction in Bella’s self-
esteem.  Later in our conversation I said to Bella (52:41) 
[transcript]: 
 
 Michael: So, I wonder… I’m asking you if you see a link 
 between…  between feeling that you ought to have some 
 classical on your  desert island, and feeling that you ought to 
 have a broader cultural palate, in terms of having a few 
 heavy-weight books under your belt or whatever. And 
 perhaps being able to talk to your friends about what were 
 [sic] on telly last week, or the latest documentary. [Bella:  Em 
 em]  And I’m just putting that to you. 
 
 Bella: A yeh, I do feel… I do feel that definitely, yeh. 
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 M: As if you strategically broaden your diet lest you get 
 thought of as being a lightweight [Bella nodding] or, you 
 know, a superficial airhead, who’s only interested in 
 gardening and The Rolling Stones? 
 
 B: Yeh [nodding] definitely. 
 
Similarly, when I asked Paul (conversation No. 8) if whether 
knowing that I planned to film him had influenced what he had 
chosen to wear on the day of the conversation, he said (01:11) 
[transcript]: 
 
 [pause] I would say a bit, but not necessarily, actually, 
 because I do [pause] dress well even without that 
 presentation.  And I’m quite conscious of how I look.  Yeh, 
 and em… because I believe that people will see you or 
 perceive you because of the way you look. 
 
So, whether through our choice of, for example: friends, art, music, 
or clothes, we become associated with certain phenomena and 
dissociated from other phenomena.  The notion of Impression 
Management hinges on just this way of thinking. Rosenfeld et al 
(2002, pp. 7, 8) write:  
 
 […] IM is a universal feature of human behavior where 
 people constantly ‘package’ themselves so as to 
 communicate their desired images and identities to 
 significant others. […] IM is seen as a goal-directed activity 
 of controlling information about persons, objects, ideas or 
 events, to audiences. 
 
Impression Management [IM] focuses on the control of outputs: 
information, clothes, office-design and the like; while Perceptual 
Control Theory (Powers 2005) posits the notion that individuals act 
as they do, ultimately, in order to control their own perceptions, or 
inputs, relative to some preferred ‘internal’ reference level or other.  
So, for example, when Paul (conversation No. 8) dresses in a 
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certain way, we can see this as an attempt to control the 
impressions that other people form of him, i.e., IM.  However, 
viewed from a Perceptual Control Theory perspective, Paul holds 
certain reference values - he wants to become rich  and successful 
in his career for example - and Paul monitors his own perceptions, 
as he interacts with other people, and if he perceives that another 
person does not treat him in a manner which he feels he deserves, 
warrants or desires, then, according to  Perceptual Control Theory, 
Paul will act in such a way as to bring his own immediate 
perceptions into closer alignment with his preferred reference 
value(s). This discrepancy-reducing behaviour modifies the 
perceivable situation.  The modified perceptible situation then gets 
perceived anew, by Paul, and the new perception gets compared to 
his reference value in an ongoing, self-adjusting, feedback loop. 
Moss (1978, p. 86) describes this circular process very clearly: 
 
 Perception and action are usually studied in isolation from one 
 another. Yet, both neurologically and at the level of human 
 action in lived-space, we discover that they are intertwined.  
 To be underway in some action is to organize our perception 
 towards some object, and inversely, to perceive a situation 
 in the world is to be invited into active involvement in that 
 situation.  With every step forward, our view of the situation 
 is adjusted; with every adjustment in our view, we are 
 invited to step forward anew.  Merleau-Ponty has called this    
 continuous interplay between man and his world a dialectic. 
 In this dialectic between man and his world it is difficult to 
 distinguish strictly between perception and action […]. 
 
Powers (2005, p. 41) puts it more succinctly, “What an organism 
senses affects what it does, and what it does affects what it 
senses.”  Indeed, this interrelationship between experience and 
action led von Ekartsberg (1978, pp. 200-201) to coin the term 
‘experiaction’ - the non-dualistic “interdependence-concept” that 
fuses ‘experience’ and ‘action’.  
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When Paul (conversation No. 8) mentioned the various European 
cities that he had either lived in or visited, I felt impressed.  But 
how did my feeling impressed impact on Paul’s perceptions?  Paul 
didn’t want me to think of him as simply a name-dropper - as 
someone only interested in creating a superficial impression.  Paul 
went to great lengths to express the fact that he holds deep 
humanitarian values and wishes to become successful, in large part, 
so that he can help people less fortunate than himself.  So when 
Paul admitted that he wanted to become rich and successful, he felt 
the need to qualify this lest I perceived his ambition as purely 
hedonistic and self-seeking. 
 
 01:14:21 Paul: So, I believe that if I’m highly successful I’ll 
 be in a position to help everybody.  And that gives me more 
 intrinsic joy than dressing good, you know what I mean.  
 Dressing good is just a taste that is not all that important, you 
 know what I mean.  What gives that intrinsic value, the 
 intrinsic joy, is to help, you know what I mean.   
 
Relatedly, when Alia (conversation No. 1) fed-back to me that she 
perceived the research room as professionally set-up, I got my 
sense-of-self - as a conscientious academic - corroborated.  A 
problem arose, as I noted in the previous ‘levels’ chapter, when my 
perception of the feedback from Matt, and from Bob - relating, 
respectively, to my purported ‘sloppiness’ and my becoming a 
‘salesman’ - failed to accord with my sense-of-self.  Carver and 
Scheier (1982, p. 113) suggest that:  
  
 […] the central function of a feedback system […] is to create 
 and maintain the perception of a specific desired condition: 
 that is, whatever condition constitutes its reference value or 
 standard of comparison […].  
 
According to this model, the reference states, or reference values, 
that people employ as benchmarks, constitute very important 
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behaviour-informing phenomena.  My data analysis thus, in part, 
entails me making reasoned inferences about the particular 
reference values that co-sponsor an individual’s behaviour at a 
particular point in time.  We have already seen, in chapter seven, 
how Matt’s and Ruby’s concepts of ‘research’ and ‘counselling’ 
ruled-in certain types of behaviour and ruled-out others.  Actors 
swearing, in an 18-certificate movie, will not surprise anyone; the 
18-certificate, itself, leads one to expect it.  However,   swearing in 
a research conversation seems more moot.  In terms of the Russian 
doll analogy, the characteristics of the particular ‘container’ that we 
find ourselves in, at a certain point in time, will inform, by degree, 
what context-appropriate behaviour we manifest whilst in that 
container.  In this sense, shared frames of reference - such as 
celebrating birthdays - mean that people, by-and-large, behave in 
‘appropriate’, socially-sanctioned ways.  When people’s conduct fails 
to conform to frame-specific expectations it can lead, amongst other 
things, to sanctions or sulks.  When Matt (conversation No. 6) 
described something I’d said as “sloppy”, I felt that he had 
overstepped my standard of politeness.  I angled for a retraction, 
but didn’t receive one; we don’t always get what we would prefer.  
We can thus think of the actualisation of control (or regulation) as a 
relative, and not an absolute, term - we control by degree, and, 
indeed, often lose it. 
 
With regard to research settings, I have already mentioned the no-
smoking rule. I’ve mentioned expectations regarding levels of 
honesty and accuracy in research.  I’ve mentioned ethical norms 
relating to anonymity and confidentiality.  I’ve touched on the 
appropriateness of dress, and the suitability/unsuitability of certain 
vocabulary. In other words, the very notion of ‘research’ has a 
powerful framing - and thus regulating - function.  And according to 
the cybernetic feedback model, a person’s reference values, in 
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relation to ‘research’, will function as the benchmarks against which 
the person’s immediate perceptions will get pattern-matched.  One 
of the problems with the negative-feedback-loop-model, as I see it, 
relates to the fact that sensing gets posited as something that 
pertains to phenomena ‘outside’ of the organism.  I have already 
made the point that, so-called, ‘inputs’ may emanate from ‘within’ 
the sensing organism. You will note that in Figure 12.2 (Chapter 12) 
I have tweaked the negative feedback loop model to include intra-
personal sensing.  Thus, for example, a person may think in an 
unwelcome-to-self,   aberrant manner.  And, if religious (and/or 
desperate) s/he might invoke a higher power in an attempt to 
curtail this mode of thinking - thinking at odds with the tidy mind 
that s/he might prefer to have.  Thus the person may silently pray, 
such that an onlooker would not see any overt behaviour, and yet a 
battle for control of the person’s mental functioning rages in the 
privacy of the person’s own subjective domain.  As already stated, a 
field-theoretical orientation implies a cross-boundary scope, such 
that a person may alight on any aspect(s) of the nested containers 
which we can think of as comprising us (intra-organismally) and 
containing us (extra-organismally). A person’s ‘inner’ goings-on 
form a part of the inferred, overarching, all-containing, ‘objective’ 
world. In scanning his/her idiosyncratically-perceived 
organism/environment field, a person may attend to any aspect of 
that field, whether perceived as existing ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ of 
his/her body.  
 
We may, if we wish, conceive of ourselves, within research settings, 
as primarily engaged in controlling other people’s perceptions, à la 
Impression Management (Rosenfeld et al 2002).  Alternatively we 
can, in line with Perceptual Control Theory (Powers 2005), think of 
the two participants, in a research conversation, as 
interdependently engaged in the process of managing their own, 
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respective, perceptions, via their behavioural interventions. Whilst 
we may, through our strategic (and inadvertent) actions, affect how 
others perceive us, the will to affect the other, according to PCT, 
stems from the more basic wish to control what we perceive. 
According to PCT we want to perceive that they perceive us in the 
manner that we would prefer.  Thus we act on them to engender 
our preferred perception.  Hence Powers (2005, p.47) suggests that 
all of a person’s immediate behaving serves to control what s/he 
momentarily perceives, relative to what s/he currently expects, 
desires, prefers etc.: 
 
 The main proposition of this book is that all behavior is 
 oriented all of the time around the control of certain quantities 
 [environmental (or internal) regulable variables] with respect 
 to specific reference conditions.  The only reason for which 
 any higher organism acts is to counteract the effects of 
 disturbances (constant or varying) on controlled quantities it 
 senses.  When the nature of these controlled quantities is 
 known together with the corresponding reference condition, 
 variability all but disappears from behavior.     
 
The five, abstract, regulable variables that comprise my ‘themes’ 
[‘access’, ‘configuration’, ‘levels’, ‘association’, and ‘expression’], 
when specified, as in the case of, say, the ‘configuring’ of a piece of 
writing, constitute the phenomena which an individual may act on 
to bring his/her perception of the acted-on variable more into line 
with his/her ‘reference condition’, namely, what s/he would 
desire/expect/prefer to perceive.  So yes, the individual does work 
on, say, the ‘configuration’ of the written work, BUT, importantly, 
only in order to bring his/her immediate perception of the acted-on 
variable (say the writing) into closer accord with the reference 
condition/level/value against which s/he benchmarks his/her 
perception of the regulable variable (or ‘controlled quantity’), in this 
example, the writing. 
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As with the ‘access’, ‘configuration’, and ‘level’s’ chapters, I posit 
‘association/dissociation’ as regulable variables in an overarching 
process of regulating one’s moment-to-moment perceptions with 
reference to preferred, expected, or hoped-for states of being.  Our 
physical body, itself becomes the focus of regulatory activities.  
What do we allow in? (‘access’).  How do we wear our hair? 
(‘configuration’).  Do we remain hydrated? (‘levels’). In this, most 
recent, chapter I focused on how we may regulate what, who, and 
where we associate with. This has a literal dimension, in terms of 
bodily proximity, and a figurative dimension, in terms of what we 
associate with mentally and via our various forms of expressive 
conduct such as speaking, and writing.  Associating with, and 
dissociating from, particular phenomena, constitute ways of 
regulating what we perceive from moment to moment, and, of 
course, what others may perceive with regard to us. 
 
In the next chapter I will consider the passage of phenomena from 
a human being into that human being’s environment - ‘expression’ - 
along with the restriction, or withholding, of this traffic. This also 
includes ‘expressive’ behaviours which do not necessarily see the 
light of day, such as when hormones get released within the body, 
or when thinking occurs but remains unarticulated. 
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Chapter 10: Expression  
 
10.1 The Main Body of the Chapter 
 
 Forever losing the thread and picking it up again.  If it weren’t 
 a real-life presentation of the ongoing flow of consciousness, a 
 subject of great interest to me as an existential-
 phenomenological psychologist, and thus justified or perhaps 
 slightly rationalised, I might become annoyed at these 
 seeming interruptions of the narrative.  But they are part of 
 the narrative as well … anyway … as I was saying … 
 
    - Rolf von Eckartsberg (1978, p. 187) 
 
 
I have employed the opening quote in support of not immediately 
engaging in ‘data analysis’ in the ‘expected’ sense of focusing on 
what went on during research conversations.  As previously stated, 
throughout the process of data analysis I found it necessary to 
question and explore the very process I found myself engaged in. 
Whilst I can see the logic of grouping these ‘interruptions’ together 
and presenting them in a dedicated-to-them chapter, I like the 
practice of running the ‘meta analysis’ alongside the ‘data analysis’ 
per se, since to do so accords with the chronology and the 
phenomenology of the lived process.  I fear that the tidying-up of 
our accounting, whilst necessary by degree, can turn the final 
documents into distant relations of what actually happened. I will 
begin this chapter, then, with further discussion relating to the 
nature of data. My developing understanding of data has 
implications for the way I approach ‘data analysis’.     
 
*  *  * 
 
I have reached an important point in my researching process.  I 
recognise that I/people can only know the experience of others via 
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my/their own experiencing of others’ expressing.  And, as I have 
repeatedly said, the experiencing that I/people sustain whilst 
exposed to the expressing of the other, will include some noticings 
not deriving from the other’s expressing.  As Julian Schnabel 
(Rappolt 2008, p. 74) put it: 
 
  I’ve always thought about simultaneity of time, I’m talking 
 about one thing, but you’re not just hearing what I’m saying 
 to you, you’re thinking about whatever happened to you - I 
 don’t know what problem you have - but I know you’re not 
 just thinking about what I’m saying [No full stop in original]  
 
In other words, I/people don’t simply constitute a blank canvas on 
which the other paints a rendition of his/her experience for me/us 
to peruse.  Any momentary act of perceiving that I/we undertake, 
whilst addressing the expressing of another person, will exceed 
simply that which the other expresses.  Minimally I/we will register 
my/our own moment-to-moment intra-personal goings-on that I/we 
host whilst registering aspects of another person’s expressive 
output.  This, of course, applies reciprocally between interactants.  
Thus my/our full-blown experiencing, whilst addressing the output 
of the other, does not simply equate, on a one-to-one ratio, with 
what the other person expresses.  Furthermore, the other person’s 
expressive output does not encapsulate the entirety of that person’s 
full-blown momentary experiencing.  So, although I/we nominally 
and ostensibly have a conversation with person ‘X’, ‘noise’ will 
inevitably disrupt a pure transmission of ‘content’ from one party to 
the other.  Although the term ‘noise’ usually connotes negative 
associations,7 for me, here, the term ‘noise’ pertains to all of the 
sensory goings-on which co-constitute full-blown experiencing 
within a given situation, but which fall outside of the, nominally, 
focal activity of, in this example, ‘conversing with  person  X ’.  Thus 
                                                 
7 For example Boesch (1997, p. 175) suggests that, “Noise is ‘sound dirt,’” which 
echoes Mary Douglas’s (1966, p. 35) quote, “Dirt is matter out of place”.  
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the very concept of ‘noise’ presupposes, and upholds, the notion of 
a pure (or purer) transmission of sound.  And pushing this way of 
thinking slightly further, the conceptual frame of ‘conversing’ 
implies a straightforward interaction between two, or more, people.  
If, instead, we frame the event as two or more individuals 
selectively interacting with aspects of their respective 360°-‘inner’-
‘outer’-‘fields’, we frame the event in a manner which anticipates a 
more promiscuous, dynamic play of each interactant’s focal 
awareness.  However, each individual can only know what goes on 
within his/her own 360°-‘inner’-‘outer’-‘field’. The very labelling of 
an event, as say ‘conversing’, triggers connotations, within those 
familiar with the language spoken, which illicit, for example, certain 
expected norms of politeness and turn-taking, which may belie the 
actual subjective experiencing which occurs under the rubric of 
‘conversing’. 
 
I take it that we can’t avoid filtering the expressive output of the 
other through our own ‘system’, resulting in that other person’s 
articulations co-sponsoring our full-blown momentary experiencing, 
and acting, as we associate with the other  person.  I simply cannot 
address the content of another’s expressive output except as that 
output contributes to my self-perceived ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ goings-
on.  Sure I can play the unabridged DVD recordings of each of the 
ten research conversations that I participated in.   I can transcribe, 
in minute detail, every utterance made therein, along with some of 
the non-verbal occurrences. And I can quote, directly and 
accurately, from those transcripts.  But three intractable issues 
remain: (1) unless and until someone reads those transcripts, or 
those quotations, the ‘data’ remain latent experiaction-triggering 
stimuli.  Whether I, as researcher, or you as reader, address the 
empirical material, someone has to actualise the data’s potential 
meaning. (2) At best, what the other person said and did 
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constitutes a non-exact, non-exhaustive account of his/her full-
blown experiencing during the research conversation. And (3) I see, 
listen-to, touch, and smell another person’s (voluntary and 
involuntary) expressive output in a non-immaculate way, by which I 
mean that the other person and I do not share an experiential 
umbilical cord down which undiluted raw experiences flow between 
us.  We will, most probably, miss certain details and attend to 
goings-on that exist beyond the expressive-output issuing from the 
other. Similarly, when watching the audio-visual recording of a 
research conversation, we will not perceive it comprehensively or    
exhaustively - such objectivist concepts don’t even make sense in 
the realm of perceiving.  
 
I host an endless-till-death [and, who knows, perhaps even beyond-
death] stream (interrupted somewhat by sleep) of ‘experiaction’.  
This moment-to-moment experiaction - as far as I can see - 
constitutes all that I consciously know, and ongoingly do.  Whether 
you put me in a jail cell or on the moon, I will experiact.  And 
whether I have a cell-mate, books, or other astronauts for 
company, does not alter the fact that, whilst these external-to-me 
phenomena may enter my stream of experiaction, these 
phenomena do not monopolise my experiactional stream.  If ‘I’ and 
the ‘other’ coincided exactly at one space-time coordinate, nothing 
would exist to distinguish us from one another - we would have 
become one.  Pregnancy constitutes an interesting test-case of this 
mode of thinking, where the unborn child, for nine months, shares 
the same space-time coordinate as the mother - albeit in an inner-
mother enclave.  However, the unborn child still occupies a unique 
space within the mother; the mother’s heart or bladder could not 
simultaneously occupy the same space as the baby. R. D. Laing 
(1967, p. 20) writes: 
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 I wish to define a person in a twofold way: in terms of 
 experience, as a centre of orientation of the objective 
 universe; and in terms of behaviour, as an origin of actions. 
 
According to Laing’s notion of personhood, my essential functions - 
my ‘being’ and my ‘doing’ - mean that I exist as identifiably 
different from whatever I come into contact with.  And yet food, 
when I eat it, becomes me, air becomes me, and other sensory 
impingements ‘enter’ my consciousness.  But in order to become a 
part of me I have to transform/translate the non-me stuff into a 
form that allows my system(s) to digest and assimilate it.  This 
‘economy’, this ‘commerce’, this transacting, this interacting, 
between the ‘me’ and the ‘not me’ constitutes my life.  And the 
concomitant behavioural and experiential particulars of that ongoing 
‘negotiation’ constitute my life in the very process of me living it.  
Any willed attempts to make public our respective private goings-on 
- or, indeed, any unwitting ‘leakages’ thereof - constitute, for me, 
the heart of social life.  Without palpable-to-others indicators, or 
proxies of my inner goings-on, others will have ‘nothing to go on’.  
 
*  *  * 
       
I no longer class myself as a student of ‘consumption experiences’, 
if by that we mean cherry-picking aspects of people’s experiactional 
streams and attributing those experiences and behaviours to 
particular ‘consumed’ phenomena.  I want only to address 
momentary being in its perceived entirety, which I can only 
conceivably accomplish, directly, in relation to myself.  I accept the 
perceived entirety of one’s moment-to-moment being as ‘life as we 
individually know it’; all that we momentarily register and do, 
necessarily manifests in our consciousness and our conduct here 
and now - ongoingly.   
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* * * 
 
The researching process has afforded me a series of existential 
contexts [‘fields’] in which I have interacted with various people, a 
guide dog, manifold animate and inanimate phenomena, and texts.   
 
* * *  
 
Here and now - 13th November 2013, 17:32/Wednesday - I find 
myself interacting with a draft chapter that I completed on the 19th 
August 2013.   
 
* * * 
 
So, whether I experiact in association with other human beings 
(such as in research conversations or during ‘supervision’), or I 
associate with various inanimate texts (such as DVD recordings or 
written materials), these manifold phenomena co-sponsor, what 
Hansen (2003, p. 206) terms, ‘affective correlates’ within me.  I 
understand Hansen’s term, ‘affective correlates’, to mean the 
experiential ‘realities’ that concurrently accompany our involvement 
with particular phenomena in particular contexts. Importantly, for 
me, the momentary full-blown experiaction that an individual hosts 
does not simply get ‘caused’, in full, by particular stimuli; rather, 
the person and his/her environment co-constitute an 
interdependent field of constituent parts. At any, hypothetically, 
frozen/arrested moment in space-time, a person’s experiaction 
exists within a complex configuration of elements which collectively 
constitute the entire field-conditions that pertain at that moment.  
This purportedly objective, whole ‘field’ differs from an individual’s 
360°-‘inner’-‘outer’-‘field’ (i.e., the world as it exists for the 
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individual - as s/he experiences it). But, as Nagel (Hoffmeyer 1998, 
p. 35) puts it: 
 
 […] the fact that reality extends beyond what is available to 
 our original perspective does not mean that all of it is 
 available to some transcendent perspective that we can reach 
 from here […]. 
 
Seen from the perspective of person2, person1 constitutes a part of 
person2’s environment.   Person2 constitutes his/her own “centre of 
orientation” and “origin of actions” (Laing 1967, p. 20).  The notion 
of total objectivity implies the possibility of an ‘all-encompassing 
centre of orientation’, one with direct access to all constituent, 
‘individualised centres of orientation’, along with access to the range 
of goings-on that lay beyond the bounds of human knowing.  This 
possibility requires nothing less than a god-like omniscience and 
omnipresence.    
 
The very notion of ‘data’ implies some sort of quasi-stable or 
enduring entity, which we can ‘analyse’ in some way.  But, to the 
limits of the view afforded by my current field-theoretical, 
phenomenologically-informed vantage point, I can only tell you 
what I register at a point in space-time - even if I speak about   
prior events. I take it that you, too, can only speak from, and in 
relation to, your own current, goings-on - whether conscious or 
otherwise.  This may include remembering, projecting forward in 
time, and even fabricating your testimony and behaviour.   All such 
expressive acts necessarily emanate from us and thus relate to our 
(conscious or sub-conscious) goals/objectives.  And, due to the 
limitations of representing consciousness through language, even 
our respective in-good-faith sharing can not include all of our 
noticings, in all of their detail.   
 
 239 
Although I haven’t written touchy-feely things, whilst writing this 
prose, such as, ‘now my nose itches’ or ‘now I need to stretch’,  I 
have experienced a strong, positive ‘affective correlate’ whilst 
writing.  Francis Bacon, the 20th century painter, described his 
creative process as (Sylvester 2002, p. 149) like, “following this 
kind of cloud of sensation in yourself”.  However, I do not suggest 
that I have simply expressed an existing-before-writing feeling-
state; rather, the writing process, itself, constitutes a kind of 
feedback loop, where what I write, itself, contributes to a whilst-
writing feeling-state, and that whilst-writing-feeling-state, in turn, 
informs what I write etc., etc.  In an important sense, what I have 
written in this opening section of this chapter exemplifies the theme 
of the chapter, ‘expressing’.  I have expressed - and in many cases 
re-expressed - some of the things that seem important to me at this 
juncture, in this particular context - at home in bed on a cold 
Wednesday evening in March 2013.   
 
* * *  
 
And now, I find myself revising the chapter, on a cold Wednesday 
evening in November 2013. 
 
*  *  * 
 
I key-in the hand-written draft now [28th March 2013] on a bright-
but-cold sunny Thursday afternoon, prior to going for a supervision 
meeting with Nancy at 16:00.  
 
*  *  * 
 
And I proof-read this section now, having met Nancy yesterday.   
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*  *  * 
 
And I proof-read this chapter now, on the 28th April 2013, as part of 
the revision process. 
 
*  *  * 
 
Now [29th April 2013 at 16:38] if find myself keying in yesterday’s 
hand-written proofing, on a sunny afternoon, with a light breeze 
detectable.  
 
*  *  * 
 
The production of this text incorporates a series of space-time-
specific noticings and actions. Yet this kind of multiplicity usually 
disappears into the polished surfaces of finished academic texts.  
 
*  *  * 
 
Alfred Korzybski (1951, pp. 190-192) posits, amongst others, three 
means of representing person/environment-specificities in a written 
form.  Firstly, he advocates the use of ‘indexing’, as in: x1, x2, x3, or 
person1, person2, person3.   
 
 The role of the indexes is to produce indefinitely many proper 
 names for the endless array of unique individuals or situations 
 with which we have to deal in life.  Thus, we have changed a 
 generic name into a proper name.  
 
Instead of writing about ‘chairs’, we might write in terms of chair1, 
chair2, or chair3 etc.   Thus we can identify specific chairs as well as 
using the class name ‘chair’. This suggestion, and the two 
suggestions that follow, aim to help us to linguistically map our lives 
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in a manner that attests to the singularity and time-specificity of 
constituent elements. Secondly, Korzybski posits the notion of 
‘chain indexing’.  Thus we might have:    
 
 […] chair11 (in a dry attic), chair12 (in a damp cellar) […]. The 
 role of chain indexes is to provide a technique for the 
 introduction of environmental factors, conditions, 
 situations, etc.  On the  human level, these would include 
 psycho-logical, socio-cultural, etc., factors.  
 
Again Korzybski wants to make us conscious of the fact that 
person11 (me during a research conversation) differs from person12  
(me at home watching an audiovisual recordings of the research 
conversation). And person13  (me during a supervision meeting) 
differs from both person11 and person12.  This kind of notation 
reminds us that context has a bearing on the experiences and 
actions (experiactions) that ‘the same’ individual will host.  Thirdly, 
Korzybski goes on to posit the notion of ‘dating’ as in, me2008 (the 
year I started my PhD), and how this contrasts with me2013 (two 
months before submitting my PhD thesis).   Korzybski writes, “the 
space-time world of motion and change, of growth, decay, 
transformation, etc.,” gets overtly represented.  We can easily fall 
into assuming consistency and continuity, whereas Korzybski’s 
devices invite us to confront dynamism and to adopt a process-
aware orientation.   Collectively these three devices - indexing, 
chain indexing, and dating - provide the parsimonious means of 
representing: self, others [people and other living animals/things], 
places, inanimate phenomena, organizations, ideas, and so on, as 
singular, context-specific, and time-specific phenomena.  Clearly the 
city of Bradford1985 differs, in many respects, from the city of 
Bradford2013 and yet the same title, ‘Bradford’, persists in relation to 
these divergent sets of particulars.  Thus Korzybski has provided 
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some linguistic tools for allowing writers and readers to remain 
mindful of discontinuities in identities, in the flux of space-time.  
 
*  *  * 
 
By monitoring, and trying to, selectively, represent, what Bacon 
referred to as, the inner “cloud of sensation” that I experience 
whilst writing, I have articulated some, important-to-me, ideas.   I 
don’t identify as an ‘auto-ethnographer’ or an ‘introspector’.  I 
identify as a human being in communion with my existential lot.  
Call it ‘research’, call it ‘data analysis’, call it ‘writing’, call it what 
you will, but, seen from my perspective, I can only ever experiact 
wherever I find myself, in [physical and mental] association with 
whoever and whatever I find myself with.  Any pieces of, so-called, 
‘data’, or texts, which co-constitute a particular ‘field’ - at a 
particular time - with me, and which I register on some level or 
other, will contribute to my experiaction there and then - or here 
and now.  
    
*  *  * 
 
At 25:57, during my conversation with Sufia (conversation No. 716 
Nov 2011) [Room TS 0.20] I noted that Sufia had laughed whilst 
watching the movie that I screened prior to our conversation. 
 
 Sufia:  I just found it very humorous in places. 
 
 Michael: Yeh, clearly, you weren’t doing that for my 
 benefit; that was an involuntary expression I guess? 
 
 S: Yeh, yeh. 
 
This, for me, raises an interesting issue.  At times we may 
strategically hold back from expressing our opinions or impressions, 
 243 
lest we upset another person or jeopardise our chances of getting a 
job for example.  But at other times we say and do things in a 
spontaneous involuntary fashion.  At 40:59, during conversation No. 
509 Nov 2011, with Bella, [Room TS 0.25] she began to cry.  Bella’s 
crying, ostensibly, exemplifies the involuntary loss of self-control.  
However, viewed from the perspective of homeostasis, crying 
constitutes an aspect of involuntary self-regulation.  Perls et al 
(1951, p. 276) write: 
 
 And even when the ‘objective’ situation cannot be changed, as 
 when a loved one dies, there are regulating reactions of the 
 organism itself, such as crying and mourning, that help 
 restore equilibrium if only we allow them to. 
 
Indeed, Bella (44:45) specifically cites the likely ‘cause’ of her 
emotional outburst that took place during our conversation: 
 
 Bella:  Well I know…  Yeh I know where it comes from.  It 
 comes from the fact that my mother died when I was a 
 baby and that I never grieved, because [pause] [Bella 
 shrugs] there was nobody around, you know.  Like if it had 
 happened to a child now, there would have been all sorts of 
 agencies helping the family. 
 
Yet later, (01:00:15), Bella talks about how, with the perspective of 
hindsight, she recognises that, as a child, she unwittingly used 
books and movies as grieving aids: 
 
 Bella: I mean, I used that as a tool when I was a child; 
 that was how I made myself grieve, or enabled myself to 
 grieve.  
 
 Michael: Using movies? 
 
 B: Erm, books and movies yeh. 
 
 M: You knew what pressed your buttons? 
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 B: Yeh, I did. 
 
 M: And you would press them in a controlled way and get 
 your release through that? 
 
 B: Yeh, and I didn’t know what I was doing. 
 
It seems that although Bella didn’t get any ‘professional’ help, as a 
bereaved child, she did, unwittingly, do things that enabled her to 
grieve. 
 
*  *  * 
 
Derlega and Chaikin (1977, p. 102) suggest that the notion of 
‘privacy’ constitutes: 
 
 […] a process of boundary regulation, controlling how much 
 (or how little) contact an individual maintains with others.  
 Self-disclosure involves the verbal transmission of 
 information.  Adjustment of self-disclosure outputs and inputs 
 is boundary regulation; the extent of control one maintains 
 over this exchange of information contributes to the amount 
 of privacy one has in a social relationship. 
 
 
 
 Figure 10.1 Self-Disclosure as a Function of Self- and 
 Dyadic-Boundary Adjustments (Derlega & Chaikin 
 (1977, p.  105) 
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Derlega and Chaikin (1977, p. 104) continue:  
 
 One boundary, the ‘dyadic boundary,’ insures the discloser’s 
 safety from leakage of information to uninvited third parties; 
 this boundary establishes the precondition for self-disclosure 
 but is not self-disclosure.  It is - as construed by an individual 
 - the boundary within which it is safe to disclose to the invited 
 recipient and across which the self-disclosure will not pass.   
 That is, the disclosure is safe with the recipient, as perceived 
 by the discloser.  The second boundary is the ‘self boundary’ 
 around the person; it is modified by self-disclosure.  We 
 maintain a barrier around ourselves which is based on 
 nondisclosure.  This barrier is opened when we self-disclose. 
 
The research setting effectively provides a regulated dyadic 
boundary.  I gave volunteers assurances that I would not use their 
real names and that I would only use the recorded material in ways 
agreeable to each volunteer.  I managed this through the use of a 
detailed, permission-giving, consent form, that each volunteer could 
personalise. [See Fig. 3.3, chapter 3] According to this privacy 
theory, when someone perceives a dyadic boundary as ‘safe’ they 
will feel more inclined to open the self boundary.  Ruby 
(conversation No. 303 Nov 2011) [Nancy’s office] exemplified this 
principle when she told Nancy, one of my supervisors, during their 
post-research-conversation debrief: 
 
 […] because I didn’t know him [Michael], I’ve never even 
 seen him around campus, so I felt pretty comfortable 
 knowing that I probably wouldn’t see him again much.  So 
 yeh, I think the majority of people will open up more to 
 strangers than people they know. 
 
Ruby here alludes to the useful-to-her anonymity of speaking with 
me. Ruby doesn’t mention the potential threat of me leaking 
information about her to third parties.  The fact that I don’t know 
any of Ruby’s extended circle of friends makes the likelihood of any 
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of her associates gleaning private information about Ruby, from me, 
quite remote - this, in addition to my own ethical obligation of 
confidentiality.  However, this does not mean that everyone in a 
research setting will wish to bare their, proverbial, soul.   
 
I noted that Neil (conversation No. 225 Jul 2011) [Room TS. 019] 
steered our conversation largely along ‘professional’ lines.  Although 
we talked at length about the juxtaposition of film texts - in relation 
to film programming [Neil’s job] - we spoke very little about our 
‘private’ lives or even, reflexively, about the dynamics of our 
conversation per se.  At one particular point, after I had asked Neil 
a series of questions pertaining to how people respond to his high-
profile job title, I asked Neil (37:56),  “Do you find this 
phenomenon… this topic somewhat  an interesting phenomenon?” 
to which Neil replied, “Yeh I do.  I’m interested in the relationship 
between film texts and institutions […]”.  Thus Neil says that he 
finds the topic of my preceding questions interesting and then 
proceeds to turn-on-a-sixpence, so to speak, steering the 
conversation in an entirely different direction.  Indeed, towards the 
end of our conversation (13:50 [second layer of DVD]) I asked Neil, 
“How do you experience your energy now, as distinct from when we 
started?”, to which Neil replied: 
 
 I feel that we arrived at a point, maybe 30 or 40 minutes into 
 the conversation, that I felt quite interested… I felt more 
 interested to pursue the conversation and that since then I’ve 
 felt more energised. […]  I felt that […] my input of my 
 interests and your challenging or questioning of what I was 
 saying possibly resulted in me feeling more energised, which I 
 hadn’t necessarily expected. 
 
Not surprisingly, Neil’s interest peaked, and his energy level raised, 
after he had steered the conversation away from, what one could 
describe as, a more ‘personal’ and perhaps ‘psychological’ direction, 
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and toward a more professionally-orientated [film-related] line of 
enquiry. Interestingly, the term ‘cybernetics’ - though often 
associated with machines and computers - derives from the Greek 
word ‘kubernētē’ meaning ‘steersman’ - a person who steers a boat 
or ship (Concise Oxford English Dictionary [11th Edition]). This 
accounts for why the terms ‘control’ and ‘regulation’ crop up so 
regularly in relation to cybernetics, homeostasis, and the ‘negative 
feedback loop’.  The negative feedback loop represents the process 
of experiaction in which an individual, animal, or machine acts so as 
to maintain his/her/its sensings relative to his/her/its reference 
values.  The steersman, similarly, acts by adjusting the oars (or 
tiller) to ensure that the boat heads in his/her intended direction.  
 
We can see from this example that Neil powerfully steered the 
conversation relative to his own preference (or ‘reference value’) 
and I acquiesced - not least because  the notion of juxtaposing film 
texts seemed close to my research, in the sense that professional 
film programmers seek to regulate: (a) audiences’ cinema-going 
behaviours and experiences, (b) the host cinemas’ brand images 
and reputations, and (c) the programmers’ individual professional 
reputations through finding juxtapositions of movies (i.e., 
sequences of films shown back-to-back, for example) which entice 
and entertain audiences.  Editing academic journals, similarly, 
involves editors seeking to compile interesting selections of articles 
which will hopefully appeal to each journal’s readership, maintain 
(or enhance) each journal’s image/reputation, and, perhaps, 
manifest each editor’s editorial style and/or each journal’s ‘house 
style’. 
 
*  *  * 
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An interesting issue arose in relation to my conversation with Jane 
(conversation No. 928 Nov 2011) [Room TS 01.05].  I found myself 
feeling sexually attracted to Jane during our conversation.  I had 
not met Jane on a one-to-one basis previously, and I did not 
anticipate feeling attracted to her during our conversation. I did not 
articulate this phenomenon during the conversation; however, my 
tongue-tiedness in the initial stages of the conversation, with 
hindsight, attests to subliminal goings-on within me: 
 
 00:06:52 Michael: I suppose I… [pause]  You can sense 
 a… [pause]  You can sense… [pause] in me a certain [pause] 
 lack of flow… or a lack of [long pause] slickness.  And I find 
 that interesting, in itself, the fact that [long pause] in your 
 company, in this context, I… I don’t feel I can find my words 
 very easily.  Sometimes I speak very fluently and er… and 
 very confidently, and yet in this context, in your company, I… 
 I feel a certain - it’s not reticence, a kind of shyness to speak 
 - but I, kind of, want to try and find a way of speaking which 
 feels authentic.  Because as I speak now I feel… I feel, kind 
 of, not relaxed.  I don’t feel in my… in a comfortable position.  
 And I don’t cite that as a complaint [Jane laughing] but… I 
 suppose in revealing my agenda, moment-by-moment you’ll 
 perhaps realise that it, in some sense, has to do with sharing 
 one’s experience in the moment. 
 
My faltering speech betrays, I think, with hindsight, things going on 
in me, at subliminal levels, which interfered with the flow of words 
on the surface level - what Julian Schnabel referred to earlier as 
‘simultaneity’.  And in this quotation you can see me attempting to 
model moment-to-moment congruence between my lived 
experience and my immediate expression.  It became very 
interesting to see how my usual style-of-being became disrupted, 
quite markedly, when I began communicating with Jane. The 
morning after my conversation with Jane (conversation No. 9) I 
wrote the following: 
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29th November 2011 
10:27/Tuesday 
 
 After the camcorder stopped rolling, yesterday, I told Jane 
 that I sensed an involuntary reaction to her, as I listened to 
 her speaking.  She said that she would not have guessed that, 
 based on my surface behaviour.  I told her that she reminded 
 me of a previous girlfriend.  […] Now whilst this did not find 
 its way into the recording, it seems important to mention that 
 the research volunteer impacted on me during the 
 conversation. And I tried (in the spirit of my research 
 agenda) to share that  experience - albeit off-the-record.  I 
 genuinely did not set out to try to ‘pick-up’ this woman.  
 Jane alluded to feeling a connection - that the words she 
 heard me say, and perhaps the ‘energy’ I gave off, had a 
 certain resonance for her […]. 
 
You will note that I didn’t feel at liberty to share the particulars of 
my experience on-the-record. Subsequently, having broached this 
topic briefly with Nancy, one of my supervisors, she encouraged me 
to mention the ‘elephant in the room’, so to speak.  I also spoke 
with Nancy about my having sworn at certain points, during certain 
research conversations. I felt ambivalent about the 
‘appropriateness’ of including ‘bad language’ in my transcripts and 
write-up.  Again, Nancy encouraged me to include the ‘real life’ 
exchanges rather than sanitizing my report.  Thus you can see that 
I sought advice regarding the inclusion of certain research-
conversation goings-on.  I had to balance issues relating to 
empirical and phenomenological accuracy, along with the ethics-
related notions of ‘appropriateness’ and ‘propriety’.    I faced these 
issues as they arose during research conversations, and during 
supervision, and they exemplify, quite powerfully, I think, the way 
in which one can feel constrained and conflicted about expressing 
certain sentiments, details, and content in the research process.  
We may describe such epoch-/culture-specific social norms as the 
‘reference values’ that become ‘internalised’ within individuals, and 
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which contribute to ambivalent/conflicted states of being - such as I 
have describe here - when we fail to live up to them.      
 
*  *  * 
 
Bella (conversation No. 5, at 01:23:19) thought that she had 
spoiled my research by becoming upset during the conversation: 
 
 Bella:  No, I’m beginning to see the value of it.  But five 
 minutes ago I was thinking, this has just been terrible, you 
 know, [Michael laughing] a waste of time.  Michael must think 
 I’m an idiot. [pause] But now I’m beginning to see that it has 
 been valuable [pause] yeh. 
 
And I felt ambivalent, after speaking with a disapproving colleague, 
about having shared what I did with Jane, albeit off-camera.   This, 
I think, relates also to the conversation I had with Ruby 
(conversation No. 3) in which Ruby spoke about certain personal 
issues, pertaining to her relationships with other people and her 
lack of a core, stable, sense-of-self.  It seems interesting that I, like 
Ruby, invoked the concept of ‘research’ to warrant and justify what 
I had said to Jane.  I recall feeling somewhat driven  to say what I 
said to Jane, but the ‘research’ agenda and context - especially 
given that my research specifically focuses on the problematics of 
communicating  complex, multi-layered experiences - ultimately 
helped me to feel satisfied that I didn’t speak inappropriately, or 
unethically.     
 
*  *  * 
 
The question of ‘mentionableness’ applies also to toilet breaks.   
Three out of the ten volunteers needed a ‘comfort break’. Neil 
(conversation No. 2) at 01:18:00, for two minutes and twenty 
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seconds; Bridie (conversation No. 4) at 01:25:04, for three minutes 
and 40 seconds; and Bob (conversation No. 10) at around 
01:35:30, for two minutes and 44 seconds.   And of these three, 
Neil and Bob pro-actively initiated their own toilet breaks:  Neil 
(01:17:56), “Excuse me Michael, would it be alright to go to the 
toilet?”, and Bob (01:36:02), “Is there a toilet nearby Michael?”   
Bridie used the euphemism of needing a ‘comfort break’, whilst both 
of the men referred, to going to that ‘place’ called the ‘toilet’.  The 
details of our toilet habits, conventionally, fall outside the scope of 
what one would expect to discuss during a research conversation 
within a school of management; however, the toilet breaks created 
interesting hiatuses within my viewing of the audio-visual 
recordings of research conversations.  
 
*  *  * 
 
 
      Figure 10.2 Toilet Break during Conversation No. 2    
      at 01:18:20 
   
I left the camcorder running during the three toilet breaks. Whilst 
looking at the people-less screen [Fig. 10.2] on 28th October 2011, 
between 12:50 and 14:58 - during my first pass of the DVD 
recording of conversation No. 2 - I wrote, “I love this because it 
shows that the space exists even when we [Neil and I] exit it.”  This 
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image, then, serves as evidence that the configuration of chairs and 
the wall persist, even in the absence of the people who had, 
moments before, occupied the self-same chairs.  However, as 
discussed earlier, until I present this visual data, in support of this 
particular way of thinking, and until these words and images get 
read and seen, then any ‘meaning’, in relation to the data, remains 
latent. The data requires human interpretation and 
contextualisation, for it to serve as purposeful ‘evidence’. 
 
 
              Figure 10.3 Toilet Break during Conversation No. 4   
      at 01:25:28 
 
Whilst looking at the people-less screen [Fig. 10.3] on 16th/17th 
January 2012, between 23:24 and 01:34 - during my first pass of 
the DVD recording of conversation No. 4 - I wrote:   
 
 Empty seats - mine with jacket on back - bottles of water on 
 floor.  Some noises in the corridor [on recording].  ‘Blue’ 
 behind Bridie’s chair; ‘green’ behind Michael’s chair.  Aware of 
 digesting-fish-&-chips. Thoughts of going to hospital with 
 Mum tomorrow. 
 
In my diary for January 16th 2012 I noted that I had socialised, with 
a friend, until ♎ 21:30, after which I note that I had eaten fish and 
chips outside the local church - which has a sheltered entrance 
door.  My diary entry for the 17th January 2012 also corroborates 
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that I did, indeed, attend a hospital appointment with my mother in 
Leeds.  I mention these diary extracts to underscore the idea that 
my ‘extra-curricular’ noticings, which occurred during the people-
less passage of watching the recording of conversation No. 4, attest 
to the embeddedness of ‘research’ within the wider contexts of the 
researcher’s [my] life.  The food-related and hospital-appointment-
related sensing and thinking, respectively, formed part of my 
moment-to-moment experiaction as I ‘analysed data’.  I, again, 
suggest that a field-theoretical, phenomenologically-informed 
orientation leads one to accept such seemingly irrelevant noticings 
as legitimate ‘data’.  
 
Similarly, on 09th/10th February 2012, whilst looking at the people-
less screen [Fig. 10.3] between 22:53 and 01:03 - during my 
second pass of the recording of conversation No. 4 - I noted, “Holes 
in the back of Bridie’s chair like the holes in Korzybski’s Structural 
Differential. [Fig. 10.4]  I could make a photograph or a freeze-
frame?”   
 
Figure 10.4 Structural Differential, Korzybski (1994, p. 388) 
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I mention this instance of associative thinking to demonstrate, once 
again, how my thinking during ‘data analysis’, went beyond the 
immediately-sensed ‘outside world’. The ‘A’ in Figure 10.4, the 
colander-like shape, represents the “mad dance of ‘electrons’, which 
is different every instant” (Korzybski 1994, p. 387).  Even a pencil, 
when examined scientifically, reveals a non-solid, mobile, structure.   
When a human being perceives a pencil s/he registers an object ‘O’, 
which constitutes a sensory abstraction from the ‘mad dance’.  The 
label ‘L’ stands for the naming of the perceived object ‘O’.  
Korzybski wishes to convey that at each successive stage, of the 
process that he calls ‘abstraction’, characteristics/details get 
omitted. The holes with no strings attached, and the dangling 
strings, represent characteristics which don’t find their way into the 
perceived object.  Similarly, some of the characteristics and details 
of the perceived object don’t find their way into the 
description/representation of the object.  Korzybski’s model, then, 
points to the ‘non-allness’ of the process of abstraction.  The 
perception doesn’t ‘contain’ everything ‘out there’, and the 
description doesn’t ‘contain’ everything about the perceived 
phenomenon.  Korzybski encapsulated this way of thinking by 
imploring us not to confuse the ‘map’ with the ‘territory’.    
 
 
      Figure 10.5 Toilet Break during Conversation No. 10 
      at 01:36:21 
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Whilst looking at the people-less screen [Fig. 10.5] on 16th/17th 
February 2012, between 22:45 and 00:41 - during my first pass of 
the DVD recording of conversation No. 10 - I mused, “What goes on 
whilst at the loo?”  Although toilet breaks occurred during three of 
the ten research conversations, the details of what occurred in the 
toilets falls outside of what gets reported here.  Bradshaw and 
Canniford (2010, pp. 201, 209) write:   
 
 The average person spends 3 years of their lives on the toilet 
 […], yet this universal activity is rarely mentioned or 
 discussed in the company of others […]. Whether it be bodily 
 waste or otherwise, we are trained to flush or throw away 
 what is unwanted into holes where we may forget the 
 presence of material that makes us uncomfortable. 
 
We adhere to culturally-ingrained parameters, such as normalized 
notions of ‘public’ and ‘private’ actions.  Animals, by contrast, do 
not [as far as I know] enter designated, gender-segregated, spaces 
specifically designed for excretion management.  I should, perhaps, 
also note that some inebriated [and/or desperate] individuals with 
their, consequently, reduced levels of social propriety, also behave 
in this ‘anti-social’, ‘animal-like’ manner. Generally speaking, 
though, our personal, toilet-related goings-on do not form part of 
research conversations conducted in schools of management. A 
differently-framed conversation, taking place within, say, a hospital, 
may well include reference to urine and the like.  Still, 
embarrassment may accompany even such ‘legitimate’ 
conversations.  Comedians, typically, have license to challenge 
social taboos; such comedic transgression may lead us to laugh in 
recognition and, perhaps, mild-embarrassment. 
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10.2 Concluding 
 
In this chapter I have considered some issues arising out of the 
notion of regulating expression and I have considered some of the 
naturalised  ‘reference values’ which work, behind the scenes, so to 
speak, informing our conduct as we benchmark our current 
experiences against ‘preferred’,  ‘desirable’, or ‘expected’ ways of 
being.  I suggest that a similar kind of dynamic occurs at the 
writing-up stage [i.e., here] as I decide what I can and cannot 
include within a ‘container’ called a ‘data analysis chapter’.  As in 
the cases of countries, cities, buildings, rooms, and bodies; we can 
think of a text, such as this one, as having an inside and an outside.  
Writing a thesis entails the regulation of:  (1) what gains ‘access’ 
into the body of a text,  (2) the way that the contents of the work 
get sequenced or ‘configured’, (3) the ‘levels’ of, for example, self-
revelation, word-count, the constancy of ‘tone’, and the density of 
the prose, (4) the ‘association with’ (and ‘dissociation from’) certain 
theories, philosophical traditions, places, and authors, and, finally, 
(5) the strategic, rule-informed, ‘expressing’ and/or ‘withholding’ 
that characterise the writing process.   I have shown that attempts 
to transcend prevailing norms can engender uncertainty, and that 
such uncertainty can lead one to act in ways calculated to reduce 
that uncertainly. Thus the pronouncements of an academic 
supervisor can, in some cases, assuage such norm-transgressing-
fuelled concerns; at other times, pronouncements by the same 
supervisor may serve to inhibit student-behaviour that strays too 
far from the norms. The five ‘themes’, that I have explored in the 
last five chapters, and which I have enumerated above, collectively 
constitute the regulable variables on which regulatory activities 
focus.  In the following chapter I will show how the cybernetic 
theory and the regulable variables discussed in the preceding five 
chapters, apply to the world beyond the university.
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Chapter 11: Cosmopolis  
 
11.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will show how the notion of a ‘consumption experience’ 
seems a problematic denomination for what goes on during two 
documented cinema visits. The field-theoretical, 
phenomenologically-informed approach - that I modelled both 
during research conversations and in this subsequent study - shows 
that people, including me, attend dynamically from moment-to-
moment - subject to what catches their attention, interests them, 
and/or what accords with their prevailing norms and expectations.  
The real-time documentation of whichever aspects of my 360°-
‘inner’-‘outer’-‘field’ momentarily come to my notice, tracks the 
goings-on that fall both inside and outside of a product-centric 
focus.   
 
In chapter five, and intermittently during the last five (‘data’) 
chapters, I have referred to three different levels at which 
regulatory processes can occur.  Firstly, at the level of Walter 
Cannon’s ‘homeostasis’ (1939, p. 24) a term that originally 
pertained specifically to: 
 
  The coordinated physiological processes which maintain most 
 of the steady states in the organism […] involving […] the 
 brain and nerves, the heart, lungs, kidneys and spleen, all 
 working cooperatively […]. 
 
Cannon (1939, p. 28) continues: 
 
 Each cell has requirements […].  The cells in our bodies, 
 however, are shut away from any chances to obtain directly 
 food, water and oxygen from the distant larger environment, 
 or to discharge into it the waste materials which result from 
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 activity.  These conveniences for getting supplies and 
 eliminating debris have been provided by the development of 
 moving streams within the body itself - the blood and lymph 
 streams. 
 
Secondly, I have discussed Perceptual Control Theory (Powers 
2005), in which a person’s own perceiving constitutes the controlled 
phenomenon. The person may act on, both, environmentally-
located regulable variables, and on internally-located goings-on, in 
the overarching process of controlling what s/he perceives.  
 
And thirdly, I have mentioned the ecological psychology level of 
regulation (Wicker 1979), which views ‘behavior settings’, such as 
cinemas, as, themselves, self-regulating systems. Such systems 
entail the maintenance of ‘programs’ [routine activities and 
processes] which the behavior-setting-system seeks to uphold. 
Program-maintenance involves agential human beings, in the form 
of staff and customers, who know the rules-of-engagement and who 
usually intervene to correct deviations from the particular 
‘program’.  
 
Wicker (1979, p. 17) alludes to each of these three levels of 
regulation: 
 
 The student is one level in a hierarchy of systems - one 
 “layer” of the onion.  At the next level down are the organs 
 - heart, lungs, stomach, brain - that make up the student (or, 
 more precisely, the person-system). Below that are the 
 tissues that make up the organ. Working upward and outward 
 from the student, the next level is the psychology-class 
 behavior setting, of which the student is a component (just as 
 her stomach is a component of her), and above that the 
 college of which the psychology class is a part. As you can 
 see, a system that is a component at one level is an 
 environment at another level. 
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11.2 The Cinema Visits 
 
On Friday 15th June 2012 I went to a late-night screening of David 
Cronenberg’s film Cosmopolis, at the Vue cinema, inside The Light 
centre in Leeds city centre. I had use of my mother’s car that night.  
Due to a medical condition my mother had had to temporarily stop 
driving.   She allowed me to use her car during that period.   I 
mention this point because without the availability of this mode of 
transport, at that point in June 2012, I would probably not have 
gone to that late night screening.  The last train back from Leeds to 
Saltaire [where I live] leaves Leeds around 23:15; the screening 
didn’t begin until 23:30.  Since I didn’t take notes during or after 
the screening of Cosmopolis, I have no record of what I noticed 
whilst watching it; however, I do remember that only a handful of 
people attended.   
 
The Vue cinema complex resides within The Light shopping and 
entertainment centre, itself contained within the city centre of 
Leeds.  I drove from one geographical location (Bradford) to 
another (Leeds).  Boundaries exist between these two regions, 
usually marked by roadside signage.  Similarly, when approaching 
the Vue cinema, one first enters The Light centre by crossing a 
threshold; this demarcates The Light centre from the rest of the city 
centre. Then one goes up an escalator, which takes one into the 
foyer of the Vue multiplex cinema.  Having bought one’s ticket in 
the foyer one moves from the foyer to the specific cinema where 
the movie, in this case Cosmopolis, gets screened.  A Vue employee 
polices the boundary between the foyer and the individual cinemas, 
only allowing access to ticket-holders. [Fig. 11.1] I include this scan 
of the cinema tickets (a) as proof that I did indeed do what I say I 
did, (b) to foreground the commercial nature of the ‘product’ in 
question, and (c) because I find the image aesthetically pleasing - 
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like an Andy Warhol-style print.  The cinema’s toilets, available to 
ticket holders, constitute gender-segregated spaces; as children we 
soon learn which door [ or] we can legitimately enter.   
  
Figure 11.1 Receipts from Vue Cinema - Three Visits 
 
The notion of regulation, and specifically the regulable variable of 
access, leads me to think of the way in which Vue cinemas regulate 
access to the spaces where they deliver their movie products.  A 
movie constitutes an ‘intangible’ product in the sense that, at least 
when visiting a cinema, one doesn’t take the movie home in a bag - 
unlike, for example, when buying a DVD from a supermarket.    One 
can not move, unchallenged, from the street and into a cinema 
seat.  A filmgoer must usually join a queue, buy a ticket, and show 
the ticket to a gate-keeping Vue-cinema employee.   More 
generally, one must present as a non-disruptive, not excessively 
smelly, clothed individual.  Thus, tacitly-agreed-upon standards of 
behaviour and self-presentation exist in this kind of setting.  In a 
naturist cinema - if such establishments exist - one may get away 
with nakedness, but not at the Vue cinema in Leeds.  If I had 
pushed my way past the Vue’s gate-keeping employee, without 
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showing my ticket, security staff would have quickly appeared to 
either make me comply or to eject to me from the premises. The 
whole system runs smoothly, providing people stick to the 
‘program’.  Wicker (1979, pp. 13-15) writes about the self-
regulating processes in ‘behavior settings’: 
 
 Within any behavior setting a number of specialized 
 “mechanisms” act in concert to assure that the essential 
 activities of the setting are carried out.  A sensing mechanism 
 receives information about events in the setting.  For the 
 most part, the eyes and ears of setting occupants serve this 
 sensing function, although in some cases mechanical, 
 electrical, or electronic devices may be installed to monitor 
 aspects of a setting.  Examples of the latter would be 
 thermostats and smoke detectors.  The sensing mechanisms 
 in a setting continually monitor setting conditions.  The 
 information that they receive is relayed to an executive 
 mechanism that examines the input to determine if what’s 
 happening in the setting is adequate (appropriate, 
 permissible, non-threatening). Generally, the executive 
 function in behavior settings is located in the brains of the 
 setting occupants, but some kinds of decisions about 
 adequacy can be made by non-human components, as when a 
 thermostat “decides” that the air is too cold.  […]  [I]f some 
 event should be seen as a threat to the setting’s program or 
 to a person’s satisfactions in the setting, maintenance 
 mechanisms may be “switched on.”  That is, people decide 
 that something must be done about the problem, and so they 
 take action to return the setting to normal […] a deviation-
 countering mechanism. 
 
 A second kind of maintenance mechanism is vetoing. In 
 this case the source of the threat or disruption is ejected from 
 the setting. […] 
 
 He [Roger Barker] proposes a closed loop cycle of events that 
 depend upon information feedback.  Attempts to deal with a 
 threat to a setting are not left dangling; the effects (if any) of 
 the actions taken are monitored by the sensory mechanism  
 and evaluated by the executive mechanism. […]  
 Unsuccessful attempts to correct a threat to the setting will be 
 monitored and evaluated, and further attempts will be made 
 to deal with the problem until corrected. 
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It seems to me that what pertains in the macrocosm of a multiplex 
cinema also applies in the microcosm of, say, producing this 
chapter.  If, for example, I found myself pushed for time and yet 
inundated with distracting phone calls, I might take the phone off 
its hook, thereby managing potential program-interrupting 
phenomena. 
 
*  *  *  
 
Prior to going into the ‘screening room’, [as distinct from other 
parts of the ‘cinema’ - such as the foyer and the toilets] to watch 
the movie, I would have emptied my bladder and cleaned my 
glasses under running water, as I usually do.  I once saw a movie 
called Cinemania (2002), about movie addicts/enthusiasts who, as 
part of their ritual, clean their glasses prior to screenings to 
optimise viewing clarity.  Some of the people featured in Cinemania 
reasoned that since film-makers and projectionists usually go to 
great lengths to produce high-resolution imagery, it seems remiss 
of movie-goers to watch movies through dirty spectacle lens.  
Emptying my bladder and cleaning my glasses constitute regulatory 
behaviours - the ‘expression’ of body waste and the removal of the 
unwanted residues from my spectacle lens.  In the latter case the 
misplaced matter on the lens gets washed down the sink with 
running water.  I then remove the water residues from my specs 
using the hem of my shirt.  
 
*  *  * 
 
Upon entering the appointed screening room, I positioned myself 
relative to the screen. I see this as a ‘configurational’ issue.  
Obviously I can not, nor would I want to, sit behind the screen, or 
hang from the roof of the screening room like a bat.  The very 
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design of the screening room delimits the range of alternative 
vantage points available. However, unless two individuals shared 
the same body (and hence the same set of eyes), each spectator 
has a unique point-of-view.  This brings me to the very heart of my 
thesis.  We can map, exactly, where a person sits within a screening 
room, within a cinema complex, within a shopping/entertainment 
centre, within a city centre, within a county, within a country, on a 
planet, within a universe - itself, perhaps, part of an encompassing 
‘multiverse’ - at a particular point in time.   And so, we exist at 
'mapable' points in space-time.   And I can provide evidence, in the 
form of a ticket, that I attended the said screening.  Indeed, if the 
Vue cinema has CCTV cameras installed within its premises, then 
the management could even verify my attendance courtesy of that 
system. Scientists could, in experimental conditions, subject me to 
an MRI scan that showed which parts of my brain lit up at particular 
points during the screening of a movie.  Other sensing devices could 
monitor my hear-rate and even which parts of the screen my eyes 
alighted on at any point in time.  Yet none of this objective data 
would furnish the researcher with the particulars of my moment-to-
moment subjective experiencing, as I watched the movie.  Laing 
(1967, pp. 21-22) writes: 
 
 It is quite possible to study visible, audible, smellable 
 effulgences of human bodies, and much study of human 
 behaviour has been in those terms.  One can lump together 
 very large numbers of units of behaviour and regard them as 
 a statistical population, in no way different from the 
 multiplicity constituting a system of non-human objects.  But 
 one will not be studying persons.  In a science of persons, I 
 shall state as axiomatic that: behaviour is a function of 
 experience; and both experience and behaviour are always in 
 relation to someone or something other than the self.  
 
Rolf von Eckartsberg (1972, p. 166) says:   
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 “Experiaction” is a new term I use that combines experience 
 and action.  […]  [Von Eckartsberg coins the term, 
 “experiaction-in-situation” saying,] embodiment implies 
 situatedness - experiacting in a context which is a physical 
 locale and the socially-defined meaning that is associated with 
 the locale. 
 
Wicker’s (1979, p. 18) sentiments accord with those of von 
Eckartsberg [above] when he writes, “People in drugstores ‘behave 
drugstore,’ for example; they do not behave ‘post office’ or 
‘swimming lesson.’”   Here we have the related notions of (a) the 
essential privateness of moment-to-moment experiencing and (b) 
the normative expectations (within particular cultures) associated 
with particular contexts and activities.   
 
In short we can verify, objectively, that I sat in a particular seat, in 
a particular cinema, on a particular day.  And we may even 
correlate my heartbeat and other bodily goings-on with particular 
sections of a movie (Rothwell et al 2006, p. 105), or notice that 
such-and-such region of my brain ‘lit-up’ on a MRI scan, at a certain 
point as I watched a movie.  But none of these measures furnish 
the researcher with my lived experiencing itself.  It seems evident 
that in order to more-exhaustively map existential goings-on, one 
must account for the subjective experiencing of embodied beings.   
Von Eckartsberg (2010, p. 259) puts it this way: 
 
 [If] I trace the path of my body through town on a city map, 
 this is only a very general characterization of my experience.  
 As viewed from my actor point of view, it is, indeed, true that 
 I moved through town, but the crucial concern for me is: 
 What did I pay attention to, what did I see, hear, feel, etc.?  
 The observer can never fully fathom what this moving through 
 town meant to me personally.  All of my perceptions, for 
 instance, are given solely to me and unless I tell about them 
 to the observer, they remain private - linked to my total 
 stream of meaningful experience, which includes all of my 
 past. 
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And so, by recording my noticings (some of them at least), along 
with the particular times of those noticings, I can produce a more 
complete mapping of my experiactional goings-on.  Since I didn’t 
keep a viewing-log, as I watched Cosmopolis on Friday 15th June 
2012, I can not say, over a year on, with any accuracy, what I 
noticed whilst watching it - although I did write the following in my 
diary: 
 
 I then took my Mum’s car and drove to Leeds - to the 23:30 
 screening of Cosmopolis - David Cronenberg’s latest film - 
 which I have looked forward to [for] many months. 
 
I attended that screening as ‘a regular cinema-goer’ rather than as 
‘a researcher’.  At the time of that particular jaunt I had not decided 
to visit the Vue cinema twice-more and to use those visits in 
relation to a chapter of my thesis. However, during my two 
subsequent visits to the Vue cinema in Leeds, on the 16th and 18th 
June 2012, respectively, I went to watch Cosmopolis with my, 
proverbial, researcher’s hat on. I created viewing-logs, using the 
same printed forms that I had designed for use when analysing the 
DVD recordings of research conversations. [See chapter 4]  I also 
created sets of meta-notes when reading each viewing-log the day 
after each of the cinema visits.  My wife accompanied me to the 
Monday 18th June screening, hence the appearance of two tickets 
for the Monday 18th screening [Fig. 11.1]. 
 
Just as, whilst watching Cosmopolis, I sat in a particular seat in a 
specific screening room, within a certain multi-plex cinema, in a 
particular city etc., likewise, as I write these words, I sit in a 
particular bed, in a particular room, within a particular apartment, 
within a particular apartment block within a particular village etc.   
Thus the same kind of space-time-specificity exists whether one 
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watches a movie or subsequently writes relatedly.  In other words, 
whether watching a movie over a year ago, or writing about the 
episodes now, I did/do so at particular space-time coordinates.  
And, importantly, I notice(ed) ‘things’ whist occupying those 
particular coordinates.   I host(ed) a stream of consciousness that 
co-exists/co-existed with my overt (palpable-to-others) actions.   
 
On the one hand I have two viewing-logs pertaining to two cinema 
visits that occurred over a year ago; on the other hand I find myself 
now, as I did back then, located in a particular context, although 
now writing (with hindsight) about those two cinema visits.  
Although the focus of my current experiaction has shifted from 
‘movie viewing’ June 2012 to ‘data analysis’ Nov., 2013 it seems to me that 
each respective setting affords me the opportunity to experiact-in-
situ. So although ‘me’2012 differs from ‘me’2013 - and my 
experiencing, actions, and the situations referred to in the 2012 
scenarios differed from the experiencing, actions, and context whilst 
reading/typing now - ‘I’ nonetheless necessarily, experiact at/in 
whichever context I find myself co-constituting.  For me, the key 
questions become, What do I experience and do at any particular 
juncture? What does my experiaction-in-situ comprise of? These 
questions point to the ‘content’, the very ‘stuff’, of my life as I 
participate therein.  
 
As a student of experiaction-in-situ, how can I ignore the acts and 
experiencing that I sustain now, whilst writing (16:29 Monday 06th 
May 2013)?  [Now, 20th November 2013, as I revisit the chapter?] 
{And now, 24th November 2013, as I key-in the hand-written 
proofing that I completed on the 20th November 2013?}.  
 
* * * 
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 Is this the “real” lived experience, my typing this right now, 
 this very second?  This is silly.  I reflect and start typing, and 
 the reflection is already replaced by the typing experience. 
 
    - Ronai (1992, p. 104) 
 
* * * 
 
The preceding five ‘data analysis’ chapters constitute, in part, an 
attempt to theoretically and methodologically address this difficulty 
of writing about various past and current events in a continually 
shifting present. 
 
*  *  * 
 
My current experiaction-in-situ, in relation to David Cronenberg’s 
Cosmopolis, entails an additional complicating layer. On 23rd 
November 2012, at 21:36, I drove to a fairly-local branch of 
Sainsbury’s supermarket, in Bradford, and bought a DVD copy of 
Cosmopolis. [Fig. 11.2]  In my diary entry for that day I wrote, “I 
then drove to Sainsbury’s to buy Cosmopolis (£9.99).  I watched 
Cosmopolis between about 22:30 [and] 00:15.”   
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        Figure 11.2 Receipt for Cosmopolis DVD 
                                                  
*  *  * 
 
On the 02nd December 2012 I wrote in my diary, “I also scanned the 
Cosmopolis DVD cover [Figures 11.3a & 11.3b] along with the 
receipt from Sainsbury’s where I bought it - both sides of each 
item.” 
 
* * * 
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Figure 11.3a DVD (Front Cover) 
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Figure 11.3b DVD (Back Cover) 
   
*  *  * 
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In anticipation of beginning to write today, last night (Friday 03rd 
May 2013) I re-watched the Cosmopolis DVD.  
 
*  *  * 
 
Now (Monday 06th May 2013 16:46) I key in the handwritten text.  
Yesterday I watched the Cosmopolis DVD at double speed in order 
to find, and then transcribe, a number of quotes that I wanted to 
use in the forthcoming text.  I mention all these details to highlight 
the fact that many ‘now(s)’, ‘here(s)’, and ‘me(s)’ contribute to the 
production of this text.  And what one notices at a ‘point-in-time’ 
relates to the ecological matrix of that ‘moment’.  You will note that 
in what follows I will honour the singularity of each set of noticings, 
so as not to collapse distinct context-specificities into a seamless 
constructed unity. 
 
*  *  * 
 
Now (Saturday 04th May 2013, 16:10) I want to try something.  I 
have before me the two viewing-logs that I created in June 2012, 
whilst watching Cosmopolis in Leeds. I want to create a real-time 
‘composite-viewing-log’, [See chapter 4] now, as I read-through, 
and reflect on, what I wrote in June 2012.  I feel a bit tired,  having 
written a lot already today, but I feel inclined to push myself a bit to 
get this job done before I break for a meal.  This will entail reading 
through the viewing-logs that I produced back in June 2012, and 
noting what now seems salient, interesting, or, perhaps, 
problematic.  This process clearly relates to my current priorities 
and sensibility, which may differ from what seemed significant when 
originally producing the viewing-logs. 
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In what follows the non-italicized text derives from the viewing-log 
that I created whilst watching Cosmopolis on Saturday 16th June 
2012. The italicized text derives from the viewing-log that I created 
when I watched Cosmopolis, with my wife, on Monday 18th June 
2012.  In addition to creating the real-time viewing-logs, as I 
watched Cosmopolis, I also created (meta-) notes whilst re-reading 
each viewing-log after each respective cinema visit.  I will also use 
material from those meta-notes, as appropriate.   
 
*  *  * 
 
 Material derived from viewing-log created on Saturday 16th 
June 2012, Vue Cinema (Leeds Light Centre) 20:50 Screening 
of Cosmopolis [Non-italicised text]  
 Material derived from viewing-log created on Monday 18th 
June 2001, Vue Cinema (Leeds Light Centre) 18:10 Screening 
of Cosmopolis [Italicised text]  
 [Material added subsequently - set between square brackets] 
 
* * *  
 
Seat F9 - aisle seat - the only one with an embedded blue floor-
lamp nearby, that enabled me to consult my clock whilst creating 
my viewing-log. [My choice of seat related to me procuring 
sufficient ambient light to enable me to consult the digital clock that 
I took with me so I could record the times of my noticings.]  
 
21:04 A trailer for Chariots of Fire [1981] screened.  I think 
‘they’ have re-released it to capitalise on Olympics-fever. [The 
Olympic Games took place in London in 2012.]   When I worked at a 
salon near the Alhambra theatre, in Bradford, I once cut Ian 
Charleson’s hair - one of the stars of the movie Chariots of Fire.  He 
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appeared at the Alhambra in a play called Cat on a Hot Tin Roof.  
He wanted an American ‘flat top’ haircut - which I felt well-qualified 
to give him.  [Here you see me ‘associating’ with a dead celebrity. 
Charleson died of AIDS.] 
 
18:25  I tell my wife the Ian Charleson anecdote. 
 
21:05 A trailer for Killer Joe, directed by William Friedkin - the 
director of The Exorcist [1973].  [I subsequently bought Killer Joe 
on DVD. Here you can see me relying on the Friedkin ‘brand’ as an 
indicator of quality in relation to his latest movie offering.] 
 
♎ 18:27 Drinking Brecon Carreg spring water, bought in Leeds 
railway station en route to the cinema (£1.05).  A young woman, in 
Boots chemists complained when I accidently caught her with my 
umbrella. [Her confrontational attitude impacted, negatively, on my 
mood, somewhat.  Here you can see me identifying myself through 
my choice of beverage - you wouldn’t find me buying a regular Coke 
for example.] 
 
21:11 Certificate screen ‘15’.  The title sequence reminds me 
of Jackson Pollock’s style of drip painting and the soundtrack 
reminds me of a cross between the sound track of Cronenberg’s 
earlier film Crash and some tracks by the group U2. [Here you can 
see me finding points of comparison/reference in relation to my 
then-immediate sensing. This points to the human facility to recall 
previously-heard music, and to benchmark immediate perceptions 
against those recalled compositions.] 
 
18:31 My wife tells me that she wouldn’t have wanted to 
attend a Sunday night screening (i.e., the day before). We had 
discussed that possibility early on Sunday evening.  
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* * * 
 
[The movie has only just started, and already my wife has 
contributed some non-commercial communication that augmented 
whatever I noticed whilst watching the opening title sequence.  My 
whilst-movie-viewing experiencing most certainly included noticings 
from ‘outside’ of the movie.  How can I possibly call my-wife-
whispering-something-in-my-ear, a ‘consumption experience’?]  
 
* * * 
 
21:31 The main protagonist announces that he wants a haircut 
by saying, “We need a haircut”.  [I served an apprenticeship as a 
gentleman’s hairstylist.  This biographical fact triggers indistinct 
associations and encourages a degree of identification between me 
and the protagonist.]  
 
21:15 “[…] the phenomenon of reputation is a delicate thing; a 
person rises on a word and falls on a syllable.”   [I ‘grabbed’ the 
first half of this quote on Saturday and the second half on Monday 
18:36.] [Here (Nov., 2013) I feel reminded of recent instances of 
celebrities falling from grace in relation to cases of ‘historical sexual 
abuse’.] 
 
21:18 When asked why he has to go to the barbers shop 
rather than having a barber cut his hair in his office, the protagonist 
says, “The haircut has associations…”  [Phone rings as I produce 
these notes; I speak with my wife briefly before resuming work at 
16:36, Sunday 05th May 2013.]  “…  A calendar on the wall…” [Just 
as ‘interruptions’ occur as one watches a movie, so the process of 
writing entails all kinds of ‘distractions’.  However, we only call 
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these phenomena ‘interruptions’ and ‘distractions’ if we harbour an 
ideal (reference value) of focused ‘concentration’.]    
 
* * * 
 
 Protagonist: A haircut has what?  Associations.  A 
 calendar on the wall, mirrors everywhere.  There’s no barber 
 chair here, nothing swivels except the chair you’re in Shiner. 
 
* * * 
 
18:37 I notice that I HAVEN’T noticed the black dot on the 
screen that I HAD noticed on Saturday. [The ‘black dot’ comprised 
of an irregularity on the surface of the cinema screen, rather than a 
flaw in the movie per se.] 
 
21:20 The protagonist’s wife says to him, “I think you are 
dedicated to knowing.” 
 
* * * 
 
 Protagonist’s wife:  You know things; I think this is what 
 you do.  I think you’re dedicated to knowing. 
 
* * * 
 
♎ 21:20 I notice the protagonist’s security guard has eyes that 
look “fucked up” - as if he’s had too much drink/drugs. 
 
* * * 
 
 Protagonist: Any assault on the boarders of perception is 
 gonna seem rash at first. 
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* * * 
 
21:23 I notice the fish and chips digesting in my stomach. 
[Prior to travelling to Leeds on the train I had eaten fish and chips 
in the car park behind the Co-Op in Saltaire.] 
 
♎ 18:41 I notice my wife chewing gum. 
 
18:51 I feel thirsty - I drink some water 
 
*  *  * 
 
[As I read one of the Cosmopolis viewing-logs through now (Sunday 
05th May 2013) I wait for something to catch my eye.  Otherwise I 
would simply copy everything down. The process, then, entails 
‘reducing’ the ‘data’, since it involves abstracting salient-at-the-
point-of-reading-the-viewing-log noticings - just as the process of 
creating the viewing-log had, itself, entailed writing down salient-at-
the-point-of-movie-viewing noticings.]   
 
*  *  * 
 
[My wife just rang me again to supplement what she told me earlier 
- I resume work at 16:51, Sunday 06th May 2013.] 
 
* * * 
 
21:25 Protagonist having sex with Juliette Binoche’s character 
in his limo - I noted in my meta-notes (produced on 17th June 2012) 
that the screen-sex seemed “not convincing” and thus “un-erotic”. 
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♎ 21:26 A technical note - I noticed that one of the scenes 
looked more ‘grainy’.  In my meta-notes I qualified this by 
explaining what I meant by “grainy”, i.e., relating to an 
“inconsistency re image quality”. 
 
♎ 21:28 I noted, re Juliette Binoche, “not good legs”. [Relative to 
my own preference/taste] 
 
21:28 Protagonist and Binoche’s character discuss some of 
Mark Rothko’s paintings - the ones housed in ‘The Rothko Chapel’. 
Binoche’s character says, “[…] the Rothko Chapel belongs to the 
world.”  The protagonist retorts, “It’s mine if I buy it.”  [Thus they 
have a conversation about ownership, and art-works as 
commodities.] 
 
♎ 21:30 Binoche’s character says, “I miss things” - she doesn’t 
pick up on them - “I missed that - I miss a lot.”   [I noted this 
because it speaks to the notion of selective perception - something 
relevant to my thesis.  We leave things out when apprehending the 
worlds within and outside of us.  Furthermore, we leave thing out 
when we verbalize our non-verbal experiencing. Our representations 
omit certain details, and perhaps include details not present in the 
original referent. This links to Korzybski’s ‘Structural Differential’ 
Fig. 10.4, chapter 10.] 
 
21:37 Protagonist asks his doctor [The doctor has just got in 
the limo and started examining the protagonist], “What do we do 
about this?” - pointing to a mole on his left side - to which the 
doctor replies, “Let it express itself”.  [I guess I noticed this because 
it speaks to me of the body, itself, as expressive - quite apart from 
any human volition and conventional ‘communication’.]  The 
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[rubber-glove-wearing] doctor tells the protagonist, “Your prostate 
is asymmetrical”. 
 
21:39 I notice the veins in the security guard’s eyes - the one 
whose eyes looked rough earlier.  [This kind of detail does not show 
up on the scale of DVD viewing.] 
 
19:00 I notice the security-guard’s eyes again during Monday’s 
screening - dilated blood vessels. 
 
[I feel sensitive to this issue.  I use Optrex®   eye drop to manage 
the appearance of my own eyes - given all the reading and movie-
viewing that I do.  So you could call this one of my pet issues. In 
terms of my five regulable variables, this relates to regulating the 
‘level’ of eye-whiteness.] 
 
♎ 21:45 I notice a black dot on the screen - unfortunately.   [I 
began to notice it more forthwith.] 
 
21:47 I recognise the actress Samantha Morton - she acted in 
Spielberg’s Minority Report, as one of the psychics.   
 
19:04 I notice my wife looking across at me. 
 
[At 10:11 - whilst producing my meta-notes on Sunday 17th June 
2012 - my wife rang and talked about James Joyce’s Ulysses.  BBC 
Radio 4 had aired a series of programmes associated with Joyce’s 
book.] 
 
19:06 Guy in front of us laughs when the protagonist’s wife 
says he smells of “sexual discharge”. 
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* * * 
 
 Protagonist’s wife: It’s true you know, you do actually 
 reek of sexual discharge.  
 
* * * 
 
♎ 19:07 I saw the black dot for the first time. [I mean the first 
time during Monday’s screening.  You will note that I first saw the 
black dot during Saturday’s screening at ♎ 21:45 - see above.] 
 
♎ 19:09 I notice that Samantha Morton has clear eyes and 
“chunky calves”.  
 
21:52 Protagonist: “[…] we still want what we want - we want 
a haircut.” [I notice this repetition of one of the first statements 
that the protagonist makes at the start of the movie. When I first 
heard about the film Cosmopolis I registered the travelling-across-
New-York-to-get-a-haircut ‘plot’.  And with my history as a 
haircutter (and having enjoyed all of David Cronenberg’s films) this 
seemed a film for me.] 
 
19:17 I hear people behind me, to my left, talking.  
 
21:55 I notice the black dot again.   [This has nothing to do 
with the movie, and it distracts me from the movie momentarily.] 
 
♎ 21:56 Two young women walk out of the Vue cinema - the 
first people to walk out.  I notice that the naked female security 
guard, on screen, has “big round nipples”.  She has sex with the 
protagonist in a hotel.  [I feel somewhat stirred now (17:20 
Saturday 4th May 2013) envisaging the scene.]   
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22:00 I noticed the female security guard’s [Euphemism 
Warning] ‘derriere’ when she stood up.  [I could, of course, edit out 
these noticings - I have already diluted them - but I include them in 
the interests of a higher degree of phenomenological inclusiveness.] 
 
* * * 
 
 Protagonist: She notices herself, then other people notice 
 her.  Then she marries one of them and they go to dinner. 
 
 [The scene changes to the interior of a restaurant.] 
 
 P:   You’re wearing a […] cocktail dress. 
 
 Wife (of P.):  Yes. 
 
 P:    It’s navy blue. 
 
 W:   Yes. 
 
 P:   And that’s your silver […] jewellery. 
 
 W:   Yes it is. 
 
 P:   I’m noticing.  How was the play? 
 
 W:   I left at [the] intermission didn’t I?  
 
 P:   What was it about and who was in it?  I’m 
    making conversation.  […]  Look I’m trying 
    to make contact in the most ordinary ways.  
    To see and hear.  To notice your mood, your 
    clothes.  […]  This is good; were like people 
    talking.  Isn’t this how they talk? 
 
* * * 
 
[This snippet of dialogue felt so appropriate to me, since my PhD 
research relates strongly to the act of noticing. The protagonist 
notices himself noticing things about his wife; apparently ‘normality’ 
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seems alien to him. And, of course, I notice the protagonist noticing 
himself noticing his wife - and you, as reader, notice me noticing 
the protagonist noticing himself noticing his wife.]  
 
 
♎ 19:26 I notice the out-of-focus candles in the background of 
the restaurant scene. 
 
[At one point I noticed that the protagonist’s degree of beard 
stubble seemed to fluctuate between one shot and the next - even 
though all of the film’s action supposedly takes place, 
chronologically, during the same day.  This seemed like a continuity 
error.]   
 
19:27 I have a drink of water; my wife gestures to give her a 
drink. The plastic bottle crackles. [Whilst keying in the handwritten 
draft right now (00:10 Tuesday 07th May 2013) it occurs to me that 
whilst the on-screen husband and wife had their restaurant scene, 
my wife and I had our own little water-drinking scene in the ‘real 
world’.] 
 
22:07 Someone else walks out of the Vue cinema 
 
22:09 Protagonist says, “Why can’t I work up any curiosity on 
the subject?” - apparently thinking aloud.  
 
 
[Whilst creating my second set of Cosmopolis meta-notes, at home, 
(19 June 2012 at 12:00) the weekly fire-alarm-test sounds.] 
 
22:11 Another guy walks out of the Vue cinema. 
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19:32 My wife whispers, to me, that the protagonist has the 
facial features of a young Elvis. [I didn’t hear the word “Elvis” 
properly when she first said it, but I checked this detail with her at 
20:17, during the closing credit sequence.] 
 
* * * 
 
 Pie Thrower: I’m an action painter of creamed pies. 
 
* * * 
 
22:13 In my meta-notes I write a note to myself suggesting 
that I start each entry with the words, ‘I notice…’. 
 
22:22 Another guy, in denim, walks out of the Vue cinema - 
he returned a while later. 
 
22:23 I notice the markedly “inexpert” haircut given to the 
protagonist by the barber. Protagonist leaves the barber shop 
before the barber has finished the haircut.  Barber: “But both sides 
aren’t equal”. [Now, whilst producing the handwritten draft of the 
text ‘now’ before you, I make a link between the asymmetry of the 
haircut and the asymmetry of  the protagonist’s prostate, as flagged 
up during the medical check-up in the back of the limo earlier.] 
 
[Whilst creating my meta-notes the blue pen runs out, so I open a 
new pack of Bic® pens.  Commercial products and non-commercial 
goings-on occur in concert and contribute to full-blown 
‘experiaction’.  But why would the commercial discourse trump the 
non-commercial?  Why would I call a strip of experiaction a 
‘consumption experience’ when it so clearly comprises of a ragbag 
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mix of disparate constituent elements, both commercial and non-
commercial?] 
 
♎ 22:25 A scene outside of an underground garage triggers 
echoes, in me, of the earlier Cronenberg film Crash - about cars 
etc., and also Cronenberg’s  film Existenz  - which has a scene, with 
Willem Dafoe, set in an isolated garage. 
 
♎ 22:30 I notice that the protagonist looks very thin and, a bit 
later, I, again, notice the protagonist’s badly cut hair. 
 
22:39 Guy with checked shirt leave the Vue cinema. [He 
returns later.] 
 
♎ 22:40 I note that the movie [Cosmopolis] forms only a part of 
the three-dimensional ‘movie’ that I, concurrently, play a role in 
whilst viewing Cosmopolis.  As Aztec Camera (1990) put it, “Life’s a 
one-take movie”.    
 
22:41 Stalker: What does anyone imagine?  100 things a 
minute. 
19:58 Stalker:  Whether I imagine things or not, it’s real to 
me. [The last two quotes constitute one continuous quote, although 
I   ‘grabbed’ the two halves of the quote during each of my 2nd and 
3rd viewings of the movie at the Vue cinema.] 
 
♎ 20:03 I notice the black dot on the screen again.  [It remains 
there all the time, of course, but it stands out more to me at certain 
moments.] 
 
22:41 Protagonist says to Stalker: “You’re forcing me to be 
reasonable; I don’t like that.”    
 284 
 
* * * 
 
 [MNW. I’ve recently watched David Cronenberg’s latest 
 movie, Cosmopolis, three times. At one point the protagonist 
 says, something like, ‘You’re forcing me to be reasonable’ – I 
 feel that way towards you today.] 
 
 {{MBH. It’s a great day for feeling that way.}}  
 
    - Woodward and Holbrook (2013, pp. 341-
    342) 
 
[Here I highlight how a movie-text-noticing finds its way into an 
email exchange, which, in turn, became a journal article.] 
 
* * * 
 
20:11 I notice a handbag getting zipped behind me. [On 02nd 
May 2013 my wife and I went to Valley Parade to watch Bradford 
City lose 3-2 in the first leg of a play-off.  I heard coarse expletives 
coming from behind us that night. Whether one hears a handbag 
zipper or coarse expletives doesn’t alter the fact that those ‘noises’ 
augment the ‘vendor-produced entertainment offerings’ - the movie 
and the football match respectively.   The zipper and the expletives 
contributed to the goings-on in the three-dimensional settings in 
which we watched the movie and the football match respectively.  
These strike me as clear cases of the interweaving of commercial 
and non-commercial phenomena in relation to particular instances 
of momentary experiencing.] 
 
20:11   My wife looks at her watch - why? 
 
22:48 The stalker, like the protagonist, also has an 
asymmetrical prostate gland.  [Right now (01:18 Tuesday 07th May 
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2013) whilst keying in the penultimate (16th) page of the first hand-
written draft of this chapter, I recall something that the clothes 
maker Yohji Yamamoto - who I quoted in an earlier chapter - said.   
He finds asymmetry more beautiful than symmetry. He likes to 
subvert precision (my paraphrasing).]   
 
* * * 
 
 I think perfection is ugly.  Somewhere in the things humans 
 make, I want to see scars, failure, disorder, distortion.  If I 
 can feel those things in works by others, then I like them.  
 Perfection is a kind of order.  Like overall harmony, and so 
 on…  They are things someone forces onto a thing.  A free 
 human being does not desire such things.  And yet I get the 
 feeling there are a lot of women who do not seek freedom:
 women who wear symmetrical clothes. 
 
    - Yohji Yamamoto quoted in Washida (2002) 
 
* * * 
 
22:51 A guy from the row behind me leaves.  I look round and 
  have eye-contact with him.  Why does he leave so close 
  to the end of the movie? 
 
22:52 I notice the “music building” in intensity. [‘Levels’] 
 
20:15 Stalker: “I wanted you to save me”. 
 
22:55 End credits start.  I notice details from Mark Rothko 
paintings in end title sequence. 
 
20:16 My wife says, “These are Rothko paintings aren’t they?” 
I nod. 
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♎ 22:56 People leaving.  I notice the “Amazing big screen” - 
“immersive”. 
 
♎ 20:17 I say to my wife, “The opening sequence looked like 
[the work of Jackson] Pollock”.  She says to me, “Yes, I agree”; 
followed (at 20:18) by, “I thought you’d write that down.” 
 
22:58 Watching the end credits I notice Paul Elliot (Key 
Hairstylist). I wonder what he does from day to day - email him 
about the haircutting in the film? [I didn’t]  I make the following 
note, “I can’t [legally] record the film per se, but I can record my 
own noticings - they belong to me.” Staff guy comes in with ID 
round his neck.  Another guy follows with a bucket and brush. They 
start cleaning the cinema before the film’s end credits have finished 
- reasonable?        
 
♎ 20:19 My wife says to me, “Have you finished now?” I reply, 
“I’ve finished when the film has finished.” 
 
23:00  The film finished exactly on the hour. [Saturday 16th 
June 2012] I then had to run to catch the last train home that left 
Leeds at around 23:15. 
 
20:21 Film finished.  [Monday 18 June 2012]  I notice my 
wife’s stomach noises.   
 
* * * 
 
11.3 Discussion 
 
By adopting the model of ‘experiaction’, instead of the notion of 
‘consumption experiences’ I have rejected the explicitly-commercial 
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discourse, in favour of a more humanistic, person-centred, 
orientation.   Gould (1991, p. 195), when referring to consumption 
by ingestion, mentions “drinking an energy-giving vitamin drink”. 
Whilst Holt (1995, p. 10), when referring to associative 
consumption, discusses how, “A variety of [consumption] objects 
are often used as symbols to mark associations with ephemeral 
events.” However, the ‘consumption’ discourse begins to falter when 
we try to classify actions such as writing and painting as examples 
of consumption.  In my dialogue with Morris B. Holbrook, 
(Woodward and Holbrook 2013, p. 326) Morris writes, “I agree that 
almost any consumption experience entails an aspect of production 
as well.”  Why, then, settle for one or the other - or even a fusion of 
them in the form of ‘prosumption’ (Kotler 1986b)?  Why not drop 
the commercially-imbued binary opposition 
(production/consumption) and, instead, adopt the term 
‘experiaction’?   Von Eckartsberg (1978, p. 200) described 
experiaction as: 
 
 an interdependence-concept, a way of conceiving of the unity 
 of experience and action in any given instance of life lived 
 through, in any given situated human event.  
 
I embraced the cybernetic negative feedback loop because the 
model includes ‘experiencing’ and ‘action’ as parts of an integrated 
system. [Fig. 9.5, chapter 9]  The consumption concept has 
difficulty accommodating creative action.  The verb ‘to write’ doesn’t 
sit comfortably as a consumptive act. Pavey (2010, pp. 100-101) 
distinguishes between, “[v]erbs of consumption (eating, drinking, 
etc.) and verbs of creation (build, write, knit, etc.)”.  Similarly, 
Jackendoff (1996, p. 305) distinguishes between, “verbs of 
consumption and creation, for example […] a. Bill ate an apple. 
(consumption) b. Bill drew a circle. (creation)”.  Yes, writing and 
drawing involve the use of inscription instruments, and perhaps 
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paper, but surely, here, products support the overarching creative 
acts of writing and drawing?  It seems, to me, skewed to describe 
writing as an act of consumption, and even more skewed to 
describe one’s experiencing whilst writing as a ‘consumption 
experience’. Writing (or drawing etc.,) conceived as experiaction 
seems, to me, far more fitting.  Some artistic individuals have 
written about the creative process in terms which implicitly accord 
with a cybernetic negative feedback-loop model: 
 
 Lived experience, as it unfolds in consciousness, is a constant 
 process of correction.  Not a correction in the sense of right or 
 wrong or trying to record the true picture but correction in the 
 sense of adjusting the picture based on the perceived change 
 in the relationships between performers in a setting.  Every 
 stimulus attended to is a line of information added in the 
 drawing process; each pass of the recording medium is a new 
 layer that changes how the prior layers will contribute to an 
 overall perception of the picture.  As new impressions are 
 received, new pictures emerge. 
 
    - Ronai (1999, pp. 115-116) 
 
 You see, one has an intention, but what really happens comes 
 about in working - that’s the reason it’s so hard to talk about 
 it […]. And one’s instinct, whether right or wrong, fixes on 
 certain things that have happened in that activity of applying 
 the paint to the canvas.  I think an awful lot of creation is  
 made out of, also, the self-criticism of an artist […]. It’s really 
 a continuous question of the fight between accident and 
 criticism.  
 
    - Francis Bacon (Sylvester 2002, pp. 149, 
    121) 
 
 This process - of inspiration-creation-contemplation-
 judgement-and correction or approval - is repeated again and 
 again until the musical composition, or as the case may be 
 the painting, or statue, or work of one of the other arts, is 
 finished […].  
 
    - C. J. Ducasse (1964, p. 111) 
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The five regulable variables, that I identified in my ‘data reduction’ 
process, constitute the (abstract) phenomena that a person can act 
on whist experiacting.  S/he can regulate: ‘access’, ‘configuration’, 
‘levels’, ‘association’, and ‘expression’.  Some of these variables 
seem more ‘consumption-related’ than ‘creative’. ‘Access’, ‘levels’ 
and ‘association’, for example, may relate to paying to see staged 
events - like concerts and football matches (‘accessing’).  We pay to 
maintain a comfortable temperature in our homes (‘level-
managing’).  And we often pay to become physically associated with 
certain brands, via buying products such as clothes and cars 
(‘associating’). However, if we address the regulable variables of 
‘configuration’ and ‘expression’, then, we move towards processes 
of creative juxtaposition (‘configuring’) and the search for the 
means by which to articulate our phenomenological and cognitive 
goings-on (‘expressing’). It seems significant, to me, that people’s 
expressing can often take the form of paying for access, and paying 
to become associated with this-and/or-that product or service. If we 
express ourselves through acquiring, appropriating, and 
associating-with commercial phenomena, then expression becomes 
more consumptive. Similarly, if the regulable variable of 
‘configuration’ amounts to assembling commercial phenomena in 
‘personalised’ arrangements then, again, our creativity becomes 
product-bound, service-bound and thus more consumptive-leaning. 
 
By adopting a non-commercial discourse when discussing human 
goings-on [‘experiaction’ rather than ‘consumption’, ‘production’, or 
‘prosumption’] I wish to symbolically foreground human-being 
rather than commercial-being.  To embrace and employ ‘consumer-
speak’ encourages us to view life as an unending-until-death series 
of ‘consumption experiences’. Holbrook (1995, p. 101), for example 
writes: 
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 People get up in the morning, start consuming the moment 
 their toes touch the carpet, allocate their time to various 
 consumption activities throughout the day, and continue 
 consuming until they finally drift off to sleep at night, after 
 which they confine their consumption mostly to dreams, 
 pajamas, and bed linens. 
 
You will note that the very term ‘consumption experience’ [an 
abstract noun] reifies the process of ‘experiencing’ [a verb]. 
(Roberts 1941, p. 543) invites us to: 
 
 […] consider experience, in all its forms, not as a thing to be 
 denoted properly by a noun but as an activity or process that 
 can not without serious error be arrested and fixed in the 
 immobility of a substantive but must be denoted by a verb. 
 
Roberts continues (1941, pp. 543-544): 
 
 The outcome of viewing experience as process will be that we 
 shall be compelled to deny the reality of mental contents of 
 any kind - of sensations, percepts, ideas, or data. We shall be 
 obliged to deny them for the reason that nouns by their very 
 nature and function conceal the fact that to experience - to 
 sense, to perceive, or to conceive - is to act. The mind is an 
 agent. Its essence is activity. If we freeze its activities into 
 things to be denoted by nouns, we must provide for the 
 "things" a location and a status. It is common to speak of 
 them as "in mind." Such a spatial description, however, is 
 metaphorical. It seems to me a bad metaphor, confusing and 
 misleading. The mind is not a container. It is, I would repeat, 
 an agent. 
 
We often find marketers promising us ‘the experience of a life-time’, 
or ‘a memorable experience’.  But as Vargo and Lusch (2008, p. 7) 
tell us, “The enterprise cannot deliver value, but only offer value 
propositions”.  Later (p. 9) they write: 
 
 “Value is always uniquely and phenomenologically determined 
 by the beneficiary” […]. Note, however, that we chose the 
 word “phenomenological” rather than “experiential.” This is 
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 partly because of the fact that we have found when many 
 people encounter the term “experience,” it often invokes 
 connotations of something like a “Disneyworld event.” Of 
 course, the word experience has several other meanings as 
 well, including previous interaction. However, to the extent 
 that the word experience is intended in a phenomenological 
 sense, we are comfortable with the terms being used 
 interchangeably, as we have done on a number of occasions. 
   
 
Thus ‘value is always uniquely and experientially determined by the 
beneficiary’. A vendor cannot sell us ‘experiences’ or provide us with 
‘value’ per se.  We author our own momentary experiaction, 
perhaps employing ‘value propositions’ provided by vendors.  
However, I contend (supported by my Vue-cinema-visits and 
viewing-logs) that my moment-to-moment experiencing - both at 
the cinema and whilst subsequently writing about the cinema visits 
- derives from multiple and diverse ‘value propositions’, originating 
from both commercial and non-commercial sources.  The manifold 
triggers and stimuli which contribute to my/our experiaction 
emphatically don’t all derive from vendor’s offerings.  Yet it doesn’t 
have quite the same ‘ring’ to say, ‘Roll-up! Roll-up! Come and buy 
your experiencing’.  And you know why?  Because our experiencing 
already belongs to us; marketers can’t logically sell us what already 
belongs to us. At most, marketers can promise us value 
propositions that will induce, in us, a mode of experiencing that we 
value/want.  Successful offerings, then, more-often-than-not (in a 
target audience) enable the audience to achieve a mode of 
experiencing not readily achievable without the offering in question. 
 
By accepting and employing the term ‘consumption experience’ we   
acquiesce to the deep colonization of human being by the logic and 
discourse of commercialism.  If even our moment-to-moment 
experiencing gets branded as ‘consumption experience’ then the 
logic of commercialism has got us inside and out.  Our subjectivity 
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has, nominally at least, become a product-like ‘thing’ prized by 
market researchers.  And to try to use the term ‘consumption 
experience’ only in relation to commercial phenomena also proves 
problematic as I have shown in this chapter.  
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Chapter 12: Discussion and Theory Development 
 
12.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I will summarise my five data themes and exemplify 
them with some of my ‘noticings’ discussed over the last six 
chapters.  In and amongst, and particularly at the end of the 
chapter, I will posit a customised version of the cybernetic negative 
feedback loop which models the underlying dynamics that account 
for the process of ‘experiaction’.  I will argue that this model offers 
a fruitful alternative to the notion of ‘consumption experiences’. 
 
12.2 Some Background 
 
Over five years ago I set out, in good faith, to study ‘consumption 
experiences’.  However, in the course of reviewing the relevant 
literature I became increasingly convinced that my, then, ‘object’ of 
study amounts to nothing more than a re-branding of everyday 
human experiencing.  I initiated an email exchange with Morris B. 
Holbrook (Woodward and Holbrook 2013), one of the founders of 
‘consumption-experience’-related research, in which I aired some of 
my misgivings about the use of the term ‘consumption experience’.  
During that email exchange Morris conceded that the term 
‘consumption experience’ does indeed serve to legitimise the study 
of subjective experience within the domain of consumer research.  
For example, Morris wrote (Woodward Holbrook 2013, p. 342) that 
he didn’t know what I planned to do in the future, but:   
 
 If the answer resembles ‘‘consumer researcher in a business 
 school,’’ then I would encourage you not to strip your work of 
 its consumption-related associations. Call this a money-
 grubbing career-oriented recommendation or whatever you 
 want. But in this day and age of running the university 
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 according to a ‘‘business model,’’ I think you’ll find that 
 various deans and school administrators will be all too curious 
 to know how your work contributes to the bottom line. I have 
 gone about as far as I think it is humanly possible to go in 
 distancing myself from real-world business concerns. If you 
 go even farther and claim that you don’t even want to focus 
 on consumers, I think that you may have trouble finding a 
 comfortable home in the business-school community. To 
 repeat, I am not expressing my own feelings in this matter. 
 Rather, I am trying to describe what I perceive to be the 
 feelings of those around me. If you feel that all this means 
 that the university has abandoned its academic values, I 
 agree wholeheartedly. But there’s a reality out there that we 
 need to face. Sad but, I think, true.   
 
Similarly, Stephen Gould - author of the edgy (1991) paper in which 
he discussed manipulating his “perceived vital energy” through 
“product use” and/or “nonconsumption activities” - replied to an 
email I sent him thus8: 
 
 Suppose I were a professor in management or political 
 science, it is very possible that I might speak of management 
 or political experiences as part of my academic discourse. But 
 I would also still have this additional perspective on 
 experience or whatever we might label it.  
 
I think I can fairly interpret this as Gould saying, indirectly, that, as 
a professor in marketing, he will very possibly speak of 
‘consumption experiences’ as part of his academic discourse, whilst 
still having an additional perspective on experience.  Here we see 
two prominent marketing academics discussing the way in which 
they employ marketing-domain-specific vocabulary of ‘consumers’ 
and ‘consumption experiences’ whilst also alluding to resisting a 
whole-hearted embrace of commercialism.  Indeed Gould wrote, as 
part of the email exchange just cited, “I largely agree with what you 
are saying in terms of commercial colonization”.   This in reply to 
what I had written to Gould, “I don’t want to allow my ‘experiences’ 
                                                 
8 Gould, S. J. (2012), Email to M. N. Woodard, “Re: Your Views?”, 23/05/12. 
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to become ‘consumption experiences’ as I feel that this accedes to 
the colonisation of the human realm by the commercial realm.” 
 
Even before the correspondence just cited, I had a choice to make. 
I either expediently upheld the discursive convenience of the term 
‘consumption experience’, or I faced the uncertain implications of 
re-positioning the notion of consumption as a contributor to full-
blown human experiencing, rather than accepting consumption as  
the nominal prime mover.  The seeds of this alternative conception 
already existed in the existential-phenomenological philosophy that 
I had gravitated towards.  One particular (already mentioned) idea 
caught my attention. Moss (1978, p. 86) writes: 
 
 Perception and action are usually studied in isolation from one 
 another. Yet, both neurologically and at the level of human 
 action in lived-space, we discover that they are intertwined.  
 To be underway in some action is to organize our perception 
 towards some object, and inversely, to perceive a situation in 
 the world is to be invited into active involvement in that 
 situation.  With every step forward, our view of the situation 
 is adjusted; with every adjustment in our view, we are invited 
 to step forward anew. Merleau-Ponty has called this 
 continuous interplay between man and his world a dialectic. 
 In this dialectic between man and his world it is difficult to 
 distinguish strictly between perception and action […]. 
 
 
Here we see perception and action posited as inseparable aspects of 
one integrated process.  Thus the actions of human beings serve to 
modify that which they subsequently perceive.  Rolf von 
Eckartsberg’s term ‘experiaction’ (1978, p. 200-201) offers an 
alternative to the commercially-imbued term ‘prosumption’ (Kotler 
1986b).  Thus instead of ‘production’ and ‘consumption’ combining 
to form ‘prosumption, we have ‘experience’ and ‘action’ combining 
to form ‘experiaction’.  I felt frustrated when it seemed that 
‘consumer researchers’ simply married the term ‘consumption’ to an 
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existing term ‘experience’ and by doing so created a domain-
relevant ‘object of study’ even though nothing but the name had 
changed. I sought to clarify this exact point during my 
correspondence with Morris Holbrook (Woodward and Holbrook 
2013, p. 327) when I wrote: 
 
 So, to put a fine point on it: Can we use the terms ‘full-blown, 
 moment-to-moment, human experience(s)’ and ‘consumption 
 experience(s)’ synonymously? If the issue simply hinges on 
 labelling, then I can rest easy. 
 
To which Morris replied, “Yes! I do believe that ANY sort of 
experience is a ‘consumption experience.’”  So, as I argued in my 
literature review, some parts of the marketing, and consumer 
research literature gave me license to treat human interaction, 
itself, as a legitimate topic to study within consumer research, 
providing I employed terms such as ‘consumer’, ‘consumption 
experience’, and ‘product(s)’ in my accounts.  Yet to characterize 
human relations in this way seemed problematic; ‘human being’ 
begins to play second fiddle to (nominal) ‘commercial being’.  To 
paraphrase what I wrote to Gould (re footnote, p 294), if we call all 
human experience ‘consumption experience’, then we have acceded 
to the colonization of the human realm by commercial-speak.  And 
whilst I could take some solace from the fact that I need only 
employ this vocabulary when donning my ‘consumer researcher’ 
hat, I didn’t feel that I wanted to give continuity to this politically-
moot practice.   
 
So I embarked on a series of video-recorded conversations with a 
view to exploring how a field-theoretical, phenomenologically-
informed orientation might provide an alternative way of 
characterizing human experience and action whilst still under the 
auspices of ‘consumer research’.  Instead of accepting the existing 
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terminology I chose, from the outset, to reject the ‘consumption 
experience(s)’ label. By adopting von Eckartsberg’s term 
‘experiaction’ as my starting point, I began talking with research 
volunteers, whilst video-recording the conversations.  It seems 
obvious that what people notice, from moment to moment, 
constitutes an important existential fact.  As a co-constituting 
aspect of a 360°-‘inner’-‘outer’-‘field’, a person may momentarily 
alight on any salient-to-him/her goings-on, anywhere in that ‘field’.  
These ‘noticings’ relate to phenomena attended to - whatever 
catches a person’s eye, ear, nose, tongue, or haptic sense. 
Additionally, a person may think and feel ‘inner’-directedly, without 
focusing on tangible phenomena.  Thus whilst conversing with 
research volunteers I followed my own noticings and, to the limits 
of my subjective sense of ‘appropriateness’ - a value-judgment 
informed by (culture-specific and ‘epoch-specific) social mores and 
ethical norms - I participated in the flow of emergent conversations.  
Importantly, I didn’t set out to answer any pre-determined, 
product-related, questions during the research conversations; 
instead I viewed each research conversation as a living example of 
inter-experiaction - two people experiencing and acting/behaving 
together.  The video recordings, then, constituted representations of 
the kind of human activity that, according to some, we could readily 
classify as ongoing self-marketing, and ‘consumption experiences’, 
but which I chose to think of as inter-experiaction.  
 
* * * 
 
Having conducted the ten video-recorded conversations I found 
myself with around 18½-hours-worth of audio-visual ‘data’.  
Applying the notion of ‘noticings’, I set out to systematically 
document what I noticed whilst watching the audio-visual 
recordings.  Since, as suggested earlier, I may notice any aspect(s) 
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of the 360°-‘inner’-‘outer’-‘field’, that I co-constitute, at any point in 
space-time, I saw the audio-visual data as just one (albeit 
significant) aspect of a larger encompassing data-viewing ‘field’.  
Thus, whilst watching recordings of research conversations, I may 
have noticed something ‘within’ myself, as well as something on the 
monitor screen.  Through a process of progressively documenting 
my noticing, I eventually ended up with the set of keywords which 
encapsulated a synthesis of my most salient noticings, written 
whilst viewing (twice) all of the ten audio-visual recordings. 
 
Another person following the same procedure of ‘data reduction’ 
would, almost certainly, have arrived at a different set of keywords.  
I thus make no claims regarding the repeatability of the process in 
terms of the manifest results.  However, the process provides a 
structured way of distilling one’s own noticings in order to arrive at 
a list of key-to-noticer terms.  My list of keywords, dominated by 
the term ‘homeostasis’ (and related terms), served as a starting 
point which led me - through related further reading - to the theory 
which would inform the creation of the five themes of: ‘access’, 
‘configuration’, ‘levels’, ‘association’, and ‘expression’. As I   
researched the concept of homeostasis it became clear to me that 
the cybernetic negative feedback loop provides the theoretical 
grounds for employing the existential-phenomenological notion of 
‘experiaction’ as a replacement for the term ‘consumption 
experience(s)’.  
 
12.3 The Cybernetic Negative Feedback Loop 
 
The cybernetic negative feedback loop (Fig. 12.1, below) brings 
together, in one unified model, both the experiential (perception) 
with the actional (output) aspects of human being.  The list of 
keywords that I had assembled chimed with this cybernetic model, 
 299 
although, at the time that I produced the keywords, I had not 
encountered the model.  Starting with this rudimentary diagram I 
began to think of human beings as perceiving and behaving beings 
who, at any point in time, ‘hold’ certain ‘reference values’ - which 
we may think of as his/her existing ‘infrastructure’ of accumulated, 
gleaned-from-living, ‘knowledge’, including what s/he prefers, 
expects, desires, etc.  Powers (2005, p. 65) defines the term 
‘reference value’ succinctly: 
 
 This reference condition is exactly what is meant by a goal, 
 and the fact that it is not connected to any observable 
 physical phenomenon is what caused behaviorists to reject 
 the notion of goal-directed behavior.  
 
Elsewhere Powers (2005, pp. 68, 69) refers to the “reference 
signal”, and the “reference level” respectively - the former used in 
Fig. 12.1. 
 
The negative feedback model invites us to visualize a process in 
which a current perception gets benchmarked against a person’s 
pre-existent reference signal/value(s). 
  
Figure 12.1 Basic Control-System Unit of Behavioral 
Organization, Powers (1973, p. 352) 
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This benchmarking process results in either a no-action-required 
‘signal’ or a must-take-action ‘error signal’.  In a nutshell, if the 
incoming perception more-or-less matches the reference value(s) 
then a person’s perception accords with what s/he expects/would 
prefer/desires [his/her goal state]. If, instead, his/her current 
perceiving fails to accord with his/her reference value(s), then the 
resulting ‘error signal’ drives action/behaviour calculated to alter the 
environmental (or inner-self) goings-on, in order to bring about a 
subsequent-to-behaviour-perception more in line with the person’s 
reference signal/value(s).  I have included this diagram mainly so 
that the reader can compare it to the customised version of the 
diagram that I developed (Fig. 12.2).  I will give a fuller explanation 
of the specifics of the diagram at that point in the text. 
 
12.4 The Five Regulable Variables 
 
From this basic negative feedback model, then, I saw how I might 
structure my data analysis chapters. In particular, the five regulable 
variables, (‘access’, ‘configuration’, ‘levels’,  ‘association’, and 
‘expression’), that I developed from my keywords, constitute the 
phenomena that a person may act on as s/he seeks to control 
his/her perceiving relative to his/her goal-states or ‘reference 
signal/value(s)’.   
 
12.4.1 Access 
Starting with ‘access’, then, I showed that individuals can, and do, 
regulate what enters certain controlled bounded spaces, whether 
(a) architectural,   (b) pertaining to the human body itself, or (c) 
relating to various ‘texts’ such as this thesis.   Thus, the desire to 
secure exclusive, undisturbed access to research rooms led me to 
manage access to those rooms. I did this through availing myself of 
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the room-booking system, and by using my activated student card 
to lock the room whenever I left it during my tenure.  I also posted 
a sign outside the door, indicating, “QUIET PLEASE RESEARCH IN 
PROGRESS”.   Similarly, if we view the human body, itself, as a 
container of sorts, then we can also, by degree, manage (or try to 
manage) what gains access to our inner cavities.  Reference values 
such as ‘I want to remain/become slim’ will (perhaps) inform how a 
person acts, and what s/he permits to cross the threshold into 
his/her stomach.  However, the desire to eat the cake, for example, 
may trump the desire to remain slim, in which case conflicting 
reference value(s) jostle for satisfaction - manifesting, perhaps, in a 
sense of ambivalence within the person at this (hypothetical) choice 
point.  In the case of texts, too, we may, for example, view a piece 
of writing as a container to which we can add (and from which we 
can remove) material.  I suggested, therefore, that in regulating 
access to rooms, bodies, and ‘texts’, a person exercises degrees of 
control over what s/he perceives relative to his/her reference values 
or goal states.  In these examples the reference values comprise, 
respectively, of wanting (a) exclusive, undisturbed access to 
suitably-equipped rooms, (b) wanting to become/remain slim, whilst 
also wanting sensory gratification, and (c) wanting to produce an 
academically valid piece of work.  One may, then, act on the 
environment (and/or on the ‘inner’-self) when one perceives one or 
other of these goal-states slipping from one’s grasp.  Had noise 
levels outside the research room reached problematic proportions - 
in terms of disturbing the audio-visual recording - then I would have 
taken remedial action.  Research volunteers availed themselves of 
drinks of water, but only Bridie (conversation No. 4) ate (some 
apple pieces) during the research conversation.  I suggest that, by-
and-large, eating during a research conversation falls outside of 
what one would expect.  Similarly, if I notice a lapse in the 
measured tone of my writing - say an inappropriate instance of 
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unsubstantiated hyperbole - then I will replace the offending 
material with something more consistent with the overarching tone.   
 
12.4.2 Configuration 
By configuring: (a) physical spaces, (b) our self-presentation, and 
(c) ‘textual’ objects, for example, it becomes possible to ensure that 
what we perceive, accords with (by degree) what we feel constitute 
appropriate, desirable, or expected configurations, at a given 
juncture.  As a researcher I had certain preconceptions (reference 
values) as to what a research setting ‘should’ look like.  My 
preparatory setting-up of the rooms, then, proceeded in a manner 
informed by certain aesthetic and functional criteria. I benchmarked 
the starting state of a room against these reference values and 
invariably found a mismatch between the actual state and what I 
wanted.  I continued to re-configure each room until it accorded, 
more-or-less, with my reference value(s).  When Alia (conversation 
No. 1), a senior lecturer, noted that the room looked professionally 
set up, she corroborated my own sense of what a research room 
‘should’ look like.  Similarly, as a researcher, one dresses 
‘appropriately’ for the role.  McCracken (1988, p. 26) suggests that, 
“A certain formality in dress, demeanor, and, speech is useful 
because it helps the respondent cast the investigator in the role of a 
‘scientist’”.  Irrespective of whether one aspires to a ‘scientific’ 
persona, [I don’t] a researcher, minimally, wants to project an air of 
competence, and to this end s/he will present him/her-self in a 
(culture-specific) manner commensurate with this goal. One may 
think of this as a configuring of one’s own physical appearance and 
conduct.  Research volunteers must also configure themselves in 
the light of the on-camera research initiative.  In particular, Paul 
(conversation No. 8) dressed in a dapper fashion and admitted to 
having made something of an effort to dress fittingly. And Matt 
(conversation No. 6) discussed having thought about his choice of 
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clothes, given the nature of the research context, namely, the 
video-recording, and the academic setting.  Apart from research-
specific considerations regarding self-presentation, I suggest that, 
at a more fundamental level, human beings adhere to codes of 
personal hygiene and context-specific conduct which guide 
preparatory bathroom habits, and modes of dress in relation to 
social occasions.  Thus even before ‘performers’ step out onto on 
the research ‘stage’, they have spent time in their ‘dressing rooms’ 
physically and psychologically preparing for the ‘performance’.  I 
have also addressed how, for example, written texts lend 
themselves to reconfiguration, such that a writer may ‘polish’ a text, 
over time, to bring it into line with what s/he aspires to. 
 
12.4.3 Levels 
The regulable variable of ‘levels’ pertains to: (a) micro-
environmental  phenomena such as   lighting levels, heating levels, 
and sound/volume levels; (b) intra-personal levels, such as  
hydration, body heat, and levels of self-esteem; and (c) the levels 
of, say, grammatical accuracy, tonality, and word count within a 
created text.  When preparing research rooms for use I managed 
the amount of light entering the rooms, commensurate with the 
screening of the pre-conversation movie therein.  Similarly, when 
the lights automatically went out, intermittently, during some 
research conversations, I immediately acted to reinstate the light 
level.  I adjusted the volume level of the DVD player so that I 
screened the pre-conversation movie at a comfortable level.  Each 
participant sipped form the bottle of water that I had provided - 
with the exception of Ruby who brought her own soft drink - 
thereby managing their respective level of hydration and vocal 
lubrication. When Paul (conversation No. 8) felt cold, he remedied 
the situation by putting on his winter jacket.  On another occasion I 
contacted the School of Management ‘Estates’ department to try to 
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have the room temperature raised.   And when I felt slighted, after 
Matt described something I’d said as “sloppy”, (conversation No. 6) 
I sought to assuage my wounded pride by exploring, with Matt, the 
ins and outs of what I’d said.  Matt gave his perspective, explaining 
his rationale for using the term “sloppy”.  Thus we can see, in these 
brief examples, how people monitor the existing state-of-play and 
if/when a particular monitored ‘level’ drops below (or exceeds) what 
one would prefer/expect/desire etc., then the negative feedback 
model predicts that people will mobilize - acting in ways calculated 
to effect the desired change in his/her subsequent-to-corrective-
action perceiving.  You will note that the regulable variables that I 
have identified constitute abstractions from the rough and tumble of 
lived complexity.  Paul’s putting on of his winter coat to maintain his 
body-temperature, for example, occurred concurrently with me 
closing a window in pursuit of the same objective.  And the action I 
took to restore the room’s lighting (after it had switched itself off 
automatically) coincided with my seeking to reassure the research 
volunteer who seemed perturbed by the lights having abruptly gone 
off.  Thus separating regulable variables into five discrete categories 
belies the fact that in ‘real life’ one may concurrently regulate 
across all of the categories.  For example, in relation to keying in 
these very words, I made sure that I ate before starting work - 
allowing food to enter my body, (‘access’) and concomitantly 
maintaining my energy (‘levels’).   I arranged my chair, script, and 
anglepoise lamp - securing ergonomically suitable working 
conditions (‘configuration’) - as well as configuring the text per se. I 
adjusted the level of heat within the room, to counteract the cold 
(‘levels’).  I ensure that the style of prose that I produce accords 
with what I feel happy to become associated with (‘association’). 
And I decide which existential-phenomenological facts I share and 
which I withhold (‘expression’).   
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12.4.4 Association 
When conversing during research conversations, participants 
(including me) mentioned: other people, places, organisations, 
‘objects’, ideas, and the like.  This selective mentioning of particular 
phenomena facilitates both the associating with and dissociating 
from the phenomena mentioned. Thus, in criticising the artistry of 
the cartoon-style drawing featured in the pre-conversation movie, 
Alia (conversation No. 1) dissociated herself (aesthetically) from a 
certain style of drawing and mentioned (associated with) the work 
of other artists whose work she admired.  Similarly, by buying a 
Panasonic® digital video-recorder with which to document the 
research conversations, I thus became associated with a reputable 
brand.  This association helped to reduce concerns I had regarding 
the equipment letting me down by failing to deliver the requisite 
audio-visual quality that I hoped for.  I noted that the very location 
of the research, within the new wing of the School of Management, 
lent a degree of kudos to my project.  To have reached the stage of 
actually conducting research I had gone through extensive 
selection/vetting, training, preliminary research, and ethics-
approval processes.  Thus the entire research project, occurring as 
it did within a credible institution, benefited from this association 
with quality.  So, the processes of association and dissociation, 
together, constitute regulable variables that a person may 
manipulate in the course of conducting a research project.  What, 
who, and where a person becomes associated with (and/or 
distances him/her-self from) thus serves to indicate [whether 
honestly or falsely], both to self and others, what the 
associating/dissociating individual prefers/values, and feels averse 
to.   
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12.4.5 Expression 
Finally, in this round-up of the five regulable variables, I come to 
‘expression’.  A person will choose to mention certain information 
whilst choosing to withhold other information (Goffman 1959 pp. 
57-128). I argued that prevailing (epoch-specific and culture-
specific) norms inform which information people feel at liberty to 
share.  Bauman (2007, p. 3), for example, writes about today’s: 
 
 […] confessional society - a society notorious for effacing the 
 boundary which once separated the private from the public, 
 for making it a public virtue and obligation to publically 
 expose the private, and for wiping away from public 
 communication anything that resists being reduced to private 
 confidences, together with those who refuse to confide them.   
 
To have publically declared one’s homosexual orientation, in the 
middle of the 20th century, would have resulted in even more fuss 
than a similar coming-out engenders nowadays. The internalized 
‘reference values’ that a person holds, covertly contribute  to a 
complex ‘calculation’ which determines what s/he expresses and 
what s/he withholds, in a given context.  I showed how research 
volunteers, such as Ruby (conversation No. 3) and Matt 
(conversation No. 6), overtly cited reference values relating to 
academic practice as warrant for, in Ruby’s case, a higher-than-
usual-for-her degree of self-revelation, and, in Matt’s case, his 
more-critical-than-usual appraisal of my “sloppy” expression.  Here, 
then, the operative ‘reference value’ functions in a manner akin to 
the way that ‘wearing a particular hat’ does.  According to Edward 
de Bono (2004, p. 93), “Hats are used to indicate roles - ‘Wearing 
my police hat / my parent hat’ and so on.”  Thus, with their, 
respective, ‘academic-research-volunteer’ hats on, Ruby and Matt 
felt at liberty to say things that, had they donned, say, their 
‘socialising’ hats, they may not have said.  You will note that, 
collectively, the five regulable variables provide a checklist, of sorts, 
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which enables one to enumerate the various phenomena that 
people may control (wittingly and/or unwittingly) in the course of 
seeking to actualise their goal-states or ‘reference values’. 
 
12.5 Field Theory and Data 
 
The process of data analysis, for me, became more complicated on 
account of the pervasive reach of a field-theoretical, 
phenomenologically-informed orientation. In particular, I 
approached the watching of audio-visual recordings of research 
conversations from the same field theoretical, phenomenologically-
informed perspective that I had assumed when conducting the 
research conversations themselves.  Consequently, with my field-
theoretical, phenomenologically-informed ‘hat on’, I felt at liberty - 
indeed I felt it incumbent on me - to document whatever  I noticed, 
during data analysis, whether research-recording-related or not.  
The key question thus became/becomes: Whilst conducting 
research in a field-theoretical, phenomenologically-informed 
manner, does one seek to restrict one’s  noticings to those parts of 
the ‘field’ which relate to the research conversations, or does one 
allow oneself a more free-ranging mode of noticing?  It seems 
unquestionable that, as a field-theoretical, phenomenologically-
informed researcher, I would have my  sensory ‘solar panels’ wide 
open, to register whatever I had the capacity to notice whilst, say,  
in the company of a research text, such as an audio-visual 
recording.  I think this particular issue has accounted for much of 
the ambivalence that I have felt around the process of ‘data 
analysis’.  Furthermore, I think this issue also goes to the heart of 
my challenging the notion of ‘consumption experiences’.  I will try to 
explain. 
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If one identifies a particular phenomenon as one’s object of 
consumption (such as a movie or a portion of fish and chips) then 
one can easily fall into the trap of going in search of the experience 
dedicated to [or caused by] those designated consumed objects.  
My whole problematization of the notion of ‘consumption 
experiences’ stems from the fact that a specified consumption 
object does not solely give rise to whatever we think, feel and do 
whilst consuming ‘it’.  If, whilst eating fish and chips, one listens to 
a radio broadcast, and thinks about, say, one’s impending thesis-
submission-deadline, then we can’t rightly describe that full-blown 
experiencing as an ‘eating-fish-and-chips’ experience.  We could, at 
a stretch, talk in terms of an, eating-fish-and-chips-whilst-listing-to-
the-radio-and-thinking-about-submitting-one’s-thesis experience.  
But in doing so we then have to decide whether we can rightly 
‘bundle in’ the non-commercial component of the experiencing - in 
the case of this example, the thesis-submission-deadline thinking - 
under the rubric of a ‘consumption experience’. 
 
If we apply this same mode of thinking to data analysis, then, we 
may identify the audio-visual recordings - of a series of research 
conversations - as our ‘objects of study’ - our ‘data’ if you like.  In 
this way we implicitly expect the data analyst to focus on the 
designated data/object.  But if one embarks on the process of data 
analysis wearing a ‘field-theoretical-phenomenologist’ ‘hat’, then, to 
limit one’s noticings to designated-object-noticings breaks with the 
very perspective one claims to assume.  If one’s  360°-‘inner’-
‘outer’-‘field’ constitutes one’s only source of existential evidence 
(as I believe it does), and if one purports to want to study 
experiaction in the full-blown, all-encompassing sense, then, surely 
one must report on salient-to-self parts of that 360°-‘inner’-‘outer’-
‘field’?  And yet, that ‘field’ comprises of a whole host of goings-on 
which extend beyond data-in-the-sense-of-a-designated-object.  I 
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hope that I have expressed this in a way that carries over to the 
reader.  But just to make sure - given the importance of this point 
to my argument - I will reiterate the point using different words. 
 
If one identifies a particular phenomenon as an object of 
consumption - for example a television programme -  then one may 
go in search of people’s (or one’s own) experience(s) of that 
programme.  What did people like about the programme?   What, in 
the programme, would they have liked to change?  What did they 
think about the costumes, and the quality of the acting?  In short, 
once we have identified the object of consumption, then we may go 
in search of noticings dedicated to that object - or perhaps people’s 
‘consumption experiences’ of that ‘product’. 
 
I approach this whole question from a different perspective.  If one 
starts from a field-theoretical perspective, then, only the field-
embedded individual can say to what extent a particular 
phenomenon monopolized his/her attention/consciousness.  Only a 
field-embedded individual can say just what occupied him/her as 
s/he ostensibly watched a TV programme.  To designate a particular 
experience as a ‘TV-programme-viewing’ experience, just because a 
person and a TV programme become juxtaposed in space-time, 
misses the fact that a person’s experiencing comprises of whichever 
particulars become foregrounded in his/her consciousness from 
moment to moment.  This full-blown experiencing may, indeed, 
have a high measure of TV-programme-relatedness, but a person’s 
momentary experiencing doesn’t owe its entire existence to the TV 
programme.  Minimally a perceived TV programme comes into 
contact with the viewer’s psychological infrastructure. This 
‘encounter’ sets in motion his/her associative and/or dissociative 
tendencies in relation to the perceived programme.  Furthermore, 
the particulars of the viewer’s embodied state, as s/he watches a 
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programme, will contribute to the overall state a person finds 
him/her-self in. 
 
In the previous, Cosmopolis, chapter, by documenting, in a field-
wide manner, my noticings recorded during, and in relation to, two 
cinema visits, I showed that the film Cosmopolis constituted just 
one, albeit important, aspect of the 360°-‘inner’-‘outer’-‘field’ 
comprising my contextualized, embodied, whilst-viewing-a-movie 
scenario.  To call my experiencing and acting/behaving - whilst 
watching a movie - a ‘consumption experience’ implicitly posits the 
movie as the object that I consumed and which sponsored my 
whilst-watching-the-movie experience.  This version of events 
means that any extra-to-movie noticings get rounded-up and 
roped-in to the overarching movie-viewing experience.  Arguably, 
this co-opts whatever comes from outside of movie-relatedness and 
nominally groups it under the movie-viewing ‘consumption 
experience’ rubric. 
 
A more nuanced description of the movie-viewing ‘field’ might 
acknowledge the mobility of a person’s attentiveness, and may thus 
acknowledge the non-movie-related noticings and actions that co-
constitute a person’s full-blown whilst-movie-viewing experiaction.  
However, seen from a product-centric perspective, because the 
term ‘product’ has become so potentially broad in its applicability 
[see section 2.2.1 of this thesis] then anything that one alights on 
whilst watching a movie - whether movie-related or not - 
nevertheless constitutes a ‘product’, of sorts, and therefore one 
necessarily has a ‘consumption experience’, since all of the objects 
of consciousness constitutes ‘consumables’ of sorts.  Thus, even if 
we don’t have a dedicated-to-movie ‘consumption experience’, since 
every ‘thing’ comes under the category of ‘consumable’ we 
nonetheless have a ‘consumption experience’.  Gould (2008, p. 
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413), for example, writes about, “the consumption of light, energy, 
sound, sensation and thought, whether or not product related”.   
And Addis and Holbrook (2001, p. 64) include in their list of 
‘products’, “the automatic teller machine.  The household pet.  The 
personal computer. The Internet.  The sun. The moon. The stars.”  
This all-pervasive conception of ‘consumption’ and ‘consumables’ 
amounts to a total colonization of the subjective realm by the logic 
of consumption.  Every ‘thing’ becomes a ‘product’ (or product-like) 
and every experience thus becomes a ‘consumption experience’, 
because nothing exists outside of the product-buffet that we live 
within and which we co-constitute.  Thus people may consume each 
other as ‘products’ and individuals may consume aspects of their 
own physical/psychological selves. As Bauman (2007, p. 12) puts it:   
 
 In the society of consumers no one can become a subject 
 without first turning into a commodity, and no one can keep 
 his or her subjectness secure without perpetually 
 resuscitating, resurrecting and replenishing the capacities 
 expected and required of a sellable commodity.   
 
 
12.6  The Experiactional Model 
 
By customising Powers’ (1973, p. 352) diagram (Fig. 12.1, p. 299) I 
have created a representation that encapsulates the experiactional 
process that I have developed throughout this thesis (Fig. 12.2, 
overleaf).  The PERSON and the ENVIRONMENT together form, what 
I have called,  a unified, interdependent, 360°-‘inner’-‘outer’-‘field’.   
A person’s Sensing function (1) may register any perceivable 
aspect(s) of his/her environment.  What the person senses at any 
point in time will not include everything within his/her immediate 
environment (6a). The various circled (V’s) represent variables in 
the person’s immediate environment. Some of the environmental 
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variables co-comprising any particular ‘field’ inescapably remain 
unperceived at a given moment; each individual has a less-than-
360° field of vision and finite sensory capacities. Korzybski (1994, 
p. 238) tells us that: 
 
 […] we are immersed in a world full of energy manifestations, 
 out of which we abstract directly [via our senses] only a very 
 small portion, these abstractions being already coloured by 
 the specific functioning and structure of the nervous system - 
 the abstractors. 
  
Fig. 12.2 Experiaction - Developed from Powers (1973, p. 
352) 
 
A person may also sense inner-directedly (6b).  This may take the 
form of proprioception and/or self-aware thinking and feeling. For 
example, whilst watching Cosmopolis - described in the previous 
chapter - I proprioceptively sensed digesting-fish-and-chips in my 
stomach.  I also engaged in thinking not directly related to the 
movie.  I wondered, for example, why people had walked out of the 
movie before it had finished. This kind of extra-to-movie 
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experiencing augments and enriches the Sensor Signal deriving 
from perceived environmental phenomena. Powers (1973, p. 352) 
describes the Sensor Signal as, “an internal analog of some external 
state of affairs.” According the Concise Oxford English Dictionary 
(11th Edition) the term ‘analog’ [USA] means, “relating to or using 
information represented by a continuously variable physical quantity 
(such as spatial position, voltage etc.) rather than digitally”.  The 
full-scale Sensor Signal thus potentially represents, concurrently, 
both environmental and ‘inner-self’ goings-on.  This signal thus 
represents the perceived state of the dynamic PERSON-
ENVIRONMENT ‘field’.  
 
The Benchmarking stage (2) postulates a meeting between the full-
blown Sensor Signal and a person’s Reference Value(s).  The 
Reference Value(s) comprise(s) of the person’s desired goal-
state(s).  The Reference Value(s) may comprise, variously, of, for 
example, what the person expects, his/her current desires/needs, 
and his/her sense of what would constitute ‘appropriate’ behaviour 
in the type of situation represented via the Sensor Signal.  I have 
included an arrow (3) leading back from the Benchmarking to the 
Sensing function (1).  This indicates that the Benchmarking process 
may lead the person to a classify what s/he currently senses, such 
that s/he adjusts the way s/he senses in line with his/her perceived 
definition of the situation.  Thus, for example, if, when the Sensor 
Signal gets Benchmarked against a Reference Value(s), a person 
classifies the currently-sensed field-conditions as, say,  
‘threatening’, then the person’s sensory acuity may need up-
grading to meet the perceived danger - his/her pupils may dilate, 
for example,  to take in the maximum amount of available light.  
According to Powers (1973, p. 352) the Error Signal represents the 
degree of mismatch between the Sensor Signal and the Reference 
Value(s).  Thus, the model predicts that if the Sensor Signal broadly 
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accords with the Reference Value(s) then any minimal Error Signal 
will precipitate only fine-tuning-type Action/Output.  If, on the other 
hand, the Benchmarking reveals a large discrepancy between the 
Sensor Signal and the Reference Value(s) [what the person would 
prefer/expect/desire etc.] then the Error Signal will mobilize a 
commensurately-calibrated response.  You will note that I have 
drawn an arrow from the Error Signal (4) to Inner Goings-on.  Here 
I suggest that an Error Signal - depending on its magnitude - adds 
to a person’s ‘noticeable’ Inner Goings-On, such that the Sensing 
Function may proprioceptively register, say, an adrenalin rush, 
which, in turn, further enriches the Sensor Signal. 
 
You will note, also, that some of the Action/Output triggered by the 
Error Signal may get directed back into the person.  This, for 
example, may relate to homeostatic processes which continue out 
of the awareness of the person.  For example, Reference Values 
exist for different essential biological processes, such that, if an out-
of-awareness sensor registers a lower-than-required-for-health level 
of, say, blood sugar, then, the Output function will set in motion 
remedial action which corrects for the imbalance indicated by the 
Error Signal. [See chapter 5]  
 
If the perceived source of the Error Signal resides in the 
ENVIRONMENT, then a person my choose to act on [control] 
environmental variables (V’s) (6a), through the Output function, 
such that the Sensing Function (1) has a now-modified 
configuration of variables to draw on, resulting in a modified Sensor 
Signal.  The inner-directed Experiencing/Sensing - whether 
introspective or proprioceptive - may now also augment/modify the 
Sensor Signal.  I define so-called ‘introspection’ as sensing 
nominally focused on ‘thoughts’ and ‘feelings’; I define 
proprioception as, for example, the physiological  sensing of bodily 
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processes, such as feeling thirsty, or needing to go to the toilet.  In 
the case of a dry tongue or a full bladder the Sensing function 
registers physiological phenomena. In the case of ‘thoughts’ and 
‘feelings’ Ducasse argues that putative mental contents do not exist 
independently of the thinking and feeling processes that sponsor 
them - no thinking no thoughts. The full-bladder and the dry tongue 
exist independently of whether a person registers them, but   so-
called ‘thoughts’ and ‘feelings’ cannot exist independently of 
momentary thinking or feeling (Ducasse 1951, pp. 246-290 
[Chapter 13]).   
 
That brings us back, full-circle.  The experiactional loop, depicted in 
Figure 12.2, constitutes a continuous-till-death process.  The five 
regulable variables that I have identified (‘access’, ‘configuration’, 
‘levels’, ‘association’, and ‘expression’) represent, in a general 
fashion, the whole gamut of phenomena that a person may act on 
whilst experiacting. 
 
* * * 
 
The following quote, from John (1976), nicely encapsulates the 
process of experiaction that I have just described. 
 
 Consciousness is a process in which information about 
 multiple individual modalities of sensation and perception are 
 combined into a unified, multi-dimensional representation of 
 the state of the system and its environment and is 
 integrated with information about memories and the needs of 
 the organism, generating emotional reactions  and programs 
 of behavior to adjust the organism to its  environment. 
 
I wish to highlight three aspects of this definition.  First, 
“information about multiple individual modalities of sensation and 
perception are combined into a unified, multi-dimensional 
 316 
representation of the state of the system and its environment”.  
Here the fruits of the various sensing activities of a person get 
combined into a complex Sensor Signal which, in toto, represents 
the perceived state of the 360°-“inner’-‘outer’-‘field’.  Second, this 
complex internal analog - the Sensor Signal - gets “integrated with 
information about memories and the needs of the organism”.  This 
corresponds with the Benchmarking stage in my diagram (Fig. 
12.2), where the “memories and the needs of  the organism” take 
the place of the Reference Value(s) in my diagram.  The Sensor 
Signal thus ‘meets’ the Reference Value(s) and the resultant 
‘integrated’ signal gives a measure of the degree of 
match/mismatch  between the perceived state of the ‘field’ (Sensor 
Signal) and the “memories and the needs of the organism” 
(Reference Value[s]).  And thirdly, the comparing of the two 
‘signals’ (Sensor and Reference) generates “emotional reactions and 
programs of behavior to adjust the organism to its environment”.  
This corresponds to the Error Signal in Figure 12.2, which drives the 
Output function.  Depending on the outcome of the ‘meeting’ 
between the Sensor Signal and the Reference Value(s), a person 
will either feel satisfied with the perceived ‘state of play’ or will, to 
the contrary, feel dissatisfied, such that s/he acts to remedy the 
perceived shortfall between the perceived state of play and what 
his/her current knowledge and objectives lead him/her to expect.  
Immediately-subsequent “programs of behavior” thus lead (if 
successful) to a more satisfactory-to-self accord between the 
subsequent-to-remedial-behaviour Sensor Signal and the person’s 
needs and wants (as represented by the Reference Values) when 
the two next meet.  
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12.7 ‘Behavior Settings’ Revisited  
 
Only one matter remains unaddressed here.  In section 5.4 I 
introduced the notion of ‘behavior settings’. According to the 
proponents of ecological psychology the micro-environments that an 
individual spends time in, such as schools, cinemas, and 
restaurants, have their own programs of operation to maintain.  
Thus, with the help of those charged with running such systems, 
any goings-on which deviate from the, respective, behavior-setting-
programs will get corrected.  And so, although my diagram (Fig. 
12.2) focuses on the level of the individual, the system that 
encompasses the individual may abide by a different set of aims 
and objectives - Reference Values that run contrary to what a 
setting-encompassed individual would prefer.  Thus I might prefer 
to drive faster - without getting a fine - than the speed-camera-
policed system seeks to determine.  Daily life, then, comprises of a 
ongoing negotiation between living creatures - and between living 
creatures and their encompassing systems - in which the various 
constituent ‘systems’ and sub-systems often ‘behave’ according to 
divergent Reference Values. This, then, goes some way to 
accounting for the commonplace conflict(s) that we witness. 
 
12.8 Concluding 
 
This chapter constitutes something of a drawing-together and a 
consolidation of the material in previous chapters.  In a sense I feel 
that I have sung my song with regard to experiaction.  And yet I 
have one more topic to address which, in Gestalt theory terms, 
constitutes an ‘unfinished gestalt’ - what we more commonly refer 
to as ‘unfinished business’.  As Fritz Perls (1973, pp. 7-8) puts it: 
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 The healthy organism seems to operate within what we might 
 call a hierarchy of values.  Since it is unable to do more than 
 one thing properly at a time, it attends to the dominant 
 survival need before it attends to any of the others; it 
 operates on the principle of first things first. […] 
  Formulating this principle in terms of Gestalt 
 psychology, we can say that the dominant need of the 
 organism, at any time, becomes the foreground figure, and 
 the other needs recede, at least temporarily, into the 
 background.  The foreground is that need which presses most 
 sharply for satisfaction, whether the need is […] physiological 
 or psychological.  […]   
  For the individual to satisfy his needs, to close the 
 gestalt, to move on to other business, he must be able to 
 sense what he needs and he must know how to manipulate 
 himself and his environment, for even the purely physiological 
 needs can only be satisfied through the interaction of the 
 organism and the environment.  
 
And so, in a spirit of addressing and expressing whatever becomes 
insistently fore-grounded in consciousness - on the understanding 
that such ‘material’ needs dealing with - I present the following 
chapter for my sense of closure, and, I hope, for your interest.   
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Chapter 13: Concluding Chapter 
 
On the 11th October 2010 at 08:57 Rose (2010) said: 
 
 I get that you don’t want to call people consumers and what 
 they do consumption. What are you recommending as 
 substitutes? 
 
On 11th October 2010 at 10:00 Michael Dawson [the Author of The 
Consumer Trap (2003)] replied: 
 
 […] When people are shopping, call them “shoppers.”  When 
 people are watching TV, call them “viewers.”  When people 
 are using a product, call them “users” of the product in 
 question.  When discussing people’s collective product-related 
 interests, call them “product users.”  The overall idea is to 
 always adopt the term that conveys the actual process and 
 intention under examination. […] 
 
So, instead of using the blanket term ‘consumption’ Dawson 
advocates a more careful focus on context-specific actions. 
 
Margolis (1960, p. 209) cares, too, about the specificity of verbs: 
 
 We seem to “watch” dramas and dances, to “listen” to music 
 and the recital of poetry, to “look at” paintings and sculptures, 
 to “read” literature. And these automatic adjustments in our 
 language serve, I believe, as warnings about the complexities 
 of what we choose to speak of, in a compressed way, as the 
 “perception” of a work of art. 
 
Thus Margolis sees the imprecision in using the collective noun 
‘perception’ to describe the many different acts involved when 
engaging with different art forms.  It seems that Margolis wants to 
do to the noun ‘perception’ what Dawson wants to do to the noun 
‘consumption’, namely, to drop it in order to encourage more 
nuanced  descriptions. 
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Roberts (1933, pp. 265-266) writes: 
 
 Organisms, we ought to say, sense, perceive, and conceive.  
 Nouns [such as ‘sensations’, ‘perceptions’, or ‘ideas’] serve to 
 summarize these processes. 
 
Roberts, too, argues for de-nominalising - turning abstract nouns 
back into verbs - in order to achieve more specific, less general, 
representations of what human beings do. 
 
Woodbridge (1936, p. 563) discusses another summarising term 
with a bearing on the discussion here: 
 
 […] it seems clear enough to us today as it was clear enough 
 to the ancients, that being conscious, if it requires further 
 specification, is seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, feeling; 
 thinking about what we see, hear, taste, smell, and feel; and 
 expressing the result in language of some sort.  This is what 
 being conscious is, and no philosopher has ever delivered 
 anything more, be he ancient, medieval, or modern. 
 
The noun ‘consciousness’, then, serves as a summarising term for 
all of the constituent sensory acts.  
 
Roberts (1941, p. 543) also expresses concern about how our 
ongoing experiencing can become objectified through language: 
 
 […] consider experience, in all its forms, not a thing to be 
 denoted properly by a noun but as an activity or process that 
 can not without serious error be arrested and fixed in the 
 immobility of a substantive but must be denoted by a verb.  I 
 use the term “experience” only because it seems the most 
 inclusive term available. I would include within it every 
 possible form of consciousness, every degree or variety of 
 knowledge or emotion. 
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Roberts wants us to treat all forms of experiencing as active 
processes.  The verb ‘consume’, for some, has become a verb that 
summarises a host of human activities. Once we embrace the 
consumption metaphor, then, seeing, hearing, tasting, touching, 
and smelling, all become acts through which we consume what the 
world has to offer us. Thus instead of watching a TV programme we 
consume it.  Instead of looking at a painting we may consume it.  
The verb ‘consume’, then, has, in consumer research and beyond, 
become something of a catch-all term that may substitute for more 
nuanced, context-specific, verbs. 
 
Gil-Juárez (2009, pp. 852, 853) writes: 
 
 Consumption is no longer a trivial relation between a person 
 and the objects that the person possesses but a fundamental 
 relation by which subjects define themselves as consumers 
 and the rest of the world as objects of consumption. 
 
Gil-Juárez, here, ups the ante by suggesting that the language we 
use can inform our whole world-view and, implicitly, our conduct. 
 
Graeber (2011, pp. 491, 502) effectively particularises Gil-Juárez’s 
more broadly-expressed concern: 
 
 Imagine, for example, four teenagers who decide to form a 
 band.  They scare up some instruments, teach themselves to 
 play, write songs, come up with an act, and practice long 
 hours in the garage.  Now it seems reasonable to see such 
 behavior as production of some sort or another, but if one 
 takes the common de facto definition [of ‘consumption’] to its 
 logical conclusion, it would be much more likely to be placed 
 in the sphere of consumption simply because they did not 
 themselves manufacture the guitars.  […]  Why does the fact 
 that manufactured goods are involved in an activity 
 automatically come to define its very nature? […]  Any 
 production not for the market is treated as a form of 
 consumption, which has the incredibly reactionary political 
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 effect of treating almost every form of unalienated experience 
 we do engage in as somehow a gift granted by the captains of 
 industry.  
 
Interestingly, Graeber uses the term ‘production’ to describe what 
the youngsters do.  I would have expected him - given his stance 
against ‘commercial speak’ - to have used the noun ‘creation’. 
 
Philip Kotler, (2005, p. 115) concluding his retrospective article on 
the broadening of the application of marketing thought into domains 
such as museums and churches, writes: 
 
 All said, the invasion of marketing into the non-commercial 
 arena has been a drama laden with setbacks, oppositions, and 
 victories, but the general consensus is that broadening 
 marketing has been good for marketing and good for the 
 areas that marketing has invaded. 
 
I find it breathtaking that Kotler uses two variants of the word 
‘invade’ to describe the encroachment of marketing thought into 
‘softer’ domains.  This issue of the pervasive incorporation of the 
logic and vocabulary of marketing (specifically ‘consumption 
experiences’) clearly goes to the heart of this thesis.  
 
So, what has the world come to?   I think that we have crossed a 
line when we blithely accept the rebranding of our subjectivity as 
‘consumption experience’.  In the case of the hypothetical garage 
band, described by Graeber above, all of the fine-detailed 
particulars of what the young people engage in may, in a worst-
case scenario, become lumped together under the rubric of 
‘consumption’.  
 
What, exactly, does it mean to consume something?  [In asking this 
question I do not intend to revisit the issues covered in my 
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literature review; here I have a different issue in my sights.]  You 
will note that the very phrasing of the question sets a trap for those 
who would seek to answer it. The transitive verb ‘consume’ 
demands a ‘direct object’ to act upon.  The term ‘to consume’ 
presupposes ‘a consumable’ that the consumer consumes in the act 
of consuming.  To consume food makes absolute sense; to use the 
verb ‘consume’ to summarise the acts of eating and drinking would 
not, I suggest, perturb many people.  Similarly, speaking in terms 
of, say, consuming a movie, where the movie becomes a 
metaphorical feast for the eyes and ears, seems OK to me; we 
know where we stand - we use the term consume figuratively. 
 
So where do I draw the line?  In this concluding chapter I began by 
quoting a number of academics who, independently, chose to 
discuss such processes as sensing, thinking, and feeling, and how 
such acts may, in common usage, become nominalised to become 
sensations, thoughts, and feelings, respectively. Melser (2004, p. 
194) develops this notion still further by providing a non-exhaustive 
list of mental nouns: 
 
 thought, belief, desire, concept, intention, emotion, feeling, 
 fear, admiration, doubt, memory, heed, hope, attention, 
 recognition, cognition, decision, opinion, anticipation, grief, 
 regret, purpose. 
 
We may think of such ‘objects’ as the ‘food’ ingested during so-
called “psychological consumption” (Ariely and Norton   2009, p. 
477); although I prefer to think in terms of 
‘psychological/phenomenological’ consuming, given the ‘touchy-
feely’ nature of ‘psychological’ phenomena.   Melser (2004, p. 194) 
goes on to make the point that, according to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, all of the above-listed nouns derive, “from the 
corresponding verbs”: think, believe, desire, conceptualise, intend, 
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‘feel emotion’, feel, fear, admire, doubt, remember, heed, hope, 
attend, recognise, cognise, decide, opine, anticipate, grieve, regret, 
and purpose.  Unlike the ‘objects’ consumed in ‘literal’ consumption 
- namely items of food and drink -  and the ‘figurative’ consumption 
of, say, a movie, psychological/phenomenological consuming 
putatively entails the consumption of phenomena unavailable for 
direct inter-subjective inspection.  Muysken (1994, p. 2812) refers 
to the process by which a verb (such as to ‘consume’) gets 
transformed into a noun (such as ‘consumption’) as ‘action’ or 
‘process’ nominalization. Melser (2004, p. 189) calls the same 
transformation “act nominalization”.  The act/verb ‘consuming’ 
becomes the noun ‘consumption’.  The noun ‘consumption’ refers to 
the practice of consuming in general, or to particular instances of 
consuming, but not to the ‘live’ act itself.  Melser (2004, p. 189) 
refers to this type of nominalization as looking at actions in “quasi-
objective ways”.  Melser’s list of  nominalised verbs of mental 
conduct, points to the way that talk about mental acts often 
includes talk about ‘things’, like ‘feelings’, ‘doubts’ and ‘thoughts’.   
But what does it mean to consume, say, a thought or a sensation? 
 
* * * 
 
I recognise that this discussion has taken us away from the 
experiactional model - that I elaborated in the previous chapter, 
and which I have argued for throughout this thesis (as an 
alternative way of thinking about processes that we might, 
otherwise, think of as ‘consumption experiences’) - but I persist 
with it in the interest of showing how, in spite of its widespread use, 
‘consumption speak’ begins to falter when closely inspected. 
 
* * * 
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Let us imagine consuming the process of thinking; how might one 
go about doing that?  The thinking putatively constitutes a 
consumable phenomenon, but who does the consuming?  When we 
consume food, and/or a movie, the food and the movie exist 
independently of us - someone else can consume the food if we 
don’t want it, and others can concurrently watch the same movie.  
But no one else can consume our unexpressed thinking and feeling.  
But can we consume our own unexpressed thinking and feeling?   
We may think self-watchingly, but this does not mean the same as 
‘watching a thought’.  To think self-watchingly means engaging in 
one specified type of process, namely, thinking in a self-watching 
manner. By replacing the term ‘watching a thought’ with the 
alternative ‘thinking self-watchingly’ we have demonstrated an 
approach to ‘mental-talk’ which does not require a commitment to 
the existence of mental objects.  To feel fearingly means to feel in a 
certain way, but feeling fearingly does not mean that one feels  a  
thing called ‘fear’ - as in ‘I feel fear’. Suffice it to say, here, that a 
philosophical orientation called ‘adverbial theory’ exists that enables 
us to challenge the objectification of the subjective realm. [See 
Ducasse (1942), and Ducasse (1951, especially chapter 13)] 
 
If we employ the verb ‘introspect’, the notion of optical/perceptual 
looking gets transferred to a putative inner landscape.  Since we 
readily accept seeing as a form of metaphorical consuming, as in 
‘taking in’ a vista, then we need only cross a, seemingly, narrow 
threshold to apply the same metaphorical logic to inner-directed 
looking - or introspection.  Thus we start with the LOOKING-AS-A-
FORM-OF-EATING metaphor [consuming landscapes] and progress 
to the MONITORING-ONE’S-OWN-THINKING/FEELING-AS-A-FORM-
OF-LOOKING metaphor [introspection].  Some key philosophical 
questions - and   potential candidates for future research - become:  
If we can, and do, introspect, does the thinking and feeling that the 
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act of introspection espies exist independently of the act of 
introspecting?  Do we have a two-tier system, where a complete 
process of thinking (as a whole) becomes the fodder for a 2nd tier 
inner-consumer of inner goings-on?  And if that 2nd tier inner-
consumer looks at the first tier goings-on, does that 2nd tier inner-
consumer have ‘responses’ to what s/he ‘sees’?  Does a 3rd tier 
inner-snooper espy the inner goings-on occurring within the 2nd tier 
introspector etc? 
 
These philosophical questions must remain unanswered here.  But 
at least I now know that an alternative exists to the kind of 
metaphysical quagmire that I have just mooted.  Following 
Thomasson (2000, p. 190) we can either opt for (a) “higher-order 
views of consciousness, according to which an act is made 
conscious in virtue of a second-order mental act directed towards 
it”, or (b) for an “intrinsic or one-level theor[y], according to which 
consciousness is an intrinsic feature of those mental states that 
have it, not something that must be bestowed on them by some 
further act”.    This distinction seems crucial for my purpose here.  
Thomasson (2000, p. 190) restates the one-level-theory-of-
consciousness premise saying, “[…] the (secondary) awareness 
should be considered as an aspect of the original mental act itself”.   
 
Seen from the perspective of a one-level theory of consciousness, 
one doesn’t consume a ‘thought’ or a ‘feeling’ but, rather, one 
thinks self-watchingly or feels self-awarely. We need not posit 
‘thoughts’ and ‘feelings’ that a 2nd tier sole-trading introspector 
consumes. We have only unitary acts of thinking and feeling, 
undertaken in specified ways, for example, self-watchingly and self-
awarely.  And, importantly, returning to the theme of ‘psychological 
consumption’, if we don’t have ‘thoughts’ and ‘feelings’ which we 
consume, but, instead, have only manifold modes of thinking and 
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feeling, then the ‘food supply’ of the putative inner consumer 
evaporates, and the thinker-feeler self-monitors his/her present-
tense thinking and feeling - s/he thinks self-monitoringly - just one 
act of thinking with no mental object(s).  I present this as an 
unprovable, yet suggestive, way of thinking.  I have ‘simply’ applied 
extant theory to the topic of consuming.  I leave the final word on 
this theme to Gilbert Ryle (1949, pp. 163, 164, 165) who sums up 
parts of what I have discussed:   
 
 It was supposed that much as a person may at a particular 
 moment be listening to a flute, savouring a wine, or regarding 
 a waterfall, so he may be 'regarding', in a non-optical sense, 
 some current mental state or process of his own. The state or 
 process is being deliberately and attentively scrutinised and 
 so can be listed among the objects of his observation. […] 
 [T]he occurrence of such an act of inner perception would 
 require that the observer could attend to two things at the 
 same time. […] But many people who begin by being 
 confident that they do introspect, as introspection is officially 
 described, become dubious that they do so, when they are 
 satisfied that they would have to be attending twice at once in 
 order to do it. They are more sure that they do not attend 
 twice at once than that they do introspect. 
 
     
Coda 
 
To cut a long story short, studying ‘experience’ - whether a 
‘consumption experience’ or simply an ‘experience’ - seems an 
impossible task, since the damn ‘thing’ doesn’t sit still long enough 
for us to paint its portrait.  And when you think you’ve trapped it, 
and you put it in a zoo for all to see, people come along in their 
droves to see your caged raw experience.  And when, after a long 
wait, they reach the front of the queue, and they come face-to-face 
with your raw, caged, experience, what happens?  They host their 
own experiencing whilst apprehending yours.  And do you then try 
to capture their experience?  Come off it.  It becomes a tail-chasing 
 328 
exercise.  So what do we do?  We do what we can and hope for the 
best.  And what can I do?  You have it in front of you.  
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